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James CrosslandABSTRACT
Since its inception in 1863 the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) has pursued its mandate to bring succour to victims of war by strict 
adherence to its core principles of neutrality and impartiality when dealing 
with belligerents. The problems of carrying out this mandate during the 
Second World War were manifold. This was owing not only to the brutal 
nature of the conflict, but the numerous restrictions under which the 
Committee was permitted to operate. Although much has been written of the 
restrictions placed upon the ICRC by the German and Swiss governments and 
indeed, the Committee's own principles and statutes, the role of the British in 
determining the success or failure of the ICRC's mission has been mostly 
ignored by historians. This thesis addresses this problem by analysing the 
often difficult diplomatic relations between the ICRC and the British 
government during the Second World War.
Through examining these relations this thesis provides new insights into 
several key wartime events concerned with International Humanitarian Law, 
neutrality, prisoner of war history, espionage studies and the history of the 
British blockade in Greece and France. A new perspective will also be offered 
herein, on the ICRC's controversial and much maligned vice-president Carl J. 
Burckhardt, who was both the bane of British-ICRC relations and the 
Committee's most influential wartime member. In conclusion this thesis will 
argue that the role of the British government in the ICRC's wartime activities 
was both far more damaging than has been acknowledged and, paradoxically, 
of great importance for the long-term development of the ICRC into the multi-
faceted humanitarian agency it is today.TABLE OF CONTENTS
    PAGE
THESIS DECLARATION           i
ABSTRACT                    ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS         iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS         iv
INTRODUCTION
The Missing History                  1
The British and the ICRC Before 1939       11
Thesis Structure       17
CHAPTER I - PARCELS AND POWS
The Establishment of Relations                                              21
The POW Crisis and the British Red Cross              53
Lessons Learned in “Unhappy Arcadia”       85
CHAPTER II - THE ICRC AND BRITISH ECONOMIC WARFARE     
The Blockade of France               99
Greece and the Great “White Ships”     120
Expansion, Innovation and Restriction     153
CHAPTER III - POLITICS AND PRAGMATISM
The Committee’s New Direction                                               175
Playing Politics: The ICRC and the Shackling Crisis     179
The Katyn Silence     205
Ambitions and Suspicions     216
CHAPTER IV - THE REICH COLLAPSES
The ICRC in the Firing Line                                                 228
D-Day Preparations     245
The March           259
Post-War: A Return to the Status Quo?                               285
                                                        
CONCLUSION
The Ends and the Means     298 
BIBLIOGRAPHY     313ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would first and foremost like to thank Michael Durey and Andrew Webster 
for the guidance they have proffered, encouragement they have given and 
opportunities they have presented to me over the past three years. I would 
also like to acknowledge Michael Sturma, Greg Brotherson and Jane Grimes 
for their assistance in guiding me through my first tumultuous years of 
academic life. My thanks also to Fabrizio Bensi at the ICRC Archives and Emily 
Oldfield at the BRC Archives.
I owe an infinite debt of gratitude to my mother, father and brother for their 
constant support and understanding not only in regards to this thesis, but in 
all facets of my life. My love to you all. Thanks also to Ryan Del Casale for 
always being there with a million thoughts to voice. Finally, my eternal love 
and appreciation to my beautiful Sarah for her patience, grace and willingness 
to look after me when I dare not look after myself.INTRODUCTION
‘It is essential that the Committee should keep its activities 
untouched by politics in any shape or form’ – Max Huber, President of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, 1928-1944
THE MISSING HISTORY
The story of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the 
Second World War was one of struggle, perseverance and, in contrast to the 
above statement, politics and diplomacy. Although a humanitarian agency, 
obliged by the articles of the Geneva Convention to maintain neutrality in its 
relations with belligerents and impartiality in its services to victims of war, the 
need to ‘reckon with politics without becoming a part of it’
1 has been a 
constant problem within the ICRC since its founding in Geneva in 1863. 
During the Second World War the most notorious example of this problem 
was in October 1942 when the Committee’s leadership elected not to speak 
out publicly against the Holocaust. The ICRC’s fear was that by publicly 
condemning Berlin’s policies it would both stray from its principle of neutrality 
and displease the Swiss Federal Council, which at the time was practising a 
policy of conciliation with Germany.
2 Thus the Committee’s decision was both 
an act of neutrality and an example of shrewd, cynical diplomacy. Such is the 
complex nature of the ICRC.
1 Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross (Geneva, 1979), p.59.
2 See generally Jean-Claude Favez, The Red Cross and the Holocaust, eds. and trans. John and 
Beryl Fletcher (Cambridge, 1999). On Swiss-German relations in late 1942 see Neville Wylie, 
Britain, Switzerland and the Second World War (Oxford, 2003), pp.307-308, 239-241. On the 
closing of the Swiss border to Jewish refugees by the Federal Council at the time of the ICRC’s 
non-appeal see Jean-François Bergier, Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era (Berne, 1999) 
hereafter Bergier Report, Part 3 and Conclusion. Unsurprisingly, the subject of the Holocaust non-appeal has dominated recent 
histories of the ICRC, which, for the most part, have been critical of the 
Committee’s efforts during the Second World War.
3 As one historian has 
noted, since the opening of the ICRC’s archives to the general public in 1996 
the well-meaning philanthropists of Geneva have joined the Swiss 
government, Swiss banks and Swiss business in being scrutinised for their 
complicity in the Nazi regime’s crimes.
4 It is, however, striking that few 
historians have thoroughly examined some of the key issues of the Holocaust 
non-appeal – the Committee’s relations with belligerents, political motivations 
and character of its leadership – within a different Second World War context. 
The purpose of this thesis is to rectify this omission by analysing the 
diplomatic relations between the ICRC and the allied belligerent with which it 
had the most contact during the war years, the British government. In doing 
so three main issues will be addressed.
Firstly, by examining relations with an Allied government this thesis will 
explore a hitherto neglected field of the ICRC’s diplomatic history, which has 
to date been generally focused on the Committee’s wartime relations with 
Berlin and Berne.
5 Secondly, an examination will be made of the ICRC’s 
attempts to expand its operations in response to the conflict and the British 
reaction to these endeavours – generally one of obstruction, objection and 
suspicion. Finally, this thesis will demonstrate how the ICRC’s difficult 
3 See Favez, Holocaust. Caroline Moorehead also begins her overview of the ICRC’s entire history 
by documenting the Holocaust non-appeal – Caroline Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream: War, 
Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross (London, 1998), introduction. David P. Forsythe 
addresses the ICRC’s history in the Second World War by focusing almost solely on the non-
appeal – David P. Forsythe, The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(Cambridge, 2005), pp.45-48; David P. Forsythe and Barbara Ann J. Rieffer-Flanagan, The 
International Committee of the Red Cross: A Neutral Humanitarian Actor (London, 2007), pp.13-
17.
4 Favez, Holocaust, foreword, p.ix.
5 For ICRC relations with Berlin and Berne see generally Favez, Holocaust; André Durand, History 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross: From Sarajevo to Hiroshima (Geneva, 1984), 
chs.7, 9; Forsythe, Humanitarians, pp.40-49. relations with Whitehall over such issues as prisoner of war (POW) welfare 
and blockade policy shaped the evolution of the Committee’s post-war 
development in terms of its capabilities and political status – a field of inquiry 
that has recently drawn the attention of not only historians but scholars of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and humanitarian diplomacy.
6
Beyond legal and political fields, interest in the history of the ICRC and the 
Red Cross movement it engendered has also heightened in recent years. In 
regards to the Committee’s role in the Second World War, however, the focus 
has been less on the ICRC’s diplomatic history and more on the sanctity of its 
principles and the success, or lack thereof, of the Committee’s work in the 
field. This trend was started by the ICRC itself which, until the mid 1990s, 
was the primary contributor to the writing of its own history. Unsurprisingly, 
this history de-emphasised the complexities of the Committee’s political 
status by focusing on the humanitarian actions of its delegates and providing 
basic statistical information on its day-to-day operations.
To this end, in 1948 the ICRC published a three-volume report on its activities 
during the Second World War, covering – with infuriatingly variable details – 
everything from financial contributions to the personal exploits of delegates 
stationed in the Greek islands. One suspects the main purpose of this report 
was to provide weight to the ICRC president Max Huber’s attempt to justify 
the sanctity of Red Cross neutrality in his Principles and Foundations of the 
Work of the International Committee of the Red Cross: 1939-1946 (1946). 
6 Two of the most recent works of note on the changing nature of IHL are Just War or Just 
Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford, 2003) by Simon Chesterman 
and Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics (New York, 2008) edited by Michael 
Barnett and Tom G. Weiss. For discussion of IHL with an emphasis on the ICRC’s involvement see 
Forsythe and Rieffer-Flanagan, Neutral Humanitarian Actor, ch.3.Little more than a pamphlet, Huber’s work was a riposte to the ICRC’s post-
war detractors, and was as unsuccessful in its aims as it was flimsy in 
substance. This owed in no small part to Huber’s romanticised view of Swiss 
and ICRC neutrality as an ‘irrevocable political axiom',
7 sacred since 
Switzerland was deemed a neutral state by the terms of the Second Treaty of 
Paris in 1815. This notion has since been refined, with a clear distinction 
recognised between the legal precedent for Swiss neutrality and the 
maintenance of the ICRC’s neutrality through its actions.
8 Huber's concept of 
neutrality was not his only opinion to ring hollow. 
The other beliefs that characterised Huber's wartime presidency – humanity, 
charity and traditional Christian values – were an obvious advantage for the 
leader of a philanthropic organisation. In the midst of total war, however, 
these values were of negligible use and even Yves Sandoz – a supporter of 
Huber and current Committee member – has conceded that ‘Max Huber 
probably placed too much faith in the virtues of the Red Cross ideal and 
system’.
9 It was this very ideal, however, that post war histories of the ICRC 
sought to promote.
Another ICRC member to take up the challenge of defending the Committee’s 
ideals was one of its wartime heroes, Marcel Junod. His fascinating, if at times 
self-glorifying, memoir Warrior Without Weapons (1951) continued where 
Huber left off by emphasising the sanctity of the ICRC delegate’s only 
‘weapon’ in the field, namely the Geneva Convention, whose articles grant the 
7 Max Huber, Principles and Foundations of the Work of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross: 1939-1946 (Geneva, 1946), p.26.
8 François Bugnion, 'Swiss Neutrality as Viewed by the International Committee of the Red Cross', 
26 May 2004 – ICRC Website, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/629cjx?
opendocument (accessed 18 November 2008).
9 Yves Sandoz, ‘Max Huber and the Red Cross’, European Journal of International Law, 18, no.1 
(2007) pp.171-197, Oxford Journals http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org (accessed 8 March 2008), p.197.ICRC permission to function as a neutral humanitarian agency on the 
battlefield.
10
Twelve years after Junod’s book was released the ICRC marked its centenary 
by commissioning one of its active delegates, Pierre Bossier, to write the 
Committee’s first official history From Solferino to Tsushima (1963).
11 Starting 
with the Battle of Solferino in 1859 – the bloody aftermath of which drove the 
Genevan businessman Henry Dunant to establish the Red Cross – the book 
covered the Committee’s history only until the end of the Russo-Japanese war 
in 1905.
It took fifteen years for another ICRC delegate turned historian, André 
Durand, to provide the next chapter of the ICRC’s official history which 
covered the ICRC’s activities during the First and Second World Wars. From 
Sarajevo To Hiroshima (1978) was originally released only in French and was 
not translated into English until 1984. Drawing primarily on information 
already contained in the 1948 reports – with the occasional poorly cited 
source from Geneva’s then closed archives – Durand nevertheless provided an 
invaluable contribution to our knowledge of the ICRC’s history. However, like 
the work of Junod and Bossier, Sarajevo to Hiroshima was a heavily doctored 
account of the Committee’s activities which once again lacked detail in crucial 
areas, whilst focusing on unnecessary minutiae in others.
With its archives still shut and its histories still official, by the late 1980s the 
ICRC had become ‘wedded to a particular view of its history’
12 which offered 
10 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded Armies in the Field (Geneva, 
1864), hereafter Geneva Convention 1864, Articles 1-3.
11 This was the first of a series of four official books released by the ICRC covering its history. The 
latest in the series is De Budapest à Saigon, 1956-1965 (Geneva, 2009) by Catherine Rey-Schyrr.
12 Neville Wylie, ‘The Sound of Silence: The History of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross as Past and Present’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 13, no.4 (2002) pp.186-204, Routledge, little in the way of objective analysis. Nicholas O. Berry's War and the Red 
Cross: The Unspoken Mission (1997) did little to improve this situation. Owing 
to the book's misguided argument – that the Red Cross movement abandoned 
its traditional mandate during the Cold War in order to pursue the goal of 
eradicating the practice of war altogether – Berry's work sits on the fringes of 
academic scholarship on the history of the ICRC.
A better effort came from George F. Hutchinson, who attempted to provide a 
detailed history of the Red Cross movement up until the First World War. 
Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross (1996) was a harsh 
assessment of the ICRC and the Red Cross movement it founded. Both the 
critical tone and the bitter nature of Hutchinson's argument – that the 
foundation of the National Red Cross Societies actually 'abetted the 
militarisation of charity'
13 – was likely to have been caused, in part, by the 
author's frustrating experience in the ICRC archives, which he described as 
being as accessible as those of the Kremlin.
14 Owing to the 'courteous 
stonewalling'
15 of the ICRC's archivists, therefore, Hutchinson's study was a 
limited one.
Prior to the release of Hutchinson and Berry's books a former rector from the 
University of Geneva, Jean-Claude Favez, was granted a greater degree of 
access to the ICRC’s archives than any previous researcher. As a result of this 
work, in 1988 Favez produced the first history of the ICRC to focus specifically 
on the period of the Second World War: Une mission impossible? Landmark 
http://www.informaworld.com (accessed 2 November 2007), p.187.
13 George F. Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross (Boulder, 1996), 
p.350.
14 Ibid, p.2.
15 Ibid, p.3.though it was, it took eleven years for the abridged English translation of 
Favez’s work to be published as The Red Cross and the Holocaust (1999). 
This book was the first thoroughly to scrutinise the ICRC’s commitment to 
neutrality in the Second World War and revealed the Committee’s complicity 
in the Swiss Federal Council’s controversial relations with the Nazi regime. 
The process of translating Favez’s pioneering work into English coincided with 
the aforementioned rise in public scrutiny of Switzerland’s wartime history. 
This scrutiny was compounded by the uncovering of reports in the National 
Archives of the United States that were compiled by the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) during the war and which named ICRC delegates suspected of 
collaboration with the Nazis.
16 These allegations were swiftly and convincingly 
refuted by the ICRC.
17 The timing of the disclosure, however, did little for the 
Committee’s embattled reputation and so in 1996 the ICRC attempted to 
exorcise the demons of its past by opening its archives to the general public. 
Naturally, it was consideration of the ICRC’s handling of the Holocaust that lay 
at the forefront of the first general history of the organisation to be written 
from the newly opened archives. This was Caroline Moorehead’s, Dunant’s 
Dream: War Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross (1998). As an 
overview of the ICRC’s entire history the book was a valuable introduction to 
the subject, albeit one with a confusing and inconsistent method of 
referencing. In addition to its format Dunant’s Dream was, in the words of its 
author, ‘not an institutional history of the Red Cross’, but rather ‘a book about 
the people’
18 of the ICRC. The same can be said of Angela Bennett’s The 
Geneva Convention: The Hidden Origins of the Red Cross (2006) which 
16 The OSS was America's wartime intelligence agency and forerunner of the CIA.
17 See ch.3, p.224
18 Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream, introduction, p.xxii.recounted the quirky personal history of the ICRC’s founders, Henry Dunant 
and Gustave Moynier, within the context of the Committee’s early years.
Although invaluable for providing much needed colour and richness to the 
otherwise dry lexicon of credible ICRC history, the scope of Bennett and 
Moorehead’s offerings meant that they only scratched the surface on details 
of the Committee’s politics, organisation and means of operation. This was 
particularly true in regards to one of the most important areas of the ICRC’s 
operational and diplomatic history: its work on behalf of POWs.
Although Favez briefly addressed this issue, his focus on the welfare of civilian 
victims of war meant that the topic of ICRC negotiations with belligerents over 
POW welfare was far from comprehensively covered. The best analysis of this 
issue, in terms of the history of the ICRC and the British government with 
which it dealt so closely in this matter, has been presented within the context 
of a more generalised history of the POW experience. Charles Rollings’ 
Prisoner of War: Voices from Behind the Wire in the Second World War 
(2008), S.P. MacKenzie's Colditz Myth (2004), Vasilis Vourkoutiotis’ Prisoners 
of War and the German High Command (2003), Jean Beaumont’s article 
‘Protecting Prisoners of War: 1939-1945’ (1996), Adrian Gilbert’s POW: Allied 
Prisoners in Europe: 1939-1945 (2006), Arieh J. Kochavi’s Confronting 
Captivity: Britain and the United States and their POWs in Nazi Germany 
(2005) and John Nichol and Tony Rennell’s The Last Escape (2003) have all 
contributed to our understanding of the ICRC’s crucial work on behalf of POWs 
in the Second World War. 
However, of these seven books only the ones by Kochavi and Nichol and 
Rennell have provided detailed insight into the tension that existed between 
the ICRC and the Allied governments on issues pertaining to POW welfare. Furthermore, in both cases the authors have drawn the lion’s share of their 
information on this topic from David Rolf’s chapter, ‘Blind Bureaucracy: The 
British Government and POWs in German Captivity, 1939-1945’, which 
appeared in Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich’s Prisoners of War and their 
Captors in World War II (1996). Therefore, despite the evident volume of 
work produced on the POW experience, a comprehensive history of the ICRC’s 
work on behalf of POWs in the Second World War is still to be written.     
In terms of the ICRC’s political and legal history, the Committee has 
continued the trend set in the post-war years of publishing from within its 
own ranks. ICRC members Yves Sandoz and François Bugnion are two of the 
more noteworthy contributors to the ICRC’s web-based content on this topic. 
They have also written several clarifying articles on the ICRC’s political status 
and mandate for the Committee’s own journal the International Review of the 
Red Cross. Invaluable though these contributions have been, their provenance 
renders them questionable in terms of objective analysis.
Although a part-time consultant to the ICRC, David P. Forsythe is a more 
reliable source for commentary on the Committee’s political and legal history, 
to which he has contributed significantly since the late 1970s.
19 Like 
Moorehead, however, Forsythe’s scope is very wide and focuses primarily on 
the ICRC’s post-war development, particularly in regards to IHL and the 
Committee's current role in civil wars. As such, with the exception of an 
occasional discussion on Favez’s work on the Holocaust or the ICRC's ties to 
19 In addition to writing extensively on human rights and the history of the United Nations, 
Forsythe has also published three books on the ICRC: Humanitarian Politics: The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (Baltimore, 1977), The Humanitarians (Cambridge, 2005) and, with 
Rieffer-Flanagan, The International Committee of the Red Cross: A Neutral Humanitarian Actor 
(London, 2007). the Swiss Federal Council, little in-depth attention has been paid by the 
author to the Committee’s Second World War history.
20 
Conversely, Rainer Baudendistel’s Between Bombs and Good Intentions: The 
Red Cross and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-1936 (2006) offers a highly 
detailed analysis of the ICRC’s diplomatic relations with belligerent 
governments, albeit within the closed context of the titular conflict.
In addition to specific Red Cross histories Neville Wylie’s Britain, Switzerland 
and the Second World War (2003) contains invaluable information on the 
ICRC’s relationship with the Swiss government.
21 Yehuda Bauer’s, Jews for 
Sale?: Nazi-Jewish Negotiations 1933-45 (1984) and Ronald W. Zweig's 
article 'Feeding the Camps: Allied Blockade Policy and the Relief of 
Concentration Camps in Germany, 1944-1945' (1998) have also provided a 
wider understanding of the ICRC’s actions, or lack thereof, on behalf of the 
Jews, complementing Favez’s more detailed work on the subject.
22 Even so, 
the role of the ICRC in the two aforementioned works is little more than that 
of a controversial walk-on extra in the drama of the Second World War. Once 
again, focused analysis on the ICRC’s relations with belligerents beyond the 
context of the Holocaust is lacking. 
In considering the aforementioned works the reader will realise that the 
diplomatic history of the ICRC in the Second World War – the linchpin of our 
understanding of the Committee’s work on behalf of not only concentration 
camp inmates but POWs and civilian populations – is patchy, un-focused and 
20 Forsythe and Rieffer-Flanagan, Humanitarian Actor, pp.15-17.
21 See Wylie, Britain and Switzerland, pp.321-329.
22 Yehuda Bauer, Jews For Sale? Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933-45 (New Haven, 1994), ch.12; 
Zweig, Ronald W., 'Feeding the Camps: Allied Blockade Policy and the Relief of Concentration 
Camps in Germany, 1944-1945', The Historical Journal, 41, no.3 (1998) 825-851, Jstor, 
http://links.jstor.org (accessed 6 August 2007).in need of a more acute analysis, which this thesis seeks to provide. By 
examining this missing history of the ICRC this thesis will not only enhance 
our understanding of humanitarian diplomacy in the Second World War, but it 
will also contribute greatly to the burgeoning field of research into the 
evolution of IHL over the course of the 20
th century.
Since its inception in 1863 the ICRC’s development has been inseparable from 
that of IHL. It was the Committee’s Genevan founders, Henry Dunant and 
Gustave Moynier, who in 1864 codified customary laws of war into the First 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in 
Armies in the Field, the cornerstone of modern IHL.
23 The ICRC has, since the 
signing of that First Geneva Convention and with the agreement of the 
signatories, acted as the custodian and primary developer of IHL.
24 In this 
capacity the ICRC has, despite its status ‘as a private association formed 
under the Swiss Civil Code’, dealt with the highest levels of government and, 
more recently, has been granted observer status at the United Nations.
25 This 
privilege, bestowed upon an organisation that today comprises twelve 
thousand staff in eighty different countries,
26 is a testament to how far the 
concept of bringing impartial relief to wounded soldiers on the battlefields of 
Europe – the original plan of Dunant and Moynier’s five man ‘committee’ – 
has come.
23 For the history of Dunant and Moynier’s efforts to draft to First Geneva Convention see Angela 
Bennett, The Geneva Convention: The Hidden Origins of the Red Cross (Stroud, 2005).
24 François Bugnion, 'The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Development of 
International Humanitarian Law’, Chicago Journal of International Law, 5, no.1 (2004) pp. 191-
215, Proquest, http://www.proquest.com (accessed 11 October 2007).
25 This status was granted on 16 October 1990 – Rona, Gabor, ‘The ICRC’s Status: In a Class of its 
Own’, 17 February 2004, ICRC Website, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5W9FJY 
(accessed 11 October 2007). 
26 Information from ICRC website, www.icrc.org (accessed 9 March 2009).THE BRITISH AND THE ICRC BEFORE 1939
To believe that the ICRC's achievements to date have been made through 
adherence to the principle of non-political involvement as prescribed in the 
Committee’s statutes is to look naively upon an organisation that, in the 
Second World War, played a complex political game with the British 
government. This game led certain ICRC delegates – in particular the 
Committee’s Vice-president Carl J. Burckhardt – to both breach ICRC 
neutrality and, against British wishes, greatly expand its operations and 
capabilities. Both of these consequences, as this thesis will demonstrate, had 
a significant impact on the ICRC’s future development. It is important to note 
that the disagreement between Whitehall and Geneva which contributed to 
these post-war changes was not instigated by the ICRC. Rather it was the 
fault of a British government which displayed ‘confusion, ignorance and 
fundamental difference of opinion’
27 in its attitude towards the Committee 
throughout the war.
This attitude was not surprising. The British government had long 
misunderstood, or preferred to ignore, one of the fundamental principles of 
the ICRC – to assist all belligerents impartially. At the signing of the First 
Geneva Convention in 1864, for example, the British delegate rejected the 
idea of neutral voluntary Red Cross societies on the grounds that the British 
army already had adequate medical staff. When it came time to sign the 
Convention the delegate further evaded the issue by declaring he could not 
sign without a royal seal. This prevarication was countered by a quick-thinking 
Red Cross member who produced his penknife, cut a button from the Briton’s 
tunic and declared ‘there, your Excellency, you have the arms of Her Majesty’.
28 The British delegate still refused and as such Britain did not sign and ratify 
27 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.390.
28 Bennett, Geneva Convention, pp.67-68.the First Geneva Convention until 1865. It was with reluctance and farce 
therefore, that Britain was dragged into relations with the ICRC. 
In the years that followed the British continued to show reluctance towards 
the ICRC’s plans to improve upon the landmark treaty. In 1874 the British 
government rejected a proposal by Henry Dunant to convene a second 
conference in Paris specifically for the purposes of discussing the treatment of 
prisoners of war – a crucial omission from the First Geneva Convention that 
was not addressed until 1929.
29 When further revisions were proposed in 1898 
for regulating maritime warfare Britain, in marked contrast to the other 
nations of Europe, again showed little enthusiasm.
30 
British weariness of the ICRC’s proposals continued into the twentieth 
century. In the Boer War of 1899-1902 Whitehall sought to block the 
Committee’s attempts to have the Orange Free State ratify the Geneva 
Convention. Once this obstruction proved unsuccessful the British refused the 
ICRC’s proposal that a British, Boer and Portuguese representative form an 
agency to help the ICRC manage the affairs of all victims of the conflict.
31 A 
similar line was taken by the British to ICRC proposals in the First World War 
that a conference be called to discuss the problem of POW welfare and 
repatriation. As had been the case in 1874, the British were satisfied with 
their handling of the issue and as such saw no reason to discuss POW matters 
29 At the instigation of Tsar Alexander II a conference to discuss POW welfare took place in 
Brussels in 1874. The resulting 'Brussels Code' was never signed and ratified and as such was only 
accepted in principle as a code of conduct for dealing with capture enemy soldiers – Geoffrey 
Best, Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts 
(London, 1980), pp.156-57.
30 Pierre Bossier, History of the International Committee of the Red Cross: From Solferino to 
Tsushima (Geneva, 1963), p.366.
31 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, pp.139-140. with other belligerents, particularly if such negotiations were to be conducted 
‘through the medium of the representations of a neutral weak state’.
32 
A policy had been set and was in place in Whitehall at the start of the Second 
World War: The British government would look after its own interests, whilst 
rejecting the efforts of an organisation they regarded as meddlesome and 
inadequate.
Were these perceptions justified? The results of the ICRC’s efforts in the 
seventy-six years before the outbreak of the Second World War were, 
admittedly, mixed. Much work had been put into the codification of the laws 
of war; forty eight treaties and their amendments had been drafted and 
signed by 1939.
33 The ICRC’s ability to implement those laws, however, was 
still highly questionable. 
In the First World War the Committee’s delegates gained access to POW 
camps, organised postal services for the prisoners and re-united families torn 
apart by the conflict, services which won the ICRC the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1917. Yet, despite these achievements even André Durand, delegate turned 
historian, had to concede that ‘breaches of the Conventions, or even the 
elementary rules of humanity, were numerous and specific’.
34 
The ICRC was similarly powerless in 1935-36 to stop Mussolini’s armies from 
breaching the laws of war during the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. In this 
instance not only were civilians and Red Cross installations bombed by the 
32 National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, London, hereafter TNA:PRO, FO 383/473 – 
Prisoner of War Department (PWD) to British Red Cross (BRC), 13 April 1918; FO Minute, 18 April 
1918; Bossier, Solferino to Tsushima, p.89.
33 International Humanitarian Law – Treaties and Documents, ICRC Website, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView (accessed 9 March 2009).
34 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.48-49.Italian air force, but the Gas Protocol of 1925, prohibiting the use of chemical 
warfare, was breached by Italy’s use of mustard gas on Ethiopian troops. At 
best the ICRC’s subsequent remonstration with Mussolini served to show how 
ineffectual the Committee was at challenging totalitarian regimes. At worst it 
demonstrated how the Euro-centric, right-wing background of many of the 
ICRC’s members led the Committee to turn a blind eye to Italian atrocities 
whilst accepting Rome’s justification of retaliation for Ethiopian barbarity.
35 
In terms of its peacetime development, the Committee’s sham inspections of 
German concentration camps in 1935 resulted in yet another failure. Many of 
the camp detainees at Esterwegen and Dachau were either restricted from 
speaking to the ICRC’s inspector, Carl Burckhardt, or showed signs of 
intimidation when interviewed. The SS-Gruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich’s 
interpretation of Burckhardt’s reports also showed the ease with which 
governments could sidestep any course of action taken by the ICRC. 
Burckhardt’s recommendation that the brutal commandant of Esterwegen, 
Hans Loritz, be removed from his post was agreed to by the Germans. He was 
re-assigned to Dachau which, under his supervision, became the model 
concentration camp of the Third Reich.
36 
Durand’s references to these episodes in the ICRC’s history highlight problems 
with the Committee which, at that time, understandably shaped the British 
view of the ICRC's competence. For all its drafting of laws and declarations of 
humanity the ICRC had no power to enforce these boundaries on the conduct 
of war. If, as I argue, this opinion was held by the British government then it 
35 Rainer Baudendistel, Between Bombs and Good Intentions: The Red Cross and the Italo-
Ethiopian War, 1935-1936 (New York, 2006), pp.304-308. For discussion on the significance of 
Swiss-Germans and conservatives in the ICRC leadership see Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.303, 
388; Forsythe and Rieffer-Flanagan, Neutral Humanitarian Actor, p.16, 27.
36 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.285-87; Eugen Kogon, The Theory and Practice of Hell: The 
German Concentration Camps and the System Behind Them (New York, 1973), p.34.was clearly correct in its evaluation. Ironically, however, Whitehall struggled 
throughout the war to accept the next logical step: if it was not the duty of 
the ICRC to enforce the Convention then it was the responsibility of its 
signatories – including the British themselves. 
Distrust of the ICRC’s competence to enforce the Convention and Whitehall’s 
reluctance to allow anyone other than itself to look after British interests were 
not the only facets behind the troubled wartime relations between the British 
government and the ICRC. Many officials at the Foreign Office placed value 
judgements on the ICRC as a whole based on their pre-war relations with Carl 
Burckhardt.
Burckhardt, 'a rather dapper, smart, fresh-coloured Swiss aristocrat', initially 
joined the ICRC in the 1920s as a POW camp inspector in Turkey.
37 Aggrieved 
by the violence and deprivation there, he returned to the academic life shortly 
thereafter, becoming professor of history at the University of Zurich in 1926. 
It was indicative both of Burckhardt's desire to be at the centre of important 
events and cure the ills of a Europe beset by 'vulgarity and cruelty',
38 that he 
once again joined the ICRC in 1933 – the year of the Nazi Machtergreifung. 
Owing to the Committee's aforementioned failure in confronting Mussolini and 
Hitler, however, Burckhardt left the ICRC in 1936 and sought a more political 
means to preserve the peace in Europe. Accordingly, he volunteered for the 
post of League of Nations High Commissioner to Danzig and, with the help of 
his old friend, the State Secretary of the Auswärtiges Amt, Baron Ernst von 
Weizsäcker, he took up the position in January 1937.
39 
37 Harold Nicholson, Diaries and Letters: 1930-1964, 3 vols., ed. by Nigel Nicholson (London, 
1968), vol.2, 3 October 1939, p.39; Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.224.
38 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, citing Burckhardt letter from 1927, p.303.
39 Ernst von Weizsäcker, Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsäcker, trans. John Andrews (Chicago, 1951), 
pp.146-47. By virtue of his role in Danzig Burckhardt became involved in peace 
negotiations that required close contact with high-ranking Nazis. These 
included Hitler himself, whom Burckhardt met on two separate occasions in 
1937 and, on the eve of war, in August 1939. After war broke out certain 
Foreign Office officials who worked with Burckhardt in Danzig, namely Sir 
George Warner and William Strang, remembered the High Commissioner's 
personal contacts with both Nazi leaders and the increasingly unpopular pro-
peace Britons R.A. “Rab” Butler and Lord Halifax, whom Burckhardt had acted 
as peace emissary for in May 1939. This added yet more distrust to 
Whitehall’s already disparaging view of the ICRC, particularly after the 
establishment of Churchill's “never surrender” policy in 1940.
40
Burckhardt was not the only problematical member of the ICRC. Both Max 
Huber, the Committee's president, and Lucie Odier, the head of the ICRC's 
Relief Section, were humanitarian idealists who were often out of touch on the 
political and military realities of the conflict.
41 Jacques Chenevière, the head of 
the Committee's Central Agency for Prisoners of War, was cantankerous and 
stubborn and Rudolphe Haccius, head of the ICRC's London delegation, was 
regarded by his British hosts as not 'a very live wire'. As has been noted by 
Caroline Moorehead, in addition to the sometimes difficult personalities of 
individual ICRC members, the organisation as a whole was highly Euro-
40 For Burckhardt’s relations with the Germans in Danzig see generally Herbert S. Levine, ‘The 
Mediator: Carl J. Burckhardt’s Efforts to Avert a Second World War’, The Journal of Modern 
History, 45, no.3 (1973) 439-455, Jstor, http://links.jstor.org (accessed 16 March 2007). For 
discussion on Burckhardt’s continuance of these relations during the war and peace talks with 
Halifax and Butler see James Crossland, 'A Man of Peaceable Intent: Burckhardt, the British and 
Red Cross Neutrality during the Second World War', forthcoming, Historical Research, vol.84.
41 See ch.2, p.108-09.centric, conservative and impatient in regards to British regulations that 
governed humanitarian action.
42 
The tenuous relationship between the ICRC and the British Red Cross Society 
(BRC), a separate Red Cross entity that was part of the League of Red Cross 
Societies,
43 was another problem. Formed in 1919 by the head of the 
American Red Cross, Harry Davison, the League originally comprised the 
National Red Cross Societies of Britain, the United State, France, Italy and 
Japan and had been a rival of the ICRC throughout the late 1920s and early 
1930s.
44 Although this rivalry had subsided by the start of the Second World 
War, there was still enough resentment on both sides for relations between 
the BRC and the ICRC to be difficult. As the Second World War began 
therefore, the ICRC had few friends in Britain.
THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter I of this thesis will examine the influence a poor BRC-ICRC 
relationship together with Whitehall’s view of Burckhardt and Britain’s 
misunderstanding of the ICRC’s principles and duties had on the problem of 
adequately supplying British and French POWS in 1940. The chapter will 
conclude with a comparison between these early problems in British-ICRC 
relations and the relative cooperation that developed between the two sides in 
the wake of the unsuccessful British campaign in Greece and Crete in 1941.
Chapter II will assess British-ICRC relations in the context of a key component 
of the aftermath of the Greece and Crete campaigns: the British blockade of 
Greece. This analysis will demonstrate how, despite moderate improvements 
42 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, pp.389-90. For British views of Haccius see ch.1, p.80
43 Known today as the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
44 For discussion on the ICRC's early relations with the League see Hutchinson, Champions of 
Charity, ch.7.in British-ICRC relations in early 1941, Whitehall conspired with the Swedish 
government and the Swedish Red Cross to undermine ICRC authority in 
Greece and Crete. The purpose of the British scheme will be explained by 
showing how Carl Burckhardt’s plans for increased ICRC autonomy and an 
expansion in its relief capabilities threatened the British government’s 
maintenance of a stringent blockade.
The purpose of Chapter III will be to assess how Burckhardt’s plans for the 
expansion of the ICRC’s traditional activities were linked to his desire to lift 
the Committee’s reputation as a diplomatic entity and, in the process, to 
improve relations with the British government. To this end, this chapter will 
provide a new dimension to our understanding of one of the key events in 
POW history in the Second World War: the Shackling Crisis. It will also assess 
the ICRC’s involvement – or lack thereof – in Polish and German calls for an 
investigation into the discovery of a mass grave of murdered Polish POWs in 
the Katyn Forest in 1943. In looking at these two controversial events of the 
Second World War, this thesis will argue that the ICRC became a more 
diplomatically and politically-minded entity in the war’s middle years. The 
effect this change had on British-ICRC relations will be addressed by looking 
at Whitehall and the OSS’ investigations into ICRC delegates stationed in 
North Africa and the Far East in 1942-43.
Chapter IV will conclude this thesis by assessing the two elements of the 
ICRC’s wartime development – pragmatic and political – within the context of 
the Allied invasion of Europe. In doing so it will argue that despite British 
reluctance to cooperate with the ICRC during the invasion, the latter was able 
– owing in no small part to its better relations with Germany – to achieve 
great success during the breakdown of the Third Reich. The importance of this 
achievement in terms of the ICRC’s post-war development will be discussed by looking briefly at the relief efforts in Europe during the first months of 
peace. This examination will conclude that, despite its wartime achievements, 
vast expansion and desire to act as the coordinating relief body in Europe, the 
ICRC was rejected by the British and the Americans in favour of the un-tested 
United National Relief and Rehabilitation Association (UNRRA). The extent to 
which this decision was coloured by British-ICRC wartime relations and early 
Cold War politics will also be assessed.
In conclusion, this thesis will argue that, despite its disparaging view of the 
ICRC, its unwillingness to co-operate with ICRC initiatives and its suspicion of 
some of the ICRC members, the British government also contributed greatly 
to both the ICRC’s wartime record and its post-war development, albeit at the 
expense of British-ICRC relations. To explain how this paradox came about, it 
is important to clarify how, and by what means, British-ICRC relations in the 
Second World War were established. As was so often the case, it was the 
ICRC – enthusiastic, determined, yet wearisome – who first extended the 
hand of co-operation. Few in Whitehall, however, were willing to shake it.CHAPTER I 
PARCELS AND POWS
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS
Official wartime relations between the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and the British government began on 14 September 1939, with the 
establishment by the ICRC of its British Section, a special department tasked 
with handling all cases of internment involving subjects of Britain and her 
Commonwealth. The British Section fell under the auspices of the ICRC’s 
Central Prisoner of War Agency (the Agency), an internal body of the 
Committee that had first been instituted in August 1914.
45 
Deemed a crucial component of the ICRC, the duties of the Agency were 
codified after the Great War in Article 79 of the 1929 Geneva Convention:
A Central Agency of information regarding prisoners of war shall be established 
in a neutral country. The International Red Cross Committee shall, if they 
consider it necessary, propose to the Powers concerned the organization of such 
an agency. This agency shall be charged with the duty of collecting all 
information regarding prisoners which they may be able to obtain through 
official or private channels, and the agency shall transmit the information as 
rapidly as possible to the prisoners' own country or the Power in whose service 
they have been.
46
By the ICRC’s own admission the British Section of the Agency was ‘only a 
small department’ during the early months of the war, owing to the fact that 
until the Norway campaign of April 1940 only a few hundred British prisoners 
45 The International Prisoners-of-War Agency: The ICRC in World War One (Geneva, 2007), p.3.
46 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva, 1929), hereafter Geneva 
Convention 1929, Article 79.of war were held by the Germans.
47 Yet despite this relatively small workload 
there was an undeniable zeal throughout the British Section and the entire 
Agency to set to its task of collecting POW information.
The driving force behind this attitude was the ‘witty and tyrannical
48 Jacques 
Chenevière, a brooding and determined senior ICRC official who had worked 
for the Central Agency during the First World War and, at the commencement 
of hostilities in 1939, was given the job of Agency director. Joining Chenevière 
in co-ordinating the ICRC’s early wartime work was the Committee’s president 
Max Huber, a lawyer, professor and former advisor to the Swiss Federal 
Council. Aggrieved at the outbreak of another war, yet motivated by his firm 
belief in the Committee's mission, Huber did not ‘let a word of pessimism pass 
his lips’ in the bleak days of September 1939, as he outlined to his delegates 
the duties that lay ahead for them.
49 
The third key member of the ICRC’s leadership was Carl J. Burckhardt who, 
owing to his diplomatic experience in Danzig, assumed the role of the 
Committee’s unofficial “foreign minister”. Unlike Chenevière and Huber, 
however, Burckhardt was far from focused on placing the ICRC on a war 
footing. Rather, Burckhardt spent the first months of the war trying to 
engender a situation in which there would be no war to prepare for. 
In November 1939 the Red Cross man was in London, officially for the 
purposes of being honoured for his services to the League of Nations.
50 There 
47 The POWs were primarily composed of merchant seamen and downed airmen – Report of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and its Activities during the Second World War, 3 vols. 
(Geneva, 1948), hereafter ICRC Report, vol.2, pp.144-45.
48 Interview with ICRC Delegate Jean Pictet cited in Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.373.
49 Marcel Junod, Warrior Without Weapons, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (London, 1951), p.141. For 
biographical details on Huber see Sandoz, 'Huber', pp.173-175.
50 Nicholson, Diaries and Letters, vol.2, 3 October 1939, p.39.is some evidence to suggest, however, that during this trip Burckhardt 
unofficially met Lord Halifax’s Under-Secretary of State, R.A. “Rab” Butler, to 
whom Burckhardt pledged his assistance as a mediator in any British peace 
overtures. If so, this meeting was the first in a series of peace discussions 
that Burckhardt partook of from the final months of peace until the winter of 
1940-41.
51
Owing to the dissolution of his role in Danzig following the invasion of Poland, 
Burckhardt's return to the ICRC in September 1939 should have established 
his war time role as little more than a neutral humanitarian. Burckhardt's 
peace talks were an early sign that the ambitious Swiss was never going to 
accept such a politically irrelevant position in the great conflict. The extent to 
which Burckhardt was willing to abuse his privilege of Red Cross neutrality is 
evidenced by his attempt to contact certain Germans for peace talks. In March 
1940 for example, Burckhardt travelled to Berlin for what was ostensibly an 
ICRC mission but was in actuality a meeting with the State Secretary of the 
Auswärtiges Amt, Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker. 
Weizsäcker had befriended the young Burckhardt during the latter’s early 
career in the Swiss diplomatic corps and, over the course of the 1930s the 
two men had forged a friendship that was based in no small part on their 
shared desire for peace.
52 To this end the two conspired throughout 
51 Throughout the first half of 1940 Burckhardt also meet with Prince Max zu Hohenlohe, a 
representative of Goering's, Ernst von Weizsäcker and the British minister in Berne, David Kelly. 
Burckhardt resumed his peace-making activities in late 1940 and played a role in the negotiations 
leading up to the ill-fated flight of Rudolf Hess to Scotland in May 1941. For discussion see 
Crossland, 'Burckhardt'; Peter Padfield, Hess: The Führer’s Disciple (London, 1991), pp.61-62.
52 The sincerity of Weizsäcker's peace efforts is still debated by historians. See Leonidas Hill, 
'Three Crises, 1938-39', Journal of Contemporary History, 3, no.1 (1968) pp. 113-144, Jstor, 
http://links.jstor.org (accessed 17 March 2007). Max Huber and Carl Burckhardt both wrote to 
President Harry Truman at the end of the war and vouched for Weizsäcker – Truman Papers, 
Burckhardt and Huber to Truman, 5 August 1949, Harry S. Truman Presidential Museum and 
Library, Independence: National Archives and Records Administration, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?Burckhardt’s tenure in Danzig to thwart Hitler’s bellicose plans and, 
unsurprisingly, these peaceable attempts continued into the war years, 
although with little success.
53
Their initial war time contact in March 1940 was indicative of Burckhardt’s 
approach to future overtures. Having spoken to Burckhardt of his intention to 
visit Berlin, the German consul in Geneva, Wolfgang Krauel, admitted to 
Weizsäcker that, although Red Cross matters would be on the agenda, 
‘Professor Burckhardt will be glad to use this opportunity to arrange, 
especially with you, Mr. State Secretary, a discussion of a general political 
character'. Krauel – who had conspired with Weizsäcker and Burckhardt in 
order to assure the latter's position in Danzig – made clear to Weizsäcker the 
form of ‘political character’ the conversations would take by mentioning that 
Burckhardt had recently met with an agent of Goering’s to discuss ‘any 
possible British peace projects’.
54
As always with Burckhardt, these peace discussions went nowhere. 
Furthermore, as the noticeable lack of Burckhardt’s name on ICRC 
correspondence in the Committee’s archives during this period indicates, his 
commitment to these fruitless endeavours effectively removed him from the 
day to day operation of the ICRC during the early stages of the war. 
documentdate=1949-08-05&documentid=1-10&studycollectionid=&pagenumber=1 (accessed 9 
August 2008). Lord Halifax also wrote Churchill saying that Weizsäcker had 'done his best' to 
hinder Hitler's plans – Halifax Papers, York: University of York, A4.410/42 – Halifax to Churchill, 27 
November 1948.
53 For details on their pre-war peace seeking efforts see Klemens von Klemperer, German 
Resistance Against Hitler: The Search For Allies Abroad 1938-1945 (Oxford, 1992), pp.101-102, 
118; Documents of British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Series 3, vol.2 (London, 1980), hereafter 
DBFP, Warner to Halifax, 5 Sept 1938, doc.775, p.242; Appendix IV, Stevenson to Strang, 8 Sept 
1938, p.689. For details on Burckhardt and Weizsäcker’s connection to the German Opposition to 
Hitler see Ulrich von Hassell, The Von Hassell Diaries: 1938-1944 (London, 1948), entries for 3 
February 1941, p.156, 23 March 1941, p.163-64, 18 May 1941, p.176-177.
54 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 (London, 1962), hereafter DGFP, Series D, 
vol.8 – Krauel to Weizsäcker, 1 March 1940, doc.645, p.833. For Krauel’s collaboration with 
Burckhardt and Weizsäcker see Crossland, 'Burckhardt'.Owing to Burckhardt’s preoccupation, it was left to Chenevière and Huber – 
neither of whom were gifted as statesmen or had Burckhardt’s ability to 
charm – to build the ICRC’s early wartime relations with the British 
government. 
In the autumn of 1939 these relations took the form of a letter-writing 
campaign by Huber and Chenevière, both of whom peppered Whitehall with 
demands for information on Germans interned in Britain, as well as presenting 
details of how the Agency intended to forward similar information regarding 
British internees to Whitehall.
55 It was a frantic effort by both men to get their 
house in order for the conflict ahead.
Contrasting this commitment and enthusiasm was a notably lethargic 
response from the British in the development of their own administrative 
apparatus for POWs, the War Office’s Prisoner of War Information Bureau 
(PWIB). Like the Central Agency, the PWIB was an organisation whose 
genesis lay in the Geneva Convention, which specified that ‘at the 
commencement of hostilities, each of the belligerent Powers and the neutral 
Powers who have belligerents in their care, shall institute an official bureau to 
give information about the prisoners of war in their territory’.
56 
Despite the Convention’s allusion to immediacy, the British took longer than 
both the Germans and the ICRC to set up this most basic agency of POW 
administration. This prompted Huber to write to the Foreign Secretary Lord 
Halifax on 20 September requesting that the British follow the Germans in 
adhering to the Convention. This was followed by a second more overt 
55 Archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, hereafter ICRC, G85/1047 – 
Chenevière to Warner, 17 October 1939; Huber to Halifax, 20 September 1939; Huber to Halifax, 
6 October 1939.
56 Geneva Convention 1929, Article 77.request in early October which specifically asked for ‘the name and address of 
the official Inquiry Office constituted by His Majesty’s Government in Great 
Britain according to article 77 of the aforesaid Convention’.
57 
Considering Burckhardt’s pre-war relationship with Halifax, it is tempting to 
conclude that the latter’s tardiness in responding to Huber was born of a 
shared pre-occupation with peace, rather than a willingness to prepare for 
war. It is more likely, however, that Halifax’s attitude was simply a reflection 
of that held by the entire Foreign Office which, most historians agree, was 
highly unprepared to deal with the primary issue in its relations with the ICRC 
– the welfare of prisoners of war.
58 
The small number of British POWs held by the Germans at that time was part 
of the reason for this sluggishness. However, as Colonel Harry Phillimore of 
the War Office wrote in his unpublished history of Whitehall’s POW 
Departments, the primary fault of the British response to the POW issue lay in 
the complicated bureaucracy, which despite pre-war planning, was both 
haphazard in constitution and cumbersome in practice.
59 This poor practical 
response, combined with what Harold Satow from the Foreign Office recalled 
was a lack of foresight and imagination on the part of both the Foreign Office 
57 ICRC:G85/1047 –  Huber to Halifax, 20 September 1939; Huber to Halifax, 6 October 1939.
58 Arieh J. Kochavi, Confronting Captivity: Britain and the United States and their POWs in Nazi 
Germany (Chapel Hill, 2005), pp.10-11; David, Rolf, ‘Blind Bureaucracy: The British Government 
and POWs in German Captivity, 1939-1945’ in Prisoners of War and their Captors in World War II 
ed. Kent Fedorowich and Bob Moore, pp.47-97 (Oxford, 1996), pp.48-49; John Nichol and Tony 
Rennell, The Last Escape: The Untold Story of Allied Prisoners of War in Germany 1944-1945 
(London, 2003), pp.37-38.
59 TNA:PRO WO 366/26 – Colonel H.J Phillimore, History of the Second World War: Prisoners of 
War 1939-1945 (1949), hereafter POWs in WWII, p.11, 249. Phillimore was a retired member of 
the War Office’s Directorate for Prisoners of War. Owing to the unwillingness of anyone from the 
War Office or the Foreign Office to edit the book, it was never published and still sits in its 
original draft form in the National Archives.and the War Office, led to a dangerous malaise in Whitehall on the issue of 
POWs throughout the Phoney War.
60 
Notably, it was the ICRC which was the first to challenge this apathy in 
October 1939 over the issue of reciprocal visits by ICRC inspectors to POW 
camps in Germany and Britain. Huber’s aforementioned correspondence with 
Halifax on the status of the PWIB was used as an occasion to raise the issue. 
The Committee’s president pointed out that, with Geneva’s roving delegate 
Marcel Junod visiting British POWs in Germany, the ICRC was eager to 
forward the reports to the relevant authorities in Britain.
61 It was this unsubtle 
hint that signalled the first instance of co-operation between the ICRC and the 
British who, having been informed of Junod’s visit to Oflag XA (Itzehoe) on 23 
September, accepted the ICRC’s request for a reciprocal inspection of British 
camps holding German internees, the first of which took place on 6 
November.
62
The importance of this exchange of inspections cannot be over-emphasised. 
As the author of the Central Agency’s post-war report lamented, ‘the ICRC 
has no means of constraining a State to apply the Convention correctly, still 
less of imposing a penalty’.
63 This made the act of negotiating reciprocity 
between belligerents regarding the treatment of POWs central to the ICRC’s 
ability to carry out its duties. As such this first success of guaranteeing 
reciprocal camp inspections was viewed by the Committee as nothing less 
than an act of confirmation by the belligerents of the ICRC’s role as inspector 
of POW camps, after which ‘the freedom of action of the delegates was not in 
60 Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, p.10, citing H. Satow M.J. Sée, The Work of the Prisoners of War 
Department during the Second World War (London, 1950), p.5.
61 ICRC:G85/1047 – Huber to Halifax, 6 October 1939.
62 ICRC Report, vol.1, pp.242-243.
63 ICRC Report, vol.1, p.223.question’.
64 It was, in other words, the first instance in which the British 
accepted the validity of the services the ICRC had to offer and so agreed to 
co-operate with the Committee’s humanitarian mission.
The man charged with carrying out the crucial November inspections in Britain 
was the Committee’s representative in London, Rudolphe Haccius, an 
experienced delegate who had performed outstanding work on behalf of 
political prisoners detained in Hungary after the First World War.
65 Upon the 
establishment of the British Section Haccius had been despatched to Britain to 
head the ICRC's London delegation, though as a further testament to 
Whitehall's unpreparedness, he was not officially approved by the Foreign 
Office as the direct conduit for communication with Geneva until February 
1940.
66 The reason for this was that the Foreign Office originally believed that 
Haccius’ role was only to act as liaison between the ICRC and the British Red 
Cross which, many in Whitehall erroneously believed, was simply a branch of 
the Geneva organisation.
67 
Despite this slow start Haccius was undoubtedly a key figure in shaping ICRC-
British relations, which strengthened in the wake of his and Junod’s first round 
of reciprocal inspections, the details of which confirmed that both German and 
British camps were in good condition.
68 The ICRC’s role as a friend of British 
POWs having been assured, in late November Major General Alan Hunter at 
64 Oflag XA contained only 2 British RAF officers, the vast majority of inmates being Polish – 
Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.404-405; ICRC Report, vol.1, pp.242-243.
65 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.124-135.
66 ICRC:G85/1047 - Dunbar to Haccius, 2 February 1940.
67 The BRC corrected the Foreign Office’s misapprehension in November 1939 – TNA:PRO FO 
369/2547 – Undated FO Minute, November 1939; BRC to Shepherd, 18 November 1939.
68 ICRC Report, vol.1, p.243.the War Office spoke of his desire for Junod to visit Britain and that ‘the 
Bureau’s relations with Monsieur Haccius are of the pleasantest’.
69 
Hunter also complimented the Central Agency’s handling of POW information, 
noting in January ‘with great satisfaction the expeditious way in which the 
International Committee disposed of the lists of British prisoners of war when 
received from Berlin.’ On this matter Hunter also showed an understanding of 
the relationship between the Agency and the French Postal Service, the latter 
inheriting the sole responsibility for any POW lists, mail, or parcels once they 
had been given over to them by Geneva.
70 Mindful of this, when there was a 
slight mail delay in early January Hunter was quick to assure the London 
delegation that ‘the time taken for the lists to travel from Geneva to London 
is, it is understood, largely a matter for the French postal authorities’.
71 Such 
intimate understanding of the means by which the ICRC carried out its 
functions was a rarity amongst the British. This understanding, combined with 
the genial tone of Hunter’s remarks, indicates that in the war’s early months 
the lack of extant work on POW problems led to relations between the British 
and the ICRC being simplistic and cordial.
The leisurely pace of events during the Phoney War also filled Huber with 
hope for both British-ICRC relations and the future workload of the Committee 
on behalf of Britain. So assured was he of the ICRC’s work that he declared in 
January that he was:
now under the impression that a number of important points have been settled 
owing to the collaboration of our Delegate (Haccius) with the various 
Government Departments concerned as well as with the War Organisation of the 
69 ICRC:G85/1047 – Hunter to Junod, 30 November 1939.
70 ICRC Report, vol.1, p.141.
71 ICRC:G85/1047 – Hunter to Clouzot, 9 January 1940.British Red Cross Society and Order of St John of Jerusalem. It would appear to 
us that in so far as has been possible in the period of his stay in England, the 
objects of his mission have been accomplished or are well on the way to 
accomplishment’.
72
Such optimism was grievously misplaced. On 10 May 1940 the Wehrmacht 
pushed west into the Netherlands, Belgium and France, an action that 
resulted in the cornering of the British Expeditionary Force around Dunkirk 
later that month. By the time of France’s capitulation on 25 June 
approximately 37,000 British POWs had fallen into German hands, a 
situation the ICRC’s official historian described as leaving the Central 
Agency completely ‘over-whelmed’ with requests for information.
73 This 
difficulty in obtaining information, in conjunction with the sudden need to 
organise relief for such a large number of POWs, constituted the first major 
crisis in British-ICRC wartime relations.
In the recent literature discussing the POW crisis of 1940 the ICRC has 
emerged relatively unscathed even at the hands of its chief detractors. Jean-
Claude Favez, for example, has attacked the overly bureaucratic and muddled 
nature of the Committee’s organisational structure throughout the war, 
describing it as ‘marked by improvisation, amateurism and even friction 
between individuals’. He does, however, single out Chenevière as being more 
alert to this issue than other ICRC officials. Despite general problems in the 
Committee’s administration, the Agency itself was comparatively well 
managed, a ‘veritable beehive’ of people working tirelessly on the ‘enormous 
index files on prisoners and civilian internees compiled on the basis of 
thousands of letters which reached Geneva every day’.
74 Even Caroline 
72 Haccius was briefly withdrawn to Geneva, however, by the end of May he had returned to 
Britain to inspect camps holding German POWs and civilian internees – ICRC:G85/1047 – Huber 
to Halifax, 19 January 1940; TNA:PRO FO 916/2587 – Satow to Chenevière, 27 May 1940.
73 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.484.
74 Favez, Holocaust, pp.46-50.Moorehead, whose book highlights the ICRC’s naïve amateurism during the 
war’s early years, concedes that following the fall of France both the Agency 
and the Committee’s camp inspectors worked tirelessly to bring succour to 
POWs despite the manifold difficulties posed by the collapse of France.
75 
Arieh J. Kochavi presents a more nuanced view. In his opinion the ICRC tried, 
but ultimately failed, to adjust itself to the ‘dramatic extension of its tasks and 
responsibilities’ in the summer of 1940. Yet at least, so Kochavi argues, its 
actions were positively geared towards rectifying the situation, unlike those of 
Whitehall which was preoccupied with managing the avalanche of criticism 
heaped upon it by an increasingly incensed British public.
76  Nichol and 
Rennell also champion this view, arguing that the War Office deliberately 
deflected criticism of its handling of POWs onto both the ICRC and the British 
Red Cross Society and the St. John War Organisation, who ‘unfairly bore the 
brunt of press criticism that “our boys” were getting a raw deal, while 
Churchill and his government got on with fighting the enemy’.
77 Similarly, in 
David Rolf’s view, there ‘can be little doubt that members of the government 
were more than happy to let the Red Cross and the St. John War Organisation 
shoulder the blame in public for the parlous state of POW relief’.
78 Before 
discussing the effects of the publicity issue on British-ICRC relations, it would 
serve at this juncture to determine whether such public criticism was wholly 
justified. How did the ICRC and the British respond to the POW crisis of 1940?
The first problem the ICRC faced was one which primarily concerned the 
Agency, namely, how to gather information on the freshly captured British 
75 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.377.
76 Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, pp.25-26.
77 Nichol and Rennell, Last Escape, p.39.
78 Rolf, 'Blind Bureaucracy', p.51.POWs and, once gathered, how to transmit this information to London in a 
timely manner. The necessity of this task was drawn from the Geneva 
Convention, which stated that the detaining power was to supply the Agency 
with lists containing the prisoner’s name, date of birth, nationality, army 
number, POW number, address of next of kin and state of health. This was to 
be provided, moreover, with respect to Article 8 of the Convention, which 
declared that ‘belligerents are required to notify each other of all captures of 
prisoners as soon as possible’.
79
With roads damaged and communications cut in the aftermath of the battle 
for France, such immediacy in POW reporting was understandably lacking. 
However, the ICRC was not without prior experience of such a situation. 
Following the mass influx of Polish POWs into Germany in 1939, the Agency’s 
system of reporting was beset by the ‘destruction or limitation of means of 
transport, the congestion in official bureaux, the priority given to work of 
national importance’, all of which rendered the Agency’s traditional method of 
compiling long lists of prisoner details for periodical transfer both time-
consuming and impractical.
80 This experience led to the Agency to make use 
of an innovation it had first experimented with during the First World War: the 
POW capture card. This was a postcard-sized document which was filled in 
with the necessary details by each individual POW upon capture and 
forwarded immediately by the detaining power to the Agency. The first of the 
near 13,000,000 of such cards to be received by the ICRC during the war 
arrived in Geneva from a captured British airman on 26 March 1940.
81 
79 Italics are my emphasis – Geneva Convention 1929, Article 8.
80 ICRC Report, vol.2, pp.32-36.
81 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.417-21.The use of the capture card was not the Agency’s only tactic in the field of 
information gathering. Mindful of the work that lay ahead, Chenevière spent 
the first weeks of May expanding the Agency by establishing volunteer 
branches in twenty seven separate locations within Switzerland. These 
volunteers were used in conjunction with the revolutionary Hollerith Machines, 
six of which had been gifted to the ICRC early in 1940 for the purposes of 
cataloguing and sorting the capture cards.
82 As in the case of his first contact 
with the British in 1939, Chenevière was determined to keep the Agency’s 
head above water.
As productive as these measures were, however, the successes of the ICRC’s 
efforts were overly dependent, like so much of its wartime work, on the 
acquiescence of the belligerent powers, in this case Germany. The problem 
with reliance on the Germans was that, unlike the ICRC, they had been either 
unwilling or unable to learn from the Polish campaign and so in 1940 were 
utterly unprepared to handle their newly acquired British and French 
prisoners.
This news would have been surprising to the British government, which in 
addition to experiencing the relative smoothness of POW reporting during the 
Phoney War, had also received generally positive reports from both the ICRC 
and the Protecting Power
83 on the condition of German POW camps.
84 The 
82 ICRC Report, vol.2, pp.108-114.
83 The Protecting Power and the ICRC were by way of their neutrality, the only two bodies given 
permission in the Geneva Convention of 1929, to act as POW camp inspectors and 
representatives of prisoner’s interests. At the start of the war the then neutral United States 
served as Protecting Power until the attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, after which 
the role of Protecting Power fell to Switzerland.
84 At the outbreak of the war there were 31 POW camps in Germany, comprising four main types. 
Stalags, which held non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, Oflags, which held officers, 
Marlags, which held Navy personnel and Stalag Lufts, which held captured airmen. In their 
reports for the first half of 1940 the ICRC and the Protecting Power rated them generally as either 
‘good’ or ‘very good’ – Vasilis Vourkoutiotis, ‘What the Angels Saw: Red Cross and Protecting 
Power Visits to Anglo-American POWs, 1939–45’, Journal Of Contemporary History, 40, no.4 capture of so many enemy prisoners in the summer of 1940, however, led to 
swift and grave changes both in the quality of the camps and the process of 
POW capture and transit, the latter having a particularly adverse affect on the 
speed of POW reporting. 
These changes in conditions were evident from the moment of capture when, 
owing to a lack of adequate transportation and the damage caused to railways 
and roads, many POWs were subjected to forced marches from France to the 
prison camps, which were located hundreds of miles away within the borders 
of Germany and Poland. In the tense atmosphere of these marches instances 
of brutality and breaches of the Geneva Convention by the often young 
and Nazified German guards were not unheard of. There were unprovoked 
beatings, shootings of stragglers and increasingly meagre rations for the 
exhausted prisoners, some of whom were executed after collapsing from 
hunger and fatigue. For those who kept their strength there was the added 
humiliation of being used as objects of propaganda by way of ‘a circular 
march (which) was made by the Germans with the intention of impressing the 
local inhabitants with the number of prisoners’.
85 All of the above were 
incidents of mistreatment that were in flagrant violation of the Geneva 
Convention.
86 
Pock-marking this harsh journey was a system of hastily built transit camps 
housed within the shells of old barracks, sports grounds or schools, at which 
accommodation generally ranged from huts and tents to open air sleeping. 
Food, usually black bread with a thin soup made of little more than boiled 
bones, was scarce in these makeshift accommodations and running water not 
(2005) 689-706, Sage Publications, http://jch.sagepub.com (accessed 6 August 2007) pp.692-693.
85 TNA:PRO FO 916/14 – Various POW accounts compiled by the Protecting Power – 12 March 
1942.
86 Geneva Convention 1929, Articles 2 and 7. always available. This left the camps ‘stinking, overcrowded, rat-infested’ and 
with ‘no sanitation of any kind’.
87 The Dante-esque journey through these 
camps began not far from the point of capture at the nearest collection centre 
for the local Wehrmacht division headquarters. Here a basic headcount of the 
new arrivals was taken before sending them further behind the front lines to 
the larger main collection centre, or Frontstalag, where a second report on the 
number of prisoners was compiled and sent to the German Army High 
Command (OKH). From there the POWs were again transported to a mass 
collection centre, or Dulag, for interrogation, medical examinations and a final 
sorting according to their rank and health before at last being transferred, 
usually by poorly ventilated railway cars and cattle trucks, to their permanent 
Stalag or Oflag.
88 
What concerned both the British and the ICRC was that despite the number of 
stops made along the journey, very little POW information was getting 
through to the Agency and so onto Whitehall. This was despite the fact that 
POW numbers were forwarded from the transit camps to OKH and deaths in 
the Dulags were internally reported to the Wehrmacht-Auskunftsstelle (Armed 
Forced Information Office for Prisoners of War). This information however, 
was primarily kept for German records and despite this evident capacity for 
such reporting, the POW information specified by the Convention was still not 
being forwarded to the British until the prisoners arrived at their permanent 
camps. This left a sinister window of time in which German guards could, if 
they so wished, dispose of any unwanted British prisoners without 
consequence.
89
87 S.P. MacKenzie, The Colditz Myth: British and Commonwealth Prisoners of War in Nazi 
Germany (Oxford, 2004), p.69 citing various accounts of prisoners from the Imperial War 
Museum.
88 Vasilis Vourkoutiotis, Prisoners of War and the German High Command (New York, 2003), p.44.
89 In addition to reports of miscellaneous shootings during the marches to the camps, there were 
also rumours that the Germans had machine-gunned several RAF pilots who had bailed out and In some instances this period of information blackout could last for two or 
three months, with some of the more valuable prisoners being kept for 
interrogation in solitary confinement within the Dulags and denied access to 
any Red Cross parcels.
90 During this time it was not unknown for German 
interrogators to commit a further breach of the Geneva Convention by issuing 
bogus Red Cross information forms, or even impersonating Red Cross officials 
as a means of extracting extra information from the prisoners – a practice 
that continued in certain Dulags until early 1944.
91 That such a ruse could be 
perpetrated further indicates not only the capacity of the Germans to gather 
the necessary information, but their willingness to keep it to themselves for as 
long as possible – an action that was in line with the OKW’s (German High 
Command) view of the Dulags as centres of clandestine interrogation, rather 
than of humanitarian administration.
92 
The first British reaction to the lack of reporting came on 22 June when the 
Foreign Office wrote to the ICRC requesting that it contact the Germans for 
information pertaining to 100 recently captured sailors from the British 
warships Glorious, Ardent and Castra. The response to the Red Cross’ 
subsequent overture to Berlin came two days later with the OKW issuing 
orders to all Stalags and Oflags to forward lists of the names of all new POWs 
every 10 days. This did not commence however, until 25 September and even 
then the Dulags – the first point of crucial information gathering on POWs – 
had their parachutes caught in trees – MacKenzie, Colditz Myth, p.37, 65; Vourkoutiotis, POWs 
and OKW, p.44.
90 Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, p.73; Vourkoutiotis, POWs and OKW, p.193.
91 The bogus Red Cross forms were still in use at Dulag Luft as late as August 1943, where some 
POWs were mis-treated for refusing to fill them in. It was not until spring 1944 that the ICRC 
confirmed that the practice of issuing these forms has ceased – TNA:PRO WO 32/18503 – Berne 
to FO, 2 August 1943; TNA:PRO FO 916/881 – Berne To FO, 16 March 1944.
92 Vourkoutiotis, POWs and OKW, p.44.were still not included in the order.
93 Understandably, this did little to allay 
British fears and two days after receiving the ICRC’s report on its efforts Sir 
George Warner at the Foreign Office voiced his grim concern to Haccius over 
those prisoners ‘who have fallen or died in “captivity”’.
94 
The ICRC persevered despite the relative failure of its various overtures and 
the intransigence of the German authorities. One of the more noteworthy 
ideas was for the delegates to visit the Dulags and Frontstalags in person in 
order to collect the necessary information firsthand, a practice that had been 
first implemented by the Committee – at the behest of the Germans – during 
the First World War.
95 The implementation of this practice was greatly 
hampered however, by the fact that the existence of many such camps ‘was 
only reported very late by the detaining authorities, and the Committee’s 
delegates were authorised to visit them only after long negotiations’.
96
Pierre Descourtes’ inspection of the massive interrogation centre at Dulag Luft 
(Oberursel) for example, did not take place until 18 October 1940 and 
although Roland Marti at the ICRC’s Berlin delegation was able to visit Dulag 
VID in late August, he reported that the Protecting Power had been refused 
admittance in the interim on the grounds that the camp was still within zone 
of military operations. This indicated that the Dulag had been cut off from the 
outside world for close to two months. On occasions when visits were 
permitted to the Protecting Power’s inspectors, such as in the case of the 
inspection of Dulag XII on 28 May, a return visit was not granted until late 
September. In the interim the United States Embassy’s only source of 
93 Vourkoutiotis, POWs and OKW, pp.137-138. 
94 TNA:PRO FO 916/2587 – Warner to Haccius, 26 June 1940.
95 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.67-69.
96 ICRC Report, vol.1, p.245.information on the camps was the OKW – a channel that the British naturally 
regarded as highly unsatisfactory.
97 On the question of POW reporting via the 
Dulags therefore, it was the Germans who proved to be the thorn in the side 
of both the Protecting Power and the ICRC, who, unable to offer adequate 
reciprocity from the relatively prisoner-less British, were left powerless to 
change the situation. 
German obstinacy was not the only problem the ICRC faced. Prompted by the 
capture of so many of its soldiers the British government began, on the day 
before the start of the evacuation of Dunkirk, the long-overdue re-
organisation of its POW administration. Though undoubtedly a necessity, the 
restructuring was both abrupt and ill-managed, resulting in what one historian 
has referred to as ‘blind bureaucracy’ in the face of a crisis that demanded 
efficiency and organisation.
98 
The biggest change was at the War Office, where in addition to the PWIB a 
specialised Directorate of Prisoners of War (DPW) was created on 25 May 
1940. Headed by Major-General E.C. Gepp, the DPW was tasked with 
safeguarding the rights of British POWs with respect to the Geneva 
Convention, a broad mandate that made it Whitehall’s central administrative 
response to the crisis and linchpin for two other agencies tasked with handling 
the practical and political issues of POW management. For the latter duty the 
DPW was assisted by the Prisoner of War Department (PWD) at the Foreign 
Office, whose job was to deal with Berlin on a diplomatic level with all matters 
relating to POWs via both the Protecting Power and the ICRC.
99 In this 
97 TNA:PRO FO 916/2576 – WO to FO, 3 September 1940; TNA:PRO FO 916/2591 – US Embassy to 
FO, 15 August 1940, FO to WO, 16 November 1940.
98 See Rolf, 'Blind Bureaucracy'.
99 TNA:PRO WO 366/26 – POWs in WWII, pp.10-15.capacity the PWD became the British governments’ primary liaison with the 
ICRC on POW matters throughout the war. 
The third body to lend assistance to Britain’s POWs was the British Red Cross 
(BRC), which had merged on 2 September 1939 with the Order of St. John of 
Jerusalem under the leadership of the veteran philanthropist Sir Arthur 
Stanley.
100 On 5 December 1939 the BRC was approved by the PWD as ‘the 
accredited authority for packing and despatching parcels to British prisoners 
of war’,
101 a position it had already prepared for by the establishment of two 
giant Red Cross parcel depots in London in November 1939. The task of 
despatching the parcels was to be facilitated by the ICRC, whose duty was to 
organise and supervise the transport of BRC packages to Geneva and the 
further carriage of the parcels to POW camps throughout mainland Europe.
102 
The BRC therefore, was not only closely connected to the ICRC both in its 
philosophy and sphere of activities, but had, unlike the DPW, been highly 
active since the commencement of hostilities in collaborating with the ICRC to 
bring assistance to POWs.
103
On paper this multi-layered response to the POW crisis appeared to be more 
than adequate in that it covered the administrative, diplomatic and practical 
spheres of the problem. In practice, however, there were complications. The 
DPW for example, despite being tasked with holding POW information that 
had been transmitted via the Central Agency, initially possessed no-one on its 
staff who could speak either French or German. This resulted in the 
100 Ibid, pp.50-51. Stanley had been chairman of the Executive Committee of Red Cross Societies 
and had worked alongside Chenevière during the re-organisation of the Red Cross administration 
in the 1920s – Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.176.
101 TNA:PRO FO 916/116 – BRC Report of activities, 2 September 1940.
102 ICRC Report, vol.3, pp.201-202.
103 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p. 423; Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.384.information having to be sent back to the PWD for translation – all of which 
added further delays to the process of transmitting POW information to 
worried relatives.
104 The BRC was also dissatisfied with the DPW’s handling of 
information on missing and wounded POWs, which would bounce from Geneva 
to Whitehall and then onto the War Office’s Casualty Branch in Liverpool, 
before at last returning again to the BRC’s War Department in London – a 
system of reporting which could add up to ten days of needless delay in the 
forwarding of information to relatives of the POWs.
105 
Of greater gravity was the negative effect these sudden administrative 
changes had on Whitehall’s co-operation with the ICRC. As Moorehead has 
argued, Whitehall’s interactions with the ICRC at this time were defined by an 
attitude of ‘confusion, ignorance and fundamental differences of opinion’ over 
the nature of the Committee’s tasks.
106 It would be erroneous, however, to 
believe that this attitude arose in a spontaneous and widespread fashion 
throughout Whitehall. Although there were certainly pre-existing issues – the 
most obvious being the divergence between Whitehall’s objective to conduct 
war and the ICRC’s to alleviate the effects of it – the source of British 
negativity towards the ICRC in summer of 1940 can be primarily traced to one 
man: the head of the PWD, Sir George Warner.
Ostensibly, Warner was well suited to be the primary conduit for relations 
with the ICRC. He was an experienced Foreign Office official who had not only 
attended the Geneva Conference in 1929, but had also served as British 
minister in Berne from 1936 until the end of 1939. It was at this post, 
however, that his first suspicions over the nature of the ICRC may have been 
104 Rolf, 'Blind Bureaucracy', pp.49-50.
105 British Red Cross Society, British Red Cross and the Order of Saint John Of Jerusalem War 
History, 2 vols. (London, 1947), hereafter BRC Report, vol.2, p.515.
106 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.390.aroused. As mentioned in the introduction, Warner had first hand experience 
of Carl Burckhardt’s forays into amateur peace-making during his tenure in 
Danzig.
107 These experiences stayed with Warner. During the war he not only 
raised concerns over Burckhardt’s ‘independent views’ and fondness for 
playing the part of an important continental figure, but as late as 1944 
Warner warned his Foreign Office colleagues that Burckhardt had pro-Fascist 
sympathies.
108 This opinion combined with the Foreign Office’s knowledge of 
Burckhardt’s peace-making activities and the fact that the latter held a 
leadership role at the ICRC led to Warner in particular viewing the Committee 
with weary suspicion.
109
In addition to these personal opinions over the ICRC’s credibility, Warner also 
suffered from a problem that was endemic amongst many officials in 
Whitehall’s POW departments at this time – the inability to comprehend and 
keep pace with the speed of events. Though he had voiced unofficial concerns 
to Haccius in late June, it was not until 14 August that Warner wrote a stiffly 
worded complaint to the ICRC’s London delegation wherein he formally cited 
the Geneva Convention article concerning the Central Agency’s duty to report 
POW names, stating that:
we do not appear to be receiving such weekly lists from the International Red 
Cross Society (sic). It is of the greatest urgency that we should receive full and 
adequate information concerning all prisoners of war in the hands of the enemy 
powers and I should be extremely grateful for your co-operation in this matter.
110
107 Warner had received Burckhardt in Berne during the latter's peace mission on behalf of Ernst 
Weizsäcker during the Munich Crisis – DBFP, Series 3, vol.2 , Warner to Halifax, 5 Sept 1938, 
doc.775, p.242.
108 TNA:PRO FO 916/113 – Berne to FO, 17 Oct 1941; Berne to FO, 19 Oct 1941; TNA:PRO FO 
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109 David Kelly informed the Foreign Office in July 1940 that Burckhardt was still using his neutral 
status to talk peace with the Germans - Kelly, David, The Ruling Few (London, 1952), pp.273-74; 
TNA:PRO FO 371/24407 – Kelly to FO, 8 July 1940. This was written almost two months after the surrender of France, though in 
tone and verbiage it reads as if Warner had only just realised the gravity of 
the POW reporting situation and, indeed, had yet to realise the unassailable 
difficulties posed to the Committee by the German attitude.
This apparent ignorance was despite the fact that Warner knew at the very 
least that the ICRC was experiencing difficulties in keeping its communications 
intact. Throughout June Warner received and dismissed proposals from the 
ICRC for the setting up of a Red Cross plane service that would fly under 
protection of the emblem in order to deliver POW mail and parcels. In this 
refusal he was justified, since at that time there were widely held British 
suspicions that the Luftwaffe was using its own Red Cross-branded planes in 
the Channel for surveillance purposes.
111 Even so, the fact Warner received 
these messages indicates that he was aware of the ICRC’s difficulties. 
Moreover, he continued to offer little support for the Committee’s attempts at 
overcoming them, waiting nearly three months to respond to another request 
by the ICRC for a similar cross-channel ship service. Of further frustration for 
the ICRC was the non-committal nature of the response, which stated – after 
three months deliberation – only that ‘these questions present much difficulty 
and that no decision had been come to’.
112
Warner was also out of step with the ICRC on the matter of the Agency’s 
expansion of duties during the crisis and, more specifically, the need to fund 
this expansion. Prior to the invasion of France the transmitting of POW 
information by the Agency to the PWIB was conducted free of charge via the 
110 ICRC:G3/3B/44 – Warner to Haccius, 14 August 1940.
111 ICRC Report, vol1, p.139-40; ICRC:G3/3B Carton 44/1 – Air Ministry Bulletin, 1 August 1940.
112 ICRC:G3/3B/44 – Warner to Haccius, 8 October 1940.Swiss and French postal services.
113 Owing to the disruption to postal 
communications in Western Europe, the Agency was forced to abandon its 
reliance on mail and, on 18 June it began to send any POW information it was 
able to gather via telegraph.
114 Though expeditious and successful, this 
innovation placed a new financial burden on the ICRC and in August 
Chenevière wrote to Warner’s successor in Berne, David Kelly, begging him to 
convince the Cable and Wireless Company in London to agree a lower tariff for 
the ICRC. In justifying the request Chenevière did not mince his words, 
pleading with Kelly to understand that it was ‘practically entirely in the British 
interest’, before going on to lament that ‘our funds are already overdrawn by 
the manifold activities we dedicate to the prisoners of war, one of the chief 
items being the tremendous expense incurred in cabling all information to 
London’. This, plus the letter’s many references to how such financial burdens 
were slowing up the speed of information transmission, made it clear that the 
ICRC saw the injection of funds as a means of easing the crisis and an appeal 
to the British sense of self interest as the best way to obtain them.
115 
Unfortunately for Chenevière, the concept of the British helping the ICRC to 
help themselves was proving difficult to grasp in Whitehall, where the 
question of British financial donations to the Committee had in fact been 
under discussion since the beginning of May when it was discovered that 
Haccius had been paying from his own pocket for the transmission of POW 
telegrams. The British Red Cross leadership had, in turn, asked Warner to 
speak to the Treasury about funding for their Swiss counterparts. Warner 
thought it ‘reasonable to support such a request’. Tellingly, however, he 
emphasised the need to ‘lay down exactly what the International Committee 
113 This was in accordance with the 1935 Cairo Postal Convention – ICRC Report, vol.3, p.11.
114 ICRC Report, vol.2, p.145.
115 ICRC:G85/1047 – Chenevière to Kelly, 26 August 1940.are supposed to do’ before authorising the funding.
116 Despite Warner’s 
apparent acquiescence, the Cable and Wireless Company initially refused the 
proposal and a further appeal from the ICRC to the PWD on 10 July never 
received a response from Warner.
117
Such negligence was an ominous sign of things to come from Warner, who 
was as unsure of the importance of the ICRC’s role in the coming crisis as he 
was occasionally confused over the name of the Committee itself, minuting 
that the ‘claims of the IRCC (sic) as to services rendered are very 
exaggerated’. He also struggled, like so many British officials before him, with 
the notion of the ICRC as an organisation mandated to serve all belligerents, 
complaining that ‘it may be said that the essential expenditure of the IRCC on 
objects in which we have a real interest cannot be considerable. We are really 
being asked to contribute to the maintenance of Allied P/W to a great 
extent’.
118 This conclusion was no doubt drawn from information on the ICRC’s 
expenses provided by Chenevière to the Foreign Office in April, which 
indicated that the lion’s share of the Committee’s funds was being spent on 
Polish POWs.
119 Following the fall of France, however, the bulk of the ICRC’s 
expenditure was for the benefit of British and French POWs. Moreover, the 
financial resources required for this were, owing to the large numbers of 
prisoners, hopelessly inadequate. 
This change in conditions was not appreciated by either Warner or officials at 
the Treasury, who agreed with Warner that the ICRC’s workload was not that 
great and, furthermore, that ‘it does not appear from the figures given in the 
116 TNA:PRO FO 916/2587 – Warner Minute, 17 May 1940.
117 Over a year later Chenevière was still asking for Whitehall’s reply to the initial message – 
ICRC:G85/1047 – Chenevière to Roberts, 29 September 1941.
118 Italics are my emphasis – TNA:PRO FO 916/2587 – Warner Minute, 3 June 1940.
119 TNA:PRO FO 916/2587 – Central Agency Funding Report, 14 April 1940.enclosure to your letter that the Committee are in immediate financial 
difficulties’. Despite this reluctance, the Treasury did approve a donation of 
£4,000 per month for the cost of POW telegrams, provided that the Germans 
would respond with a financial gift of their own to the ICRC, a practice of 
reciprocity that had been established by the Treasury during the First World 
War.
120
Although at first glance generous, the £4,000 grant was part of the total 
SFr70,800 donated by the British to the Committee during 1940 and, as a 
rather embarrassed David Kelly pointed out to the Foreign Office later that 
year, it barely made a ripple in the Committee’s £200,000 monthly 
administration costs, much of which was being covered by the Germans and 
the French.
121 As a measure of how little the British appeared to understand 
both the expansion of the ICRC’s duties and, moreover, the dependence 
British POWs now had on the successful completion of such duties, it should 
be further noted that France had donated SFr172,000 and Germany 
SFr98,426.25 for the year 1940. Even defeated Poland managed to produce 
SFr13,735.86.
122 
The British decision over limited funding and Warner’s reluctance to pursue 
the Cable and Wireless issue was not entirely born of ignorance of the ICRC’s 
workload. Over the summer of 1940 the notion that Switzerland – a ‘neutral 
island surrounded by enemy seas’
123 – would soon be submerged was taken 
seriously by many in Whitehall. These concerns had begun as early as the 
120 TNA:PRO FO 916/2587 – Syers to Warner, 21 June 1940. For First World War agreement on 
this principle see TNA:PRO T 1/12148 – PWD to Treasury, 15 January 1918.
121 TNA:PRO FO 916/2587 – Kelly to FO, 26 December 1940.
122 ICRC Report, vol.1, Annex 1, Financial Contributions 1938-1946.
123 TNA:PRO FO 916/2587 – Syers to Warner, 21 June 1940.middle of May, when reports of a planned German invasion of Switzerland 
began to surface at the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) station in Zurich.
124 
Naturally, this influenced Warner’s view of the ICRC which, he believed, would 
be drawn by the seemingly inevitable invasion into the Nazi sphere of 
influence. Although his experiences in Switzerland had convinced him that the 
tiny Alpine nation would ‘put up a strenuous resistance’ to any invasion, 
Warner believed that such resistance could only be successful ‘pending the 
arrival of the strong support which they can expect from the other side of the 
Jura’.
125 With the collapse of France in late June this scenario became 
untenable. Warner’s handling of the ICRC during the summer of 1940 was 
dictated by the belief that any financial assistance given to the ICRC would 
ultimately only be of benefit to the Germans.
126 
For its part, the ICRC did little to alleviate British anxieties. At the height of 
the May invasion scare, Halifax asked Kelly to raise the invasion scenario with 
Chenevière, who revealed that despite informal discussions no plans had been 
made by the ICRC for such an eventuality. In a mis-guided attempt to assure 
the British of the ICRC’s resolve, however, Chenevière stated that in the event 
of a German invasion ‘there could be no thought of the International 
Committee leaving Geneva’.
127 It soon became apparent to the British that 
this was no flippant declaration. The day before France signed the armistice 
Burckhardt affirmed to the British Consul in Geneva, Harry Livingston, that 
124 For discussion of German plans for an invasion of Switzerland see Wylie, Britain and 
Switzerland, pp.166-173; Stephen P. Halbrook, Target Switzerland: Swiss Armed Neutrality in 
World War II (Rockville Centre, 1998), ch.5.
125 TNA:PRO FO 371/24530 – Warner’s Political Review of Switzerland, 4 January 1940.
126 TNA:PRO FO 916/2587 – Warner Memo, 11 June 1940.
127 Ibid – Kelly’s Report to Halifax, 21 May 1940.the Committee intended to continue working no matter what fate may befall 
Switzerland.
128 The leadership was in agreement: the ICRC would go on.
This desire of the Committee to either fall on its sword or, more 
unrealistically, hope that the Germans would allow a pocket around Geneva to 
remain neutral, gave the exact opposite impression to that which it wished to 
convey to the British. Chenevière and Burckhardt’s defiance was not 
interpreted as evidence of the Committee’s intractable determination, but as 
an example of the Committee’s arrogance and naïveté, a naïveté which would 
only serve to engender a nightmare scenario in which the primary 
organisation for humanitarian relief in Europe would be placed under Nazi 
control. This attitude not only affirmed Warner’s belief of the ICRC as being 
little more than well meaning amateurs, but it also justified British 
apprehensions over offering financial support to such an apparently doomed 
organisation. Given the dominance of the Germans, the seemingly inevitable 
invasion of Switzerland and the military and financial uncertainties Britain 
faced in 1940, such reluctance to assist the ICRC was understandable. 
There were however, other more unreasonable factors which coloured the 
British POW administration’s attitude to the ICRC during and after the 
uncertain weeks of May and June 1940. Chief among them was Warner’s 
perception of the Protecting Power as the only credible channel through which 
to conduct POW matters. With regards to the inspection of POW camps 
Warner was technically correct. The Geneva Convention stated that only the 
Protecting Power was guaranteed the right to inspect the camps, the ICRC 
having to rely on the informal and reciprocal agreement of the belligerents to 
grant its inspectors admission. Though agreement by the belligerents for such 
visits had been assured in November 1939, further inspections by the ICRC 
128 ICRC:G85/1047 – Burckhardt to Livingston, 21 June 1940.had focused more on civilian internment camps rather than POW camps, the 
latter being mostly handled by the Protecting Power.
129 On the matters of both 
POW reporting and the supply of POW parcels, however, Warner’s opinion was 
completely erroneous The Geneva Convention specified that the distribution of 
relief to camps was the duty of ‘societies for the relief of prisoners of war’ and 
not the Protecting Power.
130 
Despite his knowledge of the Convention, Warner continued to believed that 
the ICRC:
have rendered valuable help in connection with the Red Cross message scheme 
for which they act as a channel, they keep a stock of clothing etc in Geneva on 
behalf of the British Red Cross which is used for recent captures, they conduct 
searches for missing. Otherwise most of their work so far as we are concerned 
overlaps with the work of the US and Swiss diplomatic missions.
131
The main problem with this ill-informed viewpoint was that it placed too much 
emphasis on the importance of the Protecting Power and not enough on the 
ICRC. Moreover, Warner held to this view at a time when, owing to the 
chaotic conditions in Europe, the services of the American inspectors were 
proving to be highly inadequate. 
This led the U.S. Embassy to float the idea in Britain of asking the ICRC also 
to begin regular camp inspections. When the question was posed to Warner 
he showed his unawareness by stating that ‘the U.S. Embassy has hitherto 
made sufficient visits to the camps and I took it for granted that as the P/W 
population increased they would visit the new camps’. Having been informed 
otherwise, Warner begrudgingly decided that it was worth asking the ICRC to 
129 ICRC Report, vol.1, pp.228-229; Geneva Convention 1929, Article 86.
130 Geneva Convention 1929, Article 78.
131 TNA:PRO FO 916/2587 – Warner Minute, 3 June 1940.‘do what they can’; although he held little optimism for the Committee's 
success, pointing out that ‘the US Embassy is in a more independent position 
than the IRCC (sic) which is only a body of Swiss, mostly Genovese’.
132  
This impression of the ICRC was not confined to the services it could offer 
British POWs in France. When, ten days earlier, Warner had been asked about 
working with the ICRC in setting up a POW Bureau for prisoners captured in 
the Middle East, he replied that despite being ‘anxious to keep on good terms 
with them’, there was no need to ‘complicate this question by bringing in the 
International Committee of the Red Cross’. Once again his justification was 
that the ICRC’s ‘work in the present case is a mere duplication of the work 
carried on through the official channel, they have no special means of 
communication and their position in is in fact rather precarious’.
133 In Warner’s 
eyes therefore, the Committee was as imperilled by recent events as it was 
unqualified to handle them. 
It was perhaps owing to the ‘excellent understanding’ between the DPW and 
the PWD – which one War Office official, ironically, presented as a positive 
aspect of the British POW administration
134 – that Warner’s negative view of 
the ICRC permeated into the DPW. Despite his initial enthusiasm for the ICRC, 
Alan Hunter shared Warner’s perception of the ICRC as the well-meaning 
inferior of the Protecting Power. Although he applauded the efforts of the 
Agency, he wrote in June that he was ‘sorry that the International Committee 
should be the channel of communication, as I have held all along that general 
efficiency is best served by strictly adhering to the diplomatic channel in all 
questions of principle’. In this instance, the principle was the reciprocal 
132 TNA:PRO FO 916/2546 – Warner Minute, 12 July 1940.
133 TNA:PRO FO 916/2598 – Warner Minute, 2 July 1940.
134 TNA:PRO WO 366/36 – POWs in WWII, p.19.exchange of dead soldier’s personal effects which, although certainly an area 
of concern for the Protecting Power, nevertheless had been initially raised by 
the ICRC earlier in the year.
135
Such knee-jerk repudiation and indeed, suspicion, of the ICRC might have 
been understandable had the Committee’s enthusiasm and desire to expand 
its operations been a new phenomenon in British-ICRC relations. By the 
summer of 1940, however, the British should have been accustomed not only 
to the Committee’s eagerness to serve, but also its capacity to back such 
intentions with action.
Max Huber had been in almost continual dialogue with the Foreign Office since 
the start of the war, attempting, with varying degrees of success, to get his 
Committee involved in everything from arranging the reciprocal exchanges of 
sick and wounded POWs to increased protection of POW camps from air raids, 
the latter objective proving an issue of particular difficulty with the British.
136 
In March 1940 Chenevière had also provided the Foreign Office with an 
explicit report on the tasks and achievements of the Central Agency to date, a 
gesture that was clearly made with the aim of educating the British as to the 
ICRC’s capabilities.
137 In other quarters, the Ministry of Economic Warfare 
(MEW), the British government department tasked with managing the 
blockade of Europe, had also worked closely with the ICRC and other 
135 TNA:PRO FO 916/2577 – German Legation to Swiss Federal Political Department, 21 May 1940; 
Hunter To Satow, 7 June 1940.
136 TNA:PRO DO 35/997/10 – FO to Dominions Office, 8 May 1940; TNA:PRO FO 916/2577 – 
Warner to Haccius, 29 August 1940. Despite Berlin’s openness to the idea, the British refused the 
ICRC’s pleas to reveal the locations of all POW camps in order that bombers might be diverted 
from attacking such zones. The only concession offered by the British on this point occurred in 
April 1941 with a commitment to improve POW camp air raid shelters – ICRC Report, vol.1, 
pp.306-309.
137 TNA:PRO FO 916/2587 – Report on the Activities of the Central Agency.departments at the Foreign Office on the matter of guidelines for collective 
parcel distribution to POWs following the invasion of Poland.
138 
Yet despite this evident willingness on the part of the ICRC, the new POW 
administration continued to receive them coolly, even after Warner noted that 
there was ‘less likelihood of a German attack on Switzerland’.
139 Whilst this 
reserved attitude might have been justified by ICRC failures, the fact is that in 
the face of overwhelming difficulties and discounting the obvious restrictions 
imposed upon it by the German authorities, the Committee was generally 
successful in its endeavours. In addition to Chenevière’s aforementioned 
efforts to expand the Agency, the Committee responded with lightning 
efficiency to the July request to help the Protecting Power with POW camp 
inspections. Within 48 hours of receiving Warner’s approval, Geneva had 
despatched Marcel Junod and Roland Marti to the camps. One month later the 
ICRC reported that both Junod and Marti had visited almost all POW camps in 
Germany and France, concluding that, despite a lack of mail and parcels, 
conditions were on the whole ‘generally satisfactory’.
140 
Aside from such outward examples of the ICRC’s abilities, there was also 
much practical closed-door discussion in Geneva about an issue that, in 
marked contrast to Whitehall, the Committee understood to be of great 
importance: British-ICRC co-operation on a diplomatic level. Upon being 
informed of the changes in Whitehall’s POW administration, the ICRC 
leadership contacted Haccius in June in order to get a general assessment of 
his relationship with the DPW and the PWD. As a measure of his exasperation, 
the usually congenial Haccius used the opportunity to implicate Warner as the 
138 TNA:PRO FO 371/25158 – MEW to FO, 14 February 1940.
139 TNA:PRO FO 916/2587 – Warner to Syers, 28 June 1940.
140 TNA:PRO FO 916/2546 – Livingston to FO, 16 July 1940; Haccius to Warner, 15 August 1940.bane of British-ICRC relations. Not only did Haccius lament that the PWD was 
‘naturally inclined towards the PP’, but he also spoke candidly of the 
‘resistance which occurs on the part of  the P/W Department of the Foreign 
Office (Sir George Warner), towards the Committee’s initiatives’. In 
concluding his report Haccius again singled out Warner, stressing that 
although his relations with the latter were ‘still absolutely correct’, he was still 
having to work around, rather than with, Warner in order to achieve anything.
141
In considering the negativity of these reports it seems likely that the 
expeditious nature of Junod and Marti’s camp inspections was as much a 
political move by the ICRC to prove itself to Whitehall’s new POW 
administration as it was a humanitarian effort. The presence of Warner and 
his influence on the other POW departments, however, greatly minimised the 
impact of the ICRC’s gesture. As a result, British-ICRC relations continued to 
be cool throughout the summer and into the autumn of 1940.
Although the British were content with the state of these relations, Haccius – 
in the unenviable position of intermediary – was continually concerned with 
the problem. As late as October 1940 he urged Geneva to respond promptly 
to requests for POW information in order to placate Alan Hunter, ‘whose good 
offices are so important to me in my capacity as Delegate of the ICRC’.
142 
Haccius’ placatory attitude was not solely prompted by his own discomfort. 
More than anything it was a response to the generally poor condition of 
British-ICRC relations, which sunk to their nadir in the latter half of 1940 as 
Geneva and Whitehall faced the second major crisis to emerge from the 
141 ICRC:G3/3B/44-1 – Haccius to Geneva, 23 July 1940.
142 Ibid – Haccius to Geneva, 2 October 1940.summer – how to maintain the health and well-being of British POWs for the 
duration of the war.
THE POW CRISIS AND THE BRITISH RED CROSS
In the First World War the British Red Cross had paid for, packed and 
despatched POW parcels via the General Post Office to Geneva, from where 
the ICRC’s delegates supervised their distribution to POW camps in France 
and Germany. The parcels’ journey to mainland Europe was by the most 
direct route possible, straight across the Channel via ship, and at the 
commencement of the second war this same procedure in parcel delivery was 
adopted at the request of the War Office. In the words of the BRC, ‘up till the 
fall of France all went well’ with this system.
143 When, however, the Channel 
became the effective frontline of the war in 1940, changes had to be made. 
The most important of these was made to the cross-Channel shipping route, 
which was diverted south to neutral Lisbon for onward carriage through Spain, 
France and ultimately to Switzerland. Owing to the breakdown in 
communications and transportation between Britain and the continent, 
however, no parcels could be shipped via this route during the first crucial 
weeks of the POW crisis.
The BRC and the ICRC were not totally unprepared for this situation. As early 
as April 1940 the two organisations had worked to create a stockpile of food 
and clothing parcels in Geneva. As in the case of POW reporting, however, no 
amount of effort by the Red Cross could overcome either the difficulties of 
conducting humanitarian work in times of war or the limitations imposed by 
its dependency on belligerents. On 15 June the Germans ordered the 
143 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.67-68; TNA:PRO WO 32/14423 – BRC Report, 5 March 1942.suspension of mail traffic in France.
144 Until the resumption of the mail service 
on 27 July the ICRC had no means to receive or distribute the parcels. For a 
little over a month therefore the ICRC, despite its best efforts, was effectively 
helpless to bring aid to Britain’s POWs. 
The reactivation of the mail routes both on the continent and across the 
Channel brought with it further difficulties. Although a new delivery route had 
been established via Lisbon, the parcels’ sea-borne journey from London was 
continually disrupted by the intensifying military situation in the skies over 
southern England and in the Channel. In these circumstances the laws of war 
offered the Red Cross little respite. Despite their humanitarian cargoes being 
intended for neutral Switzerland, the merchant ships transporting the BRC’s 
parcels were not hospital ships and, as such, were not protected under the 
Hague Convention of 1907.
145 The result was that by January 1941 it was 
estimated that 16,296 parcels had been lost due to the attacks on such ships.
146 This led to the ICRC having to apply to the belligerents for safe conducts 
for these vessels, an action which began three years of protracted 
negotiations with the British authorities over ICRC shipping, the full details of 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The problems did not cease once the parcels arrived in Lisbon. From the 
confusion of this ‘very animated centre of relief activities’, the parcels had to 
pass through seven more inland points of transhipment on a disjointed 3,000 
mile journey that the BRC regarded as ‘lengthy, indirect and subject to delays 
144 TNA:PRO FO 916/117 – BRC Parcel Delivery Report, 20 September 1940; ICRC:G3/3B Carton 
44/2 – PWD Parcel Delivery Report, 23 November 1940.
145 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.474; Convention (X) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare 
of the Principles of the Geneva Convention (The Hague, 1907) Articles 1-5. The Admiralty was 
particularly sensitive on this issue, going so far as to lodge a protest with the ICRC over the 
marking of two parcel-carrying vessels with the visual C .International +, rather than C. 
International, C.R.  – ICRC:G85/1047 – S.J. Warner to Odier, 21 March 1941.
146 ICRC:G3/3B/44-3 – BRC Confidential Report, 24 January 1941.and interruption, avoidable and unavoidable’.
147 The unavoidable factor in this 
evaluation was the transportation infrastructure of Spain and France, which 
had suffered severe damage due to recent conflicts and so proved difficult to 
navigate in an expeditious fashion.
148 What the BRC saw as controllable, 
however, was the standard of ICRC supervision during the transhipment of 
the parcels at various checkpoints and borders during the journey. Particular 
criticism was made of the operation in Lisbon itself, where the ICRC delegate 
Colonel Iselin, in addition to letting ‘thousands of parcels’ disappear on his 
watch, ‘did not keep the Organisation (BRC) in London posted as to what was 
going on’.
149
Given that the BRC’s comments were part of its explanation to Whitehall as to 
what had gone wrong with parcel delivery in 1940, it is tempting to see these 
accusations as a simple shifting of blame onto Geneva. Marcel Junod, 
however, indicated the legitimacy of the BRC’s claims in his post-war memoir, 
Warrior with Weapons. Despite the book’s clear bias, Junod recalled that 
during the operations to Lisbon in 1940 ‘there was no possibility of 
supervision, and there was a great deal of pilfering.’ So much so it seems that 
when Junod was informed by a proud BRC of a consignment of 36,000 parcels 
that had been dispatched to Geneva in September 1940, he was horrified to 
discover that by March 1941 only 6,000 of the parcels had actually reached 
their destination.
150
What made this appalling rate of delivery even worse was the fact that the 
BRC was struggling at this time even to pack the soon to be missing parcels. 
147 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.228; TNA:PRO FO 916/117 – BRC Report, 20 September 1940.
148 TNA:PRO CAB 127/166 – Cripps’ Report on BRC Parcel Distribution 1940-41; ICRC:G3/3B 
Carton 44/2 – PWD Parcel Delivery Report, 23 November 1940.
149 TNA:PRO WO 32/14423 – BRC Report, 5 March 1942.
150 Junod, Warrior Without Weapons, p.175.In addition to on-going negotiations with the Ministry of Food for assistance in 
procuring foodstuffs, the BRC’s ability to operate in London was disrupted by 
Hitler’s change in tactics in the first week of September, which saw the full 
force of the Luftwaffe’s bombers concentrate on civilian targets in the capital. 
The Blitz was so destructive that in late September Lord Clarendon of the BRC 
proposed the wholesale liquidation of all BRC packing centres in London in 
order to transfer parcel packing operations to Canada, the USA and South 
Africa.
151 Thankfully, both the DPW and Clarendon’s colleagues rejected this 
‘tragic’ idea and weathered the storm of the Blitz through till November when, 
despite all difficulties, the BRC’s parcel centres concluded their ‘running-in’ 
period and so began to operate at capacity.
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Despite the BRC’s apparent victory in the battle to produce enough parcels, 
the means of delivering them efficiently remained elusive. This problem was 
exacerbated by the fact that the Geneva stockpiles that had been created in 
April had run dry. As early as July 1940 reports were received from inspectors 
at Stalag XX (Thorn) that the prisoners had just taken a delivery of eight 
hundred of the food parcels that had been stockpiled,
153 and, though 
seemingly impressive, this one-off delivery equated to only one parcel for 
every group of twenty-five men and they had to last until mid September. In 
late October Captain Padon at Stalag Luft IV (Gross Tychow) reported to the 
Protecting Power that each prisoner had received ‘two parcels per head for the 
whole period of three and a half months’.
154 Two days later the Young Men's 
Christian Association (YMCA) delivered to the British its report on Stalags XX-
151 ICRC:G3/3B/44-1 – Interdepartmental Meeting with ICRC London, 18 September 1940. The 
practice of establishing depots in the Dominions was eventually put into effect later in the war – 
TNA:PRO FO 916/117, BRC Parcel Delivery Report, 20 September 1940.
152 TNA:PRO FO 916/117 – BRC Parcel Delivery Report, 20 September 1940.
153 TNA:PRO FO 916/2775 – PP Report on Stalag XXA, 31 July 1940.
154 ICRC:G3/3B/44-2 – Report of Captain Padon to American Embassy, Berlin, 20 October 1940.A (Thorn Podgorz) and XXI-D (Posen), which had been visited by its 
inspectors early that month. They reported that permanent accommodation – 
rather than tents – was at last being used in these camps and that, in 
general, conditions in the camp were better than they expected. However, 
parcels had only started to be received in the fortnight prior to the YMCA’s 
visit at a rate of ‘one package for every two prisoners in the Stalag’.
155 
In early November the US Embassy in Berlin confirmed these reports to the 
Foreign Office, concluding that despite the best efforts of the Red Cross in 
collecting and packing the parcels, they were still only being received 
‘sporadically’ in most camps.
156 Upon receiving these various reports the PWD 
made the even gloomier, though dramatically erroneous, conclusion later that 
month that ‘no parcels could have reached the prisoners between the middle 
of June and the middle of September’.
157 
On 26 November, three days after this bleak assessment was received, 
Whitehall made its official response. This took the form of a speech by the 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, in which he pledged to the House of 
Commons that, despite all the difficulties, from now on each British prisoner 
of war would receive at least one food parcel per week. As Kochavi has 
argued, Eden’s primary motivation for this bold declaration was to reassure an 
increasingly nervous British public that everything was being done for the 
prisoners.
158 Eden had some cause, however, to believe that his words would 
soon be backed up by action.
155 TNA:PRO FO 916/32 – YMCA Report, 22 October 1940.
156 TNA:PRO WO 32/18490 – US Embassy to FO, 4 November 1940.
157 ICRC:G3/3B/44-2 – PWD Parcel Delivery Report, 23 November 1940.
158 Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, p.20.Despite its overall negativity, the PWD report of 23 November spoke in 
hopeful tones of future parcel operations now that the bedlam of the summer 
had subsided. For example, the report recognised the improvements to parcel 
delivery that would be engendered by the ICRC’s phasing out of the individual 
parcel, a 5kg package of food or clothing that was usually packed by 
prisoner’s relatives or National Red Cross Societies for despatch to specifically 
named prisoners. Prior to the fall of France, the individually marked parcel 
had been the primary form of parcel received by POWs, the exception being 
Polish prisoners, who owing to the virtual destruction of their country had few 
relatives or relief agencies left to pack such parcels.
159 
The ICRC’s response to this problem in 1939 was to switch the primary form 
of relief for Polish POWs to collective parcels, bulk consignments of unmarked 
packages that were sent to the camps for distribution by the prisoner’s 
primary representative, the Man of Confidence (MOC).
160 Given the similarly 
chaotic conditions of POW reporting in 1940, the ICRC approached the British 
in August with the request to switch to collective relief for British POWs, to 
which Whitehall acquiesced.
161
The understanding and compliance of the British on this issue was indicative 
of another improvement that would have impressed Eden – the re-
organisation in Whitehall of the means by which POW information was 
handled. In October modification was made to the convoluted system of 
receiving POW lists, which by the end of that month were being forwarded 
159 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.17, pp.202-202.
160 The MOC was usually a non-commissioned officer elected by the prisoners with the approval 
of the camp administrators to co-ordinate the distribution of parcels and speak for all prisoners in 
meetings with the camp commandant and ICRC and Protecting Power inspectors – Geneva 
Convention 1929, Article 43.
161 ICRC:G3/3B Carton 44/2 – PWD Parcel Delivery Report, 23 November 1940.direct to the DPW rather than via the PWIB.
162 Despite this improvement, POW 
reporting was still slow from the German side, particularly with regard to 
those British soldiers captured in Belgium, whose details were not received 
until early 1941.
163 However, given that lists were at last being received and 
information on the number of POWs was being forwarded with greater 
regularity by the US Embassy in Berlin, the British and the ICRC both had 
reason to look upon the situation with cautious optimism.
164
In terms of parcel delivery, there was also cause for renewed confidence. The 
BRC was doing its part to improve the problems of the summer, particularly in 
regards to the ever-troubled Lisbon operation. Having grown tired of 
despatching parcels that failed to reach their intended destination, the BRC 
sent its General Secretary, Judith Jackson, to Portugal to meet Colonel Iselin 
in order to discuss ways of rectifying the overland route problems.
The outcome of Jackson’s visit and subsequent meetings with the DPW was 
one of the better examples of collaboration between the BRC, the ICRC and 
the British government. With the consent of the Germans, the decision was 
made to begin a feeder service by ship from Lisbon to Marseilles, where the 
ICRC would establish a parcel warehouse and supervise the shorter journey 
north to Geneva. Though the Admiralty still favoured resuming the perilous 
cross-Channel service, the PWD, DPW and Churchill himself backed the 
Marseilles option.
165 Furthermore, once this approval was given, the Ministry 
162 ICRC:G3/3B/44-2 – Satow to Haccius, 16 October 1940.
163 Ibid– Hunter to Haccius, 21 September 1940; PWD Parcel Delivery Report, 23 November 1940; 
TNA:PRO FO 916/133 – US Embassy to FO, 3 January 1941.
164 By mid-October the US inspectors had confirmed that 37,050 British POWs had been taken 
captive – TNA:PRO FO 916/2576 – US Embassy Berlin to US Embassy London, 15 October 1940.
165 TNA:PRO PREM 4/98/1 – Interdepartmental Meeting, 21 November 1940; TNA:PRO FO 916/45 
– Churchill to Herschel Johnson, 22 February 1941.of Transport agreed to pay three- quarters of the cost of the feeder ships, the 
first of which, the Juleta, sailed from Lisbon on 22 December.
166 
The willingness on the part of the British to co-operate with the ICRC towards 
the end of 1940 sits in contrast to the reservations of the summer. The 
primary reason for this new found keenness was the stabilisation of the POW 
situation and the subsequent realisation amongst many in Whitehall that both 
the ICRC and the BRC were going to be needed to supply parcels for the long 
term benefit of British POWs. As was typical of British-ICRC wartime relations, 
however, this harmony was short lived. 
As public knowledge of the POW crisis grew during November criticism of the 
British government, the ICRC and the BRC began to intensify. Against this 
wave of scrutiny the aforementioned parties fragmented rather than formed a 
unified front and in doing so, undid much of the good work that was being 
done for the benefit of POWs during the autumn of 1940. 
The public and parliamentary outcry over POW welfare that swept Britain in 
the winter of 1940/41 has been well documented by historians. David Rolf’s 
conclusion – that Whitehall was more concerned with deflecting the criticism 
away from itself and towards the BRC and ICRC, than actually dealing with 
the source of the problem – has been generally accepted.
167 My intention is 
not reiterate this appropriate conclusion, but to examine British-ICRC 
relations in the context of the turbulent and antagonistic environment that 
prevailed in Britain at this time. The key to understanding how such an 
environment was formed lies in the role played by the British Red Cross.
166 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.228; ICRC:G3/3B Carton 44/2 – PWD Parcel Delivery Report, 23 November 
1940.
167 See generally Rolf 'Blind Bureaucracy'. For confirmation of this viewpoint see Nichol and 
Rennell, Last Escape, pp.38-39; Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, pp.18-26. From the outset the BRC was identified by the public as the culprits in the 
POW crisis. The scandal began in November 1940 when the mother of A.H.S 
Coombe-Tennant, a captain in the Welsh Guards being held at the dilapidated 
Oflag VIB (Warburg),
168 wrote personally to Clementine Churchill asking why 
the government had chosen to place the fate of British POWs like her son in 
the hands of the evidently incompetent BRC.
169 Coombe-Tennant’s sentiments 
were also reflected in Parliament, where the Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State at the War Office, Sir James Grigg, was questioned over matters of POW 
rations and the lack of reporting from mid October onwards.
Grigg’s responses, particularly his admission of 5 November that 44,000 
prisoners – rather than the commonly accepted figure of 37,000 – were being 
held in Germany, spilled over into the press.
170 On 24 November the Sunday 
Express ran the headline ‘Scandal of our men in Germany’ which was followed 
on 8 December by another abrasive attack on the government for the fact 
that ‘no adequate arrangements had been made in Britain to pack and 
despatch parcels of food and clothing for 44,000 prisoners. The government 
left everything to the Red Cross.’ Not surprisingly Grigg minuted on 26 
November that ‘there might be a very considerable scandal brewing’.
171
168 Although intended to house officers, the camp was little more than a collection of brick huts 
and barbed wire that suffered from overcrowding and poor sanitation for the duration of the war 
– MacKenzie, Colditz Myth, pp.98-99.
169 TNA:PRO PREM 4/98/1 – Coombe-Tennant to Clementine Churchill, 20 November 1940.
170 According to the OKW’s records there were in fact 37,693 British POWs held by the Germans 
in September 1940. This figure was increased to 39,956 by January 1941 – Vourkoutiotis, POWs 
and OKW, p.35.
171 TNA:PRO FO 916/2579 – Parliamentary Questions, Knox to Grigg, 15 October 1940; Morgan to 
Grigg, 5 November 1940; TNA:PRO PREM 4/98/1 - Sunday Express, 8 December 1940. See also 
Rolf, 'Blind Bureaucracy', pp.50-51.Eden's “one parcel per man, per week” pledge did little to still the criticism. 
On 10 December Alfred Knox MP cornered Eden on the question of 
overcrowding and lack of parcel delivery to Oflag VII, asking the Foreign 
Secretary if he realised that ‘many of the men are now living in the clothes in 
which they were captured’.
172 This question was compounded by a report from 
an inmate of Oflag VII, Brigadier Nicholson, stating that no parcels had been 
received from the BRC since August.
173 
Nicholson’s claim was bogus, yet its acceptance by the public and, indeed, 
parliamentary critics, was indicative of the alarmist atmosphere in Britain at 
the time. In criticising the BRC’s efforts, Nicholson failed to consider that the 
2,298 parcels marked “ICRC” that had been received had, in fact, originated 
at the BRC’s packing centres in London. This was a common misconception 
amongst POWs once the switch had been made from individual to collective 
parcel shipments, and the misunderstanding led many prisoners to conclude 
that the BRC had abandoned them.
174
When this negative impression of the BRC filtered back home through POW 
letters Coombe-Tennant used them to fan the flames of public discontent, 
writing on 4 January that ‘there is a strong case for not leaving the fate of 
44,000 prisoners in the hands of an outside body whose failure is patent and 
over whom the government claims to have no control’.
175 This statement was 
echoed in Parliament by Garro Jones MP, who enquired of the Secretary of 
State for War, David Margesson, as to whether the latter intended to ‘take 
steps to ensure that the staff of the Red Cross from top to bottom is re-
172 TNA:PRO FO 916/2577 – Parliamentary Questions, Knox to Eden, 10 December 1940.
173 TNA:PRO PREM 4/98/1 – Coombe-Tennant to Clementine Churchill, 20 November 1940.
174 BRC Report, vol.1, pp.328-329, TNA:PRO FO 916/2577 – WO Minute, 3 January 1941.
175 TNA:PRO PREM 4/98/1 – Coombe-Tennant Report, 4 January 1941.organised to include people who have knowledge of business affairs rather 
than amateurs’.
176 
This question is revealing on two levels. Not only does its confrontational 
nature suggest exasperation at the failures of the BRC, but the presumption 
that a cabinet minister had the authority to re-arrange the composition of a 
neutral non-governmental body indicates that there were some in Parliament 
– most of the critics in fact – who grossly misinterpreted the BRC’s 
relationship to the British government and, indeed, its level of culpability in 
the POW crisis. 
A common misconception amongst critics was the extent of information to 
which the BRC was privy. Alfred Knox, for example, claimed that from August 
to October the BRC had been despatching parcels at a rate insufficient to 
cater for the 44,000 British POWs, a claim that rested on the faulty premise 
that the BRC actually knew the total number of prisoners before it was first 
revealed to the public in early November.
177 Another erroneous view centred 
around the actual role of the BRC in the parcel delivery system, which was 
understood to be more wide-reaching then it really was. Few critics realised, 
for example, that the BRC’s primary duty in the distribution of relief to POWs 
was simply receiving goods and packing them into parcels – a task which its 
performed to the best of its ability given the circumstances. 
Although transport on the continent was a BRC concern, its influence on the 
efficiency of the transport system, or lack thereof, was minimal. The duty of 
planning and supervising the route fell to the ICRC, whilst the actual 
176 Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, p.18, 24 citing Hansard, Commons, vol.368, pp.777-79, 5 
February 1941.
177 BRC Report, vol.1, p.334.despatching of the parcels was the task of the Post Office, a fact that was not 
publicly admitted by the British government until January 1941. As Rolf has 
argued, the reason for this was that in late 1940, at the height of public 
criticism, the British were happy to have the BRC and the ICRC portrayed as 
the hapless architects of the disaster.
178 
For its part the ICRC knew that such criticism was likely from a very early 
stage in the crisis. As early as July Haccius was hard at work making efforts to 
re-assure public opinion in Britain that the ICRC was not responsible for 
Whitehall’s clumsy POW policies. This act of public relations by the Committee 
was complementary, rather than central, to the ICRC’s strategy for handling 
the POW crisis – a strategy that was built from the notion that the best way to 
temper public opinion was actually to do something practical to address the 
complaints over POW welfare. Accordingly, Haccius advised Geneva to 
continue pressing the Ministry of Economic Warfare for concessions to the 
economic blockade in order to allow a greater quantity of collective parcels to 
be despatched from Switzerland to the camps.
179 As detailed above, the 
problem with this strategy was that its success depended on the lines of 
communication and parcel transportation being efficient – an unrealistic 
prospect for most of 1940. The ICRC’s response to the crisis, though noble, 
was undoubtedly more wishful than practical. As such, it did not take long for 
the Committee to be dragged into the scandal.
The public’s misunderstanding of Geneva’s relationship to the BRC – a mis-
understanding that was encouraged by Whitehall – implicated the ICRC. 
However, owing to the Committee’s physical distance from Britain, it was the 
178 Ibid, pp.333-335; Rolf, 'Blind Bureaucracy', pp.51-52.
179 The details of the ICRC’s scheme were not officially approved by the MEW until December 
1940 – ICRC:G3/3B/44-2 – Haccius to ICRC, 22 July 1940; ICRC:G85/1047 – ICRC to MEW, 5 
December 1940.London-based BRC that bore the brunt of the criticism. This is evidenced by 
the fact that it was not until Marcel Junod and another senior ICRC delegate, 
Lucie Odier, visited London in April 1941, that the ICRC specifically was 
targeted for criticism. So threatening was this criticism that the presence of 
Odier and Junod in Britain had to be kept secret from the press for fear of re-
igniting public anger on the issue.
180 
Without the benefit of geographical separation, the BRC stood firmly in the 
public’s firing line as the new year began. Mindful of the public’s need to 
actually see something done on the POW issue and also, perhaps, of Garro 
Jones’ suggestion in December that the BRC be re-organised, in January 1941 
David Margesson proposed to Sir Philip Chetwode at the BRC that a managing 
director for the Red Cross’ POW division be appointed from outside the 
organisation. The candidate put forward was Stanley Adams, Chairman of 
Thomas Cook and Son travel agents and, purportedly, an expert on all 
continental transportation matters.
181
As stated above, the idea that the British government had a right to interfere 
in the administration of the Red Cross was dubious – even the Foreign Office 
itself admitted that ‘the British Red Cross is an organisation independent of all 
government control’.
182 The BRC held staunchly to this view and as early as 
August 1940 Odier, upon meeting with the BRC, had observed that ‘the British 
Red Cross fears interventions of the FO in Red Cross matters’.
183 The British 
government’s allocation of blame for the POW fiasco did little to quell these 
180 TNA:PRO FO 916/112 – FO Report on Odier and Junod Visit, 7 April 1941.
181 Adams had initially been asked to simply do a report on the BRC’s procedures, but, having 
completed his recommendations in late January, was assigned full-time to the BRC as an 
administrator – TNA:PRO WO 32/14423 – Adams to Cripps, 10 March 1942.
182 TNA:PRO PREM 4/98/1 – Interdepartmental Memo on BRC, 1 January 1941.
183 ICRC:G3/22/80 – Odier Report on visit to London July-August 1940, undated.fears, even when the idea of complying with Whitehall’s wishes held the 
possibility of helping the BRC’s image. When, for example, the BRC was 
instructed in November to run all POW information by the DPW before 
releasing it to the public – the aim being to ensure both parties had their facts 
in order – Chetwode stubbornly replied that ‘we must and will publish what we 
like, provided the censor passes it in the ordinary manner’.
184 
It is a measure of the severity of the BRC’s publicity problems that this 
defiance subsided when presented with the Stanley Adams option two months 
later. From the outset, however, it was clear that some in the BRC still 
resented Adams’ appointment and regarded it as evidence of both Whitehall’s 
lack of confidence in, and desire to control, the Red Cross. These reservations 
were exacerbated at the first meeting between Adams and the BRC 
leadership. Adams demanded that funds be injected from BRC coffers to 
Thomas Cook travel and that he should be given ‘complete control of the 
Prisoners of War Department’. Both requests were denied.
185 
Contributing to the feeling of resentment amongst the BRC leadership was the 
fact that by the time of Adams’ official appointment on 26 January they 
believed that they had been able to bring the parcel situation under some 
measure of control. The BRC's 1942 report stated that ‘Mr. Adams took over 
once the back of the main difficulties had been broken, and parcels had begun 
to arrive regularly by the new sea route’. That being the case, ‘his main 
activity was expediting arrangements already instituted’.
186
184 TNA:PRO WO 258/14 – Chetwode to Grigg, 13 November 1940.
185 TNA:PRO WO 32/14423 – Stanley Adams’ Terms of Appointment, 26 January 1941.
186 Ibid – BRC Report on Parcel Delivery, 5 March 1942.The BRC can be forgiven for being so defensive. Although far from perfect, 
the parcel system was indeed enjoying improvements at the time of Adams’ 
appointment, thanks in no small part to the ICRC’s newly opened Lisbon-
Marseilles line.
187 Moreover, the BRC leadership had certainly acquitted itself 
as best it could under difficult circumstances. It had chosen to stay in London 
and organise the packing centres rather than relocate during the height of the 
Blitz. It had sent Judith Jackson to Portugal to liaise with the ICRC on the 
matter of security and transport in Lisbon and yet it was the BRC that, owing 
to the manoeuvring of the British government, shouldered much of the blame 
for the parcel problem in the eyes of the public.
This allocation of blame became even more unreasonable once Adams took 
up his post and, as even the BRC had to admit, began to enjoy success in 
his policy of improving both the sources of supply and stockpiles of parcels 
in Geneva.
188 By the end of 1941, however, the problems over jurisdiction 
within the Society’s leadership had escalated and Adams, who was 
‘conscious of the manner in which my authority is being whittled down’, 
resigned from his post on 10 February 1942.
189 A month later the Lord 
Privy Seal Sir Stafford Cripps launched an official inquiry into Adams’ 
tenure, which largely confirmed the BRC’s conclusion in early 1941 that by 
187 The Lisbon-Marseilles line was in a state of improvement throughout the early months of 1941 
as the ICRC attempted to clear the backlog of parcels held up since the autumn of 1940. One of 
the biggest success was that of the timely arrival of a large consignment of parcels in January 
1941, which helped boost Geneva’s rapidly depleting stockpile of 20,000 parcels. As the line 
improved, Adams was able to further increase this stockpile to 300,000 by June of that year – 
BRC Report, vol.1, p.262.
188 The BRC admitted that Adams had ‘intensified the policy of obtaining food supplies from 
Canada’ and ‘employed more commercial firms to increase the output’ of the parcel stockpile in 
Geneva – TNA:PRO WO 32/14423 – BRC Report on Parcel Delivery, 5 March 1942. On Adams’ 
advice Lord Clarendon also wrote to the Swiss Federal Railways asking them to inspect their 
transport system in order to assess any problems with the on-carriage of parcels, to which the 
Swiss agreed to send a representative with engineering knowledge to the Swiss/French border – 
TNA:PRO FO 916/32 – Lord Clarendon to Swiss Federal Railways, 28 January 1941.
189 TNA:PRO CAB 127/168 – Adams to Cripps, 6 March 1942; TNA:PRO WO 32/14423 – Adams to 
Howard-Vyse, 22 January 1942; Adams to Chetwode, 10 February 1942.the time Adams was appointed it had the situation well in hand.
190 The 
question therefore presents itself, why did the British government insist on 
Adams’ appointment?
Ostensibly, the answer to this question is obvious: the appointment of 
Adams was designed to make both the BRC and Whitehall appear to the 
public as active and organised in dealing with the POW problem. But if 
parcel delivery was already improving prior to Adams’ appointment, why 
did the British not make this knowledge public? The answer lies in the 
British government’s failure in early 1941 to gauge the extent to which 
both the BRC and the ICRC were working to improve the situation. In part 
this lack of appreciation was due to mistrust, forged in the finger-pointing 
environment that had been created by the public’s scrutiny. Aside from 
this, however, Whitehall’s ignorance was born of more practical problems, 
namely the bureaucratic quagmire that had been formed over the course of 
1940 between the ICRC, the BRC and the British government.
Although POW information had at last started to flow into Britain in early 
1941, its rate of receipt was inconsistent and the channels of communication, 
through which it was transferred and analysed, hopelessly muddled. 
Regarding the former issue, the problem lay in the fact that the information 
that should have been received systematically during the autumn of 1940 was 
instead reaching London months later in a confusing mess of POW lists, camp 
names and inspection reports. Although the disruptions to continental 
communications were in part to blame for this, the Germans also contributed 
to be problem by being less than forthcoming in fleshing out the snippets of 
information that were received, particularly on matters of great importance 
such as prisoner and camp names. 
190 TNA:PRO CAB 127/166 – Cripps Report on Stanley Adams, undated.A prime example of this problem can be seen in the British attempts to clarify 
such basic information as the numbers and names of those captured in 
Belgium and France in June 1940. In December the Foreign Office pressed the 
US Embassy in Berlin to take the matter up with the Germans, yet, despite 
assurances from the OKW that the information would be communicated on 
‘the first of the new year’, the issue dragged on until March.
191 When answers 
were given to queries over those captured, they often spawned new and more 
pertinent questions. Along with the names of those transferred to permanent 
Stalags, there came a compilation of prisoner accounts detailing mistreatment 
during the marches to the Dulags during the summer of 1940. When these 
accounts were finally received by the Foreign Office in early 1941 it appealed 
to the German government for an investigation into the issue, to which Berlin 
was able to reply with some conviction that too much time had elapsed since 
the date of the offences for a thorough investigation to be carried out.
192 
In the face of this obfuscation the British government’s appetite for 
clarification, both for themselves and perhaps more importantly for the 
benefit of its disgruntled public, grew. So desperate was Whitehall that Halifax 
even suggested the quite unrealistic measure that the Protecting Power 
should increase its rate of inspections to once a week.
193 This request was not 
met and so once again the ICRC’s capacity to inspect camps was brought to 
the forefront of British considerations. It was this desire for information 
amidst an environment of mistrust and accusations of blame that formed the 
basis of British-ICRC relations in early 1941. 
191 TNA:PRO FO 916/133 – US Embassy to FO,  3 January 1941; FO to US Embassy, 5 March 1941.
192 TNA:PRO WO 32/18499 – Supplement to FO to MI9, 12 March 1941; MI9 Minute, 21 February 
1941.
193 TNA:PRO FO 916/2576 – WO to FO, 7 December 1940. In January this was amended to a 
request for monthly inspections – TNA:PRO FO 916/32 – WO to FO, 30 January 1941.In theory, British reliance on the Committee should have helped relations. 
Past experiences had proved that the ICRC was very useful at collecting such 
information. It will be recalled that the ICRC’s inspectors had responded 
swiftly and efficiently to the British request for camp inspections in July 1940. 
A similar situation had arisen in October when the US Embassy in Berlin 
conceded that ‘permission for visits to places of detention of prisoners of war 
in Belgium had not yet been accorded either to a member of the Embassy 
staff or to the American consular officers at Brussels and Antwerp’.
194 Owing 
to his good relations with the Germans, however, Marcel Junod was able to 
gain access to certain camps and hospitals in Belgium. As a result in 
December Alan Hunter expressed the opinion that the ICRC was a faster 
channel for receiving information than the Protecting Power.
195 
In January 1941 this particular act of service by Junod was raised by Harold 
Satow at the Foreign Office when he wrote on behalf of Anthony Eden to 
Chenevière, praising the ICRC’s energy and ability in inspecting those camps 
and hospitals to which the US inspectors were unable to gain access. The 
clear message was that the continuance of such services would be greatly 
appreciated.
196
The ICRC was happy to oblige for two reasons. Firstly, it viewed the 
inspections as an opportunity to repair some of the damage done to its image 
over the course of the winter. Secondly, the ICRC was confident in its ability 
to carry out the inspections. This was owing to the fact that whilst the BRC 
and the British government squabbled over who was to blame for the POW 
194 TNA:PRO FO 916/2579 – Protecting Power Report to FO, 22 October 1940.
195 TNA:PRO FO  916/2577 – Hunter to Warner, 10 December 1940.
196 TNA:PRO FO 916/133 – Satow to Chenevière, 22 January 1941.crisis, the ICRC kept itself busy trying to sort out the practical difficulties of 
the POW reporting problem.
In addition to pursuing the negotiations for telegram funding detailed above, 
in December the delegates worked to improve contact between prisoners and 
the outside world by obtaining agreement from the Germans for a minimum 
of two letters and four postcards a month for each POW.
197 Geneva also 
worked to improve its own means of collecting POW information by 
permanently installing four delegates in Berlin to act as camp inspectors and 
information gatherers. The means by which this information was analysed was 
also reviewed, leading the ICRC to set up a liaison staff within its Geneva 
headquarters in order to facilitate the dissemination of the information to the 
various departments. The Committee was therefore prepared, at least on 
paper, to meet British demands.
198
There was, however, a problem. Although the system of information gathering 
was improving, the distribution of the information from the ICRC to Britain 
was still very poor. This problem began in Geneva where, despite the 
aforementioned improvements in the ICRC's capacity to gather information, 
the actual process of forwarding it to Whitehall and the BRC was still well 
below expectations. As Burckhardt’s request to David Kelly in December and 
Odier’s hints to Nicholls at MEW in September make clear, the ICRC’s 
perception was that an injection of extra funds in order to ‘reduce to the 
lowest possible minimum their administrative expenses'
199 would help 
matters. There may have been some validity to these claims, however, no 
197 A new postal branch for the benefit of prisoners in the Middle East was also established in Port 
Said by the ICRC – ICRC Report, vol.1, pp.348-350.
198 Ibid, vol.1, p.144 
199 ICRC:G85/1047 – Odier to Nicholls, 1 September 1941; TNA:PRO FO 916/2587 – Kelly to FO, 26 
December 1940.amount of money could remedy the basic problem the ICRC faced in having to 
process so much information so quickly. Lists of wounded and missing in 
particular proved confusing to analyse, as they were received by three 
different methods, telegrams, air mail and regular post. As such the 
information would ‘arrive at different intervals and their contents (would) 
overlap’.
200 
The results of this can be seen in one of the more farcical episodes of ICRC 
communications in May 1941 when, in response to a query from the 
Committee on the status of an allied airman, a puzzled BRC staffer had to 
point out that the information on the prisoner had originally been sent to the 
BRC some weeks earlier by the Central Agency in Geneva.
201 In terms of 
British-ICRC relations the effect of this problem was felt on the ground in 
London by Haccius, who was so frustrated by the tardiness of communications 
that he felt the need to nit-pick with his bosses over the inconsistency of their 
telegram numbering.
202 One can hardly blame Haccius for being on edge. 
Unlike the ICRC’s leadership he had been in London during the POW scandal 
and had seen first hand the results of failure on the POW issue. Moreover, as 
chief liaison between Geneva and the POW departments in Whitehall, Haccius 
understood that both his reputation, and that of the ICRC, would come under 
fire if the communication problems continued. 
Having launched several appeals for POW information to Geneva in December, 
he angrily wrote to Lucie Odier that ‘after ten days the information needed to 
reassure public opinion is still missing’ and that, as a result, ‘the current 
200 ICRC:G85/1047 – ICRC to London, 5 January 1941.
201 ICRC:G85/1098 – J.S Warner to ICRC, 9 May 1941.
202 ICRC:G3/3B/44-2 – Haccius to Duchosal, 17 January 1941.controversy has placed my position in peril’.
203 As we shall see this conjecture 
was misplaced, however, the fact remains that liaison between Whitehall and 
Geneva was so poor at this time that Haccius genuinely feared that his role 
would soon become obsolete. 
Part of the reason why the British did not treat Haccius as harshly as he 
expected may have been that they were distracted by their own problems in 
handling POW information. These problems concerned individual official’s 
knowledge, or lack thereof, of where the information was to be sent once 
received. As late as 1 January 1941 – over six months after the reorganisation 
of the British prisoner of war administration – the need was felt for a memo to 
be circulated in Whitehall outlining both the role of the BRC and the 
communication procedures between them and the PWD.
204
Amazingly, even after this effort at clarification, there was still confusion over 
the most basic principles of disseminating information. For example, despite 
the PWD being designated the preferred channel of communication with the 
Committee as far back as the beginning of 1940, Alan Hunter still expressed 
annoyance at both Haccius and the PWD for passing information through this 
official channel without his prior consultation.
205 Similar confusion over 
jurisdiction arose when the DPW received a request from the Army Council ‘to 
obtain information as to the methods by which the ICRC transmit and 
distribute supplies to British Prisoner of War Camps in Germany’. In addition 
to not being able to provide the answer to this basic question the DPW, rather 
than ask the PWD or the Committee directly, either via Haccius in London or 
direct cable to Geneva, instead forwarded the query to the BRC. Three days 
203 Ibid – Haccius to Odier, 17 December 1940.
204 TNA:PRO PREM 4/98/1 – Interdepartmental Memo on BRC, 1 January 1941.
205 ICRC:G85/1047 – Dunbar to Haccius, 2 February 1940; TNA:PRO FO 916/32 – Hunter To Satow, 
9 January 1941; Hunter to Warner, 25 January 1941; Satow to Hunter, 28 January 1941.later the BRC replied that it had submitted the question to Geneva 
presumably because it too did not have a clear answer.
206 
Exacerbating this communication problem was the attitude of the BRC, which 
responded to the criticism it endured by becoming more demanding, territorial 
and, most frustratingly of all for Whitehall and the ICRC, insistent upon being 
involved in facets of POW welfare that were not its concern.
207 In the course of 
the farcical communications with the Army Council mentioned above, for 
example, the BRC also put in a request to the ICRC for the latter to organise 
‘for the Camp Leader in every Prison Camp to report to them twice a month, 
in a form provided by us, full details of the number and nature of and source 
of all parcels or bulk supplies that have arrived’.
208 Although the BRC had an 
interest in making sure that the parcels it despatched were received, such 
reporting was supposed to be handled by the Protecting Power and the DPW. 
By the BRC’s own admission the ‘Red Cross had no responsibility whatever 
after handing the parcels over to the Post Office’
209 and its attempts, in the 
words of George Warner, to ‘rather complicate matters by asking camp 
captains to send separate reports to the International Committee’,
210 only 
served to exacerbate pre-existing communication problems by adding 
needlessly to the already confusing and antagonistic environment in London. 
The BRC’s attitude, however, was not without a benefit for the ICRC, which by 
comparison was regarded by some in Whitehall as the less insufferable of the 
two Red Cross organisations. When for example, the BRC proposed in June 
1941 to appoint a permanent member of its staff to Geneva to liaise with the 
206 ICRC:G3/3B/44-2 – WO to BRC, 11 January 1941; BRC to WO 14 January 1941.
207 Rolf, 'Blind Bureaucracy', p.54.
208 ICRC:G3/3B/44-2 – BRC to WO 14 January 1941.
209 TNA:PRO WO 32/14423 – BRC Report on Parcel Delivery, 5 March 1942.
210 TNA:PRO FO 916/112 – George Warner to S.J. Warner, 26 February 1941.ICRC on the matter of parcel distribution, Whitehall received the idea coolly. 
The PWD’s Walter Roberts, in particular, felt that ‘the British Red Cross 
Society have not the necessary qualifications for action generally as the 
channel between the government and the public on prisoner of war matters.’
211 In Roberts’ view the BRC was a ‘pale shadow of its more brilliant rival, the 
ICRC’ and, moreover, ‘had played only a minor role in the war’.
212 David 
Kelly’s reservations were of a more informed and justified variety, yet still 
they gave the impression that the ICRC was a preferable option. Kelly 
believed that the workload in Geneva was too small for the BRC to appoint a 
delegate and that, owing to their good relations with the ICRC, the British 
embassy staff could handle the task of liaison themselves.
213 
This is not to suggest that 1941 heralded a new chapter of acceptance of the 
ICRC by Whitehall. Walter Roberts was only one man amongst many ICRC 
critics at the Foreign Office and it is likely that David Kelly’s favourable 
assessment of Geneva’s capabilities was based more on his own personal 
friendship with Carl Burckhardt than any wider appreciation of the Committee 
as a whole.
214 Despite those who spoke in favour of the ICRC during the POW 
crisis of the summer, the public outcry and the muddled reception of the 
Committee’s efforts to improve POW reporting over the winter still cast a 
shadow over British-ICRC relations. 
Notably, it was the ICRC that was first to extend an olive branch once the 
dust of 1940 had settled. This came in the form of a proposal for a visit to 
211 TNA:PRO FO 916/15 – Roberts Minute, 13 June 1941.
212 TNA:PRO FO 916/113 – Roberts Minute, 15 October 1941.
213 Ibid – Berne to FO, 31 July 1941; Kennedy to Roberts, 16 October 1941.
214 Kelly had been a party to Burckhardt's peace schemes as late as July 1940 – TNA:PRO FO 
371/24407 – Kelly to FO, 8 July 1940. For Burckhardt and Kelly referring to each other as ‘mon 
cher’ and ‘cher ami’ in official and private correspondence see ICRC:G85/1047.London by Marcel Junod and Lucie Odier in January 1941, the purpose being 
to assess the problems that had arisen since the fall of France and, where 
possible, to find solutions and improve general relations. 
It is a testament to how bad those relations were that initially the proposal 
itself was not welcomed by either the British government or the BRC. In the 
case of the latter, the manner in which it had heard about the proposed visit – 
‘casually from one of our government departments’ – was enough to irritate 
the BRC leadership, who once again felt they were being excluded. The BRC 
also feared that the ICRC’s delegates would bring with them a resurgence of 
bad publicity for both Red Cross organisations at a time when they were 
getting their parcel operations and with it their image, back in order. As a 
consequence a warning was sent from the BRC leadership to Max Huber ‘that 
anyone coming to this country on behalf of your Committee should be able to 
answer questions on the subject of POWs’.
215 This was not a one-off concern 
for the BRC, which sought to ‘prepare answers for Parliamentary questions 
dealing with matters concerning the International Red Cross Committee’ in an 
effort once again to control events and negate public criticism.
216 
The British government was similarly unimpressed by the proposal for Junod 
and Odier’s visit and, like the BRC, feared that their guilt by association with 
the “incompetent” ICRC would once again give rise to criticism in the press.
217 
Beyond the publicity issue, however, there were more complex reasons for 
the British reluctance – reasons that greatly highlight the level of 
215 ICRC:G85/1098 – John Kennedy to Huber, 24 January 1941. 
216 TNA:PRO FO 916/115 – BRC to WO, 14 May 1941.
217 Kochavi argues that the public’s perception of the British government as being tied to the ICRC 
might have led certain MPs, in particular Anthony Eden, to defend the ICRC in parliament. It 
stands to reason that those MPs who didn’t support the ICRC would be nervous about 
Whitehall’s association with them – Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, p.26.misunderstanding about the ICRC that was still prevalent in Whitehall’s 
prisoner of war departments. 
Alan Hunter, who opined to a similarly confused George Warner that his ‘own 
reactions are much against such a visit’, was still unsure as to whether, as a 
camp inspector, Junod’s presence on British soil would infringe on the rights 
and responsibilities of the Protecting Power.
218 Moreover, Hunter used this 
concern to justify his anxiety over Junod’s intention to visit British POW camps 
holding German internees. This was an unnecessary fear for, as David Kelly 
pointed out to the Foreign Office, Hunter’s original interpretation of the ICRC 
proposal was both alarmist and askew. ‘The Committee’ wrote Kelly on 16 
January, ‘do not propose Dr. Junod should visit German camps in the United 
Kingdom. Primary object as previously reported in contact with M. Haccius 
who informed Committee that you are definitely out of touch owing to 
communication difficulties’.
219
This was a very apt observation by Kelly, but Hunter, it seems, was also out 
of touch in other ways and his reluctance to let Junod into the British camps 
was completely unjustified. Although conditions in Germany may have been 
varied and at times dangerous for internees, camps in Britain were regarded 
throughout the war by the ICRC as both well run and, despite occasional 
lapses in the quality and quantity of food and heating, generally well 
maintained.
220 Given this, the only conclusion to draw from Hunter’s 
218 TNA:PRO FO 916/112 – Hunter to Warner, 3 January 1941.
219 Underline in original – Ibid – Berne to FO, 16 January 1941.
220 Calorie intake in camps varied from 3300 to 3400 per day. There were slight indiscretions by 
camp authorities in 1944 over a lack of blankets and sufficient heating in some camps, but these 
were quickly remedied after the intervention of the ICRC - ICRC Report, vol.1, pp.257-58, 269. 
Haccius reported in 1942 that his only concern was the disappearance of food parcels, possibly 
pilfered by British guards – ICRC:D-EUR/GB1-26 – Haccius to Gepp, 11 April 1942. By mid 1944 
the ICRC felt that the only concern for German POWs in Britain was boredom, many prisoners 
having their requests for boxing gloves, footballs and German language books refused by the 
DPW – ICRC:D-EUR/GB1-51 – ICRC London Internal Memo, 14 June 1944.reservations was that he was either unaware of the desire of the Foreign 
Office to keep the ICRC active in POW camp inspections – which required 
reciprocal inspections to camps in Britain – or was equally unaware that 
conditions of British camps were such that they did not warrant his concerns. 
Either way Hunter, the head of the DPW, was clearly ill-informed on crucial 
matters pertaining to the running of his office.
Another area in which Hunter and Warner showed confusion was in their 
curious perception that the respective ICRC delegates in each country were 
somehow “attached” to the interests of the country in which they were based. 
Both men seemed to have viewed Junod – who was based in France and 
Germany – as somehow working in the interests of Berlin and so Hunter ran 
the idea of Junod’s visit past Military Intelligence. They cleared Junod for the 
visit provided that he ‘is prepared to take our decision as to where he may 
and may not go’. Hunter also insisted on reciprocity for Haccius whom he 
assumed had fallen out of favour with the Committee and so would be 
swapping assignments with Junod and thus taking over inspecting camps in 
Germany.
221 Not only was this another misinterpretation but, as mentioned 
above, reciprocity was a needless demand given that it was implicit in any 
such arrangement. Hunter should have, yet did not, understand this and so 
felt the need to make it a condition of Junod’s visit. Understandably Carl 
Burckhardt thought this odd and felt obliged to clarify Hunter’s many 
‘misunderstandings of intentions’ to David Kelly before the visit could go 
ahead.
222
221 TNA:PRO FO 916/112 – Hunter to Warner, 3 January 1941; Warner To Hunter, 13 February 
1941. Warner did not even like the idea of Haccius being sent an assistant to cope with the 
increased workload at the London delegation – Warner To Hunter, 18 February 1941.
222 Ibid – Berne to FO, 16 January 1941.Despite Burckhardt’s attempt to clarify the matter and the subsequent 
guarantee of reciprocity, Hunter’s anxiety over Junod replacing Haccius 
continued to affect his interpretation of the ICRC’s proposal. For Hunter, the 
notion of Haccius being sent back to Geneva was a ‘tragedy’, given that he 
viewed Haccius as ‘an International Delegate, accredited to FO (and to DPW) 
for a particular purpose’.
223 To Hunter’s evidently possessive mind, the 
Committee’s visit would lead to him losing “his” ICRC delegate and as such he 
needlessly resisted the proposal. The reason for Hunter’s resistance to 
Haccius’ removal provides a telling example of how the ICRC fitted into the 
running of Whitehall’s POW departments. 
Hunter’s possessiveness over Haccius was not born of affection or 
appreciation. His immediate concern over Junod’s visit to London was that 
Haccius ‘might have his scope limited’ by the presence of a more senior ICRC 
delegate who, unlike Haccius, ‘had the ear of the Central Council (of the 
ICRC)’.
224 Compared with such a heavyweight, Haccius was deemed by Hunter 
to be ‘not a very live wire’
225 and so could be better manipulated. The 
importance of this perception in the winter of 1940-41 lay in the on-going 
contretemps between the BRC and the British government. In the midst of 
this dispute ‘Haccius’, wrote Hunter in a revealing letter to Warner, ‘must not 
be used as a cat’s-paw’ of the BRC, who ‘should find their own servants’.
226 
Such language indicates that, what Odier regarded in 1940 as a British 
appreciation of Haccius’ ‘lively intelligence’
227 and what Haccius saw with equal 
223 Ibid – Hunter to Warner, 8 January 1941; Hunter to Warner, 3 January 1941.
224 Ibid – Hunter to Warner, 3 January 1941.
225 Ibid – Hunter to Warner, 21 February 1941.
226 Ibid – Hunter to Warner, 8 January 1941.
227 ICRC:G3/22/80 – Odier Report on July-August visit to London, undated.naïveté as Hunter’s ‘necessary confidence’ in his ‘standing’
228 in London, was 
in fact the type of possessiveness a master might develop over a particularly 
acquiescent servant. A servant, moreover, who the British felt they could 
count on if need be in their disagreements with the BRC. This perception of 
Haccius stands as yet another example of how Whitehall’s POW departments 
misinterpreted the ICRC’s relationship with the British government and 
indeed, the nature of the delegate in their midst. 
Although he was at pains to maintain cordiality in his dealings with Hunter 
and Warner and to uphold efficiency in his duties in London, Haccius was by 
no means a slave to British interests. In addition to his aforementioned 
criticisms of Warner and the various POW departments in the summer of 
1940, Haccius also made regular reports back to Geneva which were either 
beyond the scope of his mandate, or, in some instances, in direct violation of 
British wishes. For example, when told in confidence by Hunter in October of 
the US inspectors’ difficulties in getting into certain camps, Haccius defied the 
former’s insistence on confidentiality and reported the intelligence 
immediately to Geneva, presumably to notify the Committee that its services 
may be required.
229 
More intriguingly, in October 1940 Haccius also passed on the highly irregular 
impression to the ICRC leadership that the British were planning a ‘major 
aerial offensive’ against Germany in late February 1941. The purpose of 
transmitting such sensitive information is unclear, but given that the passing 
of this intelligence was a one time occurrence that was appended almost as 
228 ICRC:G3/3B/44-3 – Haccius to ICRC, 18 February 1941.
229 ICRC:G3/3B/44-2 – Haccius to ICRC, 9 October 1940.an afterthought to a lengthy report on POW matters, it is unlikely that Haccius 
had any sinister intentions.
230
What such indiscretions indicate, however, is that Haccius was not averse to 
conveying “non-humanitarian” information back to Geneva. Indeed, the 
Haccius file at the ICRC Archives contains many telegrams and reports, 
particularly during the period of heightened tensions over the winter of 
1940-41, which dealt specifically with the publicity issues, the impact of the 
‘state of nervousness at the headquarters of the BRC’ and general diplomatic 
relations between himself, the BRC and the British government.
231 The 
resulting insight granted the ICRC leadership by these reports – and with it 
the knowledge to decide to stay out of Whitehall’s blame game with the BRC – 
was akin to that which governments receive from their foreign embassies. 
This was a peculiar practice for a supposedly non-politicised entity such as the 
ICRC. 
It is a measure of how little Hunter understood this side of Haccius that when 
it became clear that the latter was not necessarily “working” for the British, 
Hunter responded with a blend of anger and paranoia. This situation arose in 
mid January when the British censor intercepted a telegram from ICRC 
headquarters to Haccius instructing him, again much like the Foreign Office 
would instruct an overseas diplomat, to maintain ‘discretion’ and to ‘sound 
230 Interestingly, Haccius’ information was somewhat accurate. Hanover was bombed the day 
after he sent his communiqué and from early February Bomber Command began a campaign 
specifically targeting German oil plants – Ibid – Haccius to ICRC, 8 October 1940; Simon Read, The 
Killing Skies: RAF Bomber Command at War (Port Stroud, 2006), pp.47-48.
231 For reports on the composition of the prisoner of war services in Britain see ICRC:G3/3B/44-1 – 
Haccius to ICRC, 29 June 1940; 14 August 1940. For report on an interview with Sir Philip 
Chetwode at the BRC see ICRC:G3/3B/44-2 – Haccius to ICRC, 14 January 1941. A summary 
marked ‘confidential’, of discussions with Hunter and Warner on Haccius’ proposed journey to 
Geneva can be found in ICRC:G3/3B/44-3 – Haccius to ICRC, 18 February 1941. Haccius reported 
on the parliamentary debates and the various opinions of British officials regarding the public 
criticisms in ICRC:G3/3B/44-2 – Haccius to ICRC, 28 November 1940.out’ the British over the proposed Junod visit. Incensed by this, Hunter wrote 
to Warner that he ‘did not like the tone of the telegram from the International 
Red Cross to Haccius. I feel there is something behind the whole move’. What 
that “something” was, Hunter did not make precisely clear. He did go on, 
however, to suggest that it ‘is not at all clear at the moment as to who is 
actually behind the suggestion of the International Red Cross that Dr. Junod 
should visit this country’.
232
The wording clearly indicates that Hunter thought a third party was involved 
in Junod’s mission. Although he didn’t state as much outright, Hunter’s 
subsequent letter to Warner a month later indicated that he suspected 
interference from the BRC.
233 The Foreign Office was similarly suspicious and 
Warner agreed with Hunter’s assessment of BRC influence, having been 
informed by Harold Satow earlier that day of the Postal Censor’s concerns 
over the BRC using the Swiss diplomatic bag – which Haccius alone was 
authorised to use – to send confidential correspondence direct to Geneva.
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If this were true then it would not be surprising. The BRC was as eager as 
Whitehall to gain as much information as possible on the numbers of parcels 
despatched and, moreover, the effect these parcels were having on conditions 
within the camps. Owing to the convoluted means of acquiring this 
information from the British government, the BRC sought answers either from 
prisoners’ letters home, or directly from Geneva, which obliged by sending 
Stanley Adams updates on the numbers of parcels despatched and those kept 
in reserve during the early months of his tenure.
235 This indicates that in early 
232 TNA:PRO FO 916/112 – Hunter to Warner, 19 January 1941.
233 Ibid – Hunter to Warner, 21 February 1941.
234 TNA:PRO FO 916/115 – Satow to Warner, 21 February 1941.
235 BRC Report, vol.1, pp.268-270.1941 the BRC was as loathe to co-operate with Whitehall as the latter was 
with it. The BRC’s attitude towards the ICRC as the lesser of two evils – 
provided of course, that it keep out of the headlines – echoed the view of the 
British government.
As a testament to the damage done over the course of the previous year, 
however, even these apparently “good” relations with the ICRC suffered from 
the BRC’s fear of exclusion. The ICRC’s Report is, unsurprisingly, coy on this 
issue. Communication difficulties with the British government, for example, 
are briefly acknowledged only insofar as they pertain to general problems 
caused by the physical disintegration of continental communications and the 
encirclement of Switzerland in the summer of 1940.
236 Regarding the BRC, the 
report specifies no particular National Red Cross Society, yet makes plain that 
‘some of the National Societies were disturbed to find that, side by side with 
their contacts with the Committee, the ICRC was in direct and regular touch 
with the government of their own countries on questions of importance’.
237
This was certainly true of the BRC, which in August 1941 complained to the 
ICRC about the Committee’s habit of sending communications directly to 
Whitehall’s POW departments, instead of via, or in addition to, the BRC. This 
grievance was in part born of the BRC’s lack of confidence in the PWD and 
DPW. In the opinion of Stanley Adams, ‘the organisation of these departments 
is such that a letter from you may be received by an individual who has no 
knowledge of the history and traditions of the International Red Cross 
Committee’.
238 This was a deserved criticism. However, it is clear that the 
primary motivation for the BRC’s complaints to the Committee lay in the 
236 ICRC Report, vol.1, pp.139-140.
237 Ibid, vol.1, p.164.
238 ICRC:D-EUR/GB1-56 – Adams to Huber, 21 August 1941.former’s ever present fear of exclusion and the need to maintain the ‘prestige 
and independence of the Red Cross in the minds of the public’, by making 
sure that both organisations conducted their work smoothly and efficiently. As 
both the ICRC and the BRC agreed, the issue boiled down to a lack ‘of mutual 
confidence between the International Red Cross Committee and the British 
Red Cross’.
239
Although this problem was considered by the ICRC, concerns over who 
received what information were, generally speaking, the BRC’s own. Indeed, 
so onerous had the BRC’s attitude become for Geneva by the end of 1941 that 
the Committee’s president, Max Huber – who was far from confrontational – 
felt the need to send a lengthy repost to Stanley Adams. In addition to 
pointing out that extra communications with the BRC would cost money that 
could be better spent elsewhere, Huber also criticised Adams for the latter’s 
implication that in favouring communications with Whitehall the ICRC was in 
some way breaching its own ‘extremely sensitive’ devotion to neutrality. 
Huber replied as he so often did to such accusations, by citing the ICRC’s 
statues, declaring that ‘the International Red Cross Committee is an 
institution independent not only of the Swiss government and the Swiss Red 
Cross but also independent of other governments and institutions, including 
National Red Cross Societies’. Roughly translated, the Committee owed the 
BRC nothing and so would continue to do things its own way.
240 
So the squabbling continued. Moreover, it continued in the wake of Junod and 
Odier’s eventual visit to London in April 1941, during which the issues of 
239 This conclusion was made during talks between Carl Burckhardt and Sir John Kennedy at the 
BRC in December 1941. At this meeting it was agreed that ‘subject raised by the British Red Cross 
direct with Committee will continue to be dealt with through that channel unless both 
correspondents desire to bring in a third party’ – Archives of the British Red Cross Society, 
hereafter BRC, 775-776 – Burckhardt to Huber, 12 December 1941.
240 Ibid – Huber to Adams, 31 October 1941.inadequate communication between the relevant parties, the Foreign Office’s 
tendency to refer matters raised by the ICRC to the Protecting Power and 
concerns over the ‘very unfair’ press campaigns against the Red Cross were 
all addressed.
241 The fact that months later debate was still ongoing over 
which Red Cross agency could use the diplomatic bag, the role of the BRC in 
the transmission of POW information and the value, or lack thereof, of the 
ICRC’s camp reports, indicates that despite the niceties of the visit, little was 
achieved in improving the working relationship of the British and the ICRC.
242 
The legacy of unpreparedness and the subsequent failures of 1940 left a 
blemish on British-ICRC relations that did not fade easily. The military events 
that followed the visit of Junod and Odier in spring 1941, however, provided 
an opportunity to repair some of the damage. Although the problems of poor 
communication and the habitual misunderstanding of intentions continued to 
shadow British-ICRC relations, the efforts of both parties and of the BRC 
during the subsequent POW crisis in Greece and Crete over the summer of 
1941, shows that some progress, however slight, had been made.
LESSONS LEARNED IN “UNHAPPY ARCADIA”
Much like the situation in France in 1940, the capitulation of Greece to the 
Axis in April 1941 brought with it the bulk capture of a large number of British 
and Commonwealth POWs. Although not as vast a number of prisoners as 
that taken in Western Europe, the Axis armies did capture 11,000 prisoners 
241 TNA:PRO FO 916/112 – FO Report to Churchill on visit of Odier and Junod, 7 April 1941.
242 For the issue of the diplomatic bag see TNA:PRO FO 916/115 – Roberts to Burckhardt, 26 
November 1941. For BRC’s role see TNA:PRO FO 916/15 – Roberts Minute, 13 June 1941; 
ICRC:D/EUR/GB1-56 – Memorandum on BRC/ICRC/HMG relations, August 1941. For criticism of 
ICRC camp reports see TNA:PRO FO 916/32 – Satow Minute, 17 July 1941; TNA:PRO FO 916/45 – 
DPW and PWD Memo, 9 December 1941.during the fall of mainland Greece and an additional 12,000 during the 
subsequent Battle for Crete.
243
While the numbers were comparatively smaller, the captured endured similar 
conditions to those the 1940 prisoners had faced. There were forced marches 
and uncomfortable cattle truck rides through the dusty heat of summer to 
either the northern Dulag at Salonika – a converted Greek army barracks 
designated Dulag 185 – or the southern facility at Corinth, Frontstalag 183. 
Both transit camps were appalling both in their construction and 
administration, harbouring the usual cocktail of lice, dysentery, poor 
sanitation and starvation rations. In the other, smaller camps, in Crete these 
conditions were exacerbated by the lack of medical supplies and food rations 
which led to increased instances of infection, dysentery and jaundice amongst 
the wounded prisoners held there.
244 
The physical problems in the Dulags were further compounded by the 
lethargic forwarding of POW information by the camp administrators. So bad 
was the reporting that as late as November 1941 the ICRC was still waiting on 
capture cards for prisoners who, by that time, had been transferred out of 
Greece to permanent camps in Germany.
245 This problem started in Greece 
itself, where the handling of POW camps and hospitals was habitually 
mismanaged by the Italians, which took over the lion’s share of guard duties 
from the more organised, more ruthless, Wehrmacht troops shortly after the 
Allies’ capitulation.
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243 TNA:PRO FO 916/214 – ICRC to ICRC London, 11 July 1941. 
244 TNA:PRO WO 32/18489 – Kelly to FO, 23 December 1941; Adrian Gilbert, POW: Allied 
Prisoners of War in Europe 1939-1945 (London, 2006), p.47.
245 TNA:PRO FO 916/2 – DPW to PWD – 25 November 1941.
246 The peculiar indolence of the Italian camp authorities is noted throughout the ICRC’s Report. 
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forces but also the staff of the Greek Red Cross, whose hospitals at Larissa 
and Jannia were bombed by the Italians at the close of the fighting in May.
247 
In such a brutal atmosphere the rumours which circulated during the Battle 
for Crete, that Commonwealth soldiers had machine-gunned several helpless 
German paratroopers and then left the bodies to rot, was taken at face value.
248 This incident, amongst others, combined with the already harsh nature of 
conditions in the camps resulted in several breaches of the Geneva 
Convention.
At Frontstalag 183, for example, it was reported that on ‘several occasions’ 
German guards would fire into the prisoner’s barracks without provocation.
249 
Similar violations took place at Dulag 185, where on more than one occasion 
prisoners were shot attempting to use the open trench latrines after dark.
250 
According to one estimate, up to fourteen prisoners were killed by such 
‘unnecessary causes’ in Dulag 185, whilst others at Salonika hospital perished 
as a result of sheer neglect and want of supplies.
251
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251 TNA:PRO FO 916/424 – C in C Mediterranean to DPW, 11 July 1942.Although these specific accounts were first revealed in 1942, Whitehall was 
given much earlier indications of what the British adventure in Greece was 
costing its servicemen. As early as 5 May 1941 Haccius received a report from 
Geneva detailing the numbers of those captured and the rate at which they 
were expected to be transferred to permanent camps in Germany. This was 
followed by a second telegram on 19 May which referred to the lack of food 
both for the prisoners and for the entire population of Greece.
252 
These early communications were the first in a succession of crucial reports 
on the situation in Greece provided by Robert Brunel, the Committee’s 
delegate in Athens and a man widely regarded as one of the ICRC’s finest 
servants during the war years. Brunel’s primary achievement in Greece 
pertained to the welfare of the civilian population and will be dealt with at 
length in the next chapter. For now, however, it is essential to focus on the 
importance of his tireless efforts on behalf of Britain’s POWs and, moreover, 
what those efforts tell us about the various lessons learned by the British and 
the ICRC from the previous POW crisis in France.
The first point to make is that unlike France and Belgium, the ICRC already 
had a delegation present in Athens throughout the laborious Italian invasion 
of Greece over the winter of 1940-41. Thus, when in spring 1941 large 
numbers of Allied soldiers began to be taken prisoner, Brunel and his 
delegation were in place and able to gain information on the POW situation at 
a comparatively early stage.
253 As mentioned above, this development should 
252 BRC Report, vol.1, p.399 – The impact of the scarcity of food in Greece on the civilian 
population will be addressed in the next chapter.
253 In response to the Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940, Brunel was sent to Athens on 12 
November. Over the winter months it became apparent that the Italian invasion of Greece was a 
disaster, leading to the intervention of the Wehrmacht in April 1941. It was only from this point 
that great numbers of Allied soldiers began to be taken prisoner, the majority being captured 
after the fall of Kalamata on 29 April – Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.492; Willingham, 
Perilous Commitments, pp.93-96.in no way be credited to the reporting practices of the Axis occupation 
authorities. In theory their indolence should have made things very difficult 
for the ICRC, which relied on the co-operation of Berlin and more so in this 
instance, Rome, to forward POW information, no less than it had in France in 
1940. The difference in Greece a year later was that, in the spirit of Junod and 
Marti’s July visits to the camps in France, Brunel and those under his 
supervision endeavoured from the very beginning to gather the information in 
person rather than patiently wait for the malaise of the Axis authorities to lift.
254 
In order to make these “house calls” to the camps Brunel led by example, 
acquiring trucks from the Greek War Relief organisation to carry both parcels 
and inspectors, one of whom, Brunel himself, visited the Dulags at Corinth 
and Salonika in late May.
255 
This approach was mimicked by those who came after Brunel, notably André 
Lambert, who assumed the role of detective in following up rumours that 
British POWs were being tortured at the notorious Haidari concentration camp 
on the outskirts of Athens. Once he had located the camp Lambert parked his 
parcel-laden truck outside the gates and upon being refused entry, sneaked 
in, only to be forcibly ejected by the guards. Undeterred, he followed the 
prison transport trains in a Greek Red Cross truck, often pulling up alongside 
the carriages at stations in order to force parcels through the slits in the cattle 
carriage doors. It was only once the train at last out-ran him that he was 
informed that the prisoners were not British POWs, but Jews.
256 
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256 Haidari was established in September 1943 as a transit camp for Jews and partisans – Mark 
Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation 1941-44 (New Haven, 1993), 
p.226; Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.396.The seeds of such uncharacteristically forcible action on the part of the ICRC 
were sown in the early weeks of the occupation, when Geneva – which 
recognised the importance of Brunel’s reports in terms of British-ICRC 
relations – urged action in Greece by bombarding Whitehall with as much 
information as possible. The first substantial quantity of information was 
received by the British on 13 June. The report was striking in its detail, in 
particular with regard to Brunel’s 27 May visit to Frontstalag 183. Rather than 
generalised statements about the scarcity of food, gram by gram information 
was presented alongside lists of the limited types of food available, as well as 
details of the numbers of those affected by dysentery and diarrhoea following 
its consumption.
257 A further report on more general conditions throughout 
the POW camps and hospitals of Greece was received on 11 July and once 
again details, not just of the appalling conditions, but of the numbers, 
regiments and names of those suffering, featured throughout.
258 The ICRC 
had clearly learned from France the importance of minutiae in building a 
wider, more informed picture.
What the reports lacked, however, was accurate information on when the 
prisoners would be sent to more permanent and acceptable accommodation in 
Germany. This was not for want of trying, for Brunel did provide rough 
estimates of how many he thought had been transported and when those 
remaining would enjoy similar extraction.
259 The problem was that the actual 
number of those transported was often different to the estimates. This was for 
a number of disruptive reasons, all of which were beyond the control of the 
ICRC. The railway line linking Greece to Yugoslavia and, thence, to Germany 
257 ICRC: G85/1047 – ICRC Cable of Brunel’s Report to ICRC London, 13 June 1941.
258 TNA:PRO FO 916/214 – ICRC to ICRC London, 11 July 1941.
259 Ibid – ICRC to ICRC London, 11 July 1941; Geneva to FO, 9 August 1941.was primarily single gauge and large amounts of rolling stock from the 
Balkans had been confiscated by the Germans for their invasion of the Soviet 
Union. This naturally led to delays in the scheduled extractions, delays that 
the occupation forces neglected to inform the ICRC about.
The process of transit within Greece itself was also inefficient, owing both to 
the damages to roads and, paradoxically, to an act of mercy on the part of 
the occupation forces. This was the general practice of treating the more 
severely wounded prisoners in camp hospitals before sending them off on the 
arduous journey to their permanent camps in Germany. The problem was that 
the poor conditions within these hospitals, plus the lack of food, made the 
recovery process variable and that, combined with the generally maladroit 
organisation of the Axis occupation, meant that the last of the POWs captured 
during the April-May campaign were not removed to Germany until April 
1942.
260
This reality contrasted with the ICRC’s hopeful prediction in July 1941 that all 
of the ’12,000 to 13,000 British’ captured in Crete would soon be transferred 
to Germany.
261 By August these optimistic figures had been revised. 10,000 
POWs were reported to have been taken as far as the hellish Dulag 185 at 
Salonika, with 5,394 still awaiting extraction from Crete to the Greek 
mainland.
262 This estimate was again revised four days later after the next 
round of transfers between camps, becoming ‘9,500 prisoners at Salonika and 
3,084 in Crete’. The latter were reported to have been transferred, no later 
than by September, to Frontstalag 183 at Corinth and from there on to 
260 Gilbert, POW, p.48.
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262 ICRC:G85/1047 – Barbey to FO, 5 August 1941.Germany.
263 As infuriating as the substance of these reports were, the 
regularity with which they were compiled – sometimes on a daily basis – 
indicates that the ICRC had a far more efficient grasp on information 
collection and distribution than it had possessed the previous year.
The ICRC’s reports on the fluidity of the prisoners’ movement between camps 
and the apparent stability of the POW situation in Greece was received by the 
British with relief and optimism; relief that the situation was not as had been 
the case in France a year earlier and optimism that the prisoners would only 
be in Greece for a short time and thus could survive their unpleasant, yet 
brief, stay without the need for a new parcel delivery operation. Although this 
helped British-ICRC relations – the latter being regarded by the former as 
having the situation well in hand – this perception had the negative effect of 
leading many in Whitehall initially to view the POW situation in Greece with a 
certain degree of indifference.
A good example of this attitude can be found in the response to Brunel’s July 
report on the poor quality and quantity of rations. Having received notice of 
the specifics of the insufficient foodstuffs, the DPW asked the PWD to ‘be good 
enough to take the necessary steps through the diplomatic channel to 
whichever Government is the Detaining Power with a view to the immediate 
improvement of those rations’. Although there was evidently some concern for 
the rations allocated, the lack of knowledge over which Axis power was in 
charge indicates some detachment from events in Greece on the part of the 
DPW. Moreover, Captain Gilkes at the DPW added comments at the bottom of 
the telegram suggesting that it should wait before making representations to 
either Rome or Berlin about the food. The concern was that no needless 
263 TNA:PRO FO 916/214 – Geneva to FO, 9 August 1941.demands should be made of the Axis via the Protecting Power, lest the 
effectiveness of such appeals be compromised.
264 
Similarly, the Foreign Office delayed giving Brunel’s correspondence to the 
BRC, which claimed in its post-war report that it did not receive any 
information on the needs of those captured in Crete until 10 July. What 
remains unclear is whether this was owing to the poor communications that 
existed between Whitehall and the BRC, or the former’s impression that 
nothing needed to be done for the transient POWs. In either case, despite 
what the BRC’s report claims, it was not the hapless victim of the British 
government’s machinations.
As early as June – that is prior to having supposedly been first alerted to the 
situation in Greece – the BRC proposed sending Edward Hogg to Ankara to act 
as liaison with the ICRC delegation. As Sir John Kennedy of the BRC openly 
acknowledged, the despatch of Hogg was part of the BRC’s ‘need to act when 
the public displayed anxiety, although it might consider such action 
unnecessary’. An apt observation given that Hogg returned from his dull and 
uneventful mission after only a week in Ankara.
265 Clearly, if not directly 
informed by the British, the BRC at least had a suspicion that the surrender of 
Greece could open a familiar Pandora’s Box of public criticism.
Stanley Adams certainly realised that the ramifications of the Greek situation 
could be dire. He wrote to Sir Philip Chetwode on 15 July:
264 Italics are my emphasis. The rations reported were those issued at Frontstalag 183 in Corinth. 
These consisted of a daily ration of 100 grams of macaroni, 100 grams of salt fish, 25 grams of oil, 
15 grams of sugar, 15 grams of honey and a small quantity of ‘some substitute for bread’. – 
TNA:PRO FO 916/214 – DPW to PWD, 24 June 1941.
265 Not long after Hogg had arrived in early August it was decided that his appointment had been 
an overreaction and he was not, in fact needed. He returned to Britain on 6 September 1941 – 
BRC Report, vol.1, pp.404-405.that people will be only too happy to make a scapegoat of the Red Cross.....we 
cannot be too energetic in taking steps to protect the situation. We have got to 
take steps to safeguard ourselves from the outset: it is no good waiting until a 
crisis develops and then attempt to refute the allegations.
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The day after Adams’ warning the BRC learned that the ICRC – perhaps acting 
out of a similar fear of repeating the mistakes of France – had despatched 
2,000 parcels, that is, one parcel for each of the wounded prisoners in Crete.
267 At around the same time, the ICRC also sent an extraordinary proposal to 
the British ambassador in Ankara, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, for 
approval to acquire caïques for the delegates to paddle out to the Greek 
islands and supply those POWs and civilians who had been cut off. 
Knatchbull-Hugessen would become a great ally of the ICRC in Greece and as 
a measure of his evident comprehension of the gravity of the situation and 
the need to respond to it promptly, he advised the Foreign Office in November 
to approve the caïque plan, even if it upset MEW’s intentions to enforce its 
blockade regulations. By this time Whitehall’s optimism over the POW 
situation in Greece had subsided, owing to reports of POW mistreatment in 
Crete that it had received in October. The Foreign Office, no doubt fearful of 
another public backlash, agreed to the ICRC’s proposal. In one of the few 
notable acts of ICRC defiance during the war, when MEW made efforts some 
months later to have the caïques banned, Brunel responded by ignoring the 
order.
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These responses, in the case of all parties concerned, represented a marked 
improvement to the collective handling of the debacle in France. Although it 
266 Ibid., vol.1, pp.400-401 citing Adams to Chetwode, 15 July 1941.
267 TNA:PRO FO 916/214 – Geneva to FO, 16 July 1941.
268 Ibid. – Ankara to FO, 8 July 1941; DPW to FO, 8 October 1941; ICRC Report, vol.3, p.460.can be argued that the scale of the operation in Greece was small compared 
to Western Europe, the same problems still existed and, moreover, still 
threatened the welfare of British prisoners. Motivated in no small part by 
concerns over bad publicity, the responses of the BRC, the ICRC and to a 
lesser extent, the British government, did help reduce the probability of 
further misery and mortality amongst British POWs in Greece. Indeed, in 
passing judgement on the work of the Red Cross in Greece during 1941-42, 
Lt. Colonel Venables of GHQ Middle East bluntly concluded that ‘without these 
parcels many prisoners would have died from starvation’.
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For those left behind in Crete, the energetic response of the ICRC and the 
BRC elevated parcels to something more than life preservers. By January 
1942, the handful of prisoners remaining in Crete were so satisfied with their 
camp conditions and parcel supplies that they told ICRC inspectors they did 
not want to be transported to Germany.
270 Mindful of the French experience 
the Red Cross was still cautious, however, and continued to supply Crete with 
parcels until mid 1942, when at last both London and Geneva accepted that 
they had enough parcels to handle any further influx of prisoners.
271 Given 
that military operations were still on-going in nearby North Africa, this was a 
notably sensible display of forethought by both Red Cross organisations – 
further evidence that the lessons of France had been learned.
This is not to suggest that the POW situation in Greece was devoid of 
problems. By the time parcels began to flow into the camps the majority of 
the prisoners had been moved to permanent accommodation, leading to the 
unfamiliar situation in late 1941 of the ICRC having too many parcels for the 
269 TNA:PRO FO 916/424 – C in C Mediterranean to DPW, 11 July 1942.
270 Ibid. – Pictet to Haccius, 9 January 1942.
271 Ibid. – Cairo to MEW, 14 May 1942; Ankara to FO, 30 June 1942.reduced camp population of a little over 3,000 prisoners.
272 The breakdown in 
parcel delivery, however, owed more to the practices of the occupation forces 
and the physical damage to Greek roads than to any act of ineptitude or 
tardiness on the part of the Red Cross, which had realised that a forceful and 
independent mindset would be needed to bring succour to Greece. Robert 
Brunel’s attitude helped greatly in this regard, but so too did the efforts of the 
ICRC leadership, in particular Carl Burckhardt, to help facilitate the delivery of 
parcels to Greece – a triumph of Red Cross innovation that will be examined 
in the next chapter.
The BRC, for its part, was also quick to respond to the Greek situation, having 
been encouraged by the stabilisation in April 1941 of its parcel operations in 
France, which Stanley Adams believed would continue its ‘decided 
improvement’ if, of course, it was ‘subject to no political interference’.
273 This 
statement is revealing, in that it showed that for Adams and presumably for 
the entire BRC, a wariness of Whitehall still persisted despite the recent 
improvements. Ironically, in the same correspondence Adams referred to the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare as being ‘most generous’ and providing ‘helpful 
support’ to the BRC – a conclusion that, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
was to prove erroneous once the occupation of Greece began. If Adams was 
implying that it was the PWD and the DPW that would prove a hindrance – 
which was probably the case if one considers the critical  observations he 
made of the two departments to Max Huber in August – then he was also 
mistaken.
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272 By November the ICRC reported that the only thing the prisoners needed was a fresh supply of 
underclothes – TNA:PRO FO 916/214 – Ankara to FO, 8 September 1941; Ankara to Cairo, 24 
November 1941.
273 TNA:PRO 837/1229 – Adams to Butler, 7 April 1941.
274 ICRC:D-EUR/GB1-56 – Adams to Huber, 21 August 1941.The response of the British government in Greece indicates that the contrary 
was true. Struggling to shake off the public criticism of 1940, it was the 
Foreign Office and in particular its head, Anthony Eden, and ambassador in 
Ankara, Knatchbull-Hugessen, who would prove to be the unlikely allies of the 
Committee during its battles to come with MEW over relief efforts for civilians. 
It is to this specific relationship between the British officials who wished to 
enforce the blockade of Europe and the ICRC delegates who campaigned 
constantly to have it breached, that we shall now turn.CHAPTER II
THE ICRC AND BRITISH ECONOMIC WARFARE
THE BLOCKADE OF FRANCE
We have seen how a lack of communication, co-ordination and faith on the 
part of the British government affected relations with the ICRC during the 
turbulent latter half of 1940. On the predominant issue of POWs it was the 
Foreign Office, and more particularly the PWD, which contributed to the 
unease of this relationship. It would be unreasonable, however, to single out 
the attitudes of POW-focused officials such as George Warner and Alan 
Hunter, given that neither man was concerned with the other difficult sphere 
of relations between the British and the ICRC during the war: the conflicting 
objectives of Britain’s policy of economic warfare and the ICRC’s relief efforts 
on behalf of victims of war.
The duty of providing relief to civilians in addition to soldiers in times of war 
had long been a part of the ICRC’s mandate, having been first undertaken 
alongside the Committee’s other main task of information collecting by the 
Basle Agency during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71. More widespread 
relief efforts on behalf of civilians interned by enemy nations and refugees 
were made in occupied France and Belgium during the Great War, and at the 
Tenth International Red Cross Convention in 1923 the concept of equal relief 
services for both civilians and prisoners of war was put into writing by Dr. 
Frédéric Ferrière, the Committee’s pioneer in the field of civilian protection.
275 
275 Actual protection of civilians in times of war was not, however, codified until the signing of the 
revised Geneva Convention 1949 – Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.84-85.Once enshrined, the task of providing relief for civilians became an on-going 
concern for the Committee in the years following the Great War, with 
delegates active in this field in the Crimea, Turkey, Greece and Lithuania. In 
the lead up to the Second World War the ICRC was also busy in Western 
Europe, having established a small, but experienced two man operation to co-
ordinate civilian relief efforts in war-torn Spain. The Relief Section’s chief 
duties were to receive gifts or make purchases of foodstuffs, medicaments 
and general supplies using financial donations from either direct contributors 
or National Red Cross Societies. These supplies were usually procured from 
and shipped via neutral countries, Switzerland being among the most 
convenient and common source. 
As in the case of reporting for prisoners of war, the invasion of Poland 
provided the first test of the Second World War for this relief infrastructure, 
and, much like the Central Agency, the Relief Section used the experience to 
learn from and adapt to the challenges posed by the latest European conflict. 
The result was that by mid 1940 the Relief Section’s wartime personnel had 
grown to over forty delegates and volunteers and its duties had expanded to 
absorb those previously assumed by non-Red Cross warehouse managers, 
shipping agents and contractors. In the shadow of German domination over 
much of Western Europe and the resulting large numbers of prisoners, both 
soldiers and civilians, placed into camps, by mid 1940 the Relief Section had 
arguably become the most important, multi-faceted and demanding branch of 
service within the ICRC.
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In addition to the difficulties of finding food in times of rationing and 
organising transport in times of war, part of what made the work of the 
section so demanding was that in the wake of France’s fall its intentions 
276 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.273; Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.470-471.began to intersect with those of the British who, having lost their military 
presence on the continent, turned to their now primary offensive weapon in 
the struggle against Germany – blockade. 
Like the ICRC’s relief duties, the British had a precedent for this action. The 
principle of blockade had been established in the customary laws of war by 
the Declaration of Paris in 1856 and subsequently codified in the Declaration 
of London in 1909.
277 Accordingly, the principle of restricting the import and 
export activity of an enemy nation had been implemented by the British 
during the First World War. In some British circles the blockade was regarded 
not only as being a more humane form of warfare, but also of having played a 
crucial role in the defeat of Germany by engendering the ‘physical and moral 
deterioration that set in amongst the German people’.
278 Owing to this high 
regard, during the second war a blockade of Europe was seized upon early by 
many in Whitehall as a means of bringing Germany to its knees. Within days 
of the invasion of Poland the British began negotiations with continental 
neutrals over the issue of restricting their importation of “contraband” goods 
into the expanding Reich. 
The main reason this form of warfare affected ICRC relief activities was that 
foodstuffs – the primary component of relief on behalf of both prisoners and 
civilians – had been defined as contraband under the Declaration of London. 
Although foodstuffs were not considered to be “absolute contraband”, that is 
material that could be used by an enemy for the specific purpose of warfare, 
they were classified as “conditional contraband”, that is, material that could 
277 Declaration Respecting Maritime Law (Paris, 1856) point 4; Declaration Concerning the Laws of 
Naval War (London, 1909), hereafter Declaration of London 1909, ch.1.
278 W.P. Consett, The Triumph of Unarmed Forces: 1914-1918 (London, 1923), p.269; Best, 
Humanity in Warfare, pp.256.be used for either peaceful or military purposes. The importance of this 
distinction was that according to international law, “conditional contraband” 
could be seized by a blockading power if the material was assumed to be used 
by the enemy’s armed forces or government. Given the German government’s 
absolute mastery of occupied Europe and the Wehrmacht’s role as occupying 
power and administrator, foodstuffs intended for the occupied territories could 
justifiably and legally be seized or restricted for importation by the British.
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This practice was deemed essential by Whitehall to a successful blockade of 
Europe.
The task of enforcing the blockade fell to the Ministry of Economic Warfare 
(MEW), a branch of the Foreign Office that one early employee recalled as a 
‘bewildering organisation’ of ‘many deluded optimists’.
280 This gloomy early 
assessment of the value of economic warfare was given some credence during 
the winter of 1939-40, when Berlin took effective measures to counter British 
attempts to deprive it of supplies, leading to a wave of parliamentary and 
public criticism aimed at MEW.
281 The criticism was compounded by the 
change in conditions after the fall of France later that year, which suddenly 
made the struggling Ministry’s work a key component in Britain’s ability to 
continue to wage war. With its mandate now more important than ever, MEW 
took steps in the summer of 1940, in the words of its hard line chief Hugh 
Dalton, to become ‘much more combative, more true to its name’.
282 
279 Declaration of London 1909, Articles 24, 35.
280 John Colville, Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955, (London, 2005), p.3. Shortly 
after writing this Colville made a successful request for re-assignment to the Eastern Department 
of the Foreign Office, before becoming private secretary to Chamberlain and then to Churchill.
281 W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, 2 vols. (London, 1959), vol.1, p.48.
282 Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs 1931-1945 (London, 1957), p.334.The first major step in this direction was a revision of the existing navicert 
system of control. The navicert, a document issued at the discretion of the 
British government granting permission to merchant vessels to import goods, 
was first introduced on 1 December 1939, and was used as a means of 
regulating the quantity and type of goods that could be received into neutral 
European ports. This system of control was tightened on 31 July 1940 by the 
creation of a compulsory navicert, which now had to be issued before a ship 
left its port of loading.
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For the ICRC, ‘the strictness of these stipulations took no account of 
humanitarian considerations’ and as such created new problems for its 
ongoing relief activities, the first being that only neutral ports could be used 
for the receipt of goods into Europe.
284 This provision, combined with recent 
German conquests in Western Europe, led to the end of the Red Cross’ 
convenient 1939 transport routes through the now occupied territories of 
Belgium and Holland. This left only the option of neutral Lisbon, a port that, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, was both unsecured and beset by 
shipping and rail transportation difficulties that contributed to the calamitous 
attempts to provide relief for British POWs.
A second, arguably more politically sensitive consequence, of the blockade 
regulations was the impact they had on the ICRC’s ability to provide relief in 
the form of bulk parcels for civilian victims of war in occupied France. France 
was made subject to the new blockade provisions within days of its 
capitulation. Although this brought an end to the military conflict in that 
country, throughout the war’s early years the unoccupied and occupied 
283 Owing to their status at the time as neutrals the United States refused to give official approval 
for the navicert system. American ships did, however, help enforce the regulation of navicerts in 
the Atlantic – Medlicott, Blockade, vol.1, p.43, 422. 
284 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.370.territories provided a political and humanitarian battleground upon which the 
Committee fought tirelessly against MEW. 
The first clash between the ICRC and MEW over this issue was on 6 July 1940 
when, in response to a request from the French Red Cross for supplies for 
civilian refugees, the ICRC despatched SFr75,000 worth of goods to what was 
by then occupied France. This action did not pass without adverse Whitehall 
comment. Having learnt of this displeasure, the ICRC explained itself by 
pointing out to the British Consul Henry Livingston that the French Red Cross’ 
request was made prior to the capitulation of French forces and, furthermore, 
that compared with this one truckload of goods, ‘the International Committee 
have already purchased goods in Switzerland worth 150,000 francs for 
despatch to British prisoners of war’. At least one Foreign Office official was 
unmoved by the explanation, scrawling at the bottom of Livingston's 
telegram, ‘if our policy is to refuse consent to the USA sending relief to 
unoccupied France, we cannot agree to the International Committee sending 
any further relief to occupied France’.
285 
This response was consistent not only with MEW’s blockade policy, but with 
the Foreign Office’s general weariness of the ICRC at this time – a weariness 
that had been exacerbated within MEW corridors by intelligence from David 
Kelly in Berne suggesting that the ICRC’s despatch of supplies to occupied 
France would be done in collusion with a local National Socialist organisation. 
As such, it was thought, any humanitarian goodwill earned by the British for 
slackening the blockade would instead be claimed by the Nazis.
286 This served 
only to reinforce the already present fear in Whitehall that Switzerland and its 
Red Cross would soon be forced into a closer relationship with the Reich. 
285 TNA:PRO FO 837/1218 – Livingston to FO, 30 July 1940.
286 TNA:PRO FO 837/1226 – Kelly to FO, 16 July 1940.Indeed, when moves were made by the American Red Cross in August for a 
food relief operation in France, one of the more supportive MEW staffers tried 
to downplay this presumption of ICRC-Nazi collusion by noting to his superiors 
that the operation did not involve the Nazi-controlled German Red Cross 
(DRK).
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Amidst this suspicion there were, however, some officials at MEW who 
seemed to appreciate – more so than their colleagues at the PWD and DPW – 
that the ICRC was becoming increasingly valuable for the safeguarding of 
British prisoners and so needed to be handled with care. In discussing 
whether a single ARC ship should be permitted to unload supplies into France, 
MEW’s J.W. Nichols minuted that ‘if one shipment from America was allowed, 
I think it would be necessary to square the International Organisation first’.
288 
Similarly Charles Stirling, a MEW official with a sympathetic view of the Axis-
enclosed Swiss, offered the more amenable opinion that given the services 
performed by the ICRC on behalf of British POWs, the matter of ICRC 
activities in France should be left alone. Furthermore, he informed the Foreign 
Office that if a response to Geneva’s explanation had to be sent, it was 
important to suggest ‘that so far as we are aware there has been no hostile 
comment on the action of the International Red Cross Committee’.
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Stirling’s response is revealing. Although he showed appreciation for the work 
done by the ICRC on Britain’s behalf, it is notable that he stopped short of 
wanting to assure the Committee that no comment had been made at all 
regarding its actions in France. As was to become customary in MEW’s 
dealings with the ICRC throughout the war, Stirling was endeavouring to 
287 TNA:PRO FO 837/1218 – MEW Minutes, 10 August 1940.
288 TNA:PRO FO 837/1226 – MEW Minutes 31 July 1940.
289 Underline in original – Ibid. – Stirling to Steele, 6 August 1940. reach a balance with the Committee between placation and restraint, the 
objective being simultaneously to preserve both Britain’s POWs and the 
integrity of the blockade. This was an exceptionally difficult task given that for 
the latter objective to be accomplished restrictions had to be placed on ICRC 
activities. In keeping with the Committee’s non-discriminatory mandate these 
activities included rendering assistance to British and non-British victims of 
war – including those French POWs within the blockaded areas to whom in 
late July the likes of George Warner objected to lending indirect financial 
assistance.
290
What becomes apparent in examining the relations between the ICRC and 
MEW is that Warner’s emphasis on British interests at the expense of fallen 
allies was shared by many in the Ministry. In the spirit of maintaining the 
blockade, French POWs and civilian internees were denied bulk collective 
parcel shipments under blockade regulations until 1942, nearly a year after 
the Ministry had granted similar provisions for British POWs.
291 Despite the 
precedent set by MEW’s agreement of early 1940 with the ICRC on the matter 
of collective parcels for Polish POWs,
292 the notion of Vichy receiving large 
quantities of food for despatch to its POWs in un-occupied France and 
Germany was resisted by the Ministry, which still ‘objected in principle to bulk 
shipments, the supervision of which they considered more difficult than that 
of standard parcels’.
293 This objection addressed the two main concerns of the 
British in regards to supplying France: firstly, the need for stringent 
supervision in the distribution of goods in German-held, or German-affiliated 
290 See ch.1, pp.45-46.
291 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.205. For details of negotiations see International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Report of the Joint Relief Commission of the International Red Cross: 1941-46 (Geneva, 
1948), hereafter JRC Report, pp.14-16.
292 See chapter 1, p.59
293 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.30.territory; and, secondly, the opinion of MEW that France was self-sustainable 
in terms of foodstuffs and, thus, was not in need of imported supplies for its 
civilian population.
294 
Regarding the latter argument, it is true that some French civilians in the 
countryside were able to procure luxuries such as fresh vegetables, cheese 
and meat from local farms. For those living in the cities, however, instances of 
malnutrition, tuberculosis and generally poor health rose significantly over the 
years of occupation due to small and nutritionally defective rations. Although 
these varying experiences of city and countryside make generalisations 
hazardous, it has been estimated that the average French civilian consumed 
somewhere between 1,200 and 1,500 calories a day during the occupation 
period – a rate of consumption lower than anywhere else in Western Europe, 
with the exception of Italy. Adding to this problem were the German 
occupation practices. These were defined by the billeting of soldiers where 
and when they pleased; the creation of an unfair rate of exchange between 
the Reichsmark and the Franc; and the requisitioning of goods ranging from 
eggs and bread, to fuel and tobacco.
295 
The British were aware of these practices and in late 1940 the Ministry 
received reports confirming fears that in addition to the usual plunder, 
contraband goods that had been entering the country via the Vichy port of 
Marseilles were being seized by the Germans and Italians. This was an issue 
of particular sensitivity for MEW, which had been harassing the Admiralty 
since July to tighten the blockade around southern France. This embarrassing 
294 TNA:PRO FO 837/1226 – MEW Memo, 3 August 1940.
295 The rate of exchange was one Mark to twenty Francs, a distortion of economics that inflated 
the wealth of the average Wehrmacht soldier to the point where purchases amounted to a form 
of legalised plunder – Ian Ousby, Occupation: The Ordeal of France, 1940-1944 (London, 1999), 
pp.118-126; Phillipe Burrin, France Under The Germans: Collaboration and Compromise (New 
York, 1996), pp.196-198.“Marseilles Leak” comprised an estimated 80,146 tonnes of foodstuffs that 
had been shipped from the French colonies into the unoccupied territory at a 
time when MEW was attempting to display the strength of its new blockade 
programme.
296 It is against this background of deteriorating conditions in the 
occupied territories and the blockade’s failure around Vichy that the ICRC’s 
efforts to bring relief to France must be considered. 
Having received reports of food shortages from camp inspectors on the 
ground over the summer of 1940, the cause of the French was taken up by 
Lucie Odier, one of the ICRC’s most compassionate and emotionally driven 
delegates. Despite her experience with the Committee’s relief activities during 
the First World War and her administrative duties in Geneva during the Italo-
Ethiopian War and the civil conflict in Spain, her relative lack of experience in 
diplomacy meant that she was a poor choice as negotiator for such a 
delicately political assignment.
297 
Impassioned yet courteous, demanding and yet submissive, so much of 
Odier’s correspondence with the British reads more like cries for help than 
authoritative requests, at times not dissimilar in tone and language to the 
manifold pleas from the mothers of British prisoners of war that flooded 
Whitehall in late 1940. Even Marcel Junod, who seems to have admired Odier, 
had to concede that ‘her appearance and her voice lent something truly 
296 This figure of foodstuffs received into Marseilles covers the period July-September 1940 – 
Medlicott, Blockade, vol.1, pp.562-564. Dalton was particularly aggrieved that the British Navy 
showed reluctance to challenge the vastly inferior Vichy escort vessels. With Churchill’s support 
the interception of Vichy vessels began in November 1940, however the Admiralty were still 
reluctant to risk a full-scale engagement with Vichy over the issue – Dalton, Fateful Years, pp.354-
356. 
297 A nurse by trade, Odier spent most of her post-First World War career confined to 
administrative and co-ordination duties at the ICRC, first as a member of the Ethiopia 
Commission and, during the Spanish Civil War as a member of the Commission for Spanish 
Affairs. In both conflicts she assumed the role of relief co-ordinator and head of the nursing staff 
– Baudendistel, Bombs and Good Intentions, pp.28-29; Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.321.pathetic to all she did’.
298 Rudolph Haccius also found cause to question 
whether her amateur style of ‘haggling’ with the British would undermine his 
efforts to build ‘goodwill’ in London. This rumination seemed justified given 
that at least one MEW staffer noted in 1941 that Odier’s latest proposal for 
slackening the blockade was ‘a rather confused account’ compared with the 
concise presentation of a similar request made by the Committee’s more 
politically astute vice-president, Carl Burckhardt.
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As an example of the differing viewpoints held by the British and the ICRC on 
the matter of relief, Odier’s negotiations with MEW provide crucial insight. Her 
first request of 2 August, for example, was a general appeal for a relaxation of 
the blockade with the intention of shipping medicines and food into occupied 
France for the benefit of civilian refugees. Although she graphically outlined 
the plight of these civilians and listed the various contributions made by 
several National Societies in response to the ICRC’s appeals, Odier made only 
a passing reference to MEW’s requirements for guaranteed security against 
seizure by the enemy of supplies passing through the blockade. In misplacing 
this emphasis Odier omitted any concrete plans the ICRC had for such 
supervision, a matter that both the Vichy situation, MEW minutes of the 
period and correspondence between the ICRC and MEW over POW parcels 
reveal was clearly the primary concern of the Ministry.
300 
Not surprisingly, the unanswered question of just how the ICRC would ensure 
that the supplies did not fall into enemy hands formed the basis of MEW’s 
refusal of collective relief and when it at last replied to Odier – nearly a month 
298 Junod, Warrior Without Weapons, p.177.
299 ICRC:G3/3B/44-2 – Haccius to Odier, 17 December 1940; TNA:PRO FO 837/1220 – MEW to FO, 
28 January 1941.
300 TNA:PRO FO 837/1218 – Odier to MEW, 2 August 1940; MEW Minutes, 10 August 1940; 
ICRC:G85/1047 – Odier to MEW, 9 August 1940.after her appeal –  the Ministry bluntly stated that it did 'not believe that any 
safeguards can be devised’. As such it was decreed that France would remain 
blockaded, the only concession being shipments of medical supplies for those 
who had been identified by camp inspectors as sick or wounded. Even this 
concession was flawed in practice, since the British would often alter the list of 
authorised products with little notice. This meant that many of the supposedly 
acceptable medical shipments became the subject of time-consuming 
negotiations with MEW on a consignment by consignment basis.
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These regulations, as well as those designed to restrict large imports of 
foodstuffs, both to POWs and to civilians, were in line with the British 
government’s official policy, which was made public by Winston Churchill 
when he declared to the House of Commons on 20 August that the British 
would refuse all requests for relief to be sent to any territory occupied by the 
Germans. It was Hitler, Churchill reasoned, who had the responsibility to feed 
the civilians of his newly conquered territories and, as such, the British would 
countenance only the stockpiling of relief in expectation of military victory. 
The peoples of Europe, whether starving or diseased, would simply have to 
wait for the ‘shattering of Nazi power that will bring them all immediate food, 
freedom and peace’.
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Although it may seem callous in retrospect, Churchill’s argument was based in 
part on International Humanitarian Law, the Hague Convention of 1907 
having specified that it was the duty of the occupying power to maintain the 
301 TNA:PRO FO 837/1218 – MEW to Odier, 14 September 1940; ICRC Report, vol.3, p.372.
302 Winston Churchill, ‘The Few’ speech to the House of Commons, 20 August 1940 – The 
Churchill Centre and Museum, London: Cabinet War Rooms Museum, 
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/113-the-few
(accessed 21 May 2008).well-being of the population under their control.
303 Given, however, that the 
delegates had seen first hand the poor quality of the rations on offer from the 
Germans, the ICRC was understandably horrified by Churchill’s declaration, 
which, in its reference to a distant and unlikely Allied military victory to the 
detriment of immediate humanitarian concerns, went against the very 
philosophy upon which the Committee was founded. 
There was worse to come for the ICRC. Following Churchill’s pronouncement 
Hugh Dalton declared that ‘the British authorities should not facilitate the 
passage of any shipments for Switzerland through naval controls’ – an action 
that was part of Dalton’s general campaign throughout mid 1940 to 
strengthen the blockade’s integrity around Switzerland.
304 Furthermore, when 
the issue of the ICRC’s importance was raised in discussions between the 
Foreign Office and MEW over the increased measures against Switzerland, the 
fact that ‘the Red Cross have an interest and would strongly object to being 
deprived of Switzerland as a channel of information’ was deemed a factor that 
‘by itself cannot be given much weight’.
305 
In the midst of this mood to harden the blockade and, considering the failure 
of this task in regards to Vichy, it is unsurprising that Odier’s appeals of 
August 1940, devoid as they were of an emphasis on how the supplies would 
be safeguarded once they reached France, were given little more than polite 
lip service before being refused. However, in the spirit of seeking to maintain 
good relations with the ICRC – particularly after the re-establishment of 
communication with the continent in early August revealed the gravity of the 
303 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, 1907), Sect.3, Article 43.
304 TNA:PRO FO 371/24534 – MEW to FO, 24 August 1940; Wylie, Britain and Switzerland, pp.134-
135.
305 TNA:PRO FO 371/24534 – FO Report on Switzerland, 26 August 1940.British POW situation – some concessions were made in regards to POWs.
 306 
On 29 August the Ministry complied with Articles 37 and 38 of the Geneva 
Convention, by granting navicerts to the ICRC for the shipment of individual 
POW parcels provided, of course, that the camps to which they were sent had 
been inspected by the ICRC and a delegate was present to supervise the 
distribution.
307 Given that this was in line with the basic principles of the 
Geneva Convention – which the British were a signatory to – MEW’s gesture 
was by no means a generous concession.
Understandably, this act of basic adherence to the Convention by the British 
was not enough for the persistent Odier, who disputed MEW’s conditions for 
supervision on the grounds that unforeseen military situations could cut 
inspectors off from the camps and that, more importantly, there were camps 
which they were prohibited to visit – none of which notably contained British 
POWs. This, plus the refusal of MEW to allow the French Red Cross and the 
Vichy government to purchase bulk relief supplies from Portugal later that 
year for the benefit of French POWs, led to the ICRC’s suspicions that 
Whitehall was deliberately acting in the interests of her own prisoners at the 
expense of the French. Rather than deal with this concern tactfully, Odier 
chose instead to voice bluntly the ICRC’s concerns on this issue to MEW's 
Richard Illisible. This act that not only damaged her reputation in the eyes of 
the Ministry, but also further exacerbated Whitehall’s aforementioned concern 
over the ICRC’s closeness to Vichy and preference for serving continental, 
rather than British interests.
308  
306 In late July the number of POWs captured was estimated to be 12,000, though no official 
notification of the figure arrived until August, when it was increased to 15,000. The true figure of 
44,000 did not come to light until December 1941 – ICRC:G3/3B/44-3 – ICRC London Report on 
Parcel Crisis – 24 January 1941.
307 ICRC:G85/1047 – Illisible to Odier – 29 August 1940.
308 Ibid.; ICRC Report, vol.3, p.30.As flawed as Odier’s approach was, her concerns over the French could not be 
dismissed as those of a lone agitator against British blockade policy. On 11 
August Herbert Hoover, the former President of the United States, presented 
a plan for a wide-reaching relief effort similar to that which he had 
spearheaded during the First World War. This relief effort called for a 
relaxation of British blockade policy throughout Europe and, though the plan 
was generally greeted unfavourably by the US public and press, the issue of 
food for the children of unoccupied France was one that was viewed with 
sympathy by many relief organisations in America and indeed by Roosevelt 
himself.
309 In some US government quarters sympathy also extended to 
French POWs and in November the British embassy in Washington reported 
that it ‘foresaw criticisms of our policy and political repercussions if we refuse 
navicerts for the bulk of the parcels for Allied prisoners in general’.
310 
The British reaction to this report is telling. Six days after being told of US 
attitudes MEW granted navicerts to the ICRC for the despatch of bulk 
shipments of collective parcels for British POWs and civilian internees. For 
internees of other nationalities, however, the question of prisoner numbers 
and ICRC supervision was still to be reviewed by MEW before any further 
concessions could be made.
311 Clearly, public opinion in Britain – which 
stressed the plight of British POWs – counted for more than the concern for 
Allied POWs that was being voiced in the United States. Placating the British 
public therefore, complemented Whitehall’s policy of “Britain first, allies later”. 
309 Roosevelt’s opinion was derived from Washington’s policy at the time to improve relations 
with Vichy in the hope of encouraging resistance from the latter towards German demands – 
Jean Beaumont, ‘Starving For Democracy: Blockade and Relief 1939-1945’, War and Society, 8 
(1990) 57-82, p.62; Medlicott, Blockade, vol.1, pp.555-558; TNA:PRO FO 837/1218 – Lisbon to FO, 
27 August 1940; Washington to FO, 6 September 1940, Washington to FO, 27 August 1940.
310 TNA:PRO FO 837/1219 – Washington to FO, 1 November 1940.
311 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.205; ICRC:G85/1047 – Nicholls to Odier, 7 November 1940.On the other side of the Atlantic, however, the British concessions served only 
to fuel Hoover’s campaign, which escalated on 8 December when he published 
a manifesto on the need for a neutral body to administer relief in the occupied 
territories. This action served to only further infuriate Dalton, who recalled 
bitterly how he encouraged a German visiting the United States at this time to 
tell people ‘that Hoover was responsible for prolonging the last war, and thus 
for the deaths on European battlefields of many young Americans’.
312 
It was in this tense environment that Odier launched a fresh round of appeals 
on relief for France, this time centred on the Committee’s plan to acquire 
foodstuffs from within the blockaded areas. Although the idea of building upon 
the concessions for British POWs was a logical move on the part of the ICRC, 
the extrinsic factors that were at play over the winter of 1940-41 – the 
groundswell of public concern for British POWs and the related problems that 
were developing in British-ICRC relations – called for a more nuanced 
approach than that which typified Odier’s efforts. It was for this reason that 
Odier’s December initiative was seized upon by Carl Burckhardt, whose 
instincts for realpolitik led him to take a dim view of Odier’s overly 
compassionate nature and lack of political acumen.
313
Mindful of Odier’s blunders in dealing with the British, Burckhardt’s approach 
was to attempt something as yet untried by his predecessor: to tell MEW what 
it actually wanted to hear. Accordingly, Burckhardt added a covering letter to 
Odier’s 3 December appeal, wherein he argued that in obtaining supplies for 
the benefit of French civilians from within Europe the ICRC was, in effect, 
denying the Germans those sources of supply. 
312 Dalton, Fateful Years, p.355; Medlicott, Blockade, vol.1, pp.572-573.
313 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.294, 373.This argument was well received by Kit Stevenson at the Foreign Office, who 
noted to his colleagues that ‘the International Committee have been at pains 
to avoid difficulties with our blockade’ and, furthermore, ‘that it is important 
to keep on terms with the International Committee on the relief question, and 
we should like to see a sympathetic reply sent to them’.
314 On 11 February 
1941, such a reply was sent to Burckhardt in which he was thanked both for 
not upsetting the blockade by procuring supplies from outside Europe and also 
for the ‘valuable work on the International Red Cross Committee for British 
prisoners of war and interned civilians’. These plaudits were tempered, 
however, by a reminder that ‘so long as we and the International Red Cross 
Committee do not clash over this [blockade measures] we naturally view with 
unmixed sympathy and admiration the relief work which you are doing’.
315 As 
promising as these comments seemed, however, the appeal itself was 
refused. The reasons for this refusal become evident if one considers the 
results of other proposed relief projects at this time. 
At the same time that Burckhardt’s appeals were being rejected, similar 
efforts on the part of Hoover were at last bearing fruit. Under pressure both to 
draw Vichy away from German influence and placate Roosevelt – whose co-
operation in maintaining the blockade in the Atlantic was invaluable – MEW 
reluctantly caved in to pressure for two trial shipments of milk and clothing 
for the children of unoccupied France.
316
Given that it was agreed that this relief would be conducted under the 
auspices of the American Red Cross, it seems clear that for the British there 
314 TNA:PRO FO 837/1219 – Odier to Dalton, 3 December 1940; TNA:PRO FO 837/1220 – 
Stevenson to Stirling, 24 January 1941.
315 Ibid. – Stevenson to Burckhardt, 11 February 1941.
316 Beaumont, ‘Starving For Democracy’, pp.62-63.was a distinction between the American proposals and those of the ICRC, 
which did not benefit from the political weight of Roosevelt’s concerns. This 
distinction was also formed by the perception in Whitehall that the ICRC’s real 
job was to care for POWs rather than civilians. This was yet another hurdle 
the Committee had to overcome in its negotiations with MEW, whose policy 
was evident from Stevenson’s polite, yet instructive correspondence with 
Burckhardt: The ICRC, though valuable for the preservation of British POWs, 
must be kept on a leash in regards to economic warfare.
Given its long-standing mandate to assist all victims of war, this restriction 
was viewed as anathema by the Committee. Accordingly, the ICRC continued 
its campaign against the blockade over the winter of 1940-41, albeit with a 
more shrewd attitude. With Stevenson's warning in mind, the Committee's 
winter round of appeals were characterised by an emphasis on the Ministry’s 
supervision requirements. 
In March, for example, Burckhardt sent an appeal wherein he explicitly stated 
that the Committee had obtained assurances from the Germans that ‘none of 
the gifts sent will be used for the benefit of German civilians or members of 
the German armed forces’ and furthermore, that they had also acquiesced to 
the ICRC’s request for a delegate to be present at all times during the transit 
and distribution of the goods’.
317 During her visit to London a few weeks later, 
Odier gave similar assurances. She did, however, concede that on the 
question of civilian internees in occupied France – a category of prisoner 
predominantly comprising Jews and other “enemies of the Reich” – the 
Committee could not guarantee the safe delivery of the parcels.
318 On the 
317 TNA:PRO FO 837/1221 – Burckhardt and de Rouge to Dalton, 7 March 1941.
318 Ibid. – Minutes of Odier Meeting with MEW, 25 March 1941; Minutes of Second Odier Meeting 
with MEW, 28 March 1941. whole, however, the general view of the Committee at this time was that its 
capacity for supervision, combined with the solemn pledge of non-interference 
obtained from the Germans, meant it had satisfied MEW’s conditions as best it 
could.
For their part, the British were never convinced of this. The tales of British 
POWs who endured the march to the camps in 1940 only served as 
confirmation that the Nazis were both perfidious and thuggish, with no 
respect for humanitarian law. As such MEW held to the belief that any relief 
initiatives that were dependent on the words of Germans could not be 
countenanced. To the detriment of British-ICRC relations, the Committee held 
a contrasting view of Berlin’s trustworthiness. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the ICRC's leadership was both Euro-centric 
and right-wing in its political outlook. Huber and Burckhardt were both Swiss-
Germans and the latter was, as one colleague recalled, a lover of 'German 
and Austro-Hungarian high culture'.
319 Tied to this was Burckhardt’s friendship 
with certain Germans, namely Wolfgang Krauel and Ernst von Weizsäcker. 
Indeed, both Burckhardt and Max Huber went so far as to write after the war 
that Weizsäcker had been nothing short of a partner of the ICRC who was 
possessed of ‘genuine sympathy to humanitarian ends’, and had ‘been 
responsible for any tolerant and generally comprehensive attitude shown us 
by the German authorities’.
320 
319 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.388, citing interview with Maître Lalive, 2 August, 1995.
320 Truman Papers – Burckhardt and Huber To Truman, 5 August 1949, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?
documentdate=1949-08-05&documentid=1-10&studycollectionid=&pagenumber=1 (accessed 9 
August 2008).In addition to any personal relations between Geneva and Berlin, there was 
also the important matter of the ICRC’s neutrality, which dictated that no 
belligerent – no matter how brutal its occupation practices – could be treated 
with discrimination by the ICRC. The combination of these two factors meant 
that for the duration of the war the ICRC placed trust in the promises and 
intentions of Berlin. Owing to the opposing view held by the British, the 
Committee’s March appeals were once again rejected and four months after 
receiving the sincerest assurances of Burckhardt and Odier both the Foreign 
Office and MEW were still in agreement that ‘no effective neutral control for 
distribution of goods could be achieved in occupied Europe’.
321 
The Committee’s continued insistence to the contrary did little to help its 
cause. Indeed, it is evident that the repeated appeals of the ICRC served to 
frustrate, rather than to re-assure MEW, which from 1940 onwards was 
bombarded with blockade concession requests from Geneva. To these the 
British could only reiterate the position established by Churchill’s speech of 20 
August – military victory must come before relief. By mid 1941 this mantra 
was so firmly entrenched in MEW that it was decreed that it was unnecessary 
even to discuss alterations to blockade measures anymore.
322 Owing both to 
the mistrust of the Germans and the importance placed upon economic 
warfare by Churchill, no ICRC efforts to adhere to MEW’s policy of supervision 
could change British minds. At best, the faith the Committee placed in 
German promises not to seize goods reinforced British perceptions of the 
Committee as naïve. At worst, it increased suspicions that the ICRC was 
either close to, or working in collusion with, the Nazis. 
321 TNA:PRO FO 837/1221 – Notes on conversation between Eden and Nichols, 22 July 1941.
322 Ibid. – MEW Briefing on Relief Policy, 9 May 1941.The scatty and at times un-focused nature of Odier’s correspondence did little 
to alter the former perception. An example of this can be found in the letter 
she sent on 3 April to Walter Roberts – a PWD official who had little to do with 
MEW – requesting answers to questions that had for the most part already 
been answered during her meetings with the Ministry in March. To this odd 
correspondence J.S. Nichols replied patiently, though somewhat 
condescendingly, and once again reiterated that the question of civilian relief 
for France was still ‘under consideration’.
323 Generally speaking, this often-
repeated phrase was a euphemism for “unalterable”, and was a means of 
placating the ICRC, who would normally have to wait several weeks before 
receiving refusals of their appeals. In the time spent waiting for a reply the 
Committee continued to pursue the task which the British clearly thought it 
best fit – maintaining the welfare of British POWs. 
This pattern of placation and restraint continued for the duration of the war, 
though not without further incident. Ironically, the largest disturbance to
MEW’s handling of the ICRC was caused by the British themselves, who were 
pushed out of Greece and Crete by the Axis forces in the spring of 1941. It 
was in this new theatre of relief operations that the Committee achieved its 
most significant victory in the struggle against the blockade – the formation of 
the Joint Relief Commission and the creation of a semi-autonomous Red Cross 
fleet.  
GREECE AND THE “GREAT WHITE SHIPS”
As the unresolved issue of permanent relief for France and Belgium continued 
to drag on, the Committee was faced with yet another challenge to its efforts 
on behalf of civilians. On 6 April 1941 German forces drove south into the 
Balkans and Greece. Much like the campaigns in Western Europe, the 
Wehrmacht were quick to achieve their objectives and by 2 May Greece had 
323 Ibid. – Odier to Roberts, 3 April 1941; Nichols to Odier, 5 April 1941.formally surrendered to the Axis invasion force. The resulting conditions for 
Allied POWs have been discussed in the previous chapter, so too the energetic 
response to their plight by the ICRC delegation in Athens and in particular its 
leader, Robert Brunel. Relevant to this chapter are the actions of the ICRC to 
bring succour to the other victims of war in Greece – the civilian population.
In the wake of capitulation the people of Greece and Crete were subjected to 
consequences of occupation similar to those experienced by French civilians, 
enduring not only the day to day distress of having enemy troops on their 
soil, but the arbitrary requisitioning of food by those troops as well as the 
many problems associated with the movement of refugees from war-torn 
areas. Where the fate of Greece differed from that of France, however, was in 
its almost non-existent capacity for food production. A staple like wheat for 
example, had always been imported from overseas at a pre-war rate of 
500,000 tonnes annually. When the Axis took over, these imports – 
predominately from Commonwealth nations – ceased. 
This breakdown in food availability was compounded by a poor harvest, 
requisitioning and what one historian has described as ‘infighting of Byzantine 
complexity’ between Italian generals, German diplomats and Greek puppet 
administrators.
324 The result was that both mainland Greece and, more so, its 
islands, were beset by famine for most of the occupation period.
325
The effects of this situation were felt almost immediately in Athens and on 30 
May Robert Brunel sent a plea to Geneva for urgent relief for the increasingly 
starving women and children in the capital. Much like its response to Brunel’s 
324 Mazower, Hitler's Greece, p.22.
325 Procopis Papastratis, British Policy Towards Greece During the Second World War (Cambridge, 
1984), pp.114-15. On Italian disputes with the Germans and the famine in general see Mazower, 
Hitler's Greece, ch.3.information on the Dulags, the ICRC moved as quickly as possible to take 
action. Having procured 100 tonnes of milk from the American Red Cross 
warehouses in Egypt the ICRC cabled MEW on 19 June requesting permission 
to despatch the goods to Greek port of Piraeus. The request, however, was 
not as straightforward as simply applying for a navicert. Owing to a lack of 
merchant shipping, the Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano advocated a plan 
where the supplies would be transported by the Italian Red Cross, which 
along with the Italian and German occupation forces agreed to organise the 
distribution of the goods to the Greek population.
326 
Apart from the not unreasonable reluctance of MEW to agree to such an Axis-
dependent operation, the Ministry also initially refused to allow the milk 
products into Greece unless they had been sourced from within the blockade 
area, namely Switzerland. Given the fact that by this time the ICRC already 
had the milk ready and waiting just across the sea in Egypt, MEW received a 
swift protest to this provision from the Greek ambassador in London and in 
what can only be described as a capitulation to political pressure, Dalton 
reluctantly agreed to the ICRC’s plan to despatch this one-off milk shipment.
327
What was unspoken at MEW and, moreover, what the ICRC did not appear to 
realise, was that the outcome of this trial relief shipment would shape British 
attitudes towards relief proposals for Greece for some time to come. This was 
unfortunate for the Committee, as the unresolved problems of supervision in 
France hung like a cloud over the entire Greek operation. Although a success 
326 Ciano showed disapproval of German requisitioning practices and was concerned over the 
political repercussions of the famine for the occupation forces. He sought and received 
Mussolini’s approval to turn the relief operation over to the Italian Red Cross – Count Galeazzo 
Ciano, Ciano’s Diary: 1939-1943 (Surrey, 1948), 9 and 11 October 1941, pp.381-382, 26 January 
1942, p.427; ICRC Report, vol.3, p.451, TNA:PRO FO 837/1230 – Geneva to MEW, 19 June 1941.
327 Ibid. – MEW To Berne, 3 July 1941; Simopoulos to Dalton, 16 July 1941.in terms of bringing some small measure of immediate relief to the civilian 
population, the facts and figures of this first shipment did more harm than 
good for the cause of the Committee, whose guarantees from the Axis powers 
were once again undermined.
Of the 100 tonnes distributed, only 63 tonnes were received – a peculiar 
discrepancy that the ICRC’s post-war report glosses over without explanation.
328 A report on 28 July from the British embassy in Washington gives some 
indication of what really happened. According to British sources in Rome, the 
Italian government, their Red Cross, and their occupation forces had 
conspired to steal a large portion of the consignment as well as meat and 
other canned goods received from individual donations.
329 This gave weight to 
a suspicion within the Foreign Office that reports received from Athens in 
early May of the worsening food situation may have been ‘German inspired’, a 
means of fooling both the British and the Red Cross into shipping supplies into 
Greece for the occupation forces.
330
In addition to placing another black mark against the ICRC’s distribution 
guarantees, the backlash to this initial effort on behalf of Greece was also felt 
in parliament where Anthony Eden – who in the wake of public criticism over 
the POW crisis had become a supporter of a more flexible blockade policy – 
was attacked by Dalton on 28 July for supporting the Committee’s follow-up 
proposal for a similar relief effort involving the shipment of milk products for 
the children of Belgium.
331 This proposal, sent in the form of a personal letter 
328 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.451.
329 TNA:PRO FO 837/1230 – Washington to FO, 27 July 1941.
330 Ibid. – FO to Canea, 1 May 1941.
331 In considering Eden’s proposals Dalton dubbed him a ‘lightweight’, reminiscent of  ‘a little boy 
trying to clutch all the toys’ – Hugh Dalton, The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton 1940-45, 
ed. Ben Pimlott (London, 1986), 28 July 1941, p.262.from Carl Burckhardt to Lord Drogheda at MEW on 15 July, was notable for its 
boldness and indicates clearly that, in obtaining the concession for the milk 
shipment to Athens, the Committee thought that MEW had at last turned the 
page on its blockade policy. 
As well as declaring that the ICRC was assured that no Axis interference was 
taking place in Greece, Burckhardt also found cause to mention that MEW’s 
acquiescence to the Belgium proposal would:
without doubt produce a favourable atmosphere tending rapidly to counteract a 
certain resentment which I feel duty bound to mention, is beginning to be 
noticeable in many countries on the Continent at the sight of so much suffering 
amongst the innocent especially in countries whose behaviour, as in the case of 
Greece and Belgium, had been so gallant.
332
All ostentatious wordplay aside, Burckhardt’s message was obvious: agree to 
the proposal or face a wave of public criticism for deserting your Allies. This 
was one of the many occasions during the war in which Burckhardt attempted 
to play the part of political commentator and diplomat – a pretension the 
Foreign Office in particular seldom appreciated. 
Unmoved by the veiled threat, Drogheda minuted Stirling that Burckhardt’s 
‘entirely unreal and futile suggestion’ must be rejected. Another MEW staffer, 
W.A. Camps, also seems to have been affronted by Burckhardt’s efforts, 
which he deemed ‘very obnoxious’ given that ‘even as Mr. B was penning his 
second paragraph, the Germans were stealing condensed milk sent to the 
children of Greece’.
333 Despite the fact that the War Cabinet and MEW had 
agreed to maintain the stringency of the blockade in late July, Drogheda 
waited until 6 September before sending Burckhardt the official rejection to 
332 TNA:PRO FO 837/1221 – Burckhardt to Drogheda, 15 July 1941.
333 Ibid. – Drogheda Minute, 19 August 1941; Camps Minute, 18 August 1941.his proposals, wherein the recent seizure of milk products in Greece was 
highlighted as evidence of the hollowness of any German guarantee of non-
interference.
334 The Ministry had been fooled once, but it would not be fooled 
again.
Although MEW was solidly behind Drogheda on this matter, there were 
officials in other areas of the Foreign Office who understood Burckhardt’s 
message and, moreover, were alive to the political value of blockade 
concessions. Eden for one sought shades of grey in blockade policy, if only to 
temper the growing discontent the Belgian and Norwegian governments-in-
exile had towards the situation.
335 As such Eden confided to Nichols on 22 July 
his wish for Churchill to take a greater interest in the political aspects of the 
blockade instead of simply declaring that it must be maintained at all costs.
336 
Eden’s subsequent public endorsement of the ICRC initiative and resulting 
opposition to MEW’s hard line view should not, however, be interpreted as the 
permeation of philanthropy into British foreign policy. The same day that Eden 
made his suggestion in parliament a memo was circulated at the Foreign 
Office suggesting that 
‘apart from the purely humanitarian side of the question the political 
consideration involved should not be over-looked. It has been known that the 
German propaganda in Greece loses no opportunity to point out that the tragic 
situation is due to the policy of the British Government……the ICRC of Geneva 
should be informed of the steps which are being taken in view of alleviating the 
situation, and particularly that instructions may be given in view of authorising 
334 An example of the degree to which debate was unwelcome on the blockade issue can be seen 
in the ‘complete defeat' of Eden's motion in the Cabinet on 28 July for concessions to Belgium – 
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335 Beaumont, ‘Starving for Democracy’, p.65.
336 TNA:PRO FO 837/1221 – Notes of conversation between Nichols and Eden, 22 July 1941.the transport of those food stuffs (particularly milk for the children) in which the 
ICRC is interested’.
337 
For the Foreign Office, therefore, the situation in Greece presented a unique 
opportunity to repair some of the damage done to the government’s 
reputation both by the POW crisis and the blockade of France – damage that 
had been compounded by allegations in the US press that the British were 
once again favouring their own POWs at the expense of their ‘heroic Greek 
Allies’.
338 
A certain degree of flexibility was thus deemed required in regards to the 
blockade, although in pursuing this agenda the Foreign Office understood that 
it had to tread carefully in the public presentation of these arguments for 
relief. In a telegram to the British ambassador in Ankara, Sir Hughe 
Knatchbull-Hugessen, it was emphasised that Eden’s wishes for a relief effort 
had to be conveyed as appeals by the Greek government to the ICRC, lest 
British eagerness on the matter be interpreted as weakness in the realms of 
economic warfare.
339
As the Foreign Office began to formulate this policy similarly divisive moves 
towards rectifying the blockade problem were being made in Geneva. Over 
the summer of 1941 Burckhardt, who by this time had taken the difficult reins 
from Odier in the protracted negotiations with MEW, brought one of his most 
ambitious and inspired plans to fruition. This was the co-ordination of the 
ICRC’s relief efforts with those of the national societies represented by the 
League of Red Cross Societies, into what was termed the Joint Relief 
Commission (JRC). Although far from original, Burckhardt’s conception was a 
337 TNA:PRO FO 837/1230 – FO Memo, 28 July 1941.
338 Ibid. – Angora to FO, 15 August 1941.
339 Ibid. – FO to Angora, 24 August 1941.bold plan. This was owing not only to the logistics of co-ordinating efforts 
between Geneva and the national societies, but also to the difficulty in 
overcoming the long simmering grievances that existed between the ICRC and 
the League.
340
Perhaps fearful of the “power play” Burckhardt was making, Jacques 
Chenevière, the ICRC’s own Cato, offered little encouragement, ending many 
a meeting on the subject of Burckhardt’s idea by simply declaring: ‘la league 
a tort.’
341 Wrong or not, the League of Red Cross Societies’ ability both to co-
ordinate national relief efforts in a more focused manner than the ICRC and, 
as the concessions to Vichy indicate, to garner more favourable responses 
from the blockading authorities, were vital for the improvement of the ICRC’s 
relief efforts. Burckhardt recognised this fact early on, instigating informal co-
ordination efforts between the national societies and the ICRC as early as 
November 1940. Prompted by the situation in Greece, this co-operation 
became official on 23 July 1941, when the JRC was legally constituted with 
Burckhardt as its president.
342
True to form, Burckhardt took to this new position of influence with his usual 
mixture of ambitious energy and single-minded self-importance. He made it 
clear to the ICRC leadership for example, that Odier’s duties should be kept 
separate from the JRC, a recommendation the latter wisely agreed to despite 
the protestations of Chenevière.
343 Considering Burckhardt’s bad experiences 
with Odier in the blockade negotiations, this move was understandable, 
although he was not driven in this regard purely by spite.
340 See introduction, pp.17-18.
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343 ICRC:CO2 1.925 – Minutes of ICRC meeting, 26 June 1941.Maître Lalive, a Geneva-based lawyer who was brought onboard in early 1941 
to help set up the JRC, recalled that Burckhardt’s intent was to raise the 
prestige of the ICRC, help the civilians of Europe and in the process keep the 
entire project (and the praise it garnered) out of the hands of the likes of 
Chenevière and Odier.
344 There is evidence to back Lalive’s statement. When, 
for example, Burckhardt reviewed a draft minute sheet of a meeting between 
the ICRC and the British later that year on the subject of expanding the Red 
Cross fleet under the JRC’s auspices, he made it clear to the British that it 
should be placed on record that the concept of the fleet’s expansion ‘was dealt 
with by me and not by Mademoiselle Odier. I should very much appreciate it if 
this could be made clear, as I do not want Mlle Odier to have all the onus’.
345 
For Burckhardt the JRC was, as much as anything, an exercise in personal 
empire-building and, given the high opinion he had of himself, he and he 
alone would be its architect. 
Part of what spurred Burckhardt’s possessive attitude was his assumption that 
the JRC would earn high praise for its successes. This assumption was not 
misplaced. In his post-war memoir Marcel Junod claimed that he was the 
mastermind and instigator of one of the JRC’s greatest innovations, the 
formation of the Red Cross’ fleet of relief vessels – the White Ships as Junod 
dubbed them. In telling the tale of the fleet’s conception, Junod relegated 
Burckhardt to simply being his ‘tireless and energetic abettor’ in the scheme.
346 Certainly Junod did pay a visit to London in April 1941 to discuss shipping 
issues, at which he received permission for the Committee to use the Red 
Cross emblem on its vessels. However, in keeping with the frosty relationship 
344 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, pp.386-87 citing interview with Maître Lalive, 2 August, 1995.
345 TNA:PRO FO 916/113 – Burckhardt to Roberts, 22 December 1941.
346 Junod, Warrior Without Weapons, p.176.that existed between the blockading authorities and the ICRC, his appeals for 
a widening of the relief effort fell on deaf and generally dismissive ears.
347 
Burckhardt would not be similarly denied. Armed with his experiences of MEW 
and an awareness of the importance of stable shipping for relief operations, it 
was Burckhardt more than anyone, whether for reasons of personal ambition 
or otherwise, who crystallised the idea of the White Ships and used the JRC to 
push the Committee towards success in Greece in 1941.
348
The first such success came on 16 October when a Turkish freighter, the 
Kurtulus, laden with 5,000 tonnes of wheat and flying under the banner of the 
Turkish National Red Crescent Society, unloaded its much needed cargo at 
Piraeus. In keeping with the co-operative structure of the JRC, Junod, 
representing Geneva, was onboard the Turkish Red Crescent vessel and once 
the ship had docked ICRC delegates supervised the unloading of its cargo.
349 
This first of a total of five voyages made by the Kurtulus, before it ran 
aground and sank on 20 February 1942, has quite rightly been seen in recent 
years as a triumph of philanthropy in the midst of total war.
350 At the time, 
however, the initial October shipment was viewed in Britain similarly to the 
milk shipment of July, that is, as a stand alone concession that was 
necessitated by the gravity of the food situation in Greece, where, as Churchill 
declared ‘alone of all Allied countries the enemy allows wholesale starvation 
conditions to develop’.
351
347 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.141; Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.390.
348 Crossland, 'Burckhardt'.
349 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.496.
350 In 2005 a team of Turkish divers uncovered the wreck of the Kurtulus in the Sea of Marmara 
and produced a documentary on the importance of the relief effort it was involved in entitled SS 
Kurtulus: The Steamship That Carried Peace.
351 Warren F. Kimball, ed., Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, 3 vols. (New 
Jersey, 1984), vol.2, C-250 – 1 January 1942, p.105.Such noble justification was only part of the reason behind the British decision 
to relent on the blockade issue. MEW for example, was put in a position to be 
more receptive to the voyage of the Kurtulus than it had been to previous 
relief suggestions. This was owing to the fact that the Kurtulus mission was a 
JRC effort that made use of the Turkish Red Crescent, a neutral national 
society, to transport wheat from Turkey, a country within the blockade area. 
MEW’s regulations were not being violated therefore, and so it was immune 
from any accusations of softness in its blockade policy.
352 
The Foreign Office seized on the importance of this loophole and quickly 
reversed its policy ‘that there should be no publicity and no official blessing on 
our part as regards shipments by sea’
353 when, inevitably, the story of the 
proposed mission leaked to the press. Owing to the fact that the Ministry’s 
policy was not being challenged, however, the British were able to take the 
advantageous angle that the Kurtulus was a pragmatic and blockade-friendly 
means of showing ‘the Greeks that their friends outside are trying to help 
them’.
354 The British were thus able to distance their leniency in this affair 
from the hard line approach to the blockade for the rest of Europe. MEW’s 
view was that despite the loophole, this blockade would to remain in force 
while the Kurtulus – no more than a stop-gap measure – provided the Greeks 
with food and the British with good publicity.
The ICRC of course held a different view. On the heels of permission being 
granted for the Kurtulus to sail, Burckhardt sent an appeal to Lord Drogheda 
aimed at widening the relief effort, specifically requesting a navicert for a 
352 The original plan proposed by the ICRC in May 1941 was to ship grain from Russia. This was 
rejected by the British on the grounds that it would involve an overland route through the 
Balkans which would involve breaking the blockade – Medlicott, Blockade, vol.2, pp.263-64.
353 TNA:PRO FO 837/1232 – FO to Camps, 19 September 1941.
354 TNA:PRO FO 837/1221 – MEW to Angora, 7 September 1941.shipment of quinine to Greece via another ship, the Laconikos. Once again the 
reply to this appeal took over a month to arrive in Geneva, and when received 
it spoke only of the need for tighter supervision on the ground before a 
navicert would be granted for the shipment.
355 The British policy of the 
Kurtulus being a one time gesture, that was not intended ‘to commit us to 
send further shipments to Greece or to make concessions to other enemy-
occupied countries’, was still firmly in place.
356 As winter descended on 
Greece, however, the British position became increasingly untenable.
Months after the first voyage, a report from the Red Cross delegation in 
Athens called into question the extent of the success achieved by the Kurtulus 
mission, noting that although the relief deliveries had been of great initial 
benefit:
general living conditions in Greece have deteriorated so greatly 
meanwhile that only an immediate and massive increase in the 
quantities of food coming in, more varied than those received hitherto, 
can prevent a catastrophe without precedent in the history of modern 
Europe.
357
Similar reports were received in Britain from Knatchbull-Hugessen who noted 
that the grain carried by the Kurtulus had been of a poor quality and that, on 
the advice of the ICRC, he felt compelled to support the prospect of further 
shipments.
358
As a measure of the situation’s gravity Burckhardt, with Odier in tow, chose to 
travel to London in December 1941 to discuss the matter in person with 
355 TNA:PRO FO 837/1232 – Burckhardt to Drogheda, 7 October 1941; Drogheda to Burckhardt, 11 
November 1941.
356 TNA:PRO FO 837/1231 – War Cabinet Memo, 14 February 1942.
357 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.497 citing ICRC Athens report December 1941.
358 TNA:PRO FO 837/1232 – Istanbul to UK Commercial Corporation, 28 October 1941.Foreign Office and MEW officials. This was an audacious move on Burckhardt’s 
part and his exact motives for a personal visitation were questioned by many 
within the Foreign Office, who suspected he would use the opportunity to 
pursue his ‘political ambitions’.
359 This impression was not helped when, in 
late November a report from Czech intelligence sources in Berne indicated 
that the president of the Swiss Federal Council, Marcel Pilet-Golaz had 
instructed Burckhardt to use his trip to London as a cover to bring over 
documents outlining a proposed peace deal for a “New Order” in Europe.
360 
The unease that ensued at the Foreign Office hung like a black cloud over 
preliminary plans for the visit and it was only once David Kelly officially 
warned Burckhardt to stick to Red Cross matters whilst in Britain that the 
Foreign Office agreed to let him into the country.
361 Although he did not 
present an official peace feeler, there is evidence to suggest that Burckhardt 
did talk peace – broadly and hopelessly – with the by then politically 
unimportant Rab Butler.
362
Aside from reservations over Burckhardt’s personal objectives, MEW was also 
wary of the Red Cross man’s growing ambitions for Geneva’s relief schemes in 
Europe. The decision was made long before Burckhardt set foot on British soil 
to avoid any significant blockade discussions with him, given that the 
Ministry’s ‘attitude was necessarily a negative one’.
363 To MEW the visit was a 
pointless and, if peace feelers were considered, possibly dangerous, exercise.
359 TNA:PRO FO 916/113 – Strang and Roberts Minutes, 21 Oct 1941.
360 TNA:PRO FO 371/26544 – Strang Minute, 18 Nov 1941; FO to Washington, 18 Nov 1941.
361 TNA:PRO FO 916/113 – FO to Berne, 22 Oct 1941. That Burckhardt did not do so is
362 This was Burckhardt's final peace feeler, which probably consisted of little more than him 
voicing the hopes of the German Opposition leader, Ulrich von Hassell, for the removal of Hitler 
and the concluding of a peace deal with Britain. Burckhardt had met with von Hassell prior to and 
after he returned from his visit to London – Crossland, 'Burckhardt'; Von Hassell Diaries, 9 August 
1941, p.189, 24 January 1942, pp.217–18.
363 TNA:PRO FO 916/113 – FO Minutes, 21 October 1941.Despite these opinions and the evident expectation at MEW that the ICRC 
visitation would herald yet another easily-dismissed appeal, Burckhardt was 
able to achieve both a partial lifting of the blockade of Greece and tentative 
approval from Whitehall for the expansion of Red Cross shipping operations 
elsewhere. Accordingly, on 9 January 1942 the Foreign Office informed 
Knatchbull-Hugessen that a second supply ship, the Hallaren, was to ‘get to 
the scene of the action’ in Greece as soon as possible.
364 This concession was 
not a sign of British solidarity on the issue. 
It was the Foreign Office, in spite of protests from MEW that reports of 
starvation had been exaggerated and that action to broaden the relief effort 
constituted a ‘complete reversal of policy’, which insisted that Greece was a 
‘special case’ amongst the occupied territories and so warranted immediate 
attention.
365 This point of view was compounded both by an increase in public 
criticism of Whitehall’s blockade and a dramatic appeal ‘not only to mercy but 
to expediency’ from Oliver Lyttelton, the British minister of state in Cairo, who 
declared that, ‘however much the enemy is to blame, history will I believe 
pronounce a stern judgement on our policy’, which he foresaw would be 
detrimental to Anglo-Greek relations for generations to come.
366 
Although these and other outside influences have generally been viewed by 
historians as the reasons for the British concessions to Greece, the 
importance of the ICRC’s dogged campaign and, moreover, those who 
conducted it, also needs to be considered.
367 Even with agitation from within 
364 TNA:PRO FO 837/1234 – FO to Angora, 9 January 1942.
365 The Foreign Office's primary argument was that unlike the rest of Europe, the Germans had 
left the occupation of Greece to the Italians, who were notorious for their poor administration – 
TNA:PRO FO 837/1231 – War Cabinet Minutes, 24 December 1941.
366 TNA:PRO PREM 3/74/5 – Cairo to FO, 9 January 1942.
367 Beaumont presents the best conclusion of this view by stating that the blockade concessions 
were ‘in part politically motivated’, with public agitation only playing a limited role in bringing and without, the British government would have had little basis for a practical 
relief scheme were it not for the plans presented to them by the ICRC.
Although the United States-based Greek War Relief Association could provide 
money to purchase food, neither the Italians, nor the Germans – who 
regarded ‘occupation as a matter of profit and loss’ – had displayed any 
capability to organise the means to distribute the supplies.
368 It fell to the 
ICRC, therefore, to implement such a scheme. 
It is true that the ICRC’s plans were slow to solidify into something tangible. 
The written appeals from Geneva throughout 1940-41 had yielded only 
marginal gains, and the efforts of Odier had done more to damage the ICRC’s 
reputation than to strengthen the legitimacy of its efforts. Yet the plans for 
shipping presented during the meetings in London were better thought out, 
addressed the British concerns in a more pragmatic manner and as such were 
well received.
369 
In addition to having more refined proposals for relief, the ICRC also had in 
Burckhardt a delegate whom the British – all suspicions of motive 
notwithstanding – were inclined to take more seriously than Haccius, Odier 
and even Junod. Unlike the aforementioned delegates, Burckhardt had an 
established reputation, particularly with those at the Foreign Office, as more a 
diplomat than a mere philanthropist. As such Burckhardt could not be so 
easily dismissed as the well-meaning unknowns who had come before him. 
about policy change – Beaumont, 'Starving For Democracy', p.68. A similar view is presented by 
Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.394, Mazower, Hitler's Greece, p.47 and Papastratis, British 
Policy Towards Greece, pp.116-117. Medlicott also points out the importance of US acquiescence 
to wheat shipments, given by Cordell Hull on 11 December and re-affirmed by Washington’s 
agreement on 9 January to no longer withhold US Dollars for purchases of supplies in Turkey. – 
Medlicott, Blockade, vol.2, p.267.
368 Mazower, Hitler's Greece, p.46.
369 TNA:PRO FO 916/113 – Minutes of ICRC Meeting with British government Departments, 9-10 
December 1941.The realisation at the Foreign Office that it would be ‘impolitic’ for Burckhardt 
to be given the ‘cold shoulder’ supports this argument.
 370  
It is also relevant that unlike other ICRC delegates, Burckhardt had British 
supporters – or at the very least, Britons who acknowledged Burckhardt’s 
importance – in high places. Anthony Eden knew Burckhardt from the latter’s 
work with the League of Nations and though their interactions during this 
period were often wary, it is undeniable that in the autumn of 1942 both men 
were united in the view that the blockade needed alteration. Walter Roberts at 
the PWD was also supportive of Burckhardt’s visit and, having chaperoned 
him for the duration, he reported the Red Cross man’s sensible nature and 
correct behaviour throughout his time in Britain.
371 
David Kelly was also instrumental in allaying Whitehall’s fears over 
Burckhardt’s peaceable intentions in the months leading to the visit. Kelly also 
recommended to his colleagues that they acknowledge Burckhardt’s desire to 
be viewed as ‘an international figure, rather than the philosopher and 
historian he truly is’.
372 To this end, Kelly joined officials from the BRC in 
putting forward the idea of French-speaking guides for Burckhardt – whose 
English was poor – and the organising of hunting trips in Scotland, special 
treatment that was not extended to any other ICRC representatives who 
visited Britain’s shores.
373 These discussions over Burckhardt, combined with 
the extrinsic agitations for relief in Greece, meant that the December 
meetings heralded not only the ICRC’s first major breakthrough on the matter 
370 Ibid. - PWD Minutes, 22 November 1941.
371 Ibid. – PWD to Berne, 29 December 1941.
372 Ibid. – Berne to FO, 19 October 1941.
373 Ibid. – Berne to FO, 17 October 1941; FO Minutes, 21 October 1941; Berne to FO, 19 October 
1941.of relief for Europe, but also the first time the British took a visit from Geneva 
seriously.
That is not to say that all Burckhardt’s plans were welcomed. Certain 
schemes, such as his proposal for a Red Cross plane to transport mail 
between the continent and Britain were inevitably dismissed as ‘utopian’ by 
Whitehall's officials.
374 Proposals for the empowerment of the JRC as the pre-
eminent post-war relief service were, however, better received by MEW. 
Burckhardt was so excited by this development that he felt the need 
immediately to cable the news back to Geneva.
375 Despite this enthusiasm for 
the scheme the fact remains that it was a programme for post-war Europe, a 
logical facet of MEW’s long standing policy of stockpiling relief in expectation 
of military victory. As such MEW’s co-operation on this issue was more a 
bonus to Burckhardt’s ambitions for the JRC than it was a breakthrough on 
more pressing blockade issues. Furthermore, it was a promise that rang 
hollow, for as early as July 1942 both the US State Department and the 
British government began a policy of restricting the JRC’s attempts to 
stockpile goods in Geneva.
376
The other primary area of discussion – one which encapsulated both 
immediate humanitarian needs and Burckhardt’s ambitious plans for the 
Committee’s expansion – was the issue of enlarging Red Cross shipping 
operations not just in Greece, but anywhere that was affected by the ever-
widening war. The idea of an independent fleet of ships which would act, in 
the words of Junod, as ‘stretcher bearers and ambulances’ by being able to 
374 TNA:PRO FO 916/115 – Roberts to Camps, 15 December 1941.
375 ICRC:G85/1047 – Livingston to Duchosal, 5 December 1941.
376 TNA:PRO FO 837/1224 – State Department to British Embassy, 28 July 1942.‘move about freely on the battlefield at agreed times’
377 had first been 
proposed at the 14
th ICRC Conference in 1930 and once again with the 
Commission of Naval Experts in Geneva in 1937. On both occasions the idea 
was abandoned owing to ‘legal, practical and financial obstacles’.
378
It is a testament both to Burckhardt’s ambitions and the gravity of the 
situation in both Western Europe and Greece that such hitherto 
insurmountable difficulties were now tackled in earnest. But, if war time 
circumstances rendered issues of shipping more imperative to address, their 
consideration was no less laborious. One of the first questions posed was how 
to guarantee the neutrality of the vessels, both in terms of flag and crew. 
When, for example, Burckhardt suggested that the ICRC take possession of 
the Frédéric, a Belgian freighter that had been detained at Casablanca since 
the start of the war, the fact that the ship had a Portuguese captain and a 
Belgian crew meant that assurances and ‘a definite plan covering all matters 
connected with the use of the vessel’ had to be obtained from the Portuguese 
and the Belgian government-in-exile.
379 This was in addition to obtaining 
guarantees from Berlin for the safe passage of the vessel before the idea 
could finally be approved by the British Admiralty and the War Office.
Suffice to say, the issue of the White Ships, like so many aspects of the 
blockade negotiations, were debated at length over the course of many 
months. That is not to suggest that the belligerents stonewalled the question 
of shipping during this time, for as negotiations continued over the question of 
the White Ships, progress was made in other areas of Red Cross shipping. On 
377 Junod, Warrior Without Weapons, p.176.
378 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.128.
379 TNA:PRO FO 916/113 – ICRC delegation meeting with British government representatives, 12 
December 1941.9 April a concession was once again granted to the American Red Cross by the 
British government which, in conjunction with the Swiss Federal Council, 
agreed to the opening up of 2,000-3,000 extra tons of cargo space for the 
Red Cross onboard Swiss merchant vessels on the trans-Atlantic route to 
Lisbon.
380 This concession, however, was less aimed at providing relief for 
civilian internees, than it was at having enough parcels for British POWs 
recently captured during the North African campaign.
The real development in shipping came a few days later on 14 April with the 
establishment in Basle of the Foundation for the Organisation of Red Cross 
Transport. Although the Foundation’s board of Swiss bankers and merchants 
also included the ICRC delegate Paul Logoz, the organisation was legally 
registered as being autonomous from the ICRC – a convenient means of 
getting around the thorny issue of Geneva spending ICRC funds on ships 
rather than relief supplies. With the buying power of this purely neutral 
coalition, plans got underway to secure the Frédéric through an inventive 
purchasing scheme that seems to have been devised to pre-empt the by now 
predictable concerns of MEW over the possibility of the Axis benefiting from 
the arrangement.
381
Mindful of these concerns, the Foundation organised a scheme whereby 
payment was to be reserved until the end of hostilities, with the Belgian 
owners agreeing to purchase the ship back at the original sale price. This 
method was used to acquire two more ships, the American freighters Spokane 
and Oriente, which along with the Frédéric were renamed Caritas I, Caritas II 
and the Henry Dunant respectively. These, together with nine additional 
380 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.156.
381 Of concern was the notion of vessels purchased in Europe being seized by the Germans after 
the Allies had donated money for their repairs and maintenance – TNA:PRO FO 916/333 – MEW 
to PWD, 6 August 1942.vessels, formed the nucleus of the White Ships fleet, which would eventually 
total 43 vessels by war’s end.
382
Such achievements could not have been made without a resolution to the 
second major problem of the White Ships – how exactly were they to be 
used? That this question was a vexed one for the belligerents is evidenced 
from the fact that, despite receiving the official announcement of the 
Foundation’s formation and goals on 26 May, approval for sailing conditions 
was not given until 23 July.
383 As part of its argument for approval the 
Committee made sure to stress the benefits of the White Ships not just for 
civilians but, more importantly, for British POWs.
On 15 July Burckhardt informed Walter Roberts at the PWD of his concerns 
over the lack of ICRC shipping tonnage and how this would affect ‘the 
requirements of the British prisoners, as well as those of other nationalities 
who have fought or are fighting on the side of the United Kingdom’. These 
requirements would, Burckhardt argued, ‘take on considerable extension 
before next winter and very great supplies of relief such as food, clothing, 
medicaments, tobacco, surgical articles will be called for’.
384 This appeal for a 
need to prepare for the coming winter was followed a few days later by 
another proposal from the Committee for increased shipping, in which the 
suggestion that ‘cold weather uniforms will be required for British prisoners of 
war captured at Tobruk’ was mentioned in the opening paragraph.
385 This 
attempt by the Committee to appeal to British self interest appears to have 
been influential, for on the same day approval for the White Ships was given 
382 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.476-77.
383 TNA:PRO FO 916/333 – ICRC Report on setting up of Foundation, 26 May 1942; Berne to FO, 7 
July 1942; TNA:PRO FO 837/1235 – FO to Cairo, 24 June 1942.
384 TNA:PRO FO 916/333 – Burckhardt to Roberts, 15 July 1942.
385 Ibid. – Geneva to FO, 28 July 1942.the PWD voiced its concerns to the BRC on the need for increased relief 
efforts for British POWs captured in North Africa.
386
Throughout much of the White Ships negotiations, however, the British focus 
appears to have been less on the benefits of the scheme and more on the 
need to rein in any suggestions of ICRC autonomy on the high seas. The 
original, and characteristically idealistic, wishes of the Committee were that 
the ships be used for the exchange of POWs and civilian internees, the 
delivery of mail and the transport of relief supplies for all categories of 
prisoners. The British response was also characteristic, with permission given 
only for the latter provision and then only if the supplies in question already 
had a navicert and the shipping route had been communicated to the 
Admiralty well in advance. The idea of passengers was completely out of the 
question for security reasons, so too the idea of mail being transported 
beyond the reach of the censor – a refusal the British insisted be put in 
writing before agreeing to the overall provisions.
387 Whitehall was determined, 
therefore, to make sure that if the ICRC possessed a fleet it would sail only 
under British conditions and, if any additional ships were acquired, their 
specific role be outlined to MEW prior to purchase.
388 
This was not the only attempt by the British during this period to clamp down 
on notions of autonomy and expansion in Geneva. Although the ICRC’s official 
historian presents the development of the fleet as a neat and natural 
extension of Burckhardt and Odier’s December negotiations, the truth is that 
386 This was in reference to the approximately 33,000 British and Commonwealth troops taken 
prisoner at Tobruk – Ibid. – PWD to BRC, 23 July 1942; Rollings, Prisoner of War, p.19.
387 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.142.
388 ICRC:G85/1048 – MEW to Burckhardt, 30 June 1942.path to agreement on Red Cross shipping was fraught with debate, distrust 
and manipulation on the part of the British.
389
These machinations were focused on the situation in Greece and appear to 
have had their genesis in Burckhardt and Odier’s visit to London in December 
1941. Despite outward displays of agreement to Burckhardt’s proposals, 
internally MEW was still highly critical. In the wake of the despatch of the 
Hallaren and a second ship, the Radmansoe, Drogheda minuted that ‘the 
concession made to Greece has broken down the principle of complete 
blockade’ and as such ‘we are going to be bombarded with a series of piece-
meal suggestions to admit food through the blockade’.
390 The ongoing problem 
of the ‘vague’ nature of the ICRC’s controls in Greece did not help matters 
and as such the Committee was belittled behind closed doors for its faith in 
German assurances of non intervention whilst ‘contenting itself with the staff 
of a man and a boy’ for supervision.
391
Yet still there was a need to do something for Greece. The solution proposed 
was an agreement to Burckhardt’s proposals for increased relief, provided 
that they were undertaken not by the ICRC, but by ‘a body of invigilators from 
Sweden, Turkey, and possibly Switzerland’.
392 MEW in effect wished to pursue 
the ICRC’s plans for expanded relief without the ICRC, whose own 
administrative body in Greece, the Comite de Haute Direction, composed of 
representatives of the Greek, Italian and German Red Cross societies, was 
deemed unacceptable by the Ministry.
393 Keen, both on humanitarian and 
political grounds, to expand the relief operation in Greece, both the Foreign 
389 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.476-77, 497.
390 TNA:PRO FO 837/1223 – MEW Minutes, 17 March 1942.
391 TNA:PRO FO 837/1235 – MEW Minutes, 4 February 1942.
392 Ibid. – MEW Minutes, 4 February 1942.
393 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.464.Office and the United States government agreed with this sentiment and on 
27 February London and Washington communicated to their embassies in 
Stockholm a detailed plan for a co-ordinated appeal to the Swedish 
government and their Red Cross to take over the administration, distribution 
and shipping duties pertaining to the Greek relief effort.
One of the more glaring points of the plan was the blatant manner in which 
the ICRC was maligned. Although it was agreed that, given that it was 
Burckhardt’s idea, the operation would have to fall under ‘the general 
auspices of the International Red Cross Committee’, the actual running of the 
scheme was to be handed over to the Swedes who were to form a new 
management commission that would by-pass the ICRC and ‘report fully to His 
Majesty’s government on all matters connected with the working of this 
scheme’. The telegram went on to state that this entire proposal had not yet 
been presented to either the Committee or the Axis occupation 
administration, and that ‘the whole scheme should emanate from the 
Swedes’.
394
The reasons for this approach were discussed in MEW minutes of 15 February 
wherein points of advantage for Swedish supervision were listed, among them 
being ‘we assume no commitment’ and ‘the presence of the Swedes ought to 
afford us all the information we need about what goes on. If the Germans 
exploit the arrangement, we are at least protected against extension of 
similar relief to other countries’.
395 This point was of special importance given 
that MEW was still operating under the assumption that any relief effort 
involving the British or the ICRC would be targeted by the occupying forces 
for the purposes of plunder. Thus it was vital that no word get out to the 
394 TNA:PRO FO 837/1235 – FO to Stockholm, 27 February 1942.
395 TNA:PRO FO 837/1235 – MEW Minutes, 15 February 1942.press – as had been the case with the Kurtulus – of British involvement and 
so a crucial part of the plan called for the Swedes to present the proposal to 
both Berlin and the ICRC as their own.
396 
The implication is clear. The British, despite assurances from Burckhardt that 
the Kurtulus’ cargo had been delivered without interference, and despite the 
apparent breakthroughs achieved in London in December, had grown tired of 
the ICRC’s management of the relief effort in Greece and so sought to replace 
them with a more Britain-friendly neutral power.
397 Unsurprisingly MEW was 
the driving force behind this idea, its argument being that though the
International Red Cross have done some excellent work, we doubt if that body 
itself is competent to handle a job of this size. It is also inconvenient to deal 
with it, because it has no government behind it and no facilities for rapid and 
secret communication. Moreover, it is naturally inclined to pursue its own policy, 
and also to engage in negotiations with Allied governments, whereas we desire 
to keep the strings of any permitted relief action firmly in our own hands.
398
Related to the latter point was another prevalent concern that stemmed from 
the presence of the Italian and German Red Cross societies in the composition 
of the Comite de Haute Direction – the apparent closeness between the ICRC 
relief mission and the Axis occupation forces. 
This apparent closeness, which had been posited by the various British 
prisoner of war departments since mid 1940, was naturally heightened by the 
fact that circumstances in Greece dictated that the ICRC had to rely more
than ever on the acquiescence of the occupation forces in order to conduct its 
relief operations. That this situation perturbed MEW is revealed in the 
396 Ibid. – Stockholm to FO, 12 March 1942.
397 Ibid. – Burckhardt to Roberts, 3 December 1941.
398 Ibid. – MEW to Washington, 10 July 1942.language used in the minutes of 21 May, wherein Junod was criticised for his 
attempts to undermine the British scheme through the ‘inadequate expedient 
of attaching a few Swedes to the executive body, leaving the high control in 
the hands of the International Red Cross and Axis’. Although the Ministry 
admitted that such collusion was ‘from one point of view to be desired’, the 
ICRC’s ‘excellent collaboration with the Axis authorities’ was seen not as an 
achievement of diplomacy on the part of the Committee, but as further 
evidence of the ICRC’s dubious ability to maintain good relations with the 
enemy.
399
MEW was not beyond pursuing these suspicions. On 30 March it made a 
request for an investigation into ‘Red Cross correspondence which throws any 
light on the International Red Cross being used by the enemy for exploitation 
of neutrals as intermediaries for the passing of information, particularly in 
connection with shipping intelligence’.
400 This was followed by a curious 
incident involving the mail of the ICRC’s London delegation, which was always 
sent to Geneva via Swiss diplomatic bag, but for some unknown reason was 
held up for two days in late April by the British censor.
401
Kit Stevens at the Foreign Office also voiced concerns about the activities of 
the ICRC, communicating to MEW his suspicions that the ICRC had allowed a 
surplus of wheat supplies intended for Greece to build up in order to sell it off 
for a profit.
402 MEW, moreover, appear to have followed up on this notion, 
proposing to Washington in August 1942 that a co-ordinated approach should 
be made to the ICRC in order to deter them from canvassing for donations in 
399 Ibid. – MEW Minutes, 21 May 1942.
400 TNA:PRO FO 837/1223 – MEW to IRB HQ, 30 March 1942.
401 ICRC:D-EUR/GB1-22 – Haccius to Roberts, 29 April 1942.
402 TNA:PRO FO 837/1236 – FO to MEW, 29 May 1942; FO to Greek Embassy in London, 15 July 
1942.Swiss Francs from individuals in the Americas, the fear being that the money 
was ultimately ending up in the pockets of ‘persons or interests in Enemy or 
Occupied territories’. In actual fact the money was being used to purchase 
goods from within Europe – as per MEW’s regulations – in order to create 
stockpiles of goods in Geneva. In keeping with British suspicions, the US State 
Department found fault even with this compliance. It was feared that the 
amassed supplies in Switzerland might fall into German hands.
403
In all fairness to those who suspected the ICRC, the attitude of the Axis 
powers at this time did little to ameliorate the climate of distrust. The Italians 
insisted that the ICRC maintain a leadership role in the new relief 
arrangement with the Swedes. Indeed, it was this insistence from Rome that 
led to MEW agreeing to keep the ICRC in a figurehead role when it would 
otherwise have preferred to confine its dealings to the Swedes.
404
Berlin was similarly loathe to upset the arrangement in Greece, replying to 
the February proposal from the Swedes that whilst it accepted the plans for 
increased shipping and supplies, it was unwilling to allow the Comite de Haute 
Direction to be dissolved. In addition, the Germans insisted that any further 
shipments should continue to be addressed not to the Swedes, but to the 
ICRC’s delegation in Greece. The fact that Italy herself was suffering from 
wheat shortages at this time and indeed made plans to withhold a grain 
shipment in April 1942, did little to help correct the impression that the Axis 
403 TNA:PRO FO 837/1224 – MEW to Washington, 13 August 1942; State Department to British 
Embassy, 28 July 1942. The MEW followed up this line via Geneva, asking the British Consulate 
there to raise the issue of the Committee’s use of the Red Cross message system to arrange for 
the dispatch of food in the occupied territories – ICRC:G85/1048 – MEW to Geneva, 26 June 
1942.
404 TNA:PRO FO 837/1235 – MEW to Washington, 11 July 1942.Red Cross services, the occupation forces and the ICRC, were working in 
collusion.
405
The ICRC’s official report is generally guarded on the issue of the British 
proposals, stating mildly that ‘despite its readiness to co-operate with the 
Swedes, the Committee considered it hazardous to introduce any far reaching 
change into the existing arrangement.
406 The report goes on to state that the 
Committee had to object to the British plan given that it would contravene the 
ICRC’s principle of neutrality by involving the Swedish government in its 
operations. This is a highly unconvincing argument given that Edouard de 
Haller, the Swiss Federal Delegate for Humanitarian Affairs, was at that time 
serving on the board of directors of the JRC and acting as liaison between the 
ICRC and the Swiss government in its capacity as Protecting Power.
407 
The flimsiness of this argument did not mean, however, that the ICRC was 
protecting some form of conspiratorial relationship with the Axis 
administration to seize relief supplies. The ICRC's, and in particular 
Burckhardt’s, objective in resisting the Swedish proposal was only to protect 
the Committee’s reputation and maintain a presence in Greece that would 
help lay the foundation for more expansive relief operations elsewhere. 
For their part, the reluctance of the Axis to upset the status quo reflected 
more their own indifference and unwillingness to improve conditions in 
Greece, rather than any particular fondness for the ICRC. The fact that even 
after the Swedes were put in charge large quantities of relief supplies – 
estimated by some to be up to 40% of that which was received – were still 
405 ICRC:G85/1048 – Livingston to Burckhardt, 7 April 1942; Medlicott, Blockade, vol.2, p.265.
406 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.462.
407 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.494; ICRC:CO2/1.935 – Minutes of ICRC Meeting, 19 January 
1942.going “missing” supports this argument.
408 Another point to consider is that 
the style of the ICRC’s work in Greece was hardly conducive to collaboration 
with the Axis. The efficiency of Brunel in working for British interests and the 
maverick actions of delegates like Andre Lambert would hardly have been 
needed had relations between the ICRC and the occupation forces been as 
close as the British presumed.
409 
Furthermore, it should be emphasised that the Italian government had a long 
history of poor relations with the ICRC, dating back to Rome’s use of mustard 
gas on civilians and repeated bombing of Red Cross hospitals during the Italo-
Ethiopian war of 1935-36.
410 This evident contempt for the neutrality of the 
Red Cross was further demonstrated by the Italians during the invasion and 
occupation of Greece. In a repeat of the attacks in Ethiopia, in November 
1940 and May 1941 Italian planes deliberately bombed Greek Red Cross 
hospitals at Larissa and Jannia. This was followed by an even more heinous 
act in June 1942, when a squadron of Italian dive bombers torpedoed and 
sank the clearly marked JRC vessel Stureborg, an action which led to the loss 
of tonnes of relief supplies and the death of all but one of the crew, including 
the ICRC’s escorting agent, Richard Heider.
411 These attacks were hardly the 
actions of a collaborative partner of the ICRC, which – with the urging of the 
British – was quick to launch a protest to Rome over the Stureborg sinking.
412 
408 TNA:PRO FO 837/1214 – Washington to MEW, 27 March 1943. Refugees from Greece who had 
arrived in Egypt in early 1943 estimated that up to 40% of supplies were still being requisitioned 
by the occupation forces for the benefit of the army. The MEW confirmed later that same year 
that supplies of wheat and pulse were still being ‘pilfered’ – TNA:PRO FO 837/1215 – Lord 
Selbourne to Archbishop of Canterbury, 1 June 1943.
409 See Chapter 1, p.90-91.
410 See Baudendistel, Bombs and Good Intentions, chs.4 and 6.
411 It was agreed by both the Axis and the Allies that the Stureborg had veered 30 miles off 
course, yet it was still clearly marked with Red Cross emblems – TNA:PRO FO 836/1231 – Naval 
Cipher to C in C Mediterranean – 12 July 1942; ICRC Report, vol.1, p.65.
412 The British aim was to deflect criticism of their blockade policies by highlighting the brutality of 
the Italians – TNA:PRO FO 837/1236 – FO to Cairo, 6 July 1942; FO to Geneva, 22 July 1942.Despite their knowledge of these incidents, the fact that so many relief 
consignments had gone missing on the ICRC’s watch continued to affect 
British perceptions of the Committee’s relations with the Axis. A report 
received in April by Eden from Victor Mallet, the British minister in Stockholm, 
did little to change this view. Mallet reported that the ICRC ‘had now excellent 
collaboration with the Axis authorities, largely owing to the advice given the 
Comite de Haute Direction by the Italian and German Red Cross 
representatives thereon’.
413 This direct implication of the influence of Axis Red 
Cross societies on the ICRC’s managing commission served only further to 
polarise the issue in the eyes of the British, who increasingly began to see the 
Swedes and themselves allied on one side against Berlin and Geneva on the 
other. The British had quite simply run out of trust and patience with the 
ICRC’s Greek operation.
The Swedes by contrast were viewed, erroneously according to the British 
Naval Attaché in Stockholm, as being both firmly anti-German and, as an un-
tested commodity in Greece, well positioned to serve British interests. The 
British invitation for Stockholm to become involved, therefore, was in keeping 
with Whitehall’s general ‘wish to get as much co-operation as possible out of 
the Swedes and of getting them to deny as much as possible to the Germans’.
414
413 TNA:PRO FO 837/1235 – Mallet to Eden, 30 April 1942.
414 According to Henry Denham, the British Naval Attaché in Stockholm, the Swedes did not truly 
believe that Germany would be defeated until the end of 1942, and so continued to favour Berlin 
over London until that time – Henry Denham, Inside The Nazi Ring: A Naval Attaché in Sweden 
1940-1945 (London, 1984), pp.55-56. The Allies for their part, continued to put pressure on 
Stockholm, which let the Germans transport troops and materiel via Sweden into Norway until 29 
July 1943 – Christian Leitz, Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe During the Second World War, 
(Manchester, 2000), pp.59-63.This was not the only advantage of the Swedish option. The acquisition of 
valuable neutral Swedish vessels – of which there were many laying dormant 
in Baltic ports – was also very important for building a relief fleet on which the 
British felt they could rely.
415 This advantage gelled nicely with the over-riding 
aim of the British to remove the ICRC from a position of authority in Greece. 
This rejection of the Committee, built upon the foundation of frustrating 
negotiations and distrust of its supervisory work, also contained elements of 
the usual criticisms levelled at Geneva by the British – the amateurism of its 
delegates; the independence of thought and movement; and the Committee’s 
seemingly incessant habit of taking on more than it could handle.
416 
The irony of this was that such assertiveness on the part of the ICRC was 
spurred on more than anything by MEW’s repeated attempts to restrict its 
efforts. It had been MEW’s lack of response to written appeals throughout 
1941 that had prompted Burckhardt’s visit and the presentation of his 
proposals for increased shipping. As the sluggish negotiations over these 
proposals dragged on into spring the Ministry’s obstinacy continued to eclipse 
what in December looked like a new dawn for British-ICRC relations. When, in 
May, more reports were received from Greece of starvation amongst the 
populace, the ICRC launched a fresh round of appeals and plans. One such 
scheme, aimed specifically at satisfying MEW’s concerns, was for the 
establishment of camps in Greece to feed children under Red Cross 
supervision. Both this idea and a subsequent appeal for additional shipments 
of food to be sent from Trieste to Piraeus, were met with refusals by MEW.
417 
415 TNA:PRO FO 837/1231 – War Cabinet Minutes, 14 February 1942. There were 21 Swedish 
vessels used during the war. In total they made 94 voyages and transported 712,000 tonnes of 
goods – ICRC Report, vol.3, p.479; Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.498.
416 TNA:PRO FO – 837/1235 – MEW to Washington, 11 July 1942.
417 TNA:PRO FO – 837/1236 – MEW to FO, 10 June 1942; Camps Minute, 7 May 1942; Cairo to FO, 
27 May 1942.The same was true of the Committee’s appeal of 12 March for a shipment of 
Canadian wheat. This appeal was met by prevarication from MEW, which 
demanded exact details of the extent of the starvation before agreeing to the 
proposal, provided of course that the Swedes be involved. So time consuming 
were these negotiations that the three Swedish ships carrying the wheat did 
not leave Montreal until 21 July, only two days before an agreement was 
reached on the issue of the White Ships.
418
The effects of these prolonged negotiations were felt hardest on the ground 
where Robert Brunel, having witnessed the tragedy of Greece first-hand, 
summed up the Committee’s noble, yet overly simplistic, view by commenting 
bitterly that ‘the Anglo-Americans should know better than to tighten the 
restrictions on the blockade when we’re doing such good work’.
419 In the 
pursuit of this ‘good work’ on behalf of Greece and, moreover, in defiance of 
MEW’s interests, the ICRC enjoyed success, albeit at the expense of 
casualties. In addition to the Greek nurses killed during Italian air raids and 
the crew of the Stureborg, Robert Brunel also lost his life during the course of 
the Greek relief effort. Suffering from fatigue and exhaustion, Brunel was 
invalided back to Switzerland in 1943 where on 16 June, he finally died, 
having quite literally worked himself to death in an effort to bring succour to 
Greece. It is little wonder that upon hearing of his demise flags across the 
war-torn country were flown at half mast and the Municipal Council of Athens 
saw fit to name a street in the capital after him.
420
Had Brunel lived, he would have seen the foundations he laid in 1941 
supporting what by the time of Greece’s liberation in October 1944 had 
418 ICRC Report, vol.3, pp.463-467
419 ICRC:G3/27C/147 – Report of Greek delegation, 5 May 1942.
420 ICRC Report, vol.1, p.66; Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.502.become the ICRC’s greatest wartime triumph. The crucial 45,435 tonnes of 
food shipped under the auspices of the Committee de Haute Direction was 
eclipsed by the tonnage shipped under the new Managing Commission – as 
the Swedish/ICRC enterprise became known – which between September 
1942 and April 1945 amounted to 712,000 tonnes of food, clothing and 
medical supplies.
421 Given that it was the British and the Americans who 
insisted on Swedish involvement, which admittedly brought with it the 
necessary tonnage to better the relief effort, it is tempting to cast the Foreign 
Office and those who supported its scheme as the architects of this success. 
This, however, would be misguided.
The interests of the British in occupied Greece were threefold: quelling of 
public criticism; preservation of her POWs; and relief for the civilian 
population. I list these in order of Whitehall’s consideration. Compared with 
France, the POW problem was small and so was considered more an 
opportunity to assuage public criticism than a true cause for concern. The 
civilian problem, far greater than that of the POWS, was heavily influenced by 
the pressure of public criticism over the blockade, particularly from the United 
States where figures of standing advocated throughout 1941-42 that 
concessions be made to Greece.
422 There was also genuine empathy in some 
British quarters, particularly in the cases of Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen and 
Oliver Lyttelton. Sympathy, however, had its limits and those were imposed 
by MEW, which was as determined to maintain the blockade’s integrity around 
Greece as the Foreign Office was to break it down.
423 In an effort to resolve 
421 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.459, 479.
422 Beaumont, 'Starving for Democracy', pp.66-67.
423 The entries in Hugh Dalton's diary for 5 January and 9 June 1942 best exemplify this division in 
Whitehall particularly between Eden and Dalton. Though this resistance from the MEW 
continued throughout 1942, it was Dalton’s view that by February 1943 his more moderate 
successor at the MEW, Lord Selbourne, had taken to Eden’s line with regards to limiting the 
blockade – Dalton, Diary, 13 February 1943, p.340, 456, 553.this division a compromise was reached – increased shipping to Greece to 
keep the Foreign Office happy and a change of staff to supervise its 
distribution to satisfy MEW.
In terms of a response to the crisis in Greece the solution was admirable in 
that it indicated a realisation in Whitehall that something needed to be done 
despite the determined resistance of MEW. In saying this, however, it must be 
stressed that this action was only taken by the British under pressure from 
public scrutiny and, after Greece had starved for a little over half a year, 
during which time Brunel and Burckhardt had supplied the British with plenty 
of information on the scope of the disaster and plans – often specifically 
aimed at satisfying MEW’s requirements – of how best to deal with the 
situation. 
The lethargy of the British response to Geneva’s efforts and urgings on the 
matter indicate that the distrust that was forged over the problems in France 
in 1940 had abated little despite the best efforts of the ICRC. This in turn, led 
to a natural resistance in Whitehall to the Committee’s proposals. When the 
British did decide to act, the Committee, although not entirely removed from 
operations in Greece, was forced by Whitehall’s scheme into an arrangement 
that, once implemented, proved disruptive to its on-going relief efforts 
throughout the first half of 1942.
424 Moreover, and detrimental to British-ICRC 
relations, the British proposals callously dismissed the ICRC’s prior 
achievements conducted under its own auspices and without outside 
influence. These included the organisation of POW parcel distribution and 
overland transportation routes through the Balkans to Greece; creation of the 
424 The mid year report on the ICRC concluded that although the belligerent governments had 
allowed some life-saving shipments through, the irregularity of the shipments meant that 
conditions in Greece had actually worsened since February 1942 – TNA:PRO FO 837/1237 – ICRC 
Report on General Situation in Greece, undated August 1942.JRC to increase relief efforts across Europe; formation of the White Ships and 
Transport Foundation as a practical means of assuring this increase; and, 
perhaps most notably, a welcome realisation that changes in its style of 
operations would be required in order to achieve success in the face of the 
escalating conflict. The use of caïques to service the Greek islands, often in 
defiance of both blockade regulations and the wishes of the Axis 
administration, stands as an excellent example of this more inventive 
attitude.
425 Whilst these efforts are widely applauded by historians, it is 
seldom emphasised that these were made under the shadow of British 
attempts to either resist or control the ICRC’s plans. 
EXPANSION, INNOVATION AND RESTRICTION
Why did Whitehall decide to interject itself so significantly into the ICRC’s 
Greek operation? The obvious, and most widely touted, reason was that the 
British were concerned by the on-going seizure of relief goods by the Axis 
forces in Greece, a fact that cannot be denied. The British had every right to 
be wary of the ICRC’s ability to supervise distribution. However, as was so 
often the case in British-ICRC relations, Whitehall was quick to single out the 
Committee as the primary cause of the problem, viewing its delegates either 
as poor supervisors or Axis sympathisers. This view was formed at the 
expense of basic logic which dictated that the ICRC was a non-government 
relief organisation operating in a country under the occupation of troops who, 
by the nature of their empowered position, could and did take what they 
wanted. Despite what the British thought, no amount of administrative 
rearrangement in Greece on the part of Whitehall, Washington or Stockholm 
was going to change that fact.
425 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.460.It is true that seizures of imported goods were reduced under the Swedish-
run Managing Commission. However, if one bears in mind the increase in 
partisan activity in Greece from early 1943 onwards, it seems more likely that 
the reduction in plundering was related to the fact that the occupation troops 
were preoccupied with an increasingly unwinnable guerrilla war in the 
Peloponnesian Mountains.
426 However, although they may have disrupted the 
Axis troops’ plans to plunder, neither partisans nor the presence of the 
Managing Commission prevented the theft of goods altogether.
From late 1942 until the retreat of the Germans from Greece in October 1944, 
Red Cross parcels and meagre local produce were still being seized in notable 
quantities for transport back to Germany and Italy.
427 This fact ran contrary to 
MEW’s lofty expectations that ‘the Swedes will probably be able to stop the 
Germans stealing the wheat’ or, at the very least ‘afford us all the information 
which we need about what goes on’.
428 This opinion was founded on little but 
prejudice against the ICRC's delegation, which the British, unreasonably and 
erroneously, saw as inferior in terms of its reliability and forcefulness, 
compared with the similarly neutral Swedes.
This need to improve the security of the Greek relief effort was only part of 
the reason for the British government’s interference. If one looks at the 
aftermath of the Managing Commission’s creation in August 1942 and the 
wider scope of British-ICRC relations from that time onwards, it becomes 
apparent that British insistence on involving the Swedes in Greece was but 
426 The Greek People’s Liberation Army, or ELAS, began organised resistance against the Axis 
occupation in mid 1942. Attacks on Italian troops increased over the course of the winter and by 
spring 1943 the ELAS had massed its forces in the Peloponnesian Mountains, where it effectively 
ruled. This lead the Axis occupation forces to both demand more troops and recruit anti-
communist militia for the purposes of fighting the ELAS – Mazower, Hitler's Greece, pp.123-133, 
172, see ch.21 generally for ELAS history.
427 Medlicott, Blockade, vol.2, pp.273-275.
428 TNA:PRO FO 837/1235 – MEW Minutes, 15 February 1942.one factor in a wider-reaching effort to restrict the influence and 
independence of the ICRC, in particular with regards to its new fleet. 
As early as 6 August – that is, only a week after agreement had been 
begrudgingly reached on the question of the Transport Foundation and the 
White Ships – W.A. Camps at MEW raised the old fear that in expanding its 
fleet the ‘IRC were probably acting under pressure from the German and 
Italian authorities’. Moreover, he doubted ‘whether the company [Transport 
Foundation] will bring any advantage to the British Red Cross’, given that ‘the 
chief preoccupation of the International Committee is to get space for 
transport of goods for non-British prisoners’.
429 This sentiment was echoed by 
representatives of the Ministry of Transport and the Foreign Office, which 
raised concern over whether the ICRC was increasing its own fleet at the 
expense of the BRC’s vessels that delivered British POW parcels from Lisbon 
to Marseilles.
430
Clearly Whitehall viewed the creation of the White Ships, rather than being a 
welcome means of securing supply lines, as a move by the ICRC to expand its 
relief effort to other areas – ones which did not directly concern the welfare of 
British POWs. In addition to being yet another expression of Whitehall’s 
flawed view of the ICRC as a servant of Britain, this opinion was also deeply 
at odds with the goals of the Committee’s expansion in 1942. The political 
motivations for this expansion will be covered in the next chapter. For now it 
is enough to say that under Burckhardt’s emerging leadership the ICRC began 
a campaign from mid 1942 onwards both to improve relations with the British 
and work to closer with them than it had in the past. 
429 TNA:PRO FO 837/1224 – MEW to PWD, 6 August 1942.
430 TNA:PRO FO 916/333 – Minutes of Interdepartmental Meeting, 13 August 1942.This campaign began in the aftermath of Burckhardt and Odier’s meetings in 
London in December 1941, from which Burckhardt concluded that the strained 
character of British-ICRC relations was an issue that needed to be addressed.
431 Having reviewed Burckhardt’s findings, Jacques Chenevière proposed that 
the London delegation – ‘a post of the highest possible importance’ – needed 
to be strengthened. Accordingly, the Committee chose to send the delegate 
Horace de Pourtales, a consummate English speaker, to work alongside 
Haccius in London.
432 He was later joined by another delegate, Nicholas 
Burckhardt (no relation to Carl), who, when in need of a recall to Geneva for 
personal reasons in February 1943, was replaced by Jean Cellerier.
433
The ICRC, therefore, was determined both to strengthen and to maintain the 
presence of its delegation in London. This was hardly the action of an 
organisation that was seeking to distance itself from British interests, which, 
Burckhardt made clear in his letter to Lord Drogheda on 19 August, would be 
best served by Whitehall’s acquiescence in the Transport Foundation's plans 
for expansion.
434 It was this issue – key for the evolution of the ICRC’s 
operations – that the British were made to consider during the summer of 
1942. The conclusions Whitehall reached on this matter had a lasting impact 
on British-ICRC relations.
In terms of these relations, Whitehall’s interdepartmental meetings in August 
were a grim affair. Of those present only Walter Roberts and his colleagues at 
the Foreign Office appear to have truly appreciated the ICRC’s rationale for 
expansion. Roberts – having perhaps succumbed to Burckhardt’s charm 
431 ICRC:D/EUR/GB1-56 – Burckhardt’s Report on Visit to London, 19 February 1942.
432 ICRC:C14 – Minutes of ICRC meeting, 2 February 1942.
433 ICRC:G85/1049 – Chenevière to Norton, 22 February 1943.
434 TNA:PRO FO 916/333 – Burckhardt to Drogheda, 19 August 1942.during the latter’s recent visit to London – stated that both the ICRC and the 
PWD considered that all Allied prisoners should be treated the same as 
Imperial troops. This view effectively opposed Whitehall’s policy on POW relief 
in favour of supporting Burckhardt’s argument that the ICRC could serve both 
British and non-British POWs. The Foreign Office’s general conclusions went a 
step further by expressing the rather catty opinion that the ICRC was
a body of high-minded people concerned mainly with humanitarian projects and 
they (FO) feel that the fleet scheme springs from this motive and is not (as 
suspected by the Ministry of Economic Warfare) the result of pressure from 
enemy powers.
Despite this support, reservations amongst others in Whitehall remained. One 
view, shared by the Admiralty and the Ministry of Transport, was that the 
ICRC was manoeuvring to absorb the BRC’s modest fleet of merchant vessels. 
The Ministry of Transport’s G.D. Frazer went so far as to claim that a 
campaign to discredit the BRC’s vessels on the grounds that they had 
insufficient marking and lighting had been invented to further the ICRC’s 
aims.
435
In fact, the Italian Control Committee had made protests in early 1941 about 
the size and marking of the BRC vessels. Although the BRC thought these 
complaints were only a ‘pretext to cause trouble’, it joined the British 
government in using the issue of inadequate ships’ markings to blame the 
ICRC for attacks along the Lisbon-Marseille route in 1944.
436 This hypocritical 
reaction was a logical culmination of the simmering grievances first aired by 
the various government departments in August 1942. In general, these 
grievances centred on the fear that in agreeing to the ICRC’s proposals the 
435 Ibid. – Minutes of Interdepartmental Meeting, 13 August 1942.
436 BRC Report, vol.1, pp.366-367. The details of these attacks on the Embla and the Cristina will 
be detailed in chapter 4.British would forfeit control of the Lisbon-Marseilles route to an entity that, 
unlike the BRC, had concerns beyond the welfare of British POWs. Mindful of 
the fact that the Committee was still needed to bring succour to British 
internees, the Ministry of Transport suggested that, as a show of ‘goodwill’, it 
would back a proposal to grant the ICRC one ship – to be run of course, by 
the BRC’.
437
This suggestion was clarified at the 21 August meeting, at which it was 
proposed that a Danish vessel, the Nancy, be released to the ICRC to be used 
along the Lisbon-Marseilles route – effectively to bolster BRC shipping 
operations, not the White Ships. Tellingly, this scheme was only backed by 
Whitehall on the proviso that the money paid for the Nancy would be held in a 
blocked Swiss bank account and that the ‘ship would be used principally in the 
first place to reduce the accumulation of supplies already around Lisbon for 
Imperial Prisoners of War’. All other Allied prisoners, however, would have to 
wait for ‘some future date’ before being granted the same service.
438 
Clearly, despite Roberts’ minority view, little had changed in terms of 
Whitehall’s perceptions on shipping since the parcel crisis of 1940-41. In 
October 1942 the War Office’s W.H. Gardner echoed the same fears 
expressed by George Warner over two years beforehand when he wrote that 
‘if we surrender the BRCS fleet and place ourselves entirely in the hands of 
the IRC for shipping, our whole programme for servicing British prisoners is 
likely to be seriously prejudiced’.
439 Similarly, MEW felt that in addition to 
possibly diverting supplies from British POWs, any resulting increase in the 
437 TNA:PRO FO 916/333 – Minutes of Interdepartmental Meeting 13 August 1942.
438 Ibid. – Minutes of Interdepartmental Meeting, 21 August 1942.
439 TNA:PRO FO 916/334 – WO to PWD, 19 October 1942.flow of goods to French POWs would be of further detriment to the blockade, 
given that security arrangements in France were still deemed unacceptable.
440 
In the face of this resistance, approval for the release of the Nancy was not 
given until 14 November, almost three months after the matter was first 
raised. Even then, the usually supportive Foreign Office still felt that ‘a 
cautious attitude’ needed to be maintained towards the Committee’s 
Transport Foundation and, despite Whitehall’s agreement on the Nancy, it was 
still ‘anxious to guide the initiative of the International Red Cross into 
convenient channels’.
441 In blunter language: it wanted to control the actions 
of the ICRC for British benefit.
Although approval for the release of the Nancy was given in November, 
conditions of operation were still proving unsatisfactory to the British. They 
had been wary from the outset of responsibility for the cost of upkeep of the 
White Ships vessels.
442 When it was discovered that the running costs for the 
Nancy – to be paid by the BRC whose funds it was felt would be better spent 
on packing parcels for British POWs – would be ‘unduly onerous’, the 
negotiations over the release of the vessel were broken off. This obfuscating, 
flawed dialogue by the British in relation to the ICRC’s shipping expansion 
proved to be its last of note until the war’s final months. As with the debates 
over blockade relaxation, the British had simply had enough and in February 
1943 MEW decided that its official policy was to offer ‘no encouragement in 
general terms’ for the White Ships and instead only to ‘consider a particular 
440 Ibid. – MEW to PWD, 14 October 1942.
441 Ibid. – FO to Washington, 14 November 1942.
442 TNA:PRO FO 916/333 – ICRC Shipping Memo, undated, August 1942. Owing to its location 
within the file, it is likely this memo was written and circulated sometime between 1 and 6 
August.proposal for the company to acquire a particular ship for a particular purpose’.
443
With regard to the goals of the ICRC expanding its fleet, the release of the 
Nancy would have meant little anyway as the clear intention of the British, 
even before MEW reached its stark conclusion, was not to assist the 
Committee in improving the scope of its parcel delivery, but to ensure above 
all else, that British and Imperial troops remained well supplied. Even so, the 
negotiations over the Nancy were still very important in terms of British-ICRC 
relations in that they outlined in the broadest possible terms the conflicting 
intentions of Geneva and Whitehall on the question of the White Ships. Given 
how crucial this issue was in shaping British-ICRC relations, the question must 
be asked, were the views of each party justified?
Looking at the wider context of the ICRC’s work during 1942-43, the British 
policy of protecting their own appears both overzealous and unreasonable. At 
the time of the Nancy negotiations the ICRC’s primary area of operations – 
the despatch of parcels to POWs – was stable and, in some theatres, thriving. 
The annual number of parcels received and despatched from Switzerland 
during that year reached its wartime height of 14,690,625 and, more 
importantly, the parcels were now reaching prisoners in places that had 
previously been almost impossible to supply.
444 The operation to supply the 
Greek islands and the introduction of collective parcels for French POWs 
detailed in the previous chapters were two of the more notable areas of 
expansion. 
443 TNA:PRO FO 837/1214 – MEW Note on Blockade Policy, 14 February 1943.
444 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.11.There were also improvements for those British POWs who had endured the 
privations of 1940-41, given that Eden’s two-year old pledge to delivery ‘one 
parcel, per week, per man’ was finally being delivered at places like Stalag 
Luft III (Sagan).
445 Even in Dulag Luft, the source of so much difficulty in 
1940-41, parcels were being received regularly by September 1942.
446 MI9, 
the British agency responsible for POW escape and evasion, also benefited 
from this stability. Although its chief, Colonel Norman Crockett, declared Red 
Cross parcels 'absolutely sacrosanct', MI9 had no issue with using the ICRC's 
efficient delivery infrastructure to send bogus relief parcels containing escape 
equipment and maps into the camps.
447 
These improvements and benefits were the result of stable supply lines which 
the White Ships were intended above all to maintain. The reason why these 
supply lines needed constant reappraisal and expansion was that their ability 
to operate – like all facets of the ICRC’s activities – was dictated in no small 
part by the variability of the war. The way this variability affected the shipping 
lanes will be examined at length in another chapter, but it is worth noting 
here that without the stability given to parcel supply lines in 1942 several 
crises in POW relief may not have been averted.
The first of these crises was that, owing to an increasing lack of general 
resources within the Reich, material conditions within POW camps and the 
standard of their upkeep began steadily to decline from mid 1942 onwards.
448 
445 TNA:PRO WO 224/63 – MOC Report to Protecting Power, 13 August 1942.
446 TNA:PRO WO 32/18490 – ICRC Report on Dulag Luft and Lazaret, 16 September 1942, 4 March 
1943.
447 These parcels were not marked 'Red Cross', but were delivered by the ICRC's transport 
infrastructure – M.R.D Foot and J.M Langley, MI9: Escape and Evasion, 1939-1945 (Boston, 1979), 
pp.97-98.
448 Vourkoutiotis, ‘What the Angels Saw', p.705.One of the more severe manifestations of this problem was a result of the 
OKW’s decision during spring 1942 to cut POW rations to match those of the 
German civilian population. The ICRC’s camp inspectors estimated that this 
left some groups of POWs dependent on Red Cross parcels for 60% of their 
daily calorie intake.
449
Owing to the improvements made to the ICRC and the BRC’s operations what 
once may have been a serious problem was generally well handled. In August 
1942 production by the BRC was increased by an extra 20,000 parcels per 
week over the course of twenty-six weeks. Having learnt from its 
unpreparedness in 1940-41, the War Office also showed some foresight on 
this issue, advocating that the BRC’s scale of production be maintained until 
June 1943, by which time the surplus had grown to approximately 200,000 
parcels.
450 When it came time for the ICRC to manage this increase in 
shipping it had the flexibility of the White Ships to rely on. When transport 
moved onto the continent the Committee’s efforts were similarly characterised 
by an efficiency and ingenuity it had lacked in 1940-41. 
In July 1942 for example, the ICRC’s warehouses in Lisbon began to overflow 
with parcels. Faced with this problem the Committee acquired 16 trains, each 
comprising 20 to 25 wagons, to shift the supplies overland to Marseilles. The 
result of such enterprise was that by the end of 1942 the parcel stockpile in 
Geneva had grown so large that the ICRC had to commission the construction 
of a new 6,600 square metre storehouse at La Renfile. This new storehouse 
was in addition to the already over-burdened 6,000 square metre facility at 
Vallorbe that had been procured by the Committee in November 1941.
451 
449 ICRC Report, vol.1, pp.254-55.
450 BRC Report, vol.1, pp.269-270.
451 TNA:PRO WO 916/333 – Geneva to FO, 28 July 1942. The use of the trains proved a  successful 
stop-gap measure whilst additional shipping was being negotiated with the MEW – Durand, These facilities, combined with an impressive monthly average of between 
1,000 and 1,200 wagons of parcels being sent into Germany, meant that few 
British POWs suffered from a lack of parcels over the winter of 1942-43.
452 
This achievement was especially notable given that from October 1942 until 
the New Year merchant shipping in the western Mediterranean was 
significantly disrupted by Allied military operations in North Africa.
453 The 
foresight of the Committee and the BRC made sure that, unlike 1940-41, the 
escalation of hostilities in Red Cross transportation zones had a minimal effect 
on parcel delivery.
This stability should have made two things clear to the British. Firstly, the 
expansion of the ICRC’s operations in no way engendered a situation in which 
‘the whole programme for servicing British prisoners might seriously be 
harmed’.
454 The opposite, in fact, was true. Secondly, although problems still 
occurred from time to time, the ICRC in general shouldered its increasing 
burdens well and demonstrated that, despite ongoing concerns about its 
capabilities, both the Committee’s delegates and its leadership were handling 
the challenge of expanding operations in as efficient a manner as could be 
expected given Geneva’s limitations. An example of how the ICRC was able to 
bring much needed fluidity to these limitations and, conversely, how resistant 
Whitehall was to such innovation, can be seen in the creation of the 
Concentration Camp Parcel Scheme (CCPS). 
Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.481; ICRC Report, vol.3, p.239.
452 Ibid, vol.1, pp.168-69. One notable exception to this rule was Oflag IVC (Colditz), where the 
prisoners did not receive their ‘one parcel, per man, per week’ promise until mid 1943. Even so, 
the inmates were far from suffering, as over the summer of 1942 the camp MOC reported that 
each man still received approximate ¾ of a parcel each week – TNA:PRO WO 224/69 – ICRC 
Report on Oflag IVC, 3 July 1942; Berne to FO, 2 June 1942; ICRC to ICRC London, 14 June 1943.
453 The intensification of battle in this region lead to the Portuguese government forbidding any 
of its merchant ships to call at Mediterranean ports – ICRC Report, vol.3, p.159.
454 TNA:PRO FO 916/334 – FO to Berne, 31 October 1942.Under the terms of the Committee’s agreement with the Allies, parcels, either 
for POWs or civilian internees, were only permitted to pass through the 
blockade if the names and addresses of the recipient were known and a Red 
Cross delegate was on hand at the camp to distribute them. Whilst these 
requirements were more often than not met in POW camps, for political 
prisoners of the Reich the situation was more complicated.
455 This was owing 
to Hitler’s Nacht und Nebel decree of 7 December 1941, which declared that 
no information on the fate or location of captured ‘communistic elements and 
other circles hostile towards Germany’ was to be given to the outside world.
456 
The all-important names for those “enemies of the Reich” incarcerated under 
these measures were, therefore, thin on the ground.
The ICRC’s response to this problem was one of the most adroit and creative 
of the entire war. The innovation came from one of Burckhardt’s closest allies 
in the Committee, Jean de Schwarzenberg, whom the former had made head 
of the newly created CCPS in July 1943. In the months prior to the 
organisation being made official Schwarzenberg had pioneered a system 
whereby each parcel in a delivery run had an attached receipt on which 
additional prisoners’ names and addresses could be written before being sent 
back to Geneva for onward transmission. As Schwarzenberg himself admitted, 
‘it was something of an adventure, since we were departing from the 
traditional basis of our work as defined by the Conventions’.
457 
This unorthodox method led to the positive identification of many more 
prisoners and subsequently, a need to expand the ICRC’s capacity to deliver 
455 POW camps holding Soviet prisoners were exempt from this agreement. 
456 'The Nacht Und Nebel Decree', 7 December 1941 – Project Avalon, Yale: Lillian Goldman Law 
Library, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/l-90.asp (accessed 4 May 2007).
457 Favez, Holocaust, p.95, citing Schwarzenberg Memoir in ICRC/G3/26F/DAS.parcels into these camps. By the end of the war the CCPS had delivered 
1,112,000 parcels to concentration camp inmates, many of whom would have 
perished without the crucial supplementation to their increasingly meagre 
rations.
458 As an example of how the much-feared notion of ICRC/Axis 
collaboration could be used beneficially, the part played by the German camp 
authorities in getting the scheme off the ground should be noted. 
Much of the scheme’s early success was due to Roland Marti’s ability 
successfully to negotiate with camp commandants and higher ranking 
Gestapo for concessions for collective parcel delivery at the Oranienburg-
Sachsenhausen and Ravensbruck camps. These agreements were not always 
held sacrosanct. By 1944, however, similar arrangements had been agreed to 
in principle by camp authorities at Dachau, Natzweiler, Buchenwald and 
Stutthof. Amazingly, there were some instances in which the German 
authorities actually helped the ICRC by forwarding parcels intended for those 
who had been transferred to other camps.
459 
Although initially the Committee was able to procure supplies from Eastern 
European countries from within the blockade, the need for greater quantities 
of supplies grew as the scheme broadened.
460 The ICRC’s delegate in 
Washington, Alfred Zollinger, anticipated this eventuality and in August 1943 
sent a plea to MEW for supplies for the burgeoning CCPS. In reply Zollinger 
was told that although the Ministry realised ‘that these prisoners are suffering 
exceptional privation and in many cases must deserve exceptional sympathy’, 
458 ICRC Report, vol.3, pp.335-336.
459 Favez, Holocaust, p. 96; Meir Wagner, The Righteous of Switzerland: Heroes of the Holocaust, 
ed. Andreas C. Fischer and Graham Buik (Hoboken, 2001), pp.218-220.
460 Most of these were countries allied to the Third Reich such as Hungary, Romania and Slovakia 
– ICRC Report, vol.3, p.336.it would have to give him a ‘particularly painful’ refusal.
461 This comparison of 
attitudes is not to suggest that the Germans showed greater compassion for 
the plight of concentration camp internees than the Allies – the Germans 
were, after all, their jailers. Whitehall’s obstinacy does suggest, however, that 
as late as 1943 the British opinion of the blockade as vital was still proving to 
be a thorn in the side of the ICRC’s plans to expand its relief operations. 
The fact that the ICRC's mandate had been altered beyond the scope of the 
Geneva Convention was, for an organisation so often accused of hesitancy 
and inflexibility, a great step forward. Typically, as in most instances of ICRC 
expansion, the natural British reaction was to attempt to make the Committee 
take two steps back. In the case of the rejection of Zollinger’s CCPS appeal, 
there were two important factors in play in this rejection. The first was that 
Zollinger may have already blotted his copybook with MEW in June when he 
candidly suggested to Drogheda that as the Vichy authorities had been good 
enough to allow shipments for British POWs through their ports, the British 
should be more flexible in granting navicerts for shipments destined for 
French POWs.
462
Another, more decisive factor was the timing of the appeal. As 
Schwarzenberg’s scheme began the ICRC was already in the midst of a 
campaign to have MEW lift the blockade around Belgium in order to send milk 
and medical supplies to children. As with so many other proposed initiatives, 
the Committee received a rejection letter in reply.
463 Yet the fact that the 
scheme was backed by influential figures in the United States, meant that 
461 ICRC:G85/1048 – MEW to Zollinger, 18 August 1943.
462 TNA:PRO FO 916/613 – Minutes of Zollinger meeting with Drogheda, 16 June 1943.
463 TNA:PRO FO 837/1214 – MEW to Burckhardt, 1 July 1943.MEW received a barrage of bad publicity and increasing pressure from 
Washington over the issue throughout 1943 and 1944. 
Despite this and despite MEW admitting internally in April 1943 that its 
dogmatic attitude to the blockade was one of ‘growing embarrassment’, 
Whitehall’s official policy was that the blockade still needed to be maintained 
as stringently as possible.
464 The Ministry’s clearly dismissive and frustrated 
attitude with the ICRC during late 1943 suggests that the part played by the 
Committee in drawing the attention of Washington and other Allied 
governments to the blockade issue was not appreciated by MEW.
In September the ICRC’s appeals for concessions to ship medical supplies to 
wounded and sick military personnel – received favourably by the United 
States blockading authorities – initially failed even to garner a response from 
the Ministry.
465 When responses were given, MEW officials could scarcely 
conceal their exasperation. This was particularly evident in the impatient tone 
Drogheda took in his correspondence with Burckhardt and MEW’s note to the 
US Embassy that it no longer had any intention of ‘entering into any detailed 
argument’ with the ICRC on the matter of relief for Belgium.
466 This 
resentment was crowned by the new trade agreement brokered between the 
blockading authorities and the Swiss government in December 1943, which 
included a clause stating that the Swiss were not to approve any more 
exports on behalf of the ICRC without the prior agreement of the Allies.
467  
464 Medlicott, Blockade, vol.2, pp.612-614. There was also pressure from the émigré Allied 
governments based in London – TNA:PRO FO 837/1214 – MEW Minute, 11 April 1943. 
465 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.129.
466 TNA:PRO FO 837/1225 – Drogheda to Burckhardt, 16 November 1943; MEW to US Embassy, 6 
October 1943.
467 Medlicott, Blockade, vol.2, pp.514-515. For further details see JRC Report, pp.20-26.If one looks at the Committee’s CCPS proposals with this background in mind, 
it becomes clear that the British attitude was, rather than the result of 
callousness or indifference, about context and experience. Having endured a 
constant barrage of ICRC initiatives since 1940 – most of which had, from 
MEW’s point of view, produced nothing but headaches and disruptions to its 
goal of maintaining the blockade – the Ministry had emerged with a palpable 
dislike and distrust of the Committee. This attitude had been exacerbated 
when MEW lost its battle with other government departments over its plans to 
scuttle the Committee’s White Ships. The fact that the approval for the White 
Ships had, as one MEW staffer predicted, given ‘rise to demands for relief 
action to which we cannot consent’, served to confirm the Ministry’s 
suspicions that expansion of the ICRC could only lead to trouble, both in 
terms of publicity and blockade integrity.
468
Some of MEW’s rejections were reasonable. The ICRC’s scheme to have ships 
sailing the Lisbon-Marseilles route call at smaller Portuguese ports to load 
supplies, was quite rightly viewed by the Ministry as serving only to further 
complicate security and control measures.
469 Had this suggestion been raised, 
rejected and then forgotten it is likely that MEW would not have been so 
incensed. As the ICRC’s own post-war report admits, however, schemes of 
this nature were continually put forward and, when met with rejection from 
MEW, ‘the Committee refused to take these restrictions as final’.
470 
This stubbornness, born both of the ICRC’s conflicting aims with the Ministry 
and its inability to force issues by any other means, was perhaps ill-advised. 
Despite engendering occasional success, the Committee’s attitude served 
468 TNA:PRO FO 916/333 – Camps to Roberts, 6 August 1942.
469 TNA:PRO FO 916/334 – MEW to FO, 23 November 1942.
470 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.28.primarily to confirm Whitehall’s impressions of the ICRC as meddlesome. As a 
result, MEW was understandably loathe to throw its support behind the CCPS 
which, despite its noble cause, was viewed as little more than yet another one 
of Geneva’s highly inventive and troublesome schemes for relief. Although 
there were some supporters of the ICRC at the Foreign Office – Walter 
Roberts being the best example – MEW’s attitude towards the ICRC’s 
expansion left its mark on other areas in Whitehall.
471
In September 1943 the DPW expressed concern to the American Red Cross 
that the ICRC was ‘definitely attempting to obtain an operative control over 
matters which are entirely outside the supervisory functions of the 
Committee’.
472 Similar doubts, held by the Ministry of War Transport and the 
Admiralty over the Committee’s ability to handle the management of a fleet, 
were given some validation on 9 July 1943 when the ICRC ordered a BRC 
parcel ship on the Lisbon-Marseilles route, the Lobito, to leave Lisbon without 
a safe conduct. The order had been given after the Admiralty refused to grant 
the Lobito safe passage to Marseilles on the grounds that Geneva’s application 
for a safe conduct had been lodged with only one day's notice – the usual 
practice required at least six days.
473
There is no evidence to suggest the ICRC’s action was in any way purposely 
defiant of British wishes. The order to sail was an honest mistake on the part 
of the ICRC, cause by the convoluted method of notification required for ships 
sailing along the Lisbon-Marseilles route and the difficulties any vessel faced 
471 In addition to approving of Burckhardt, Roberts was also at pains to maintain good diplomatic 
relations with the ICRC during the latter’s efforts to expand the London delegation. He pressured 
both his colleagues at the Foreign Office and MI5, to approve the delegation’s expansion and 
ensure the arrival of visiting ICRC delegates was conducted as quickly and with as little hassle as 
possible  – TNA:PRO FO 916/613 – Roberts Minute, 23 January 1943; Roberts to Liddell, 1 March 
1943.
472 TNA:PRO FO 916/618 – DPW to ARC, 14 September 1943.
473 Ibid. – ADM to PWD, 8 July 1943; FO to Geneva, 9 July 1943.in sticking to a pre-determined sailing schedule in times of war.
474 Once the 
mistake had been recognised the Committee ordered the Lobito to head 
directly for Gibraltar to await the granting of a safe conduct.
475 Despite the 
ICRC’s efforts to correct the error, the Ministry of War Transport could not 
resist tersely pointing out to the Foreign Office that the financial cost of the 
ICRC’s neglect would have to be borne by the BRC, which had chartered the 
vessel. This was followed by the PWD requesting that the Committee be 
reminded that ships along the Lisbon-Marseilles route were BRC ships and 
that the ICRC’s only job was to guarantee their safety by ensuring Red Cross 
markings and the presence of an escorting agent.
476 
Although it may have served to validate the complaints of the ICRC’s critics in 
Whitehall, in the context of the ever-widening scope of the Committee’s 
shipping operations the failure to report the Lobito’s sailing was one of only a 
handful of minor incidents. Non-Red Cross freight was mistakenly loaded at 
Lisbon on one occasion and a German soldier was found stowed away onboard 
the Caritas I on 25 April 1945, but in general the ICRC’s capacity to supervise 
its new shipping schemes was good and the incidence of negligence minimal.
477 This claim, stated in the ICRC’s post-war report, is backed up by some 
simple calculations.
474 The notification time sometimes altered, depending on the route of the ships, anywhere from 
10 days notification to 48 hours. The process of notification started with the ICRC delegation in 
Lisbon informing the British and German Naval Attaches there of a vessels’ sailing schedule. This 
in turn, was transmitted to the Admiralty and the Kriegsmarine, which were required to grant the 
vessel a safe conduct before it left port – ICRC Report, vol.3, p.150. 
475 TNA:PRO FO 916/618 – Ministry of War Transport to PWD, 10 July 1944; ICRC Report, vol.3, 
p.150.
476 TNA:PRO FO 916/618 – Ministry of War Transport to PWD 10 July 1943; PWD to WO, 17 July 
1943.
477 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.143n.From the first voyage of the Kurtulus in April 1941 until the end of the war 43 
vessels made 383 voyages under the auspices of the ICRC.
478 Including the 
non-reporting of the Lobito and the two cargo incidents mentioned above, 
there were three further incidents of poor notification. The first concerned the 
aforementioned Stureborg, a mistake that led to its sinking by Italian planes. 
There were also two more incidents in 1944 which resulted in attacks being 
made on Marseilles-bound vessels, Embla and the Cristina, the details of 
which will be discussed in another chapter. In summary, of 383 voyages, 
there were only six notable infractions made by the ICRC. This record hardly 
backs up the Admiralty’s claim in April 1944 that ‘Geneva indeed appears to 
be extremely lax’ in its shipping matters.
479
Furthermore, archival evidence suggests that the Committee’s penchant for 
bureaucratic minutiae extended to its handling of shipping issues. In addition 
to generally providing sufficient notification, on occasions when new ships 
were required, such as the Spokane in December 1943, the ICRC made sure 
to provide the British with as much information as possible, notifying them of 
the specific colour, dimensions, speed, tonnage and manufacturer of the ship.
480 Other requirements set down by the Ministry, such as a prohibition on the 
use of ships for refugee evacuation, exchange of civilian internees and the 
transport of medical supplies, were also stringently adhered to by the 
Committee – albeit with protestations, given that a primary facet of the 
original conception of the White Ships was to facilitate these aims.
481
478 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.477.
479 TNA:PRO FO 916/941 – ADM to PWD, 21 April 1944.
480 This ship was renamed the Caritas II and became one of the ICRC’s key vessels – TNA:PRO FO 
916/618 – Geneva to FO, 30 December 1943.
481 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.141.In considering the British government’s handling of the ICRC’s relief plans 
from mid 1941 until mid 1943 it is clear that with the exception of Greece and 
the concessions made to internees in southern France, the integrity of the 
blockade was preserved, despite the best efforts of the ICRC. Even with this 
hindrance the ICRC’s efforts brought success. POW parcel delivery in Europe 
reached the pinnacle of its efficiency during this period and from spring 1942 
the number of visits to camps by ICRC and Protecting Power officials greatly 
increased, reaching a peak of 105 visits during the winter of 1943.
482 These 
two improvements were of significant benefit for the welfare of British POWs – 
an outcome that was unquestionably the primary goal of Whitehall in its 
handling of the ICRC’s expansion. In considering this fact alongside the slew 
of rejected ICRC expansion schemes, it is fitting to conclude that Whitehall’s 
objective to steer the Committee’s ambitions in a direction that would 
primarily benefit the British was a success. That said, some officials in 
Whitehall grudgingly recognised the Committee’s achievements during this 
period as indications that the ICRC was indeed capable of acting more than as 
a mere conduit of relief for British internees.
Although MEW based its arguments against the ICRC’s schemes on the belief 
that the Committee was incapable of managing its ambitions, it should be 
noted that in March 1943 one of the Committee’s chief critics, W.A. Camps, 
told the Co-Ordination Centre for Relief in Washington that ‘the International 
Red Cross appears, from various signs we have noted, to be manoeuvring 
with more than usual vigour for the position of central agency for civilian relief 
in Europe’. Although he expressed this ‘merely as an interesting opinion’, 
Camps did hint that, should the blockade be lowered, the ever-expanding 
482 Vourkoutiotis, ‘What the Angels Saw’, p.692.ICRC might, in fact, be the right candidate to manage a massive relief effort.
483
This indicates that, in spite of its persistent clashes with Geneva, MEW may 
have followed some officials at the Foreign Office in recognising the ICRC’s 
abilities. In the struggle to maintain blockade policy, however, this view was a 
minority one and as such was never nurtured in the Ministry, even after the 
start of 1943 when the Committee reached its apex of efficiency. The very 
principle of the blockade did not allow the entertainment of such notions. We 
can only speculate as to how much more beneficial the ICRC’s schemes might 
have been for non-British POWs, concentration camp internees and civilian 
populations, had the Ministry, and indeed the rest of Whitehall, shown greater 
acknowledgement of and encouragement for the Committee’s capabilities, 
rather than emphasising the need to curtail and control these capabilities to 
suit British ends.
What is evident, however, is that this situation had consequences for British-
ICRC relations. As noted above, Robert Brunel and his associates formed a 
bitter opinion of the blockading authorities during their struggle to bring relief 
to Greece. The problems over the CCPS also left an indelible mark on Alfred 
Zollinger. After many more fruitless months of struggling for blockade 
concessions on behalf of concentration camp inmates, the delegate angrily 
declared to a representative of the World Jewish Congress that he would 
publish incriminating material on Washington and Whitehall’s attitude towards 
the Jews in Hungary.
484 Nicholas Burckhardt similarly claimed – albeit after 
483 TNA:PRO FO 837/1214 – MEW to Co-Ordination Centre, Washington, 10 March 1943.
484 Bela Vago, ‘The Horthy Offer: A Missed Opportunity For The Jews in 1944’ in Contemporary 
Views on the Holocaust, ed. R.L. Braham (Boston, 1983), p.40.the war – that he had been frustrated by British disregard for reports he 
presented to them regarding the transport of Jews to camps and ghettos.
485
For the ICRC delegates in constant contact with the British, the experiences of 
prolonged debate with Whitehall during 1942-43 were subject to more 
nuanced appraisal. Ever keen to maintain good relations with his hosts, 
Rudolph Haccius continued through 1942 to play the neutral conduit.
486 The 
nearest he came to straying from this path worked in Britain’s favour when in 
April 1943 he gave the Foreign Office prior warning of Zollinger’s intention to 
raise blockade issues during his visit to London.
487 In general, however, 
Haccius followed a conciliatory policy in dealing with the British that was 
markedly different to that expressed by the ICRC delegates on the ground. In 
doing so Haccius was following a policy championed by Carl Burckhardt, 
whose rise to prominence in Geneva from late 1942 onwards significantly 
affected the ICRC’s political and diplomatic conduct for the rest of the war. In 
the wake of the often tumultuous interactions between the ICRC and the 
British during the war’s early years the goal of this conduct was simple: to 
develop a new, more agreeable working relationship with Whitehall. 
485 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, pp.418-419.
486 See ICRC:D/EUR/GB1-31 generally for Haccius’ correspondence with the British from 1939-43.
487 TNA:PRO FO 916/613 – FO Minute, 3 April 1943.CHAPTER III
POLITICS AND PRAGMATISM
THE COMMITTEE’S NEW DIRECTION
In the introduction to this thesis reference was made to the two war time 
presidents of the ICRC: the cautious, moralistic Max Huber and the ambitious, 
politically-minded Carl Burckhardt. As the preceding chapter has shown, 
Burckhardt’s approach to his duties, made whilst he was vice-president rather 
than president, was highly successful in improving the ICRC’s traditional 
undertaking of parcel delivery for POWs and civilians. However, despite the 
success of the White Ships and the JRC’s activities on the ground, these 
innovations led to very little change in the ICRC’s leadership’s overall policy of 
operations. This was still guided, during the formation of these initiatives, by 
Huber’s orthodoxy when dealing with belligerents and by adherence to the 
fundamental principle of the ICRC’s existence – to exercise neutrality whilst 
providing impartial relief for victims of war. In late 1942, however, a notable 
change began in Geneva as Burckhardt’s star rose and Huber’s health – 
always fragile – led to him gradually withdrawing from the Committee’s 
presidency. Ultimately, this decline led to Huber nominating Burckhardt to 
replace him as official president of the ICRC in December 1944.
488 By that 
time the leadership transition was a formality. 
As early as autumn 1942 the currents of change, both in leadership and 
policy, were already emanating from Burckhardt and spreading through the 
entire Committee. Nowhere was this change more evident than in the 
Committee’s infamous “non-appeal” meeting of 14 October 1942, at which the 
488 Burckhardt assumed the post on 1 January 1945 – Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.590.bedridden Huber cast his absentee vote for silence on the issue of the 
Holocaust, whilst Burckhardt held forth at the ICRC leadership meeting at the 
Hotel Metropole advocating similarly for the dropping of any public démarche 
against the Nazis. Although both men agreed on the Committee’s course of 
action, there was a subtle, yet significant, difference in their reasoning, which 
exemplifies the path down which the ICRC would be led in the war’s final 
years.
For Huber, publicly accusing Berlin of such crimes was out of the question as 
such a flagrant act of impartiality breached both the Committee’s key principle 
of neutrality and its policy of non-intervention in matters beyond its mandate. 
He felt the Committee would be better disposed to issue broadly worded 
appeals to all belligerents urging them to conduct the war in as humane a 
fashion as possible, whilst the Red Cross delegates on the ground continued 
to provide relief wherever they could. Ever aware of the ICRC’s limitations in 
terms of political weight – which would have been needed in order to draw a 
favourable response from Berlin – Burckhardt agreed with Huber’s 
sentiments. But, unlike the president, Burckhardt knew better than to build 
justification for this argument on the ever-weakening foundations of ICRC 
neutrality – foundations he himself had shaken by his peace-seeking activities 
in the war’s early years. 
Burckhardt felt a dose of reality was needed in Geneva. Accordingly, he used 
the occasion of the 14 October meeting to raise the unpleasant fact that the 
Nazi hold over Europe was so absolute that it could and, if provoked, would 
eclipse the moral authority of the ICRC and its Conventions. As such, he 
deemed the idea of speaking out against Berlin to be both futile and 
dangerous in that the Nazis could retaliate by hindering ICRC relief operations 
to POW camps throughout Europe. Better, thought Burckhardt, to place the fate of the Jews within the context of a wider problem, that being the Nazis’ 
brutal treatment of not just Jews, but POWs, civilians and concentration camp 
internees of all races and nationalities. In order to help these people, 
Burckhardt argued, the goals of the ICRC had to become more focused, 
realistic and attainable. Rather than relying on the grand gesture of a public 
démarche, he recommended that the Committee focus on working behind the 
scenes, sending the odd private note of protest to Berlin concerning the Jews, 
whilst continuing, with greater pragmatism, its duty of providing practical 
relief to those it could actually save.
489
Burckhardt’s actions, in the direct aftermath of the “non appeal”, stand as a 
prime example of how this new approach merged his political instincts with 
the Committee’s more traditional humanitarian duties. Although written and 
non-publicised appeals were still sent to Berlin, the large public protest 
against the Holocaust was left to the Allies who, on 17 December 1942, made 
the move the ICRC refused to do, by issuing a joint statement denouncing the 
‘bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination directed mainly against the Jews’. 
Notably, this declaration appears to have been, at least in part, the result of 
Burckhardt’s policy of discreet information passing. After the war the U.S. 
Consul in Geneva, Paul Squire, stated that it was the information provided by 
Burckhardt in November regarding the extent of the Final Solution – 
information gleaned from one of Burckhardt’s former students and Weizsäcker 
at the Auswärtiges Amt – that helped convince Washington of the need to 
launch the démarche.
490
489 For discussion on the “non appeal” meeting see Favez, Holocaust, pp.83-89.
490 Ibid, pp.293-294 citing Squire Memo, 7 November 1942; Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, pp.424-
25.Burckhardt’s leaking of this information indicates that, in spite of what has 
been written about his indifference to the fate of the Jews, he had at least 
thought that he should warn the Allies – whom he perhaps believed could 
exert more pressure than Geneva – of what he knew.
491 That is not to say that 
his efforts were entirely noble.
In passing this information to Squire, Burckhardt’s intention was more than 
likely to give the impression of something being done in Geneva, to 
encourage the Allies to do the ICRC’s work for them, and, in the process, 
absolve the Committee of any blame from Berlin for meddling in the Reich’s 
affairs. Although this tactic was successful in that it spawned a public appeal, 
it is worth noting that the words of the Allies fell, just as Burckhardt had 
warned of the ICRC’s approach, on deaf ears in Berlin and resulted in no 
improvement in conditions for the Jews of Europe. Even so, it is clear that 
Burckhardt, using his contacts in Germany, broke the ICRC’s guidelines on 
discretion in order to get word of the Holocaust out to the wider world.
This instance was the first of many that, from 1942 until the end of the war, 
saw the ICRC turn, albeit slightly, away from Huber’s orthodoxy to follow 
Burckhardt’s new, more fluid, policy of discretion and pragmatism, 
characterised by a focus on ‘practical and local activities’. As the Committee’s 
official historian, André Durand, happily noted, it was a change that heralded 
a considerable improvement in the ICRC’s efforts on behalf of victims of war, 
491 Herbert S. Levine has presented the most convincing explanation of Burckhardt’s views on 
Jewish persecution, arguing that during his time in Danzig his motivation for pursuing close 
relations with the Nazis and working to moderate the Nuremberg Laws, was his desire to 
maintain law and order in the Free City. A similar pragmatism was taken by Burckhardt in his 
approach to the Holocaust, which he saw as a tragedy not just for the Jews, but for the wider 
cause of justice and order in Europe. This aloof view has naturally, led to accusations of 
Burckhardt being a passive anti-Semite. For further discussion see Herbert S. Levine, Hitler’s Free 
City: A History of the Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925-39 (Chicago, 1973), pp.140-44; Levine, ‘The 
Mediator'; Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Starting World War II, 
1937–9 (Chicago, 1980), pp.197–202; Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, pp.414-425; Crossland, 
'Burckhardt'.particularly concentration camp internees.
492 What Durand did not address, 
however, was the effect the ICRC’s transformation from naïve philanthropist 
to politically-minded humanitarian over the course of 1942-43, had on its 
relations with those belligerents which, like Britain, had grown accustomed to 
Geneva’s well-meaning amateurism.
The response to the ICRC’s operational expansion has been covered in the 
previous chapter. To answer the question of how the Committee’s overall 
policy change affected British-ICRC relations we need to examine the nature 
of the ICRC’s conduct, not just in its customary role as provider for POWs, but 
in the Committee’s less traditional involvement in areas which might best be 
termed “humanitarian diplomacy”. Although Burckhardt’s conduct on the 
Holocaust issue undoubtedly falls into the above category, the question of Red 
Cross involvement in the fate of European Jewry has little relevance to 
relations between the British and the ICRC and, indeed, has already been 
covered expertly by Jean-Claude Favez. Accordingly, my focus here will be on 
two diplomatic issues in which the policy of the “new” ICRC affected its 
relations with Britain – the year-long reciprocal shackling of enemy POWs by 
Berlin and London and the discovery of a mass grave of Polish POWs at Katyn 
in 1943.
PLAYING POLITICS: THE ICRC AND THE SHACKLING CRISIS
Historians who have examined the Shackling Crisis of 1942-43 with a scope 
beyond the experience of the prisoners themselves, have tended to focus on 
either the diplomatic background or the work of the Swiss Federal Council in 
its mediatory capacity as Protecting Power,
493 using the incident as either a 
yardstick to measure the latter’s efficiency, or as an example of a watershed 
492 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.576.moment in British-Swiss wartime relations.
494 Looking at this incident with an 
emphasis on the ICRC, however, it becomes apparent that Geneva’s efforts to 
resolve the crisis were equal to, and by the end of the affair, greater than, 
those of Berne. Moreover, the actions of the ICRC during the Shackling Crisis 
provide insight into not only how and why Burckhardt’s new pragmatic policy 
was being implemented, but also how it affected relations between the British, 
the ICRC and the Protecting Power.
The Shackling Crisis began on 8 October 1942 when the German government 
announced that 1,376 British and Canadian prisoners of war had been placed 
in shackles and would continue to be so for 12 hours a day for an indefinite 
period of time as an act of reprisal against Allied violations of the Geneva 
Convention.
495 The first violation had occurred on 19 August during a 
combined Canadian and British raid on the port of Dieppe, during which 
captured German prisoners were bound and blindfolded. Although the 
Germans initially accepted the British pledge to launch an inquiry into the 
matter, a more severe violation of the Convention in the aftermath of a 
similar raid on the Channel island of Sark on 4 October, prompted Berlin to 
respond with the shackling order.
496 This, in turn, was met by a reprisal from 
the British, who on 9 October coerced the Canadian government into 
shackling 1,100 German POWs held in Canada. Driven both by Hitler’s desire 
493 The Swiss government became the Protecting Power for the British following the entry of the 
United States into the war in December 1941.
494 For discussion with an emphasis on POW conditions see S.P. MacKenzie, ‘The Shackling Crisis: 
A Case Study in the Dynamics of Prisoner of War Diplomacy in the Second World War’, 
International History Review, 17, no.1 (1995) 78-98; Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, ch.2. For 
discussion on Protecting Power functions and POW diplomacy see Jonathan F. Vance, ‘Men in 
Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943’, The Journal of Military History, 59, no. 
3 (1995) 483-504, Jstor, http://links.jstor.org (accessed 21 May 2007); Wylie, Britain and 
Switzerland, pp.324-328; Vourkoutiotis, ‘What The Angels Saw’, pp.699-701.
495 Geneva Convention 1929, Article 2; Vance, ‘Men in Manacles’, p.485.
496 The Germans were further aggrieved by the fact that four German bodies were found on Sark 
with their hands bound behind their backs – Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, pp.40-43. to use the POWs as bargaining chips for better conditions for German 
prisoners on the Eastern Front, and by Churchill’s need to promulgate the 
ethos of never backing down, the situation was rapidly escalating beyond the 
scope of the original incident.
497 
The ICRC jumped quickly into the fray. On 9 October the Foreign Office 
received a message from Clifford Norton, the British minister in Berne, 
conveying an offer from Burckhardt to mediate in the matter. The Committee 
was not alone in its approach. Less than an hour after hearing from the ICRC 
Norton received a similar offer of mediation – undoubtedly co-ordinated with 
the ICRC – from Marcel Pilet-Golaz, the president of the Swiss Federal Council 
and key representative of the Protecting Power.
498 Before examining how the 
British dealt with these two options for mediation it is important to clarify how 
Whitehall viewed the status of both the Protecting Power and the ICRC in 
regards to “humanitarian diplomacy”.
The Shackling Crisis was not the first instance in which the British had 
experienced a crossover in the services offered by the ICRC and the 
Protecting Power. As mentioned in the first chapter, Whitehall’s POW 
departments wrestled with this question of jurisdiction throughout the 
1940-41 parcel crisis. Although there were criticisms by the British of the 
efforts of US camp inspectors during this time – leading to British reliance on 
ICRC camp inspectors as the crisis escalated – Whitehall’s general perception 
of the Committee was still that it was an amateur body, subordinate to the 
Protecting Power, however disappointing the latter’s efforts sometimes were.
499 The assumption of the role of Protecting Power by Switzerland following the 
497 Vance, ‘Men in Manacles’, p.488.
498 TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – FO to London, 9 October 1942.
499 See Chapter 1, p.71United States’ entry into the war in December 1941 and the subsequent 
muddle in co-ordination between Berne and Geneva over camp inspection 
schedules – for which the ICRC was blamed by Whitehall – reinforced this 
perception.
500 
Although undoubtedly a manifestation of the long held negative view of the 
ICRC’s capabilities, the British favouring of the Swiss Federal Council in the 
role of Protecting Power was influenced by other factors. Since October 1939 
the ICRC and the Swiss Federal Council – which was the Protecting Power 
representative of Germany from the start of the war
501 – had been 
campaigning to organise exchanges of sick and wounded POWs between the 
belligerents. In the course of these negotiations the roles of both parties in 
POW matters had been clarified by Whitehall, with the general understanding 
being reached that the Swiss would handle diplomatic matters such as 
negotiation and liaison with belligerent governments, whilst the ICRC would 
work out the practical issues of making the exchanges possible, through 
organising shipping, escorting and supervision.
502
In keeping with Whitehall’s tendency to limit the ICRC’s scope, this 
arrangement generally satisfied the British, in particular Alan Hunter who was 
‘sure the IRCS (sic) will do all they can to run the show, but having in mind 
their status under the Convention I think this would be wrong and most 
unsatisfactory’.
503 This viewpoint was still prevalent and indeed, clarified in no 
500 There had been at least three camp inspection clashes between the ICRC and the PP inspectors 
over the summer of 1942. The reason given for this was that the German authorities gave the 
Committee very short notice of when it could run its inspections and so were unable to co-
ordinate them better with Berne. Nevertheless, the British blamed the ICRC for the problem – 
ICR:G85/1048 – Gepp to Huber, 5 February 1942.
501 TNA:PRO WO 366/26 – POWs in WWI, p.39.
502 For details on POW exchanges see Geneva Convention 1929, Articles 68-7. For details of 
ICRC/Protecting Power roles in POW exchanges see ICRC Report, vol.1, pp.373-375.
503 TNA:PRO FO 916/15 – Hunter to Roberts, 25 July 1941.uncertain terms in May 1942 by Harold Satow at the PWD, who stated that 
regarding negotiations over POWs and breaches of the Convention, the ICRC 
had ‘no diplomatic status’. This statement appeared in the draft of Satow’s 
correspondence to Sir Richard Howard-Vyse at the BRC and, perhaps mindful 
that this blunt language might get back to Geneva via its British counterparts, 
the phrase was amended in the final copy to read ‘cannot make on our behalf, 
representations regarding what we consider to be breaches of the P/W 
Convention’.
504 If one considers the original draft, it is clear that Satow was 
diplomatically stating what the British had held as policy for much of the war: 
the ICRC was to be restrained in matters of diplomacy and used only where 
necessary for purposes of POW relief.
How inflexible the British attitude could be is apparent in Whitehall’s handling 
of POW mistreatment at Averoff prison camp in Athens. An initial approach to 
the ICRC enquiring into the lists of those interned was sent in January 1942, 
after the Foreign Office confirmed, notably, that it was Geneva, rather than 
Berne, which could provide a better answer.
505 When, having received ICRC 
inspectors’ reports, it became clear a year later that POWs were being 
mistreated at the camp, the appeal for an inquiry to the German government 
was sent via the Protecting Power.
506
The fact that the Swiss inspectors took over three months to respond to the 
Foreign Office’s request for an investigation at Averoff did little to shake this 
faith in Berne and when further violations, this time the theft of blankets and 
food by the guards, was reported in November 1943 the solution once again 
was to ask the Swiss government to launch an investigation. The ICRC, by 
504 TNA:PRO FO 916/251 – Satow to Howard-Vyse, 15 May 1942.
505 TNA:PRO FO 916/424 – DPW to PWD, 26 January 1942.
506 TNA:PRO FO 916/702 – DPW to PWD, 12 February 1943.contrast, was merely requested to send replacements for the supplies.
507 
Unlike the situation with US inspectors in 1940, Whitehall by 1942, perhaps 
owing to wariness at the ICRC’s expansion, was less willing than ever to let 
the Committee share duties with the Protecting Power. 
At the time of the Shackling Crisis this view of the Swiss Federal Council as a 
more credible conduit for dealing with POW matters was complemented by a 
change in the British diplomatic corps in Switzerland. David Kelly, the British 
minister in Berne, was a friend of Pilet-Golaz, however, he also enjoyed a 
relationship of ‘great cordiality’, ‘friendship and hospitality’ with Burckhardt. 
Kelly also, notably, voiced support for the Committee’s ‘beneficial and 
expanding role’ when, having been reassigned to Buenos Aires in April 1942, 
he saw fit to compose a parting letter of thanks to ‘mon cher’ Burckhardt for 
his friendship during his time in Switzerland.
508
Kelly’s replacement in the post of British minister in Berne was the no-
nonsense Clifford Norton, who initially held little regard for Burckhardt’s 
attempts at backdoor diplomacy. This was perhaps owing to the fact that 
Norton had been the Foreign Office’s chargé d’affaires in Poland and a 
counsellor at the embassy in Warsaw during Burckhardt’s tenure as High 
Commissioner to Danzig between 1937 and 1939. 
As an adamant supporter of the Poles it is likely he, like so many others, 
found Burckhardt’s seemingly pro-Nazi conduct unsettling, or, at the very 
least, gained the not unreasonable impression of Burckhardt as an amateur 
507 Ibid. – Berne to FO, 29 April 1943; Berne to FO, 3 November 1943; DPW to PWD, 11 November 
1943.
508 ICRC:G85/1048 – Kelly to Burckhardt, 6 April 1942.and troublesome diplomat.
509 Norton was however, a fan of Pilet-Golaz and 
sympathetic, as many in Whitehall had been since 1940, to Switzerland’s 
geographical plight in the jaws of the Third Reich. This sympathy for the Swiss 
Federal Council, plus the undoubted improvement Berne was able to bring to 
its services on behalf of British interests, further marginalised the already slim 
degree of faith Whitehall had in the ICRC as a diplomatic entity in matters 
pertaining to POWs.
510 
Burckhardt, of course, saw things very differently. Four days after offering 
Norton his services in the Shackling Crisis, the intrepid Swiss sent a further 
offer to the PWD in which he ignored the accepted procedure of Whitehall 
deferring to the Protecting Power by offering to mediate in a fresh round of 
exchange proposals for POWs and civilians who had been held in long-term 
captivity.
511 This was one of the many signs that Burckhardt was dissatisfied 
with the Committee’s position as assistant to the Protecting Power in matters 
of mediation. He said as much in December 1942, when he lamented that the 
Committee had ‘suffered an irreparable loss of prestige’ by having its 
activities made subordinate to those of Berne.
512 This attitude in part explains 
why Burckhardt chose to involve himself so deeply in the Shackling Crisis. His 
ambitious personality, sense of self worth and evident desire to inject 
diplomacy into the policies of what was fast becoming his ICRC, meant that 
he was never going to accept the role envisaged by the British of the ICRC as 
junior partner to the Swiss government.
509 Peter Neville, ‘Norton, Sir Clifford John (1891–1990)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press: Sept 2004, online edn, Jan 2008 
http://0www.oxforddnb.com.prospero.murdoch.edu.au/view/article/65288 (accessed 14 
January 2009).
510 The two main successes were the granting of entry into civilian internments camps holding 
British subjects in occupied France and the revival of negotiations for long term POW exchanges 
under Berne’s auspices – Wylie, Britain and Switzerland, pp.97-98.
511 ICRC:G85/1048 – Burckhardt to PWD, 13 October 1942.
512 Favez, Holocaust, p.278 citing ICRC:Box B – Burckhardt to Albert Oeri, 11 December 1942.Another, more justifiable, reason for Burckhardt to get involved was the need 
to preserve the ICRC’s new found emphasis on pragmatic activities. Given the 
timing of the crisis in relation to the 14 October meeting, the reciprocal 
shackling was viewed not only as a humanitarian concern but, perhaps more 
importantly, as a potential millstone around the neck of Burckhardt’s 
emerging doctrine of ‘practical and local’ relief work. His concern stemmed 
from the fact that this policy hinged significantly on the belligerents’ continued 
adherence to the Geneva Convention, the ‘essential texts’ of which, 
Burckhardt concluded, had been violated by both parties the moment they 
initiated the shackling reprisals.
513 Ever the pessimist, Burckhardt recognised 
early that if such reprisals escalated to their logical extreme, the sanctity of 
the Convention might be jeopardised – a conclusion that proved adroit when 
in late November Berlin hinted, however insincerely, that it was prepared to 
cease abiding by the Hague and Geneva Conventions.
514
Burckhardt’s official motivation, therefore, was to end the crisis as quickly as 
possible in order to protect the ICRC, which could not operate without the 
belligerents’ adherence to the Geneva Convention. When writing to the 
Foreign Office he employed the Committee’s often used tactic of appealing to 
British self interest, using the violation of the Convention to justify his offer to 
help end a situation that ‘might seriously jeopardise the entire question of 
prisoners of war and affect Red Cross work for them’.
515 Pilet-Golaz was more 
reserved in his offer, simply stating that if the British thought it necessary, 
the Swiss were ready to place themselves at Whitehall’s disposal.
516
513 TNA:PRO FO 193/555 – Berne to FO, 23 October 1942.
514 TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – FO Memo, 24 November 1942.
515 ICRC:G85 1048 – Burckhardt to FO, 9 October 1942.
516 TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – Berne to FO, 9 October 1942.The British were not keen on either option. The general feeling was that both 
the Swiss Federal Council and the ICRC had ‘a misconception of the position’ 
they held in the matter.
517 In terms of the Convention this was untrue. A 
breach of Article 2 dealing with the prohibition of reprisals had occurred and 
the Protecting Power was, under the conditions of Article 87, authorised to 
intervene in settling the dispute with the assistance of the ICRC if necessary.
518 Even so Whitehall, despite its aforementioned preference for the Protecting 
Power, was still inclined to reject both Berne’s and Geneva’s mediation offers. 
Neville Wylie offers two explanations for this attitude, the first being that the 
British did not wish to place the Swiss in a position where they would have to 
endanger themselves by acting against Berlin’s interests, the second that 
Whitehall was simply against any third party mediation in its political affairs.
519
It is true that German intentions towards Switzerland in late 1942 were far 
from clear. Despite the tactical irrationality of the Wehrmacht marching on 
Switzerland at this time, many in the German press were still calling for Swiss 
heads to roll, in part prompting Berne to commit the Berlin-friendly action of 
closing Swiss borders to Jewish refugees in August 1942.
520 However, if one 
considers the manifold instances of British resistance to ICRC intervention 
detailed in the preceding chapters, Wylie’s second explanation seems more 
likely to have been the primary motivator.
517 TNA:PRO CAB 65/28 – Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 12 October 1942.
518 Geneva Convention 1929, Articles 2 and 87.
519 Wylie, Britain and Switzerland, pp.324-325.
520 For discussion see Bergier Report, p.90; Leitz, Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe, p.23. There may have been more to the British decision than Whitehall’s habitual 
reluctance to accept Swiss mediation. Churchill’s comment to Clement Attlee 
that a consideration of either offer was ‘only a step to mediate peace’ 
indicates that the significance of the specific involvement of Pilet-Golaz and 
Burckhardt was not unappreciated.
521 Although Alexander Cadogan, the 
permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, put such stubbornness down 
to the Prime Minister’s ‘silly fighting mood’,
522 it is highly likely that the 
memory of the Burckhardt/Pilet-Golaz peace feeler scare of the previous year 
– on which Churchill had been fully briefed – was also a factor in raising initial 
apprehension at the idea of either Swiss getting involved in diplomatic issues 
concerning His Majesty’s government.
523
This wariness could not, however, resist the pressure of the Canadian 
government, which had only agreed to reprisal shackling in order to avoid a 
rift with Whitehall. Moreover, the agreement came with a proviso that the 
British would seek mediation via the Protecting Power, a request which the 
British grudgingly acceded to on 13 October.
524 The official British reply to the 
ICRC made clear that the Protecting Power was the favoured channel of 
mediation, which left any further consultation between the Swiss government 
and the ICRC in the hands of the latter to pursue.
525 This indicates that by this 
stage the views of the cabinet had been tempered, perhaps by the realisation 
521 TNA:PRO PREM 3/363/2 – Churchill to Attlee, 11 October 1942.
522 Alexander Cadogan, The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan: 1938-1945, ed. David Dilks (New York, 
1972), 12 October 1942, p.483. 
523 That Churchill himself knew of this issue is evidenced by his initials being on the inner file of 
TNA:PRO FO 371/2644 and on several documents therein concerning the Pilet-Golaz/Burckhardt 
peace feeler.
524 The British requested the Protecting Power launch an inquiry into the matter on the basis that 
the shackling of POWs was a cruel and unusual punishment, distinct from the initial binding of 
German prisoners whilst on the battlefield at Dieppe and Sark – TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – 
Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 13 October 1942; TNA:PRO WO 193/355 – FO to Berne, 13 October 
1942.
525 ICRC:G85/1048 – Livingston to Huber, 15 October 1942.that the ICRC did, under the terms of the Convention, have every right to 
become involved. Even so, it is clear by the re-iteration to the ICRC of Harry 
Livingston, British Consul in Geneva, that the British ‘counter measures’ were 
forced upon them by the actions of Berlin, that Whitehall believed the 
Committee’s only real concern in the issue was the question of whether the 
belligerents’ shackling measures had breached the Convention.
526 Actual 
involvement of the ICRC in negotiations to end the shackling was to be 
discouraged.
What Livingston did not yet realise was that Burckhardt was far more 
concerned with mediation than he was with questions of International 
Humanitarian Law. On 15 October – the same day Livingston informed the 
Committee that the Protecting Power was the preferred mediator – Burckhardt 
telephoned Edward de Haller, the dual Swiss Federal delegate/ICRC delegate, 
to inform him that the ICRC was indeed active in a mediation capacity. 
Burckhardt told de Haller that he had informed Wolfgang Krauel, his old friend 
and German Consul in Geneva, that London had accepted the ICRC’s 
mediation offer, prompting Krauel to contact ‘competent military authorities’ 
in Berlin.
527 This was the start of Burckhardt’s thirteen month long effort to 
end the Shackling Crisis.
The next phase of his initiative began on 28 October, the day after the ICRC 
received a polite reminder from Livingston – who by now had become aware 
of Burckhardt’s intentions – that, although grateful to the ICRC for its offer, 
his government ‘have already invited the Protecting Power to lay before the 
German government their solemn protest’ against Berlin’s shackling.
528 
526 ICRC:G25/28/658 – Livingston to ICRC, 28 October 1942.
527 ICRC:G25/28/658 – Burckhardt to de Haller (phone call text), 15 October 1942.
528 Burckhardt advised Livingston to refrain from making a public announcement about the ICRC’s 
involvement until he had received a reply from Krauel – Ibid. – Livingston to Burckhardt (phone Ignoring Whitehall’s sentiments, Burckhardt wrote to Dr. Ernst Grawitz, SS 
Gruppenführer and head of the German Red Cross (DRK), asking for him both 
to pass on and to support Geneva’s suggestion that the shackles be removed 
in incremental fashion, under ICRC supervision and with no publicity. As a 
measure of the weight of Burckhardt’s contacts in Berlin, the letter was 
presented to Hitler himself, who, so Roland Marti later reported, found it to be 
a ‘reasonable document’.
529 Having received this report of the Führer's opinion 
hopes rose in Geneva that Berlin would launch a fresh proposal for ending the 
crisis. Moreover, this fresh approach was expected to be directed at the ICRC 
for mediation, rather than at Pilet-Golaz. This was a move which Field Marshal 
Wilhelm Keitel, head of the OKW and presumably a member of the ‘competent 
military circles’ alluded to by Krauel, expressed support for.
530 
The hoped-for approach from Berlin did not come. As has been suggested by 
Arieh J. Kochavi and S.P. MacKenzie, this may have been owing both to 
Hitler’s vengeful frame of mind and his desire to drag out the Shackling Crisis 
for as long as he could in a vain effort to persuade the British to moderate the 
brutal treatment of German POWs by their Soviet allies.
531 It is unclear 
whether Burckhardt knew of Hitler’s opinion. The fact that Burckhardt’s next 
overture was aimed at the Führer's subordinates, however, suggests that the 
Red Cross man realised that a new, more subtle, plan was required. 
Burckhardt again contacted Krauel in late November in order to obtain 
information on the views of other German leaders, in particular Ribbentrop.
532
call text), 29 October 1942; Livingston to ICRC, 28 October 1942.
529 Ibid. – Burckhardt to Grawitz, 28 October 1942. For report on Hitler’s opinion see Marti to 
Gallopin (phone call text), 26 November 1942.
530 ICRC Report, vol.1, p.369.
531 Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, pp.44-45; MacKenzie, ‘Shackling Crisis’, p.89.
532 ICRC:G25/25/658 – Krauel to Burckhardt, 1 December 1942; TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – Berne 
to FO, 20 November 1942; PWD to DO, 5 November 1942.At the same time Burckhardt also encouraged Haccius to agitate for 
permission to inspect the camps in Britain holding the shackled prisoners. In 
the interests of reciprocity, inspections were also organised for Marti in 
Germany and Ernst Maag, the ICRC delegate in Canada.
533 Although of value 
in terms of the ICRC’s traditional mandate, these inspections were less about 
pure philanthropy than about adding depth to Burckhardt’s plan. As he stated 
to Marti, the inspections were designed more specifically to form a basis upon 
which to suggest to the belligerents that, as the prisoners were not being 
mistreated, the matter could be resolved quietly by the simultaneous removal 
of the shackles.
534 Burckhardt clearly saw, correctly as it turned out, that 
discretion and the need for all parties concerned to maintain prestige, was the 
key to solving the crisis. 
In December 1942 Burckhardt came very close to achieving this goal. At that 
time the Canadian government was planning to unshackle some of its 
prisoners with an aim to initiate a reciprocal gesture from Berlin. In order to 
save face the British agreed to put the Canadian proposal to the Swiss Federal 
Council in order to make it seem that the Allies and the Germans were 
unshackling simultaneously.
535 As the British awaited a response from Berne, 
Burckhardt interjected himself into this latest initiative.
Having taken soundings from Krauel on the views of the Wilhelmstrasse – 
generally one of opposition to the shackling – Marti reported to Burckhardt 
533 TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – Berne to FO, 20 November 1942; PWD to DO, 5 November 1942. 
Conditions for the prisoners in all three countries were deemed to be good by the ICRC’s 
inspectors. It was Marti’s belief that the prisoners at Oflag VIIB were treated with greater 
kindness by the camp authorities then non-shackled POWs – TNA:PRO WO 224/74 – ICRC Report 
on Oflag VIIB, 10 November 1942; ICRC Canada to ICRC London – 23 November 1943; ICRC 
Report, vol.1, p.233.
534 ICRC:C14 – Minutes of Central Committee Meeting, 20 and 23 November 1942; 
ICRC:G25/28/658 – Burckhardt to Marti, 2 November 1942.
535 MacKenzie, 'Shackling Crisis' p.90.that the Germans would agree to remove all shackles over the Christmas 
period. In a typical show of exuberance Churchill, having heard of this 
proposal, declared his desire to make a public statement in Parliament on 7 
December announcing the removal of all shackles by the British as well. This 
was by no means an endorsement of Burckhardt’s actions. 
It was stated in the Foreign Office telegram to Berne that if ‘the Swiss 
government’s appeal is received in the meanwhile, Prime Minister will indicate 
that shackles are being removed immediately in response to it’.
536 This 
indicates that although de Haller and others in the Swiss Federal government 
may have known of, and supported, Burckhardt’s efforts, the British were 
downplaying the role of the ICRC in favour of the Protecting Power. This was 
especially unreasonable given that, compared with Burckhardt, Pilet-Golaz’ 
activities had been rather nonchalant in attempting to resolve the crisis. The 
British knew this to be so. On 10 November the Foreign Office asked with 
polite urgency for Berlin’s response to Pilet-Golaz’s initial enquiry which had 
been communicated by him to the Germans an entire month earlier.
537 
Despite these contrasting efforts it was Pilet-Golaz, not Burckhardt, who was 
applauded by the British for masterminding the cessation of shackling – a fact 
that has led some historians to either downplay Burckhardt’s efforts or omit 
reference to them altogether.
538 As one of the few dissenters of this viewpoint 
has indicated, the real source of British gratitude for Pilet-Golaz’s efforts lay in 
536 TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – FO to Berne, 7 December 1942.
537 Ibid. – FO to Berne, 10 November 1942.
538 Phillimore’s official history of the British Prisoner of War Departments exemplifies this view. 
Burckhardt is not even mentioned in the section dealing with the Shackling Crisis, which, 
Phillimore asserts, was simply ‘discontinued’ in 1943 by the Germans – TNA:PRO WO 366/26 – 
POWs in WWII, p.67. Kochavi does not mention Burckhardt at all when discussing the Shackling 
Crisis – Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, pp.48-52. Vance only mentions Burckhardt’s final and 
successful appeal in October 1943 – Vance, ‘Men in Manacles’, p.497. MacKenzie does not 
mention Burckhardt either and instead indicates that the ICRC were informed by the Swiss 
Federal Council that the shackling was going to cease – MacKenzie, ‘Shackling Crisis’, pp.93-94. the fact that he had managed to take a political hand grenade out of 
Whitehall’s hands by agreeing to take on the negotiations.
539 Even though 
these negotiations were bolstered considerably by Burckhardt’s efforts, it is 
understandable that, given that Pilet-Golaz was the official intermediary 
chosen by Whitehall, the emphasis was on praising the Protecting Power for 
this minor breakthrough – which in any event turned out to be a false dawn 
owing to the Germans re-applying the shackles on 26 December.
540
Successful or otherwise, the credit given Berne for this small victory was 
largely undeserved. Although official representations on the proposal were 
made via the Swiss, it is evident that Burckhardt’s liaison with Krauel and the 
engineering of reciprocal inspections played a larger part in prompting the 
German offer than Pilet-Golaz’s patient waiting for a reply from Berlin. Those 
Germans who wanted the shackling to cease certainly felt this way, with such 
‘competent circles’ in Berlin conveying to Odier in late December their support 
for Burckhardt’s efforts.
541 Furthermore, as Neville Wylie has alluded, the 
efforts of Pilet-Golaz not only marginalised those of the ICRC, but may even 
have done more harm than good.
542
As the deadline for the impending Christmas cessation neared, Pilet-Golaz 
admitted to the British that he had been aware of Burckhardt’s efforts yet cast 
doubt on them by indicating that since the guarantee to unshackle had not 
come specifically from Hitler, it was perhaps questionable. This view played 
well on British suspicions that neither the ‘German Army or German Foreign 
Office had any say in the matter’.
543 This assessment failed to consider the 
539 Wylie, Britain and Switzerland, p.327.
540 TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 30 December 1942.
541 ICRC:C14 – Minutes of Central Committee Meeting, 21 December 1942.
542 Wylie, Britain and Switzerland, p.327.
543 TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – Berne to FO, 24 December 1942; WO Minute, 11 November 1942.importance of Burckhardt’s unshackling suggestion reaching high circles in 
Berlin and the fact that the Christmas cessation did indeed take place – albeit 
two weeks later than the day initially indicated by Burckhardt.
544 Furthermore, 
the decision to re-apply the shackles was in no way a consequence of 
Burckhardt’s plan being faulty. The order to re-shackle was more likely to 
have stemmed from a combination of Hitler’s desire to prolong the situation 
and London’s obliging refusal to adhere to Berlin’s request for a guarantee 
that shackling on the battlefield and elsewhere would not take place in future.
545 Owing both to this concern of a second shackling crisis emerging later in 
the war – a fear shared by Burckhardt as much as Berlin – and to Livingston’s 
suggestion that the Committee stick to questions of the Convention, the ICRC 
sought to shape its next appeal along more traditional Red Cross lines.
In the first days of 1943 the Committee launched a fresh initiative aimed at 
resolving the ‘divergences between the governments regarding meaning and 
scope’ of Article 1 of the Geneva Convention.
546 Although it was an ICRC 
initiative, Pilet-Golaz was also involved in a significant supporting role. When 
Norton predictably dismissed the ICRC’s suggestion as both a cause for 
confusion and a means of undermining Whitehall’s faith in the Protecting 
Power, Pilet-Golaz’s response was to speak up in support of the Committee’s 
suggestion. Having admitted that for his part, ‘it cannot be said that 
discussions are in progress’, Pilet-Golaz suggested that the ICRC’s idea be 
presented to Berlin for semi-official consideration. The rationale was that the 
ICRC's proposed investigation into the Convention could be used as a basis 
544 It is unclear whether Hitler’s entourage had any say in the Christmas cessation, but it is 
notable that most of those within his inner circle saw little merit in the shackling. The degree to 
which Hitler’s subordinates had influence on his decisions is disputed. For discussion see Ian 
Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, (London, 1993), 
ch.4.  
545 Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, p.48.
546 TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – Berne to FO, 6 January 1943.upon which to call for another cessation to the shackling.
547 This was, in 
essence, a modification of Burckhardt’s own suggestion to unshackle in 
November 1942, albeit presented this time to the British through the more 
credible conduit of Pilet-Golaz.
It is unknown whether this change in approach was engineered by 
Burckhardt, but it is notable that at the same time Pilet-Golaz was presenting 
this option to the British, Burckhardt’s old friend Weizsäcker was also voicing 
circuitous support for the ICRC initiative. At a meeting with the Swiss minister 
in Berlin, Weizsäcker stated that his government could not countenance the 
‘handing in of protests by a protecting power in the name of a state at war 
with Germany’.
548 Whether by Burckhardt’s design or otherwise, it seems that 
by early 1943 the continental parties to the issue, including Pilet-Golaz 
himself, were looking to the ICRC, rather than to the Swiss Federal Council, 
for a solution.
The British, however, were not. Clifford Norton, for one, found Burckhardt’s 
on-going discussions with Krauel to be unreliable and unhelpful distractions 
that might ‘seriously have upset the delicate negotiations’ he presumed to be 
underway under the auspices of Pilet-Golaz.
549 Norton’s aforementioned 
regard for Pilet-Golaz, whom he described as possessing ‘genuine sentiments 
of humanity,’
550 no doubt influenced the minister’s opinion. But in addition to 
this personal viewpoint Norton, in his capacity as the conduit through which 
Burckhardt’s schemes were filtered to Whitehall, found the Red Cross man’s 
547 Ibid. – Berne to FO, 6 January 1943; Berne to FO, 16 January 1943.
548 Ibid. – Berne to FO, 19 January 1943.
549 Ibid. – Berne to FO, 10 March 1943.
550 Ibid. – Berne to FO, 24 December 1942.approaches to be a constant distraction from the embassy’s more 
conservative and measured day to day handling of the situation. 
Himself a humanitarian and son of a clergyman, Norton felt as deep an 
empathy for the shackled POWs as he felt confident in the Protecting Power’s 
abilities to manage their fate in a sensible and level-headed manner. As such, 
he held a clear aversion to the cavalier nature of Burckhardt’s approach. This 
attitude naturally affected not only relations between British officials in 
Switzerland and the ICRC but also, to some extent, Whitehall’s overall 
handling of the Shackling Crisis. 
When, for example, on 21 February Norton received a secret report from 
Burckhardt indicating that the physical shackling of the POWs was becoming 
less stringent, he advised the Foreign Office to take the information lightly 
and await credible confirmation from the Protecting Power. The Foreign Office, 
which valued Norton’s opinion in regards to policy issues, agreed that the 
word of Krauel, from whom the information came, could not be trusted.
551 
Notably, only Walter Roberts and Anthony Eden – both of whom had dealt 
with Burckhardt in the past and were aware of the intimacy of his contacts 
with Germans – offered any support for his contact with Krauel. Roberts 
raised the idea of using the ‘new channel that is open to us’ with his 
colleagues at the Foreign Office, whilst Eden confined himself guardedly to 
minuting that ‘it will be of immense relief if and when Burckhardt’s news is 
confirmed’.
552
551 Ibid. – Berne to FO, 10 March 1942; 12 March 1943; TNA:PRO FO 916/558 – Berne to FO, 13 
March 1943. For discussion on Norton and the Foreign Office’s relationship to its legation in 
Switzerland see Wylie, Britain and Switzerland, pp.45-48.
552 TNA:PRO FO 916/557 – Roberts Minute, 21 February 1943; FO Minute, 27 February 1943.Norton had no such faith and on 16 March he sent a telegram to the Foreign 
Office setting out clearly how further ICRC efforts should be considered. Using 
the excuse that Burckhardt had got his dates wrong when passing information 
about the Christmas cessation – and in the process glossing over the fact that 
the cessation took place regardless –  Norton stated that ‘I cannot too 
strongly emphasise that only reports of protecting power can be regarded as 
really authoritative’.
553
This dismissal of Burckhardt’s sources, although understandable in the wake 
of Whitehall’s endorsement of the Protecting Power as the official negotiator, 
was by this stage of the crisis misguided. Not only had Burckhardt proved his 
worth during the Christmas negotiations, but Krauel’s information from 
February was confirmed by the Protecting Power inspectors on 17 March. This 
was nearly a month after the Foreign Office was first informed by the ICRC 
that the shackles were fast becoming “symbolic”.
554 In addition to this, by 
early April Pilet-Golaz, who as mentioned above had previously indicated to 
Norton the merits of bringing in the ICRC, was admitting that ‘his own efforts 
have been ineffective’.
555
One would think that in such circumstances the next best alternative to the 
Protecting Power, however unpalatable and unconventional, would have been 
better utilised and yet, despite being aware of Burckhardt’s contacts in Berlin 
and possessing evidence of their worth, the British continued to rely on Pilet-
Golaz. Even after this reliance abated, the ICRC was still not even considered 
as an option by the Foreign Office, which was so thoroughly dissatisfied with 
the Swiss Federal Council’s efforts that it suggested that the only way to 
553 TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – Berne to FO, 16 March 1943.
554 Underline in original – TNA:PRO FO 916/558 – Berne to FO, 10 March 1943. For further 
discussion of the alleviation of the shackling in 1943 see MacKenzie, Colditz Myth, pp.247-248.
555 TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – Berne to FO, 20 April 1943.break the deadlock was to agree to the German demands for a general order 
prohibiting any further shackling.
556 As had been the case with the ICRC in 
Greece, the apparent closeness of Burckhardt to Berlin and the indication by 
the latter that the ICRC should be the official mediators,
557 was seen as a 
cause for alarm rather than a means of exploiting the situation to Whitehall’s 
benefit.
That is not to say that the German suggestion for ICRC involvement should 
necessarily have been adopted along the lines advocated by Burckhardt and 
Berlin. The need to maintain prestige for the Protecting Power was quite 
rightly viewed as important by Norton and the Foreign Office and, more often 
than not, was employed as justification for their continual faith in Pilet-Golaz.
558 However, there was little to be gained in this respect by dismissing 
Burckhardt’s diplomatic efforts not only in public, but also behind the closed 
doors of Whitehall. If anything, a more welcome, if quiet, embrace of 
Burckhardt’s endeavours may have helped to end the situation quicker, which 
in turn would have reflected well upon the “official” negotiators in Berne. The 
means by which the crisis was eventually resolved supports this argument. 
By August 1943 the Shackling Crisis had descended into a disjointed farce. 
Reports from ICRC and Protecting Power inspectors spoke of the continuing 
decline in the severity of the reprisals, particularly at Oflag VIIB where some 
of the supposedly shackled POWs took to ‘carrying their manacles and 
556 Burckhardt’s suggestion that the ICRC delegate and former Swiss minister in Rome, Paul 
Ruegger, become involved was also rejected by the British – TNA:PRO FO 916/559 – FO Minutes, 
25 June 1943; FO to Berne, 5 June 1943.
557 ICRC Report, vol.1, p.369.
558 Norton’s view was that in championing the ICRC, the Protecting Power might become 
‘indisposed’ – TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – Berne to FO, 6 January 1943. For Norton’s argument on 
the need to maintain Swiss prestige see Berne to FO, 9 December 1942. swinging them nonchalantly as their hosts tried to count them’.
559 The 
opposite was true at Stalag VIIIB, where heavier chains had been applied and 
forced labour imposed upon one shackled prisoner who had a medical 
certificate proscribing only light work.
560 The inconsistency of these measures, 
combined with information from the DRK conveying the increasing discontent 
of the OKW and the Auswärtiges Amt over the reprisals, painted a picture of 
discord in Berlin over the issue. Having been made privy to this information, 
Burckhardt concluded that the time was ripe for another intervention.
561 
Once again Pilet-Golaz provided the official backing for this initiative, 
reporting to Norton in early August that both Keitel and Ribbentrop were 
planning to confront Hitler to suggest ending the reprisals.
562 Owing to 
Burckhardt’s direct line into Berlin and the similarity of this report to that 
which Krauel provided in 1942, it is more than likely that this information was 
given to Pilet-Golaz via Burckhardt, yet the latter’s name was not mentioned 
in the telegram.
The reason for this becomes apparent when one considers Burckhardt’s 
comments to Livingston in November 1943. The Red Cross man reported that 
he had been asked by the DRK to visit Berlin to meet the German 
government, which ‘desired to treat through Red Cross channels’ a proposed 
resolution for ending the shackling. Notably, Burckhardt also emphasised to 
Livingston that whilst in Berlin he would ‘have no contacts or discussions on 
political matters or any approaches outside [the] scope of Red Cross 
559 MacKenzie, Colditz Myth, p.247 citing account of Tony Strachen in Robert Gayler, Private 
Prisoner (Wellingborough, 1984), p.68; TNA/PRO/WO 193/555 – Berne to FO, 14 September 
1943.
560 ICRC:G25/28/658 – Marti Note, 12 July 1943.
561 ICRC Report, vol.1, p.370.
562 TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – Berne to FO, 6 August 1943.business’.
563 Clearly Burckhardt realised that his prior indiscretions were a 
source of British apprehension over his involvement and so, having obtained 
the initial information of a possible resolution in August, he asked Pilet-Golaz 
to act as the official messenger in order to receive British approval. As the 
German government’s preference was to use the ICRC as the diplomatic 
channel, however, it was Burckhardt who ultimately had to go to Berlin for the 
talks, hence the need to reassure Livingston that nothing suspicious was 
taking place.
Although Norton persisted in placing his faith in Pilet-Golaz – asking him the 
day after Burckhardt left for Berlin whether the Swiss had any further 
information on the shackling – it was clear to Pilet-Golaz himself that he had 
become a lame-duck negotiator. His reply to Norton’s request was to wait for 
Burckhardt to report on his discussions in Berlin.
564 This report arrived on 23 
November, stating that during a meeting between Burckhardt and Ribbentrop, 
it was decided that the shackles would be removed immediately and that 
Marti would visit all camps to confirm that the order had been carried out.
565 
This was followed by confirmation via Pilet-Golaz on 10 December, that the 
order to shackle had been officially rescinded by Berlin.
566 Almost fourteen 
months after its initiation, the Shackling Crisis had been brought to a quiet, 
inglorious end under the auspices of the ICRC – exactly what Burckhardt had 
intended in October 1942.
It had been a marathon effort for all involved. Beyond the ordeal of the 
prisoners themselves the Shackling Crisis had dramatically affected British 
563 Ibid. – Berne to FO, 10 November 1943.
564 Ibid. – Berne to FO, 11 November 1943.
565 Ibid. – Berne to FO, 23 November 1943.
566 TNA:PRO FO 916/560 – Berne to FO, 10 December 1943.relations with Switzerland, bringing the hitherto ignored neutral firmly into the 
considerations of the War Cabinet and the Foreign Office. If, as had been 
argued by Neville Wylie, Pilet-Golaz’s involvement helped raise the profile of 
Berne in the eyes of Whitehall,
567 how then did Burckhardt’s generally 
unwelcome involvement affect British perceptions of Geneva?
Unlike the Swiss Federal Council, the ICRC had previously entered into 
discussions with the highest circles of power in Britain on the issues of POW 
parcel delivery and the blockade. As the previous chapters have shown, these 
prior interactions had generally painted the Committee in an unfavourable 
light, particularly regarding instances in which the ICRC was perceived to 
have strayed from its customary role as a provider of relief. Also, many of the 
British officials involved in the Shackling Crisis had been privy to Burckhardt’s 
prior attempts at diplomacy from his position in Danzig in the late 1930s 
through to his peace feeler initiatives during the war’s early years. The 
opinions formed of Burckhardt and the ICRC by these prior experiences 
contributed greatly to Whitehall’s handling of the Shackling Crisis.
Much like the British rationale for bringing in the Swedes in Greece months 
earlier, Whitehall’s reaction to the shackling was to limit the involvement of 
the ICRC as much as possible in favour of embracing a more “official” 
alternative – in this instance, the Swiss Federal Council. In a further echo of 
British rejection of Brunel’s valiant work in Greece in early 1941, this decision 
once again led the British to dismiss Burckhardt’s “unofficial” efforts during 
the Shackling Crisis in favour of those of Pilet-Golaz, even after the latter 
admitted that his discussions with the Germans had broken down. At the very 
least this admission should have prompted the British to pursue other 
channels, yet the Foreign Office, guided in its judgement by Clifford Norton, 
567 Wylie, Britain and Switzerland, pp.326-327.continued to place unwarranted faith in Pilet-Golaz at the expense of 
Burckhardt.
It can be argued that the British had good cause to be weary of Burckhardt’s 
intervention, owing to his prior instances of dubious and unwanted diplomacy. 
However, once he had proved his credentials during the Christmas cessation 
and Krauel’s information on the slackening of the reprisals in early 1943 had 
been verified, the British should have softened their attitude, particularly if 
one considers that by this time it was obvious that the quickest way to resolve 
the issue was via the kind of closed-door negotiations that Burckhardt thrived 
on and was experienced in. As is evidenced by his appeal to both belligerents 
in October 1942, Burckhardt recognised early that for Berlin and London the 
need to save face had to be the linchpin of any deal. It was this conclusion 
that dictated his efforts to resolve the issue, ultimately culminating in his 
clandestine meeting with Ribbentrop at which the latter made clear that no 
public declaration was to accompany the removal of the shackles – a condition 
to which the British agreed.
568 
In the wake of this agreement the British finally recognised Burckhardt’s 
efforts, instructing Norton to pass on their gratitude, notably with the 
acknowledgement that Burckhardt’s German contacts had played a pivotal 
role.
569 Burckhardt also received plaudits from Huber, whose own efforts to 
engineer the first exchange of long-term POWs around this time may also 
have played a part in the success of Burckhardt’s November negotiations.
570 
No doubt Burckhardt would have enjoyed this praise; however, he was 
568 TNA:PRO WO 32/10719 – Berne to FO, 23 November 1943; 7 December 1943.
569 Ibid. – FO to Berne, 28 November 1943; ICRC:G25/28/658 – Norton to Burckhardt, 30 
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570 ICRC:CO2/1.935 – Minutes of Central Commission Meeting, 23 December 1943; Kochavi, 
Confronting Captivity, p.52.mindful of where such sentiments travelled. On 7 December the British 
indicated their desire to make a statement in parliament regarding the end of 
the shackling to which Burckhardt grudgingly agreed, but only on the proviso 
that the British should not express any gratitude towards either himself or the 
Committee.
571
It was an odd request for a man who clearly enjoyed being regarded as a 
diplomat extraordinaire. But, as was becoming typical at this time, 
pragmatism ruled in Geneva. Burckhardt’s request for a low-key 
acknowledgement came from his fear that public exposure of Berlin’s backing 
down would lead to the resumption of reprisal measures. This in turn would 
not only undo his own triumph, but once again raise the spectre of non-
adherence to the Geneva Convention and damage Burckhardt's attempts to 
establish the ICRC as a credible mediator in POW issues.
572
There may have been more to Burckhardt’s reaction, however, than concern 
over the effect on the Committee. Owing to his promise to Ribbentrop that the 
back down would not be acknowledged, the politician in Burckhardt was no 
doubt trying to preserve the goodwill he had built up in Berlin over the course 
of the Shackling Crisis. This intention to use the situation to strengthen the 
ICRC’s diplomatic relations was not exclusively targeted at the Germans. The 
extent to which Burckhardt exerted himself on behalf of the British during the 
Shackling Crisis and his agreement, against his better judgement, to the 
British proposal of a public declaration, indicates that Burckhardt may have 
571 ICRC:G25/28/658 – Burckhardt to Norton, 8 December 1943; TNA:PRO FO 916/560 – Berne to 
FO, 7 December 1943.
572 ICRC:G25/28/658 – Burckhardt to Norton, 8 December 1943. The British agreed with 
Burckhardt's views on publicity and so ordered that the press be censored on the matter – 
TNA:PRO FO 916/560 – FO to Berne, 7 December 1943.viewed the episode as a means of building a similar relationship with 
Whitehall to that which he had enjoyed with Berlin for much of the war.
In addition to improving Burckhardt’s own image in Britain, this goal was in 
keeping with the ICRC’s new pragmatic policy which, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, included plans to strengthen both its London delegation and 
its relations with the British government. It is no coincidence that these plans 
were first seriously raised by the Committee’s leadership during the early 
weeks of the Shackling Crisis.
573 That said, as much as the Shackling Crisis 
provided a medium for the ICRC to display its worth in serving British 
interests, it also highlighted the concern still held by Whitehall over the 
Committee’s forays into diplomacy. With the discovery in April 1943 of a mass 
grave containing Polish POWs outside the forest of Katyn, the ICRC was 
handed a timely opportunity to address this criticism. 
THE KAYTN SILENCE
The Katyn Affair began on 13 April 1943 when Berlin Radio announced that 
German authorities in the region of the Russian city of Smolensk had 
discovered a mass grave in the nearby forest of Katyn. The initial inspection 
of the grave site by the Germans revealed the bodies of 3,000 Polish army 
officers who had been missing, presumed captured, since the German-Soviet 
invasion of Poland in 1939. As the radio broadcast claimed and, as Moscow 
finally admitted in 1990, the POWs had actually been executed by agents of 
The People’s Commissariat For Internal Affairs (NKVD), on the orders of its 
chief Lavrenti Beria, during the summer of 1940. When the initial accusation 
573 ICRC:C14 – Minutes of Central Commission Meeting, 4 November 1942.of cold-blooded murder was made by the Germans in April 1943 the Soviets 
replied via their own propaganda medium, the Sovinformburo, declaring that 
the Poles had in fact been executed by the ‘German-Fascist scoundrels’.
574
This was not the first time the fate of the POWs had been raised. Moscow’s 
forty-nine year denial of the truth about Katyn began following the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and the subsequent resumption of 
Soviet-Polish relations – now as allies rather than enemies. The first inquiry 
was made by General Wladyslaw Anders of the Polish Army, who had been 
released by the Soviets from Lubyanka prison in August 1941. When he 
realised that many of the men he had served with were not released at the 
same time, he questioned his new allies as to the whereabouts of the Polish 
officers who had been held in Soviet POW camps since 1939.
The Soviet response, that the prisoners had been set free when Germany 
invaded in June 1941 and had since been ‘lost track of’ by Moscow, was 
rightly viewed with cynicism by the Poles, who endured a suspicious series of 
re-affirmations and alterations to this lie over the course of the next year and 
half. Accordingly, by the time the German announcement concerning the 
discoveries at Katyn in April 1943 was made, the unresolved question of the 
fate of the POWs had grown into one of many sore points in Soviet-Polish 
relations.
575
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Massacre (London, 1977), ch.5.Alive to this situation, the Reich Minister for Propaganda, Josef Goebbels, saw 
the discovery at Katyn as an opportunity unsettle the Allies by snapping the 
already strained relations between the Soviets and the Poles. As part of his 
campaign to conduct ‘anti-Bolshevik propaganda in a grand-style’, Goebbels 
ordered ‘neutral journalists and Polish intellectuals’ as well as members of the 
Polish Red Cross to be sent to Katyn.
576 The objective of this supposedly 
neutral medical commission was to conduct an inquiry that would legitimise 
the German allegations whilst further demonising the Soviets. The chances of 
this propaganda tactic bringing success were greatly increased on 16 April, 
when it was announced that the investigators had uncovered a further 1,500 
Polish bodies.
577 
The day before the announcement on Berlin Radio of this new find the DRK, 
undoubtedly under orders from Berlin, requested the ICRC to send a 
representative to join the excavation team.
578 Ostensibly this was in order to 
help better identify the bodies. It is more likely, however, that the request 
was a further attempt by Berlin to legitimise its claims of Soviet barbarism by 
including an organisation that was regarded as being truly neutral by the rest 
of the world. Ironically, Berlin may also have sought the ICRC’s assistance for 
the opposite reason.
As previous chapters have shown, from the war’s beginning Berlin had 
displayed a preference for intervention by the ICRC over that of any other 
neutral organisation, on matters pertaining to anything from POW welfare to 
disputes over International Humanitarian Law, both of which were issues tied 
to the Katyn Affair. The support shown by the Germans for Burckhardt’s 
576 Josef Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries: 1942-1943, ed. and trans. by Louis P. Lochner (New 
York, 1948), 14 April 1943, p.328.
577 Fitzgibbon, Katyn Massacre, p.110.
578 ICRC:ACICR/A/CL-06 – Grawitz to Huber, 16 April 1943. efforts to diffuse the Shackling Crisis in the months prior to the Katyn 
discovery indicates that this opinion of Geneva as being on “their side” was 
still prevalent in Berlin in 1943. In seeking to validate their claims of Soviet 
guilt, therefore, the Germans would have found the ICRC to be an attractive 
and, as the investigation progressed, necessary option.
This was owing to the attitude of Waclaw Lachert, the Polish Red Cross 
representative on the ground at Katyn, who, unlike his colleagues at the DRK, 
had resisted German attempts to bastardise the Polish Red Cross into 
becoming a mere tool of the Third Reich. When asked by the Germans to 
make a public declaration confirming that the Soviets had committed the 
massacre, Lachert refused to be drawn into what was clearly a propaganda 
exercise. Despite being informed of the Soviets' guilt by Polish Red Cross 
inspectors at Katyn, Lachert evaded Berlin’s request by replying that to issue 
that kind of definite statement he would need two witnesses to each of the 
murders.
579 It was only after Lachert’s refusal to co-operate with Berlin that 
the ICRC was contacted. 
As testament to the validity of Goebbel’s belief that the world viewed the 
ICRC to be credible, the Germans were not the only ones to request Geneva’s 
intervention. The Polish government-in-exile, which had been based in London 
under the leadership of General Wladyslaw Sikorski since 1939, was 
understandably keen to get to the bottom of the Katyn Affair and so sought to 
gain clarification over what had happened from sources beyond Berlin’s mixed 
medical commission. Accordingly, on 17 April Prince Radziwill, the Polish Red 
579 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.427, 437; Cienciala et al, Katyn, p.311 citing 'Report of the 
Secretary of the Polish Red Cross, Kazimierz Skarżyński, on the PRC Technical Commission's Visit 
to Smolensk and Katyn', 15 April 1943.Cross representative in Geneva, requested on behalf of his government that 
the ICRC launch its own independent inquiry into the Katyn affair.
580
The reaction of the British to this development was one of disappointment 
edged by a small, yet very real, dose of fear. The latter emotion was owing to 
Britain’s alliance with the Soviets who, in the spring of 1943, were in the 
midst of a massive offensive to capitalise on their recent victory over the 
Germans at Stalingrad. At such a crucial moment in the European conflict it 
was perceived as disastrous by the British for the Russians to be accused of 
mass murder comparable with that committed by their German enemies. 
Accordingly, the response of the Foreign Office when informed of a pending 
ICRC investigation was to have a ‘loophole’ sentence placed into the official 
British statement indicating that the accusations against the Russians could 
simply be a construct of German propaganda. This was despite the fact that 
both Churchill and Alexander Cadogan suspected that the Soviets were indeed 
guilty.
581
Tempering their suspicion, the British decided that the only way to preserve 
their alliance and overcome Goebbels' plan was cautiously to follow the Soviet 
line. As part of this display of solidarity with Moscow, Churchill opted to attack 
the ICRC when he wrote to Stalin on 25 April saying that Whitehall would 
‘certainly oppose rigorously any “investigation” by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross or any other body in any territory under German 
580 ICRC:ACICR/A/CL-06 – Radziwill to Huber, 17 April 1943.
581 Churchill himself confessed that ‘the German revelations are probably true. The Bolsheviks can 
be very cruel’. Cadogan also pondered how the British, being aware of Soviet guilt, could possibly 
talk of prosecuting German war criminals – Cadogan Diaries, 15 April 1943, 18 June 1943, p.521, 
537. For discussion of the propaganda value the British found in promoting German guilt see ‘The 
Katyn Massacre: An SOE Perspective’ FCO Historians, no.10 (1996) 
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco.gov.uk (accessed 10 
May 2009).authority’.
582 Although he showed little support for Stalin’s absurd opinion that 
the Poles, the Germans and the ICRC were using Katyn to construct an anti-
Soviet conspiracy, Churchill clearly felt the need to tap into this paranoia by 
taking the Soviet line that the ICRC was susceptible to influence from Berlin 
and so could not be trusted.
583
One wonders whether Churchill was being sincere in his suggestions of ICRC-
Nazi collusion. In addition to this idea having been raised since the start of 
the war by Whitehall’s POW departments and MEW, Churchill and the entire 
cabinet had more recently shown displeasure at Burckhardt’s close dealings 
with the Nazi leadership. That, coupled with knowledge at the Foreign Office, 
from those who worked alongside Burckhardt in Danzig, of his hatred of 
Communism and distrust of the Soviets would have made the idea of the 
ICRC being sympathetic to the German cause one worth considering.
584 That 
said, there is no evidence that this thought – if indeed it was considered – 
was ever sincerely committed to paper.
What is clear, however, is that there was definite concern in Whitehall that 
the Committee, already deemed to be, at the very least, susceptible to 
German influence, would follow its tendency to involve itself in matters 
beyond its mandate by naïvely agreeing to Berlin’s request. Such an action, it 
was feared, would serve only further to infuriate the Soviets.
582 Italics are my emphasis – Churchill and Roosevelt, vol.2, C-284, 25 April 1943, p.193.
583 TNA:PRO FO 371/34570 – FO Circular Memorandum to Foreign Embassies, 26 April 1943. This 
idea was heavily promulgated in the Soviet press at this time owing to the seemingly co-
ordinated request by both the Poles and the Germans for an inquiry. There is very little evidence 
to support the idea that this was anything other than a co-incidence  – TNA:PRO FO 371/34571 – 
Izvestia Editorial (text of broadcast), 27 April 1943.
584 For discussion of Burckhardt's hatred of Communism see Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.308; 
Forsythe, Humanitarians, p.47. The degree to which the ICRC was put under a microscope by the British on 
this account is evidenced by the existence of a special report on the 
Committee’s involvement in the Katyn Affair that was produced for the benefit 
of the Foreign Office on 29 April. This document, compiled by the Political 
Warfare Executive (PWE), contained a series of intelligence and media reports 
outlining the progress of the ICRC’s deliberations over whether or not to 
respond to the German and Polish requests, as well as analysis on what the 
outcome of the ICRC’s reply would mean for Polish-Soviet relations.
585
The reason for such scrutiny was that by that stage in the affair the question 
of ICRC involvement had taken on a new and more potent significance. As a 
measure of how little Moscow trusted the ICRC and how much it feared what 
the Committee's investigation might uncover, an enraged Stalin threatened to 
cut diplomatic ties with the Poles on 24 April unless Sikorski retracted his 
appeal to Geneva. Sikorski refused, and so ties were officially severed 
between the two allies on 25 April.
586
As the PWE gathered its intelligence, Eden began frantic attempts to persuade 
Sikorski to withdraw the request to the ICRC. An indication of Whitehall’s 
desperation to resolve the issue is evidenced by a letter Churchill sent to 
Stalin on 25 April, in which he stated that Sikorski would retract the appeal.
587 
This was despite the fact that a formal request from Eden to the Polish 
ambassador, Edward Raczynski, was not sent until five days later. Eden’s 
informal appeal for the Poles to back down was, in fact, met with only a 
585 TNA:PRO FO 898/227– Report on ICRC in Katyn Affair, 29 April 1943.
586 Stalin had gone so far as to inform Eden that he would drop the notion of breaking off 
relations with the Poles if Sikorski retracted his request to the ICRC – Cadogan Diaries, 24 April 
1943, p.523.
587 TNA:PRO FO 371/34570 – Churchill to Stalin, 25 April 1943.partial agreement from Sikorski and it was not until 4 May that the Poles 
officially withdrew their request for the Committee to launch an inquiry.
588
It is apparent from this sequence of events that the ICRC’s involvement in the 
Katyn Affair was a significant factor in the British handling of the issue. 
Indeed, it was the opinion of the Foreign Office that the Polish request for 
ICRC intervention was nothing short of being ‘the immediate cause of the 
crisis’.
589 There was more to Whitehall’s concern, however, than simply 
keeping its Allies at peace. The British quite rightly suspected their Soviet ally 
of guilt and were themselves aware of their own complicity in covering up the 
crime by following Stalin’s line.
590 Apprehension over this delicate situation 
being made public, plus the lingering suspicions in Whitehall over the 
Committee’s apparent closeness to and, more importantly, capacity to be 
manipulated by, Berlin, would only have added to the British sense of anxiety 
over what the ICRC might uncover.
If one considers Burckhardt’s unwanted efforts throughout the Shackling 
Crisis, the British fear that the ICRC would throw itself with typical enthusiasm 
into the Katyn issue was understandable. This was particularly so given that, 
on 18 April, the Foreign Office received word from Berne that, although the 
Committee planned to reject the German request, it would be more receptive 
to an appeal for an investigation from the Poles.
591
588 Cadogan Diaries, 30 April 1943, p.525; ICRC Report, vol.1, p.429.
589 TNA:PRO FO 371/34573 – FO to Moscow, 1 May 1943.
590 Sanford, 'Soviet-Polish Relations', p.110. The British ambassador to the Polish Government in 
Exile, Sir Owen O’Malley, was the greatest opponent of Whitehall’s pro-Soviet line. Cadogan was 
similarly minded, questioning in his diary ‘how can we discuss with Russians execution of German 
“war criminals”, when we have condoned this?’ – Cadogan Diaries, 18 June 1943, p.537.
591 TNA:PRO FO 371/34568 – Berne to FO, 18 April 1943.Rather than being interpreted as a sign that the Committee was not as 
gullible as it appeared, the British instead saw this report as evidence that the 
ICRC would in some way get involved and might uncover the truth behind the 
Katyn Affair. It was fear of the truth – perhaps more so than fear of the 
Committee being manipulated by Berlin – that served as the catalyst for the 
PWE’s report, which eventually calmed British fears on 29 April by stating that 
the ICRC’s ‘reply is really a negative one’.
592 It is fair to say that until this 
report was received Whitehall waited anxiously, expecting the ever-
enthusiastic and politically meddlesome ICRC to answer positively to the 
Polish and, possibly, German requests. It is clear from ICRC sources, 
however, that the British had nothing to fear.
Much like Lachert at the Polish Red Cross, the Committee was mindful from 
the beginning of the political weight attached to the Katyn Affair. At a time 
when the ICRC was trying to ingratiate itself with the British and, moreover, 
focus on practical activities, this burden was deemed to be too much to bear. 
The Committee never had any real intention of getting involved in either 
Goebbel’s propaganda games or Polish attempts to uncover the truth. In 
coming to the decision to reject both appeals for an inquiry, the ICRC’s 
reasoning was notably pragmatic, politically-minded and self-serving. 
As early as 19 April the Committee’s leadership concluded that any affirmative 
response to the DRK’s request might anger the Soviets. This was of particular 
concern for Geneva as, since the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, it 
had been campaigning unsuccessfully for Moscow – which was not a signatory 
to the Geneva Convention – to allow the ICRC to conduct relief activities on 
behalf of POWs on the Eastern Front.
593 Kid-glove treatment of the Soviets 
was, therefore, a policy of the ICRC leadership at this time. 
592 TNA:PRO FO 898/227 – Report on ICRC in Katyn Affair, 29 April 1943.In subsequent Committee meetings over the course of mid-April the argument 
for non-intervention was also raised in relation to the Polish request. In this 
instance, the Committee had recourse to Huber’s solidly legalistic argument 
that the ICRC was not authorised to conduct a unilateral investigation of this 
nature without the consent of all belligerents involved in the matter.
594 This 
rationale formed the backbone of Geneva’s official reply to both the Poles and 
the Germans on 23 April, which stated that the Committee was
willing, in principle, and provided that all parties concerned ask them to do so, 
to lend their assistance in the appointment of neutral experts, in accordance 
with the memorandum which the Committee sent on 12 September 1939 to the 
belligerent states, and by which, immediately upon the outbreak of the war, the 
Committee established the principles according to which they would be able to 
take part, if need be, in making investigations.
595
Put simply, the Committee would only involve itself in the Katyn investigation 
– and then, only with the participation of other neutral bodies – if ‘all parties’, 
meaning the Soviets, agreed to its involvement. For a number of reasons, this 
was one of the ICRC’s most shrewd and calculated diplomatic moves of the 
Second World War.
As has been argued by Fitzgibbon, the Committee’s primary motivation for 
distancing itself from the Katyn Affair was its need to re-establish relations 
with the Kremlin, which had stopped responding to the ICRC’s direct 
communications in December 1941.
596 Accordingly, the ICRC’s response 
593 ICRC:ACICR/A/CL-06 – Minutes of Committee Meeting, 19 April 1943. For discussion of the 
ICRC’s relations with Moscow see Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.509-521.
594 ICRC:C11 – Minutes of Committee Bureau Meeting, 21 April 1943.
595 ICRC:ACICR/A/CL-06 – ICRC Public Communiqué, 23 April 1943.
596 Fitzgibbon, Katyn Massacre, p.115. The breakdown in ICRC-Soviet relations began when the 
Kremlin refused to respond to the ICRC’s proposal for the setting up of a delegation in Moscow 
on 18 December 1941. Subsequent attempts by the ICRC to get Washington and London to demanding Soviet involvement, to which the Committee knew the ever 
obstinate and undoubtedly guilty Moscow would not agree, was designed to 
be rejected.
597
As much as the response was intended to preserve what remained of the 
ICRC’s flimsy relations with Moscow, it was also designed, albeit subtly, as a 
statement of purpose. The clever wording made it clear to any who doubted 
the ICRC’s resolve that it was indeed authorised, capable and willing to 
investigate Katyn. This not only placed the ICRC above the issue but implied 
that the fault for a lack of investigation lay, not with the Committee, but with 
the squabbling governments involved. As in the Shackling Crisis, the 
Committee’s “prestige” needed to be preserved in the eyes of the belligerents, 
upon whose co-operation the ICRC’s new pragmatic mandate ultimately 
depended.
Another factor in shaping Geneva’s response is one seldom considered by 
historians. Namely, how the ICRC’s conduct in the Katyn Affair fitted into the 
context of the Committee’s push during 1942-43 both to expand its 
operations and better serve British interests. If one takes into account the 
ICRC’s decision in late 1942 to improve its relations with Britain, Burckhardt’s 
on-going involvement in the Shackling Crisis and the ICRC’s campaign – in 
persuade their Soviet ally to agree to ratify the Geneva Convention and allow the ICRC into its 
territories failed and as such, the ICRC’s dealings with Moscow had to be made through the 
Soviet embassy in Ankara. On the same day that the first bodies were discovered at Katyn, Huber 
received a negative reply from the Foreign Office to his latest appeal for the British to exert 
influence on the Soviets in this matter. As a consequence of Moscow’s attitude, the Committee’s 
impact on the Eastern Front was minimal compared to its activities in other theatres of the war – 
ICRC:G85 1048 – FO to Huber, 13 April 1943; Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.510-515. 
597 In 1944 an independent inquiry concluded that the Polish Red Cross had sent a telegram to the 
ICRC upon first seeing the Katyn grave site, declaring that ‘according to the papers found on the 
corpses the murders must have taken place about the months of March and April, 1940’. Given 
Soviet occupation of the territory at this time, this was an indication by the Polish Red Cross of 
Soviet guilt. As such, the ICRC would have believed, based on this information and its own 
experiences with the Russians, that they were guilty of the murders – TNA:PRO PREM 3/353 – 
Professor D.L. Savoy’s independent report into Katyn Massacre, 17 February 1944 .the face of British deference to the Protecting Power – to organise exchanges 
of German and British POWs throughout 1943, it becomes clear that the 
ICRC’s policy of practical and local activities had been extended by this time 
into areas of “humanitarian diplomacy”.
598 Success in the aforementioned 
areas, all of which concerned British POWs, was both achievable and worth 
pursuing in the interests of improving British-ICRC relations. Considered 
against this clear objective the Katyn Affair, mired in Polish-Soviet 
antagonism and German propaganda, was an unwanted diversion for the 
ICRC.
It is impossible to know whether the more naïve and well-meaning Committee 
of 1940 would have embraced the Katyn Affair with greater enthusiasm. 
However, we can conclude by looking at Katyn in the wider context of the 
ICRC’s policy and actions during 1943, that the Committee was aware that to 
respond affirmatively to the Polish and German requests was to pursue an 
idealistic course that may have been both beyond Geneva’s capabilities and 
disastrous to its relations with the British and the Soviets. Much like the 
proposed Holocaust démarche, therefore, Katyn was a complex and difficult 
issue from which the increasingly pragmatic ICRC chose to walk away, albeit 
with a more convincing argument for doing so.
In addition to favouring the pursuit of issues relating to British POWs, there 
may also have been a realisation, in Burckhardt’s mind in particular, that in 
choosing not to participate in the Katyn Affair the ICRC could earn some much 
needed respect from the British. The fact that Burckhardt chose to notify 
Moscow via the Foreign Office rather than Geneva’s usual line to the Soviets 
in Ankara, that the Committee had been ‘absolutely correct in the matter’, 
598 The ICRC launched a POW exchange initiative only days before the Katyn Affair – TNA:PRO FO 
916/613 – WO to FO, 26 March 1943.indicates that he wanted to make sure both the Russians and the British knew 
that the ICRC was on “their” side in the Katyn Affair.
599 The British, however, 
needed more than a display of discretion on the part of Geneva for their 
suspicions of the ICRC to abate.
AMBITIONS AND SUSPICIONS
Considering Burckhardt’s often difficult history with the British his efforts to 
work on their behalf during 1942-43 seem, at a glance, quite peculiar. This is 
particularly so if we follow the view cherished by some historians that the 
Euro-centric, German-Swiss Burckhardt, reciprocated the antipathy of the 
British.
600 We cannot know for certain what Burckhardt’s personal feelings 
towards the British were, though it is more than likely that the refusal of 
Churchill’s regime to entertain peace proposals and MEW’s interference with 
ICRC aims would have impacted negatively on Burckhardt’s perception. That 
said, Burckhardt’s private thoughts on the British were of little consequence. 
What mattered were his actions.
Burckhardt was more aware than anyone of what the British thought of him 
during the war – by his own recollection he believed he had been followed by 
British Secret Service agents in Portugal whilst en route to London in 
December 1941.
601 Bearing these suspicions in mind and the irritation the 
ICRC’s expansion was causing to the blockade authorities, the politician in 
Burckhardt knew that, with his rise to prominence within the Committee, 
599 TNA:PRO FO 371/34573 – Lisbon to FO, 28 April 1943. After a year of receiving no replies to its 
direct communications with Moscow, the ICRC resolved to contact the Soviets via their embassies 
in certain countries. Although the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, was contacted by 
Burckhardt in late 1941 to this effect, this line proved useless and in early 1943 the ICRC decided 
to focus on the Soviet embassies in Ankara and Tehran instead – ICRC Report, vol.1, pp.430-432.
600 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, pp.302-03; Favez, Holocaust, p.285.
601 Wylie, Britain and Switzerland, p.296.relations between Geneva and Whitehall could only get worse. This, in turn, 
would inevitably lead to a decline in the Committee’s ability to pursue its new 
pragmatic policy. As the emerging leader of the ICRC therefore, Burckhardt 
undertook throughout 1942-43 to improve his standing in Britain in order to 
improve that of the Committee. 
There were also wider and more long-term matters to be considered. 
Burckhardt viewed the idea of improving relations with not just the British, 
but the Allies as a whole, who by this time were looking more a certainty to 
win the war, as a means of bolstering the ICRC’s post-war image, concern for 
which he raised as early as October 1943. Beyond anxiety over the reputation 
of the Committee itself, Burckhardt’s emphasis on pleasing the British may 
also have been born of more personal considerations. In particular, he needed 
to cleanse his own post-war reputation of the taint of having been pro-
German, which had been hanging over his head since his time in Danzig and 
which, as Jean-Claude Favez has argued, Burckhardt endeavoured to ‘correct’ 
through weeding out incriminating material from the ICRC Archives and his 
own papers after the war.
602
This campaign by Burckhardt to repair his own image started years earlier, 
running in conjunction with his efforts to improve British-ICRC relations as his 
power rose in Geneva from late 1942 onwards. It was during this time that 
Burckhardt tipped off Paul Squire about his knowledge of the Holocaust in 
order to get word to the Americans; went out of his way to broker a cessation 
to the shackling; and later made clear to the Foreign Office that the 
Committee would not rock Whitehall’s boat over the Katyn Affair.
602 Favez, Holocaust, p.90, 312n.It was no coincidence that towards the end of 1943 Burckhardt – in yet 
another clear breach of ICRC neutrality – also provided information on 
conditions within Germany to Allen Dulles, the head of the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) in Switzerland. Dulles noted that during a recent visit by 
Burckhardt to Berlin on Red Cross business – presumably his meeting with 
Ribbentrop over the shackling issue – he had taken soundings about the mood 
in Germany, the prospect of Hitler being usurped by Himmler and, most 
importantly, the possibility of the Germans making a secret peace deal with 
the Soviet Union. Burckhardt further noted, with his usual sense of fatalism, 
the ‘self delusion’ of those in Germany who could not realise that defeat was 
inevitable.
603 Clearly Burckhardt suffered from no such delusion and so he 
began to trim his, and the ICRC’s, sails to the changing winds of the war. 
The problem, of course, was that the British were not similarly concerned 
about reviewing their opinion of either Burckhardt or his ICRC. In regards to 
the former, first impressions clearly mattered. In late 1943 the Swiss Federal 
Council recalled Walter Thurnheer, its highly unpopular minister in London, 
leading to discussion over a possible replacement.
604 Two main candidates 
were considered. Paul Ruegger, an ICRC delegate who had worked closely 
with Max Huber since his recall from the post of Swiss minister in Rome in 
January 1942, was one option. The other was Burckhardt. Both, as testament 
to the fluidity of the relationship between Berne and Geneva, were considered 
despite not even being official members of the Swiss government.
The Foreign Office discussion over both candidates is telling. Fears that 
Ruegger’s wife was a fascist and that the man himself was ‘effeminate’, ‘over 
603 Neal H. Petersen, From Hitler’s Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 
1942-1945 (Pennsylvania, 1996), Document 2-70, Telegram 1151-53, 26 November 1943, pp.162-
163.
604 For details of Thurnheer see Wylie, Britain and Switzerland, p.78.pleasant and too anxious to be all things to all men’,
605 were put aside in the 
face of long-held and, clearly unalterable, views of Burckhardt as being too 
inclined to take the ‘good German line’.
606 One Foreign Office official bluntly 
minuted that in addition to the problem of Burckhardt’s sympathies for 
German peace-makers, he ‘didn’t like Dr. Burckhardt as a man either’.
607 For 
his part Clifford Norton voiced support for Burckhardt, which, although 
presented as a matter of him picking the lesser of two evils, was likely an 
attempt by Norton to get the troublesome would-be diplomat out of his hair.
608
Anthony Eden presented the most reasonable view, albeit coloured, like the 
rest of the Foreign Office, by past experiences. Having recalled Burckhardt’s 
controversial trip to London in 1941 and his ‘close contacts with Germans’ 
whilst at Danzig in the late 1930s, Eden thought the appointment of 
Burckhardt to London would prove embarrassing to the British and their Allies. 
Eden’s concern came from Whitehall’s on-going campaign to reassure the 
ever paranoid Stalin that no separate peace deal with Berlin would be 
entertained by the Western Allies.
609 Even without this quite reasonable 
605 TNA:PRO FO 371/39852 – Berne to FO, 30 March 1944; FO to Berne, 5 March 1944.
606 Ibid. – FO to Berne, 1 April 1944.
607 Ibid. – FO Minute, 31 March 1944.
608 Ibid. – Berne to FO, 4 April 1944; Berne to FO, 30 March 1944.
609 This fear of Stalin's was first heightened after Rudolf Hess' peace-seeking flight to Scotland in 
May 1941, and the subsequent British deception campaign against Moscow that was designed to 
convince the Russians that Hitler would betray the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Despite forming an 
alliance with the British and Americans later that year, Stalin continued to believe that his new 
allies were stalling on the planned invasion of Europe and, until the final days of the war, he was 
paranoid that the British and Americans would broker a separate peace, ally with the Germans 
and turn on the Soviet Union – Jonathan, Haslam, 'Stalin's Fears of a Separate Peace, 1942', 
Intelligence and National Security, 8, no.4 (1993), Informaworld, http://www.informaworld.com 
(accessed 12 January 2008); Schmidt, Rainer F., 'The Marketing of Rudolf Hess: A Key to the 
Preventive War Debate?', War in History, 5, no.1 (1998) 62-83, Sage Publications, 
http://wih/sagepub.com (accessed 12 January 2008); Waller, John H., The Unseen War in Europe: 
Espionage and Conspiracy in the Second World War, New York: Random House, 1996, pp.265-66.argument, it is clear from the attitudes recorded in the file, that Burckhardt’s 
reputation as pro-German had been irreversibly established to his detriment 
in the preceding years. Even George Warner’s recollections of Burckhardt 
being pro-Mussolini during the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1936 were raised in the 
discussion.
610 Ruegger was duly appointed in May 1944 and Burckhardt, 
despite his best efforts, continued to be viewed without favour in Whitehall.
In terms of the Committee’s overall reputation the story was not too 
dissimilar. Far from engendering a greater sense of faith and trust in Geneva, 
the actions of the ICRC, both political and practical, during 1942-43 served 
only further to raise Whitehall’s hostility towards, and suspicion of, the 
Committee. This is evidenced by the fact that in addition to the on-going 
reservations of Burckhardt’s political affiliations, greater scrutiny was also 
placed by the British on the work of lesser delegates on the ground. Owing to 
the classification of British Intelligence files it is impossible to know when 
precisely the British began to monitor Red Cross delegates. However, the 
surveillance of Burckhardt on his trip to London in December 1941 – which 
appears to have been the first major security scare for Whitehall regarding 
the ICRC – seems as likely a time as any for this practice to have begun. 
Support for this conclusion can be found in the poverty of evidence that has 
been declassified regarding Allied monitoring of the ICRC.
In January 1942, a month after surveillance was conducted on Burckhardt, 
new ICRC delegates were being screened by the British, on the orders of the 
War Office, before taking up their overseas postings.
611 The ICRC’s lack of 
protest and indeed, willingness to comply with the British by sending the 
relevant background information indicates that the Committee had accepted 
610 TNA:PRO FO 371/39852 – Warner to Cadogan, 1 May 1944.
611 See generally TNA:PRO FO 916/309.such measures as a consequence of its operations and staff expanding across 
the globe.
612 Although this compliance helped the process of screening run 
smoothly for the most part, there were instances in which the British were 
unsatisfied with the proposed delegates. In far off Madagascar for example, 
the prospective delegate Paul Giroud, was put under surveillance owing to his 
alleged ‘pro-Axis sympathies in 1940’.
613 Nothing came of this monitoring of 
Giroud. There were, however, instances in which these security measures 
bore fruit, albeit not immediately.
One of the more notable security scares concerned Hans Bon, a hotelier from 
St Moritz, who was appointed delegate of the ICRC in Cairo in April 1942. As 
testament to the problems with the British screening process, Bon was 
approved by the War Office on 18 April.
614 Soon after, however, the British 
were informed that the Bon family had a long history of pro-Nazism and, by 
December 1943, MI5 had concluded that Hans had ‘the closest Nazi contacts 
of all the family’. The British subsequently placed ‘discreet pressure’ on 
Geneva to have him removed.
615
The discovery of Bon followed the approval by the DPW of tighter measures to 
be taken by British Intelligence and the War Office in screening new ICRC 
delegates.
616 The fact that, even prior to this tightening of security measures, 
the aforementioned observations of delegates in new postings were being 
made indicates that the British security services, like the rest of Whitehall, 
responded to the ICRC’s expansion with greater scrutiny and control. This 
612 The first instance of this information being request was in January 1942, when Haccius sought 
British permission for the appointment of a Swiss national as ICRC delegate in Malaya – TNA:PRO 
FO 916/309 – Haccius to Satow, 5 January 1942.
613 Ibid. – WO to FO, 4 September 1942; FO to WO, 14 September 1942.
614 Ibid. – WO  to FO, 18 April 1942.
615 TNA:PRO KV 4/49 – Report on Switzerland, Sweden and Neutrality, 22 December 1944.
616 TNA:PRO FO 916/309 – DPW Minute, 28 November 1944.would explain why the lion’s share of declassified information on this matter 
concerns delegates who had been posted to areas of operation that were 
either new, or being enhanced by the ICRC during 1942-43.
617
One such area which, owing to military operations, was of understandable 
concern to the Allies, was North Africa. Even before the Hans Bon affair, the 
ICRC’s Cairo delegation had been brought under British scrutiny when, in July 
1941, the office of the Commander in Chief Mediterranean requested that 
Geneva do something about its delegates Georges Vaucher and Philip Junod, 
who had been quarrelling with each other and neglecting their duties. The 
delegates were soon removed.
618 This offence by the ICRC was eclipsed in late 
1942 when the increase in military operations in the North African theatre led 
both the British, and their new American allies, to more serious concerns over 
Geneva’s activities there.
At the same time that the British were looking into Hans Bon, a general order 
put out by Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ)
619 in December 1943 called for 
all ICRC delegates in North Africa to be ‘treated with considerable 
circumspection’ as they were not considered to be ‘reliable’ from an Allied 
point of view. In March 1944 further orders came down from AFHQ for 
increased censorship of ICRC correspondence being sent from Algiers to 
Geneva.
620 The full extent of these concerns in North Africa was not made 
617 By May 1942 the ICRC had 42 delegates posted beyond Switzerland. 7 were in Europe, 6 in 
Africa, 7 in Asia, 5 in the South Pacific and six in North America. Following the outbreak of war in 
the pacific in December 1941, extra duties fell upon the ICRC’s delegations in the Sub-Continent 
and Australia – Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.522. 
618 TNA:PRO FO 916/113 – C in C Mediterranean To WO, 19 July 1941.
619 Allied operational command centre for the Mediterranean theatre under the command of 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower.
620 TNA:PRO WO 204/779 – AFHQ Cable, 19 December 1943; AFHQ Cable, 15 March 1944.apparent until 1996 when material, held by OSS, documenting wartime 
suspicions of the ICRC’s involvement with the Nazis was declassified. 
The accusations were severe. Of the forty-nine people named in the 
documents, twenty-one were identified as delegates of the ICRC. Their 
alleged crimes ranged from the laundering of seized Jewish assets to 
conducting espionage on behalf of Berlin, and most of these activities were 
alleged to have occurred in North Africa, Turkey and Italy. Incensed at the 
accusation, Geneva – already reeling from public criticism of its actions 
regarding the Holocaust – launched an inquiry into the matter, the findings of 
which were made public in 1996. It was found that only eighteen of the 
people named had worked for the ICRC and of them only three had 
committed ‘reprehensible acts’. None of the three guilty parties were full time 
members of the ICRC; all of them worked in a purely voluntary capacity and 
were extra staff taken on by Geneva to handle its expanding duties. The 
remaining fifteen were declared to have been accused on the basis of little 
more than a ‘total ignorance of the organisation's role and work’.
621 
The ICRC’s conclusions have, to date, not been challenged and there is little 
reason to doubt the Committee’s assertion that the OSS concerns rested 
primarily on a misinterpretation of the ICRC’s activities. Aside from the fact 
that forty-six people were wrongly accused of partaking in illicit activities, 
there were also some basic errors made regarding the composition of the 
ICRC. One of the named individuals – Paul Burckhard – appears to have been 
confused by the OSS with Carl Burckhardt, a mistake which in part validates 
621 François Bugnion, ‘ICRC Action During the Second World War’, International Review of the Red 
Cross, no.317, (1997) 562-567; Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, pp.701-702; Tom Bower, Blood 
Money: The Swiss, the Nazis and the Looted Billions (London, 1997), p.40.the ICRC’s contention that the accusations were made by people who did not 
actually understand what they were investigating.
622
This and other errors on the part of the OSS are perhaps best explained by 
the fact that North Africa was the first area in which the Americans had close 
interaction with the ICRC during the war. This factor seems particularly 
pertinent if one considers similar misunderstandings on the part of the British 
during their initial relations with the Committee during the war’s early stages.
623 The mention of Burckhardt, however, also indicates that despite knowing 
little of the Committee, the OSS had been drawn to him, perhaps on the 
advice of British Intelligence, which had begun collaborating with the OSS in 
mid 1942.
624 In the absence of hard evidence, this must remain conjecture. At 
the very least, however, it seems highly probable that the suspicions of the 
Americans were either shared with, or influenced by, British Intelligence, 
which appears to have held similar reservations to those of the OSS regarding 
the ICRC’s North African operations.
The passing of information – presumably of a military nature – was one of the 
more prevalent concerns of the British. Since 1939 an agreement had been in 
effect between Whitehall and the ICRC, permitting the latter to make use of 
the Swiss diplomatic bag for the purpose of transmitting Red Cross 
correspondence.
625 In 1943, however, reservations were raised by the Foreign 
Office over a similar arrangement for the ICRC’s delegation in Cairo. Tellingly, 
622 Bugnion, 'ICRC Action', p.566. For discussion of the OSS files see Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, 
pp.701-703.
623 See Ch.1, pp.21-52.
624 The initial Anglo-American intelligence collaboration in this theatre began in mid 1942 in 
preparation for Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa – Jay Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs: 
Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special 
Operations, 1940-45 (London, 1999), pp.66-67.  
625 See Ch.1, p.83.approval for ICRC use of the bag came only on 9 September – the day after 
the capitulation of Italy – and even then, only with the proviso that ICRC 
correspondence be subjected to more intense censorship.
626 These concerns 
are remarkably similar to those raised by the Americans. When considered 
alongside both the OSS’ accusations and further concerns raised by Allied 
Force Headquarters (AFHQ) over ICRC correspondence in the weeks prior to 
D-Day, it becomes evident that suspicion of the ICRC by the Allies was not 
just a reaction to the Committee’s expansion during the war’s middle years. It 
was also a direct and reasonable response to the increase and intensification 
of Allied military activity in Europe.
627 Of detriment to British-ICRC relations, 
however, was the fact that the results of this scrutiny in many ways confirmed 
British fears of the Committee's inability to handle its expansion.
Allied observations of the delegates abroad indicated that in order to facilitate 
its expansion Geneva was forced to hurriedly seek the services of individuals 
who were not necessarily ‘politically reliable’. In the cases of two delegates in 
Cairo, Georges Kuhne and Marc Seidl, for example, the ICRC was so tardy in 
appointing them that Geneva sent a request for passes for both men to visit 
POW camps before either had been screened or approved for despatch to 
Egypt by the British.
628 Understandably, this negligence added to Allied 
concerns over the ICRC’s North African operation and Georges Kuhne was 
subsequently mentioned in the OSS’ report. Even the author of the ICRC’s 
rebuttal to the OSS’ claims hints that the scale of the Committee’s wartime 
operations may have contributed to the Allies' suspicions.
629 Considering this, 
626 TNA:PRO FO 916/614 – FO to Cairo, 29 July 1943; 9 September 1943.
627 TNA:PRO WO 204/779 – AFHQ Cable, 4 April 1944. A report on intercepted ICRC messages was 
compiled on 12 June 1944 – Communication Censorship To AFHQ, 12 June 1944.
628 TNA:PRO FO 916/613 – PWD to Haccius, 12 October 1943; Pourtales to Satow, 18 October 
1943.
629 There were 180 ICRC delegates posted overseas during the war, spread out over 92 separate 
delegations. This information was presented in the author’s concluding paragraph, which in we are left with the question of whether Burckhardt’s lofty ambitions for the 
ICRC were, as the British believed, beyond Geneva’s capabilities. 
Certainly there were indiscretions both in terms of shipping procedures and 
delegate activities. Indeed, one wonders how damaging Burckhardt’s well-
meaning contacts with Allen Dulles were to Allied perceptions of the 
stringency of Red Cross neutrality. If, however, one considers the minimal 
damage caused by these incidents compared to the substantial humanitarian 
achievements that resulted from the Committee’s expansion, any argument 
portraying the ICRC as politically unreliable on the basis of a few dubious 
individuals appears trivial. Moreover, the expansion of the Committee’s 
activities was a natural and, most certainly, necessary reaction by Geneva to 
the growing scale and intensification of the war during its middle years. As 
this intensification rose to its bloody crescendo in 1944-45, however, the 
capabilities of the expanded and improved Committee were challenged as 
never before and British-ICRC relations – frayed to a slender thread by years 
of poor co-operation – finally reached their breaking point.
listing the achievements of the ICRC in terms of facts and figures emphasised the scope of the 
Committee’s operations as compared to the three individuals who were found to have been at 
fault – Bugnion, 'ICRC Action', pp.565-567.CHAPTER IV
THE REICH COLLAPSES
THE ICRC IN THE FIRING LINE
By early 1944 the ICRC’s operations in Europe were sprawling and 
multifaceted. The foundation for this expansion, and the success it 
engendered, lay in the more focused and pragmatic approach adopted by the 
Committee towards its work over the course of the previous year. This 
approach brought improved efficiency to Geneva’s handling of its more 
traditional fields of parcel delivery and camp inspections, as well as the 
establishment of important innovations such as the White Ships and the 
Concentration Camp Parcel Service, both of which were born of the ICRC’s 
increasing confidence and autonomy. As was so often the case, however, the 
variable nature of the conflict in Europe was never far from threatening the 
stability of these operations. When the tide of war began to turn inexorably 
against the Axis in 1943, the ICRC’s operations were brought under increasing 
threat as the space, quite literally, between the Committee’s humanitarian 
missions and the Allies’ military activities narrowed. This inevitable clash of 
objectives defined British-ICRC relations during the final year of the Second 
World War. 
Prior to D-Day the primary medium through which Allied military operations 
interfered with the ICRC’s activities was the bombing campaign, which by 
early 1943 involved sizable American forces joining the RAF in the skies above 
the Third Reich.
630 The “collateral damage” implicit in the Allied bombing 
630 The first all American air raid of the European war was an attack on Wilhelmshaven on 27 
January 1943 – Read, Killing Skies, pp.143-44.strategy was felt by the ICRC as early as November 1942, when the parcel 
ship Padua was hit by an incendiary bomb whilst at anchor in Genoa. The final 
fate of the ship provides an example of the dangers that also existed on the 
high seas. Having been repaired and re-floated, the Padua was sunk almost a 
year later by a submerged mine off Marseilles in the Golfe du Lion, resulting in 
the loss of six men and all the Red Cross parcels in her hull.
631
The bombing and later sinking of the Padua were the first major instances in 
which Allied, rather than Axis, military actions inflicted damage on Red Cross 
shipping. Perhaps owing to the fact that, unlike the Italians in 1941, the Allies 
were first-time offenders, the ICRC showed remarkable restraint in dealing 
with this first infraction. The Committee, acknowledging that the ship’s fate 
was an accident of war, confined itself to merely notifying the British what 
had happened and accepting the apology offered by Whitehall. The British, in 
turn, showed their concern by proposing that all relief ships plying the 
Marseille route be degaussed to lessen the chances of their being hit by 
magnetic mines. Of course, this was provided that any ships mooring at 
Gibraltar for degaussing adhered to strict security procedures, the details of 
which took the Admiralty nearly a year to agree upon.
632
The prevarication over the degaussing reflected the Admiralty’s overall 
outlook on the problem of safety for Red Cross ships. When Colonel Brown at 
the BRC noted that the Padua’s sinking was owing to a stray, floating mine 
and not a magnetic one the point was not lost on the Admiralty, which 
responded by stating that degaussing was the best that could be offered, 
given that ‘it is not possible for the Admiralty to guarantee that the enemy 
631 TNA:PRO FO 916/618 – Geneva to FO, 29 October 1943; ICRC Report, vol.3, p.139.
632 TNA:PRO ADM 1/16061 – ADM Minutes, 12 November 1943; ADM Memo, 1 September 1944.will leave the route clear or that drifting mines will not be encountered’.
633 
Whitehall’s harsh but ultimately pragmatic attitude to all subsequent attacks 
was set with this response: we can guarantee nothing in terms of safety for 
the Red Cross.
Although this argument may have been accepted by Geneva in the case of the 
Padua, as time went on and the attacks increased across more areas of 
Europe, the ICRC became more frustrated with the lack of protection accorded 
to its vehicles and installations. For the dogmatic followers of the ICRC’s 
principles, this was a justified complaint, as the ships, trucks and hospitals 
bearing the Red Cross emblem were, under the terms of the Geneva 
Convention, technically sacrosanct on the battlefield.
634 The misplacement of 
this trust in the Convention, in spite of the realities of war, was proven time 
and again during the spring of 1944 when there were numerous attacks by 
Allied aircraft on clearly marked Red Cross ships and installations in the 
Netherlands, Albania, Romania and the Golfe du Lion. The perpetrators’ 
attitude to the attacks is best summarized in the ICRC’s post-war report, 
which concluded that, overall, protests about these and other violations by 
either the Axis or Allies during this intensifying period of bombing ‘elicited no 
reply’ or, ‘if they were acknowledged, the answer was usually either confined 
to denying the alleged facts, or sometimes asserting that the emblem was 
inadequately displayed, or entirely lacking’.
635
There were exceptions, such as the case of the attack on the Chasseral, a 
clearly-marked vessel that was strafed in late April by British fighters, leaving 
633 Ibid. – Frazer to Brown, 3 November 1943; Brown to Frazer, 5 November 1943.
634 Geneva Convention 1929, Article 24.
635 ICRC Report, vol.1, p.211.the Admiralty ‘at a loss in these circumstances to explain the attack’.
636 In 
general, however, there was a degree of British evasion of responsibility. As 
the attacks increased, Whitehall’s policy in dealing with the ICRC’s protests 
hardened into the response that the British would only investigate the issue if 
they received an official complaint via the Protecting Power.
637 This reply was 
in marked contrast to the British reaction to the sinking of the Stureborg by 
Italian bombers in 1942, which was characterised by the Foreign Office urging 
the ICRC to investigate the incident and to emphasise in public the fault of the 
Italians.
638
As damaging as each incident was physically to the Red Cross and its 
delegates, there was a further price to be paid in terms of the cumulative 
impact of the attacks on British-ICRC relations. The political fallout from the 
incidents was not truly felt until one of the most serious pre D-Day attacks 
occurred on 6 April 1944 when the parcel ship Embla was bombed by British 
planes off Port Vendres in the Golfe du Lion, resulting in the loss of 25 tonnes 
of goods through fire and water damage. The ICRC’s response followed the 
line taken in previous attacks in the form of a written complaint to Whitehall. 
This time, however, the Committee took its protest one step further by 
suggesting to the British that shipping in that region – the crucial parcel route 
upon which many British POWs relied – would be suspended in protest.
639 
Although the ICRC’s Report is understandably guarded, it is hard to believe 
that the evasive attitude of the British regarding the increasingly regular 
attacks on Red Cross installations did not influence the Committee’s decision 
636 TNA:PRO FO 916/941 – Admiralty to Air Ministry, 30 April 1944.
637 ICRC Report, vol.1, p.690.
638 See Ch.2, p.147.
639 TNA:PRO FO 916/941 – Berne to FO, 12 April 1944.to shock Whitehall into paying attention.  The ICRC succeeded in its objective, 
albeit with the drawback that the harshness of the threat made the 
Committee seem callous. The British response to the ICRC’s ultimatum was, 
understandably, one of outrage and astonishment. Such extreme measures 
were, after all, far from typical of the ICRC. Even the BRC, no doubt mindful 
of the public criticism it received in 1940 when the Marseilles route collapsed, 
was indignant at the ICRC’s threat to engender a similar situation. Thus, with 
the approval of the Ministry for Transport and the Admiralty, the BRC drafted 
an ‘emphatic protest’ to Geneva questioning the Committee’s wisdom in 
suspending parcel delivery operations and casting doubt upon the veracity of 
its story of the attack.
640 
The already volatile situation worsened when confirmation was received that 
the attack had indeed been perpetrated by Bristol Beaufighters, leading the 
Admiralty to go on the offensive and blame the ICRC. Its claim was that ‘no 
notification of sailing of Embla was received by C in C Mediterranean’ and, 
furthermore ‘during March and early April the majority of movements of Red 
Cross ships sighted south bound from Marseilles were not received by C in C 
Mediterranean’.
641 This was a reactive statement by the Admiralty which, 
behind closed doors, was very unsure of its posture towards the ICRC. This is 
evidenced by the fact that in the wake of the ICRC’s threat the Admiralty felt 
the need to cable the British embassy in Lisbon requesting clear instructions 
of the notification procedure for ships along the Lisbon-Marseilles route – a 
procedure the Admiralty should already have been aware of.
642 
640 Ibid. – Draft Response from BRC to ICRC, 14 April 1944.
641 Ibid. – C in C Mediterranean to Admiralty, 17 April 1944; Admiralty Minute, 13 April 1944.
642 Ibid. – Lisbon to C in C Mediterranean, 19 April 1944.Furthermore, when pressed by the ICRC to present evidence of the latter’s 
numerous errors in reporting, the Admiralty compiled a weak report that 
indicated there were only two infractions other than the Embla, one being the 
comparatively minor Lobito incident.
643 On the matter of the Embla itself the 
Admiralty continued to insist that the ICRC never reported the vessel’s sailing, 
an allegation that was refuted by the ICRC’s Colonel Iselin in Lisbon. In the 
midst of this finger-pointing on 19 April the ICRC backed down from its threat 
to suspend sailing.
644 
It is difficult to ascertain what prompted this decision but one suspects it was 
an effort to defuse the tension rather than an admission of guilt by the 
Committee. This, however, was not the end of the story. After being repaired 
at Port Vendres and setting sail on 20 April the Embla was subjected to a 
second attack by British planes, this time resulting in her sinking with the loss 
of all cargo and the ICRC’s convoy agent, Marcel Reutter.
645
Although the Admiralty once again emphasised lack of reporting as the cause, 
the fact that the Embla was this time attacked by multiple planes, in clear 
daylight and with Red Cross markings on the hull and deck, indicated that 
British trigger-happiness was as much, if not more, to blame than any 
negligence in reporting on the part of Geneva.
646 Furthermore, unlike the 
initial attack, the British promptly apologised suggesting that someone in 
643 Ch.2, p.169-170.
644 TNA:PRO FO 916/941 – Berne to FO, 9 May 1944; Admiralty to FO, 21 May 1944; Geneva to 
FO, 19 April 1944; Berne to FO, 12 May 1944.
645 ICRC Report, vol.1, p.72; TNA:PRO FO 916/941 – Berne to FO, 20 April 1944.
646 From the British investigation it was concluded that the ICRC had reported the Embla’s sailing 
route, albeit to the wrong British authorities. This was denied by the ICRC’s delegate in Lisbon, 
Colonel Iselin. The British also alleged that the markings on vessels of this size were too small to 
be identified from the air. Even so, the attack did occur in broad daylight, owing the suspension 
by the Germans of night time shipping around Marseilles in early April 1944 – TNA:PRO FO 
916/941 – PWD to ICRC, 25 May 1944; BRC Report, vol.1, p.373; ICRC Report, vol.139.Whitehall was mindful of the seriousness of the incident or at the very least 
sympathetic to the fact that the ICRC’s notification systems in Marseilles and 
Toulon were slow and often prone to break downs. This was particularly the 
case where ships were held up and their shipping schedule disrupted, which, 
owing to the first attack, the Embla’s certainly was.
647
The apologetic British reaction may also have been prompted by other factors, 
such as the aforementioned attack by British fighters on the Chasseral on 26 
April. British guilt in both attacks, therefore, influenced Whitehall’s decision to 
handle the sinking of the Embla in a more conciliatory manner than the initial 
attack. Although guilt was a factor the swift British apology was, however, 
primarily designed to calm the ICRC as it was recognised by the Foreign Office 
that ‘we have more to lose than the Axis by the curtailment of shipping’.
648 
Unfortunately, no amount of apology could undo what happened only a matter 
of days after the Embla’s sinking. 
On 6 May yet another Red Cross ship, the Christina, was attacked whilst at 
anchorage in the port of Sete, not far from the site of the Embla attack. Once 
again British pilots were identified as the culprits and once again the ICRC 
announced that it was suspending all shipping to Marseilles until such time as 
the safety of its vessels could be guaranteed. Ostensibly this reaction was 
prompted by the British suggestion that, in the wake of the Christina and 
Embla attacks, a new procedure for reporting should be introduced using 
wireless transmission from the vessels rather than pre-designated route 
planning. The ICRC believed that the Germans – whose acquiescence was 
required for any such change in ICRC shipping procedure – would take time 
647 For details of notification problems in 1944 see ICRC Report, vol.3, pp.150-151, 136-137; 
TNA:PRO FO 916/941 – Berne to FO, 9 May 1944.
648 Ibid. – Washington to FO, 11 May 1944.responding to the new proposal. Accordingly, the ICRC decided that while 
deliberations were made, the best course of action would be to suspend 
shipping until the new measures could be agreed upon.
649 
The argument for a suspension on this basis was sound and reasonable. As 
the Committee suspected, debate over the specifics of the new wireless setup 
was laborious and an agreement by both belligerents not reached until August 
1944.
650 The Committee’s ban on shipping, however, did not last that long and 
was lifted on 2 June.
651 The hesitancy on the part of the ICRC fully to commit 
to retaliatory measures indicates that its real intention in threatening to 
suspend traffic was both to gain leverage in further negotiations with the 
British over shipping conditions and to vent frustration at the lack of respect 
given to the Red Cross emblem. The fact that, by this time, Geneva had a 
stockpile of up to ten weeks worth of parcels supports the notion that the 
ICRC may have felt comfortable enough, in terms of its supply lines, to cut 
the shipping service for more long-term gain.
652
Nothing, however, was gained from the ICRC’s protest. Indeed, the poor 
timing of the ban – barely a week before D-Day – made the Committee’s 
actions appear particularly unreasonable in British eyes. Although the brief 
shipping ban had no real effect on parcel delivery, the audacity of Geneva’s 
threat was yet another indication to Whitehall of the Committee’s increasingly 
maverick nature. The BRC was equally annoyed by the ICRC’s ‘unhelpful 
attitude’
653 on shipping. This perhaps was what led the BRC representative in 
649 Ibid. – FO to Berne, 18 May 1944; Berne to FO 31 May 1944.
650 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.152.
651 TNA:PRO FO 916/942 – Lisbon to FO, 2 June 1944.
652 The BRC also had ten weeks worth of parcels in British storehouses at this time – BRC Report, 
vol.1, p.272.
653 TNA:PRO FO 916/942 – BRC Memo, 14 June 1944.Washington to leak information to the War Office concerning the ICRC’s plans 
to publish the many protests lodged in Geneva over attacks on Red Cross 
ships.
654 For its part the Admiralty expressed concern that the ICRC was 
recklessly handling a situation that ultimately affected British POWs.
655 As it 
turned out, the impact of the Committee’s brief suspension of the Marseilles 
route was minimal compared to the impact of Allied military action on ICRC 
operations in that region.
The real problem for the Marseilles route came on 14 June when, owing to the 
successful bombardment of rail lines in southern France by the Allies, the 
Committee announced that all rail services from Marseilles to its storehouses 
in Geneva had to be stopped. There is no evidence to suggest that this 
announcement was a leverage-seeking protest similar to that launched over 
the Christina attacks. There had been a lack of rail wagons throughout 
southern France since mid 1943 when Allied air raids in northern Italy 
knocked out several rail yards which the ICRC relied on for rolling stock.
656 
The escalation of the air raids in southern France during early June, therefore, 
exacerbated what was already an unstable situation. Compounding this issue 
was the fact that, six days after the announcement of the rail system 
collapse, all shipping to Marseilles was also suspended on account of 
increased military activity. This left the Committee's storehouses in that city 
packed full of increasingly valuable parcels which were unable to be 
transported to the camps by train or by sea to a more suitable transshipment 
654 Ibid. – WO to ADM, 6 June 1944.
655 Ibid. – ADM to C in C Mediterranean, 2 June 1944.
656 The rail yards in question were at Milan, Bologna, Verona and Rome. By the time Italy 
capitulated in September 1943, rail cars were so scarce in that country that the ICRC were denied 
the use of any Italian rolling stock – ICRC Report, vol.2, pp.171-172.location.
657 The ICRC’s prior threat of suspending the Marseilles route had 
been brought to fruition, albeit in a manner that was now beyond its control.
The British could exercise some measure of control over the parcel situation, 
yet chose not to. With the war initiative firmly in the Allied camp and 
Operation Dragoon,
658 the planned landing of Allied troops in southern France, 
set for 15 August, it was clear that Marseilles, one of the targets for liberation 
in Dragoon, would soon become a battleground. Despite the seriousness and 
outrage with which the British responded to the ICRC’s threat to shut down 
Marseilles three months before, no one in Whitehall appears seriously to have 
considered how Dragoon would affect the delivery of parcels to British POWs.
659  This was owed as much to a lack of consideration by Whitehall as it was to 
the delayed planning of Dragoon, the purposes and execution of which was 
argued over by the British and the Americans until the final acceptance of the 
plan in June 1944.
660 In the midst of these disagreements the problem of POW 
welfare remained one of minimal importance to the military planners even 
when solutions were being clearly offered to them. 
When, for example, the British received a request on 1 July from the ICRC to 
establish an alternative shipping route via the Baltic, Whitehall sat on the 
proposal for a full month before finally replying on 30 July that the idea would 
only be ‘sympathetically examined’.
661 In the meantime, the first two ships 
considered for the new route, the Swedish freighters Mangalore and 
657 TNA:PRO FO 916/943 – Geneva to FO, 14 June 1944; TNA:PRO FO 916/932 – FO to Geneva, 20 
June 1944.
658 Originally named Operation Anvil.
659 A greater emphasis was placed in the planning on developing new supply routes for the French 
Resistance via Marseille – TNA:PRO WO 204/553, 554, 555.
660 E.F. Ellis, Victory in the Second World War, 2 vols. (London, 1962), vol.2, pp.434-35.
661 The initial proposal specified the granting of passage for only two Swedish owned vessels the 
Mangalore and the Travancore – TNA:PRO FO 916/943 – Geneva to FO, 1 July 1944; FO to Berne, 
30 July 1944.Travancore, waited fully-laden at Barcelona for notification of their as yet 
undetermined destination. In the weeks prior to its response Whitehall, 
despite knowing full well that Dragoon would further cripple the already 
struggling Marseilles route, continued to speak in hopeful terms of the 
‘pending resumption [of] service to Marseilles’ and the need to make 
‘maximum use [of] rail service as and when it might be intermittently open 
for traffic’.
662 These comments were made internally and as such there is no 
reason to believe that they were an element of the pre-invasion deception 
plan, Operation Ferdinand.
663 The assumptions were the product of 
negligence, not subterfuge.
In defence of the British it should be noted that the ICRC reported to the 
Foreign Office on 24 June that the Marseilles route would be temporarily 
restored, which indeed it was the next day.
664 What must be considered, 
however, is that, at this point, the ICRC had no reason to think that this 
resumption would not become at least semi-permanent. The British, on the 
other hand, knew of the imminent Allied military operations in southern 
France and yet it was they, not Geneva, who continued to place hope in a 
swift and stable restoration of the Marseilles route.
British faith in Marseilles came from the view that Dragoon, despite being 
initially disruptive, would eventually help the Allies to take control of the city 
and re-activate it as a viable port.
665 Bearing in mind the importance of 
662 Ibid. – FO to Geneva, 4 July 1944; FO to Geneva, 16 July 1944; Ministry of War Transport to 
PWD, 26 July 1944.
663 The objective of this plan was to convince the Germans that the landing would be at Genoa. 
The final draft of the plan was not approved until 28 July – Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied 
Military Deception in the Second World War (New York, 2004), pp.615-618.
664 TNA:PRO FO 916/942 – Geneva to FO, 24 June 1944; ICRC Report, vol.3, p.159.
665 The primary target was Toulon, the secondary was Marseilles – TNA:PRO WO 204/554 – AFHQ 
To C in C Mediterranean, 7 July 1944.Marseilles to the welfare of POWs, this was a weighty and reckless assumption 
for Whitehall to make. It also turned out to be an erroneous one. Although the 
city was captured, the docks were so badly damaged in the fighting that, 
when a new Mediterranean route was finally established in September, ships 
were diverted to nearby Toulon which initially had none of the warehousing 
and transhipment facilities needed by the ICRC. The establishment of parcel 
delivery from Toulon was, therefore, sluggish at a time when it needed to be 
anything but.
666
The British handling of the Marseilles problem indicates that despite the 
concerns raised in Whitehall over the ICRC’s June threats, few in the POW 
administrations seriously considered that humanitarian operations – including 
those that benefited British POWs – would need to be moved as far from 
active military zones as possible. In conceiving the idea of a new northern 
route both the ICRC and the American Red Cross (ARC), its supporters in the 
initiative, showed that they at least appreciated this necessity. Although 
heavily mined, the Baltic was a far less active theatre than southern France. 
Yet, when the idea was presented to the British prior to Dragoon, they 
prevaricated.
As much as this was a manifestation of Whitehall’s reluctance to entertain the 
ICRC’s plans, the British were also acting in accordance to the long-held 
formula of “victory before relief”. Following this doctrine it was easier to 
believe in the success of Dragoon, and the expectation that the Allies’ 
subsequent northward advance would not disrupt the Marseilles line, than it 
was to approve a new route that would, inevitably, open up fresh disputes 
over navicerts and safe conducts. MEW, in particular, had cause to reject 
anything that might further complicate its already laboured dealings with the 
666 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.234.ICRC. Since April the Ministry had been involved in intense negotiations with 
the Committee over both the latter’s proposal to exempt all further civilian 
relief from the Swiss national import quota, and proposals for a general 
loosening of the blockade in order to provide relief for civilian populations and 
concentration camp internees. These negotiations raised a flurry of 
complications in which MEW’s most prevalent condition – adequate 
supervision – was the key point of discussion.
667 
MEW’s goal, especially at such a crucial time for the Allied military effort, was 
to prohibit anything that might give the Germans an advantage and so 
prolong the war. The Admiralty also shared this concern, rejecting the Baltic 
route idea on the grounds that Stettin, the proposed destination port, was in 
German hands. It was instead suggested, albeit reluctantly, that Gothenburg 
be used as a terminal port and that the ICRC use a ferry from that point 
onward.
668 Walter Roberts similarly doubted the probability of a safe conduct 
being granted for Baltic waters and so advised that more time would be 
needed to consider the military situation before the British could come to a 
decision.
669 
Although these arguments for refusing the Baltic route seem credible, 
Whitehall also had an underlying reason that was not revealed to the ICRC. 
The British were not perturbed because their POWs were ‘not in immediate 
jeopardy', owing to the fact that the BRC 'had accumulated substantial 
reserves at Geneva’.
670 American POWs, however, were in desperate need of a 
667 The Swiss quota proposal was eventually approved by the British on 19 December – JRC 
Report, pp.22-24. The proposal for civilian relief was given approval in early June, albeit with 
conditions that were subject to revision over the course of 1944. For a summary of these 
negotiations see generally TNA:PRO FO 837/1217, especially MEW Memo, 18 September 1944. 
668 TNA:PRO FO 916/943 – ADM to Ministry of War Transport, 20 July 1944.
669 TNA:PRO FO 916/943 – FO to Washington, 21 July 1944.
670 Ibid. – Minutes of War Office Meeting, 29 July 1944.new shipping route because supplies held in Geneva for their benefit were 
only expected to last until 15 August.
671 Evidently, this was not Whitehall’s 
concern and for the Ministry of War Transport, the Admiralty and MEW, the 
establishment of a new route that would initially benefit only the Americans 
was simply too much of a headache at that stage of the war. The Baltic route 
was rejected simply because it would be too much effort for too little British 
gain.
Unsurprisingly, both Washington and the ARC enthusiastically supported the 
ICRC’s proposals for the Baltic route. The State Department even went so far 
as to adopt the ICRC’s often-used tactic of appealing to British self-interest by 
indicating to the Foreign Office that a quarter of the supplies onboard the 
Mangalore and the Travancore were destined for British POWs.
672 The 
substance of this suggestion was equally important as its source. The very 
fact that Washington was getting involved in the situation was enough to help 
convince the British to reconsider the ICRC’s plan and on 5 August Whitehall 
granted safe conducts for the two ships and all other Red Cross vessels 
transhipping goods to Gothenburg. This was provided, of course, that ICRC 
supervision comparable to that which had previously existed in Marseilles 
could be guaranteed.
673
The ICRC’s reaction to Whitehall’s agreement was typical of the strained state 
of British-ICRC relations. Rather than accept what it had been granted, the 
ICRC protested against the stringency of MEW’s new conditions, arguing that 
the British proposals were not only impractical but also time-consuming. 
Accordingly, the Committee pushed for permission for direct transhipment to 
671 BRC Report, vol.1, p.387.
672 TNA:PRO FO 916/943 – US Embassy to FO, 18 July 1944.
673 TNA:PRO FO 916/944 – FO to Berne, 5 August 1944; FO to Geneva, 10 August 1944.German ports via Swedish commercial vessels. In theory this alternative was 
dangerous for the Committee in that it placed relief supplies on unmarked 
and, therefore, unprotected vessels.
674 The fact that the ICRC put forward this 
proposal regardless of the danger, gives some indication of the level of 
cynicism that the attacks on the Marseilles route had engendered. Owing to 
this acceptance by Geneva that the Red Cross emblem was no guarantee of 
safety, as well as fears of the possibility of another 1940-type collapse of the 
parcel routes, the ICRC deemed its proposal for unmarked vessels in the 
Baltic to be a risk worth taking.
Another reason why the ICRC was so determined to resist British insistence 
on controls was that, unlike previous shipping disputes, the issue of the Baltic 
route was of deep concern for the Americans. The Committee knew it had the 
backing of Washington and so pushed for a speedier alternative, even toying 
with the idea of the parcels being shipped in German commercial freighters 
under a guarantee of non-interference from Berlin. These, and other 
untenable schemes, were put forward by the ICRC, Washington and the 
Swedish government for several crucial weeks until finally, in late October, 
Stockholm agreed to the use of Swedish commercial shipping, flying under 
neutral colours. The port of final destination was agreed – grudgingly by the 
British – as Lubeck.
675 These conditions were the exact opposite of those the 
British had laid out as requirements for the Baltic route in early August. 
Such a reversal of policy on the part of the British did not mean, however, 
that the establishment of the Baltic route was a victory for the ICRC. More 
than anything, Whitehall’s agreement to ICRC shipping in the Baltic stands as 
an example of how influential the wishes of Washington could be and, 
674 Ibid. – FO to Washington, 22 August 1944; ICRC Report, vol.3, p.163.
675 BRC Report, vol.1, p.394.moreover, how those wishes affected British-ICRC relations during the final 
stages of the war. The fact that in the wake of Washington’s involvement the 
British Chiefs of Staff met specifically to discuss the ICRC’s proposal in early 
August indicates how politically weighty the issue of the Baltic route was. 
Furthermore, it is clear from the minutes of this meeting that the British 
realised that, owing to the American viewpoint, there could be ‘very high level 
political repercussions’
676 should they refuse the proposal. It was a fear of 
these repercussions, rather than agreement with the ICRC, that led to the 
British approving the Baltic route.
Behind this agreement, however, the British were still pursuing an “us and 
them” POW policy with their American allies. In August, under pressure from 
Washington, the British authorised the release of some of their own parcels in 
Geneva for distribution to the deprived American POWs.
677 Though ostensibly 
a noble gesture, this came with the proviso ‘that supplies for United States 
prisoners do not receive preferential treatment as compared with those for 
British Commonwealth prisoners’.
678 In one instance a violation of this 
condition was used by the British as a stick with which to beat the ICRC. In 
late October Whitehall complained to Washington that Colonel Iselin, the 
Committee’s delegate in Lisbon, was favouring American interests by 
permitting the Henry Dunant and the Caritas II, both of which were loaded 
with ARC parcels, to leave port ahead of ships laden with BRC parcels.
Whitehall was supported by the BRC, which, although defensive of Iselin's 
role, agreed that a degree of blame for the order lay with the Committee’s 
676 TNA:PRO WO 193/344 – Minutes of British Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 3 August 1944.
677 TNA:PRO FO 916/944 – FO to Washington, 21 August 1944.
678 TNA:PRO FO 916/945 – FO to Washington, 10 October 1944. leadership.
679 This British criticism took no account of the fact that, despite 
the release of some British parcels to American prisoners, the latter were still 
comparatively lacking in relief supplies and that if Geneva was guilty of 
anything it was only of an attempt to redress this imbalance.
There is a striking similarity in this situation to that which existed regarding 
French and British POWs in 1940. This indicates that, despite everything that 
had occurred in the field of parcel delivery over the intervening four years, the 
British were still unduly putting the interests of their own POWs far ahead of 
their allies and still attempting to push the ICRC’s activities in favour of British 
interests. In terms of comprehending the ICRC’s mandate to supply relief to 
all POWs of all nationalities, the British were still at best detached and, at 
worst, ignorant and selfish. This unreasonable attitude persisted even after 
the German declaration of 20 October that no more stockpiles of parcels 
would be allowed to accumulate in POW camps. This measure was taken by 
the Germans on the assertion that such stockpiles of food would be targeted 
for theft by partisan groups.
680
In the wake of Berlin’s declaration, the US State Department sent a note to its 
embassy in London ordering them to persuade the British to be more 
agreeable about parcel delivery routes. This indicates that the Americans, at 
least, both comprehended the significance of the prohibition of stockpiling 
and, in general, understood that the question of POW relief was going to be 
one of ‘imperative urgency’
681 in the context of the liberation of Europe. 
Bearing in mind the liberation of Europe had begun three months beforehand, 
679 The BRC wished to keep on good terms with Iselin and so requested the Foreign Office tone 
down mention of him in its protest – TNA:PRO FO 916/946 – FO to Washington, 26 October 1944; 
BRC to FO, 18 October 1944.
680 TNA:PRO FO 916/821 – Berne to FO, 20 October 1944.
681 TNA:PRO FO 916/945 – State Department to US Embassy, 30 September 1944.this realisation seems to be a bit tardy. In considering this, as well as the 
British attitude to their POWs and the negotiations over the Baltic parcel 
route, a question presents itself: Did the Allies actually consider the welfare of 
their POWs in the planning for D-Day? And if not, how did the ICRC deal with 
this situation?
D-DAY PREPARATIONS
Historians have generally been scathing of the Allies’ efforts to care for their 
POWs during the final stages of the European conflict. Arieh Kochavi has 
deemed the policy of the Western Allies to be based on little more than the 
‘calculated risk’ they took with their POWs throughout the war, whilst a more 
disparaging opinion, expressed by Nichol and Rennell, is that the prisoners 
were quite simply ‘abandoned to their fate’ in the months following the D-Day 
landings.
682 Although this latter sentiment generally rings true, the implication 
of callous desertion is to some extent misleading and requires clarification. In 
addressing this issue my aim is not to offer yet another assessment of this 
well-documented topic, but to present a context in which to understand how 
the efforts of the Allies on behalf of their POWs during the war’s final months 
related to those of the ICRC.
Although they were undoubtedly low on the Allied leaderships’ priority list the 
POWs were not arbitrarily ‘abandoned’. Throughout the invasion of Europe the 
Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), Washington 
and various ministries in Whitehall worked on schemes to both safeguard and 
supply Allied POWs.  Many of these schemes were hastily devised. However, 
682 Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, p.202; Nichol and Rennell, Last Escape, ch.2. See Rolf 'Blind 
Bureaucracy' for a generally negative assessment of British policy towards POWs in the Second 
World War. See Gilbert, POW, ch.14 for an analysis of the Allied leadership’s confusing POW 
liberation policy in Italy in 1943.considerations of POW welfare had in fact been discussed at high levels in 
Whitehall as early as 1942, when a plan was put forward proposing the 
dropping of arms into POW camps during the invasion for the purpose of 
enabling the prisoners to both protect themselves from German reprisals and 
‘control “chaos” in the liberated territories’.
683
Although it was rejected at that time by the DPW as impractical on many 
levels, the plan was not totally forgotten in Whitehall, and the Air Ministry 
proposed a similar scheme in January 1944.
684 Notably, this renewed 
suggestion was not seriously considered by Whitehall’s POW administration 
until after D-Day, when Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Phillimore of the DPW 
concluded that the proposal might now be worth pursuing. Having considered 
Phillimore’s plans in July, SHAEF responded with tentative approval.
685 Yet 
despite receiving confirmation for the proposal from the highest Allied 
authority on the continent it was not until March 1945 that a bastardised 
version of Phillimore’s plan was finally realised in the creation of the Special 
Allied Airborne Reconnaissance Force (SAARF). 
An initiative of Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the American OSS, 
SAARF only began training in early March and thus had completed only one 
mission, Operation Violet, before the armistice was signed. Deemed a 
success, the mission resulted in the securing of the prisoners, the 
‘demoralising’ of the German guards and, most importantly, the prevention of 
the prisoners falling into the hands of their supposed “allies” in the Red Army.
686 This was a far cry from the initial proposal for POW protection voiced in 
683 TNA:PRO WO 193/351 – DPW Memo, 19 June 1942.
684 TNA:PRO WO 193/352 – AIR to Washington, 27 January 1944.
685 Nichol and Rennell, Last Escape, p.45.
686 TNA:PRO WO 219/2423 – Report on Operation Violet, 13 May 1945.1942. After many months of deliberation SAARF was only active from the final 
weeks of the war until 1 July 1945, when the organisation was quietly 
disbanded.
687
The story of SAARF is a telling example of how the Allies’ plans for 
safeguarding their POWs were conducted in 1944-45 – in a laborious, overly 
bureaucratic and generally ineffective fashion. This was despite, as Churchill 
remarked to Roosevelt in March 1945, having supposedly ‘long foreseen the 
danger to these prisoners arising either in consequence of chaotic conditions 
resulting from a German collapse or alternatively out of a deliberate threat by 
Hitler and his associates to murder some or all of the prisoners’.
688 These 
scenarios may have been envisaged and even remarked on in Whitehall but 
few seriously considered how much the complete breakdown of the Third 
Reich would impact on the well-being of POWs. Even fewer of those who did 
realise took action. For all the talk the actual details of any plans were left in 
the ether.
The main reason for this negligence was that, much like their attitude during 
the Baltic route negotiations, the British were more inclined to stick to the 
status quo rather than risk a shake-up of their POW management structure. A 
prime example of this policy in practice was the decision made by the DPW on 
21 January 1944 that, rather than attempt the long-debated arms drop plan, 
the prisoners would instead be ordered to “stand fast” and patiently await 
their liberation.
689 The fact that this order was given and continued to be 
issued even after it had become untenable over the winter of 1944-45 is 
further evidence of Whitehall’s stubbornness. As had occurred throughout the 
687 Nichol and Rennell, Last Escape, pp.179-180.
688 Churchill and Roosevelt, 22 March 1945, vol.3, C-920, p.580.
689 TNA:PRO WO 193/344 – Minutes of DPW Meeting, 21 January 1944.war, plans for POW welfare were put forward. Failure to understand both how 
best to implement those plans and recognise which ones would be truly 
effective, however, engendered a scenario in which nothing could be 
practically executed. The failure in 1944 was not a lack of consideration. It 
was simply a recurrence of the ineptitude shown throughout the war by the 
British in co-ordinating humanitarian and military tasks.  
The outlook of their allies in Washington was not the same. In general, the 
American leaders displayed a degree of foresight and consideration on this 
issue that their counterparts in Whitehall did not. Moreover, it was a 
consideration that proposed greater involvement of the Red Cross than had 
been welcomed by the British throughout the war. In March 1944 the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied invasion force, General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, raised the idea of the ARC accompanying Allied forces into the 
zones of occupation for the purpose of providing relief for civilians and 
liberated POWs.
690 The US State Department had similarly recommended that 
the blockading authorities alter their ‘unnecessarily stringent’ conditions 
allowing Red Cross POW parcel ships along the Marseilles line so that they 
could also carry supplies for invalids, children and pregnant women. Even 
more surprising, the State Department proposed that these supplies should 
be distributed by the ICRC using its existing supervision and delivery 
infrastructure.
691
This dissimilarity in attitude towards the ICRC was the product of differing 
experience. Unlike their British allies the Americans had not endured the 
difficulties of relief negotiations with the ICRC in Greece and southern France 
and thus they did not have Whitehall’s long held reservations over Geneva’s 
690 TNA:PRO WO 219/33 –  SHAEF to WO, 25 March 1944.
691 TNA:PRO FO 837/1217 – US State Department to FO, 27 May 1944.intentions. Once presented with the American plan the Foreign Office was 
quick to voice these reservations, conceding to Washington that whilst the 
proposal ‘would appear to dispose from the operational point of view of the 
difficulties connected with safe conduct and the use of a European port, those 
involved in internal transport and distribution would remain to be solved’.
692 
The British, as always, did not trust the ICRC’s capabilities to supervise and 
distribute the supplies. 
It seems likely that this mistrust laid the foundations for a modified version of 
Eisenhower’s suggestion in which the ARC and the BRC alone would be 
permitted to conduct relief operations in areas near to the front. Even this 
pre-planning, however, was plagued by red tape. Despite being conceived in 
the spring the proposal was only approved on 4 July and then only after 
Eisenhower had reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCOC) that his three-
month old idea had yet to be decided on.
693
This lack of enthusiasm for the ICRC’s, and anyone else’s, attempts to co-
ordinate relief during the invasion was indicative of the Allied leadership’s fear 
that in embracing humanitarian schemes the goal of a swift victory would be 
jeopardised. This attitude was best encapsulated by Churchill when discussing 
relief plans with Roosevelt in April 1944. He observed that ‘the opening of 
further channels of importation into Europe at the present moment would, in 
our view, be wholly incompatible with the naval and military situation which is 
developing’. Accordingly, both Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that with regard 
to the blockade ‘nothing should be done that will interfere with or hamper 
forthcoming operations’.
694 
692 TNA:PRO FO 837/1217 – FO to Washington, 3 June 1944.
693 TNA:PRO CAB 122/451 – SHAEF to CCOS, 28 June 1944; CCOS to SHAEF, 4 July 1944.
694 Churchill and Roosevelt, vol.3, 8 April 1944, C-641, R-519, pp.85-86.This opinion formed the root of the problem in relations between the ICRC and 
the British during the invasion of Europe. With terrestrial military operations 
underway the British mantra of “victory before relief” was modified into an 
Anglo-American policy in which humanitarian operations – primarily for 
civilians, though to a lesser extent, also for POWs – were to be reduced or 
delayed until the fighting came to an end.  Although an argument can be 
made to justify the Allies’ policy, particularly if one considers the attacks on 
the Embla and the Christina, there was an important difference in the ICRC’s 
perspective of the conflict that made its opinion on relief strategy, particularly 
regarding POWs, far more valid.
Unlike Washington and Whitehall, the ICRC had delegates on the ground who 
continually observed the changes in mood in the German administration and 
the conditions in POW camps. This was a crucial factor in Geneva’s ability to 
interpret the threat to the prisoners in 1944-45. Whereas in the war’s middle 
years the ICRC would gather information, report it to the belligerents and 
await a response, the rapid changes in conditions in post D-Day Europe led 
the Committee to gather and analyse information in a more expeditious, 
independent and adaptive manner. This ability gave the ICRC an overview of 
the changing situation on the ground that the belligerents’ respective POW 
departments, coloured in their opinions by military concerns as they were, did 
not have. What the ICRC's reports indicated was that by late 1943 – a time 
when the Allied governments were just emerging from their state of inertia 
regarding POW safety
695 – incidents of POW mistreatment were escalating 
and, owing to military circumstances, taking on new and perilous guises. 
695 Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, p.171.One of the more common phenomena was observed in a report compiled in 
November by a delegate inspecting the newly relocated Dulag Luft at 
Frankfurt am Main. Food and clothing supplies were substantial and material 
conditions at the new site comfortable. However, the inspector concluded that 
the ‘only point to which this report must pay extra special attention’ was that 
the camp had been built so near to the city that it was ‘exposed to aerial 
attack’. The delegate’s allegation that this relocation was deliberate was 
wholly justified, for in March 1944 the Dulag was destroyed by Allied 
bombing.
696 Similar alarms were raised in April when the ICRC became aware 
of an OKW order authorising factories in the Rhone Valley to use POWs as 
operators of anti-aircraft defences. Geneva’s protests to Berlin on this issue 
were met with the flimsy excuse that as German civilians were now being 
similarly employed, the POWs could not expect preferential treatment.
697 
The callous German attitude to the issue of POW protection was more overtly 
felt within the camps themselves. In August 1943 captured airmen– dubbed 
Terrorfligers by Goebbels' propaganda – in Dulag Luft were placed in solitary 
confinement inside windowless cells with the radiators turned up high.
698 In 
October reports from the ICRC and the Protecting Power suggested that 
German guards at Stalag Luft III (Sagan) were getting jittery, threatening to 
shoot without warning any prisoners seen out of their barracks at night.
699 
Trigger-happy guards were not a phenomenon of Sagan alone. In February 
1944 the ICRC was able to confirm that over the course of 1943, 28 prisoners 
at Stalag VIIIB (Lamsdorf) had been shot dead, allegedly whilst trying to 
696 TNA:PRO WO 32/18503 – ICRC Report on Dulag Luft, 15 November 1943; TNA:PRO WO 224/67 
– Protecting Power Report on Dulag Luft, 24 April 1944.
697 ICRC Report, vol.1, pp.312-313.
698 TNA:PRO WO 32/18503 – Berne to FO, 2 August 1943.
699 TNA:PRO WO 224/63 – WO to FO, 6 October 1943.escape.
700 This grim escalation of events culminated in the execution of fifty 
Allied POWs in retaliation for the “Great Escape” from Sagan in late March.
Even though the ICRC was able to procure knowledge of these events in a 
prompt manner, its capacity to respond was impeded by its own limitations. 
The Committee’s first attempt to limit the damage from air raids was to make 
a proposal similar to that which had been rejected by the British in 1939, 
namely the reciprocal marking of camps and, if possible, notification by each 
belligerent of the location of the camps in occupied Europe and the British 
Isles. The idea, utopian at best, was that these locations would then be 
avoided by attacking aircraft. Owing to the change in the military situation by 
1943 – the Germans were now the ones under severe attack from the air – 
Berlin showed obstinacy, determined to make sure that the Allies’ air raids 
would not continue without a cost to their own POWs. This attitude was 
particularly unfortunate as, unlike shipping and parcel delivery, any scheme to 
better protect POW camps was one in which the ICRC was solely dependent 
on the assent of the belligerents. 
Owing both to the ICRC’s powerlessness in this issue and the belligerents’ 
focus on pursuing the war to the fullest, these protective measures were 
never introduced and by the end of the war the Committee estimated that up 
to thirty camps in occupied Europe had been attacked from the air, resulting 
in the deaths of over one thousand POWs.
701 Even Lubeck, the centre of the 
ICRC’s northern supply operations, was not safe from attacking Allied planes, 
700 TNA:PRO FO 916/871 – WO to FO, 11 February 1944.
701 651 of the prisoners were killed before October 1944 – ICRC Report, vol.1, pp.313-316; 
TNA:PRO WO 916/889 – WO Report on POW death from Air Raids, 14 October 1944.which sunk three ships carrying concentration camp inmates – one of which 
was marked with a Red Cross – during the final week of the war.
702
The ICRC’s dependency on the belligerents to moderate the nature of air 
attack, coupled with the lack of co-operation from Berlin, set the tone for 
future negotiations by the Committee in which humanitarian concerns were 
dwarfed by military objectives. In such circumstances Geneva was helpless. A 
measure of how helpless can be seen by the fact that the ICRC was forced to 
respond to the intensifying air war by returning to the futile démarche 
strategy of the war’s earlier years.
Following the POW camp marking proposal, Huber wrote to all belligerent 
governments on 15 March 1944, lamenting the horrific effects of total war on 
civilian populations and proposing that some respite from the carnage might 
be achieved by the establishment of zones within the fighting fronts that 
would not be subject to either aerial or terrestrial attack. Not only was this 
notion impractical in the context of total war, but it was also little more than a 
re-imagination by the traditionalist Huber of a decades old Red Cross idea. 
Although during the Second World War the suggestion was primarily a 
response to the new terrors of aerial warfare, the establishment of such 
“immunity zones” had been a cherished notion of the ICRC since its founder, 
Henry Dunant, first proposed in 1870 that certain towns within the field of 
fighting should be designated as safe havens for women and children. In 1938 
the concept was even drafted as an article for inclusion in the Geneva 
Convention. The outbreak of war in 1939, however, prevented any further 
702 This attack took place despite the local RAF intelligence officer being informed of the ships' 
cargo. A post-war investigation into the attacks concluded that the information, initially provided 
to the British by a representative of the Swedish Red Cross, was not passed on to the pilots – 
David Stafford, Endgame 1945: Victory, Retribution, Liberation (London, 2007), pp.296-303.discussion of this issue at the Diplomatic Conference planned for 1940.
703 It is 
highly unlikely this article would have been ratified for, as in the case of the 
aforementioned request to the belligerents to both mark and reveal the 
locations of all POW camps, the idea of such “immunity zones” was rejected 
by the belligerents in 1939.
704
It is testament to the desperation of the Committee during the war’s final 
years that the concept was again revived at a time when the Allied military 
strategy had become focused on aerial warfare as a means of paving the way 
for a continental invasion. The Germans, grasping any straw to diminish the 
damage of the bombing campaign, gave a tentatively positive reply to Huber’s 
appeal. The Americans at least deemed the proposal worthy of a written 
refusal. The Soviets and the British on the other hand, neglected to reply at 
all.
 705 
A sense of the contempt felt by Whitehall for Huber’s suggestion can be 
gleaned from the fact that the British decision not to reply was only made in 
October 1944 – seven months after the appeal had been received. This was 
also three months after the Foreign Office declared that it saw only the 
‘practical difficulty of carrying out the suggestion under conditions of modern 
warfare’. The Admiralty agreed with this sentiment, adding that such an 
arrangement would lead to the Germans manipulating the Red Cross for their 
own military ends.
706 The proposal, therefore, was another failure for Huber’s 
703 ICRC Report, vol.1, pp.693-695.
704 ICRC:G85/1049/042-043 – Huber to Churchill, 28 March 1944; ICRC Report, vol.1, p.314. The 
ICRC was able to establish two modified immunity zones in Jerusalem during the 1948 Arab-
Israeli war – François Bugnion, 'The International Committee of the Red Cross and the 
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(2004) 191-215, Proquest, http://www.proquest.com (accessed 11 October 2007), p.206.
705 ICRC Report, vol.1, p.699.
706 TNA:PRO ADM 1/16086 – FO Memo, 4 July 1944; Crutchley to FO, 6 October 1944; ADM 
Memo, 31 August 1944.tactic of appealing to the goodness of human nature at a time when military 
concerns were paramount. Moreover, it served only to re-affirm the old belief 
in Whitehall that the ICRC was clueless as to the realities of the war in Europe 
and as such, was an easy target for manipulation by Berlin. As was so often 
the case, however, Carl Burckhardt saw things differently.
Not content with démarches and forwarding reports of Geneva Convention 
violations to Whitehall, in early 1944, Burckhardt went a step beyond Huber’s 
work and attempted to verify whether German abuse of POWs was systemic. 
No doubt driven by the fear that if it were true the escalating violence could 
break down the Geneva Convention, Burckhardt instructed Roland Marti in 
Berlin to find out just how far the Germans were willing to go in the 
maltreatment of POWs. Having canvassed his contacts in Berlin Marti reported 
to Burckhardt that fatal reprisals might soon become official OKW policy. 
Marti’s impressions were that the Germans believed that an impending revolt 
by Allied POWs was about to occur and so had resolved to ‘take special 
measures’ against any suspected prisoners.
707 On the day after Burckhardt 
conveyed this warning to Clifford Norton, “the fifty” Allied prisoners from 
Sagan were executed as a reprisal for the “Great Escape”. 
Without knowledge of Marti’s source in Germany, it is difficult to know for 
certain whether the ICRC’s report was a credible warning of the atrocity to 
come or a coincidence. The former seems likely owing to the fact that, despite 
Weizsäcker's transfer to the Vatican at the end of 1943, the ICRC still had 
good contacts with the OKW.
708 As good as these relations were, however, the 
ICRC was still powerless to ensure the safety of POWs and civilian internees 
707 TNA:PRO FO 916/881 – Berne to FO, 25 March 1944.
708 Over the course of his appointment to Berlin Marti had maintained close and constant contact 
with the OKW and concentration camp authorities – Junod, Warrior Without Weapons, p.182; 
Favez, Holocaust, p.96.from acts of violence, be they from Allied aircraft or German guards. As we 
shall see, this situation was only altered, and even then only slightly, 
following Burckhardt and Marti's negotiations with the Schutzstaffel (SS) in 
early 1945. Until that time, however, the Committee’s focus in terms of POW 
welfare was limited to the task of making sure that the prisoners would be 
well supplied over the course of 1944.
The ICRC’s preliminary preparations for coping with this task had been good. 
As early as September 1943 Burckhardt had ordered that medical parcels be 
stockpiled in Geneva ‘to be used in cases of emergency’.
709 With the bombing 
campaign intensifying and an invasion of Europe imminent, the ICRC also 
made arrangements with the Germans to stockpile eight weeks worth of 
parcels at Sagan and in March 1944 an additional stockpile of parcels for 
POWs in transit was created at the main Frontstalag in western France.
710 The 
means of maintaining these stockpiles and keeping terrestrial parcel routes 
active was a more difficult affair.
Under pressure from the advancing Red Army the Germans had by late 1943 
significantly decreased the amount of rolling stock available to Geneva for the 
purposes of transporting supplies by rail. In February 1944 the ICRC’s fiery 
Washington delegate, Alfred Zollinger, decided to look to the Allies for help in 
this matter; a logical decision given that Allied soldiers were the ultimate 
beneficiaries of an efficient rail system. Even so, Zollinger’s request for 600 
rail wagons from the Allies was rejected on the grounds that MEW would have 
found familiar: the specific use of the wagons for Red Cross purposes could 
not be guaranteed in Nazi-held territory. This issue remained unresolved until 
709 ICRC:G85/1048 – Drogheda to Burckhardt, 25 September 1943.
710 TNA:PRO WO 224/63 – PP Report on Stalag Luft III, 17 July 1944. 5,371 parcels had been 
stockpiled at Frontstalag 133 by March 1944 – TNA:PRO WO 224/57 – PP Report on Frontstalag 
133, 27 March 1944.D-Day, when Zollinger sent a second, related, appeal to the Allies, this time 
for the establishment of relief supply depots at certain POW camps. Despite 
encouraging replies from Berlin, this suggestion was also dropped by the 
Allies, as it ‘presented many administrative difficulties’.
711
The question of road vehicles for ICRC use was no less impeded. In May the 
Committee appealed to the Allies for trucks to help the distribution of parcels 
between Marseilles and Switzerland. This request was supported by the ARC 
and the US Embassy in Berne – even MEW voiced cautious approval. Despite 
this support, agreement by all parties on the technical details was difficult to 
achieve.
The ARC accurately foresaw the manifold levels of bureaucracy that would 
have to be overcome before American trucks landed on European soil for Red 
Cross use and so encouraged the Committee to seek trucks from neutral 
Spain or Switzerland in the interim. Neither Spain nor Switzerland was able to 
meet this demand and it was not until 20 September that fifty American 
trucks arrived at Barcelona onboard the Caritas I. These, however, were only 
shipped on the proviso that they would be stored at Barcelona until MEW 
approved their despatch to Switzerland.
712 It took an additional three months 
for the heavily laden vehicles to reach the Spanish border, during which time 
a second consignment of twenty-three trucks arrived at Marseilles to form a 
shuttle service between there and Toulon. An additional fifty trucks from the 
Canadian Red Cross arrived at Toulon shortly after. It was not until early 
1945, however, that the ICRC received its full quota of trucks, by which time 
the rail service between Marseilles and Switzerland had been stabilised.
713 
711 ICRC Report, vol.2, pp.171-172; BRC Report, vol.1, pp.418-420.
712 TNA:PRO FO 916/944 – Washington to MEW, 21 August 1944.
713 ICRC Report, vol.3, pp.186-88.These trucks were eventually put to excellent and invaluable use in the 
shattered countryside of Germany and France, but the fact that it had taken 
eight months for the ICRC’s request to be met gives some indication of the 
inefficient level of co-operation between Geneva and the Allies during this 
crucial period.
This lack of liaison resulted in the isolation of the ICRC and, initially, a retreat 
from the progress it had made since 1942. As much as the Committee had 
improved its operations during the war’s stable middle years, the rapid 
escalation of the conflict in 1944 still posed considerable difficulties that could 
only have been overcome with support from the belligerents. Unable to 
handle the intensification of military operations and denied co-operation from 
both the Allies and the Axis, the Committee was forced to revert to appeals 
for leniency from the belligerents at a time when both sides were pursuing the 
exact opposite course. In this context the ICRC could do little except stockpile 
parcels, attempt to maintain its delivery routes and continue its camp 
inspections under increasingly dangerous conditions. In planning relief 
throughout the invasion of Europe, therefore, the ICRC resigned itself to the 
fact that it would be, for the most part, on its own.
The view of the Allies was, in much the same way as the ICRC, coloured by 
prior experiences. Whitehall’s persistent concerns over the ICRC’s supervisory 
capabilities and opinion of the Committee as being out of touch with the 
realities of the military situation led the Allies – with the exception of 
Washington’s swiftly quashed suggestion in March 1944 to co-ordinate with 
Geneva – practically to omit the ICRC in their preparations for the invasion of 
Europe. It was not until 28 June that the British even questioned whether the ICRC had enough delegates in Berlin to cope with the expected influx of 
POWs.
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This act of exclusion was in keeping both with the Allies’ mantra of “victory 
before relief” and the attitude, particularly prevalent in MEW and the POW 
departments, to abstain from modifying pre-existing structures for relief. 
Unsurprisingly, it was not until victory became more distant and the threat to 
POWs more acute in the autumn of 1944, that the British finally decided that 
closer liaison with the ICRC was necessary. As was so often the case in the 
instances of humanitarian and military co-ordination this decision was, by this 
stage of the invasion, long overdue.
THE MARCH
By autumn 1944 a change that greatly worried the Allies had taken place in 
Berlin’s POW administration. On 1 October Hitler, incensed by the Warsaw 
Uprising and the threat of similar action being taken by POWs, ordered that 
the administration of all POW camps be handed over to Heinrich Himmler who 
in turn passed the duty onto the SS Gruppenführer Gottlob Berger.
715 As a 
result of this action the fate of Allied POWs in Germany now rested in the 
hands of the SS, which had been identified in a report by the Allied Joint 
Intelligence Committee on 29 July as the German organisation most likely to 
carry out any last minute reprisals against POWs.
716 Ever mindful of POW 
safety, Harry Phillimore at the War Office was quick to envisage a doomsday 
714 TNA:PRO FO 916/938 – Berne to FO, 28 June 1944.
715 Berger later claimed during the Ministries Trial at Nuremberg that he had countermanded 
several of Hitler’s orders to use POWs as hostages and carry out brutal reprisals. He was 
acquitted of the allegations of crimes against POWs, but was sentenced to twenty-five years for 
his role in the Final Solution. He was released in 1951 – Nichol and Rennell, Last Escape, pp.400-
401.
716 TNA:PRO FO 916/894 – Report of Joint Intelligence Committee, 29 July 1944.scenario for the prisoners in which they might be used either as hostages or, 
worse yet, simply executed by the Nazis in one final act of vengeance.
This concern had first been raised by Phillimore in August 1944 when he 
wrote to the Foreign Office asking what effect Himmler’s appointment as 
commander of the German Reserve Army would have on POWs. He feared 
that the Reichsführer-SS might introduce Gestapo-like tactics into the 
Wehrmacht which at the time was still running the POW camps.
717 These 
concerns were compounded by information received by the DPW in September 
from recently exchanged British prisoners which indicated that the SS had 
both threatened and, indeed, committed acts of violence against POWs. Days 
after Berger’s appointment in October the Swiss Federal Political Department 
confirmed Hitler’s motivation for the change of administration, reporting to 
Clifford Norton that the Germans feared mass breakouts by British POWs for 
the purposes of forming, together with Allied paratroopers, ‘cells of resistance’ 
and they had therefore resolved to take ‘enthusiastic measures’ of reprisal.
718 
Once these reports on SS intentions were received in Whitehall apprehensions 
intensified and discussions over POW safety, which would eventually 
culminate in the aforementioned SAARF operation, began.
719
Understandably, the ICRC was not consulted on the matter of safeguarding 
the POWs. As the repeated and failed appeals concerning camp marking and 
immunity zones indicated, the physical protection of POWs from violent 
reprisals was beyond the Committee’s capabilities. The heightening of concern 
over this issue did, however, prompt Whitehall to consider other problems 
717 TNA:PRO FO 916/871 – WO to FO, 14 August 1944.
718 TNA:PRO WO 193/355 – DPW 'Report on Possibility of Acts of Violence Towards British 
Prisoners of War by SS Troops and Gestapo', 29 September 1944; Swiss Federal Political 
Department To Berne, 9 October 1944.
719 For discussion of the various schemes, including plans to drop weapons and supplies to POWs 
see Kochavi, Confronting Captivity, pp.187-192.relating to POW welfare, specifically, the effects the approaching winter would 
have on parcel supply routes. It was this problem that finally drew the ICRC 
into the Allies’ plans to protect their POWs.
The instigator of the ICRC’s involvement was Walter Roberts, who raised the 
idea with his colleagues during discussions on the proposal to meet 
representatives of the Protecting Power.
720 Shortly thereafter Harry Livingston, 
the British Consul in Geneva, contacted Burckhardt requesting a meeting 
between the ICRC and the British in order to discuss ‘the maintenance of the 
service of supplies to British prisoners of war and internees in Germany’. 
Notably, Livingston emphasised that this was the only thing the British POW 
departments wished to discuss with the Committee’s representatives.
721
One suspects Livingston was instructed to emphasise this point so as to 
discourage the ICRC from once again raising the immunity zones issue. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the attempts of the ICRC delegate Walter Fulleman 
to raise the notion of immunity being granted to a central parcel supply depot 
in Germany was swiftly rebuffed by War Office representatives on three 
separate occasions during the series of meetings.
722 As always, the British 
were not interested in the Committee’s impractical attempts to protect the 
POWs. Their only concern was that the ICRC keep the camps regularly 
supplied with necessities.
The minutes of the first meeting, for which a British delegation comprising 
War and Foreign Office representatives travelled to Geneva, was more a 
720 TNA:PRO FO 916/899 – Roberts Minute, 28 October 1944.
721 ICRC:G23/610 – Livingston to Burckhardt, 8 November 1944.
722 The initial meeting in Geneva was followed by three more meetings in London in December – 
ICRC:G85/1049 – Minutes of Meeting between ICRC and British government Representatives, 26 
November 1944; TNA:PRO WO 193/344 – Minutes of Interdepartmental Meeting with ICRC, 11 
December 1944.question and answer session than an informed discussion. Questions from the 
British delegation – all of whom represented prisoner of war departments – 
over why rolling stock was unavailable, whether the Committee had 
established itself properly yet at Lubeck and what would happen if the rail 
lines from France into Switzerland were cut, indicate the level of confusion 
amongst the British over the POW situation. It was perhaps owing to this lack 
of understanding, as well as a reluctance to tax themselves over POW 
matters, that the British showed an uncharacteristic willingness to let the 
ICRC take the lead.
Having had the particulars of the supply problem clarified by the Committee’s 
representatives, the British contribution to the discussion was generally 
passive. The most notable items they put forward were an agreement in 
principle to a safe conduct for ICRC ships bound for the German port of 
Sassnitz and a few proposals regarding POW exchanges. Aside from these 
small contributions the British confined themselves to simply asking questions 
and, once satisfied, they drew the meeting to a close, with the DPW’s director, 
General Gepp, praising the Committee for its ‘superhuman’ efforts on behalf 
of British POWs.
723
Such pleasantries set the tone for a second round of meetings in London in 
December at which British optimism shone through. Whitehall’s 
representatives expressed confidence that the Marseilles route could ‘maintain 
a regular flow of all necessary supplies to the camps’, given that repairs had 
been made to the docking facilities there and new warehouse space had been 
prepared in Toulon. The War Office even went so far as to predict a return to 
723 ICRC:G85/1049 - Minutes of Meeting between ICRC and British government Representatives, 
26 November 1944.the ‘one parcel, per man, per week’ rate of delivery.
724 Although Fulleman 
stopped short of guaranteeing this wish, he did cautiously agree with the 
British that there were ‘encouraging’ signs that the route was running at pre-
invasion capacity.
There was less agreement on the question of the Baltic route, which Fulleman 
indicated was not running at its optimum owing to the disorganisation of 
warehouse and transport facilities at Lubeck. It was at this point in the 
meeting that Fulleman ended the pleasantries by proposing the unpopular 
solution of a parcel depot in central Germany. Unlike other radical ideas 
proposed by Geneva during the war the central depot concept was one that, 
although appearing to the British as yet another idealistic whim, was crucial 
for the ICRC’s strategy for POW relief. The ICRC’s proposal not only 
circumvented the German ban on stockpiles within the camps, but it also 
complemented Fulleman’s other suggestion that parcels should no longer be 
distributed by nationality. If priority needed to be given at all, it should be to 
those prisoners in most immediate need.
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Evidence that these two ideas formed the cornerstone of the ICRC’s POW 
relief strategy in 1944 can be seen in the fact that Geneva had raised this 
issue long before the November and December meetings. On 17 August the 
Committee proposed to all belligerents that ‘should the internal organisation 
of the Detaining State break down at a time when it is urgently necessary to 
forward relief consignments’, parcels intended for all internee nationalities 
should be pooled for easier and more equal access.
726 Alfred Zollinger also 
pressed the issue of a central depot with the Germans over the summer and 
724 TNA:PRO FO 916/947 – WO Memorandum, 23 November 1944.
725 TNA:PRO WO 193/344 – Minutes of Interdepartmental Meeting with ICRC, 12 December 1944.
726 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.87.was able to reach an agreement in principle with Berlin on the proposal for a 
site at Torgau. The BRC and Whitehall, however, were unreceptive.
727
This attitude was unchanged at the time of the winter meetings and the 
suggestion was quickly dismissed by the British. Although it was not 
mentioned outright, the tone of the refusal to this request indicated that, in 
addition to wishing to avoid the question of immunity for such a depot, the 
British also feared that such a large store of food in the heart of Germany 
would be easy pickings for the retreating Wehrmacht. The only Briton who 
voiced any kind of support for Fulleman’s schemes, or indeed, proposed any 
of his own for the benefit of the POWs, was Harry Phillimore, who emphasised 
the ICRC’s need to be flexible in its delivery routes and – in contrast to the 
optimism of his colleagues – questioned the delegate for details of the 
Committee’s contingency plans should the Marseilles route again be 
compromised. Fulleman could only reiterate that the other alternative, 
Lubeck, was inadequate to handle the tonnage being shipped there. It was on 
this note that Phillimore’s colleague at the War Office, W.H. Gardner, abruptly 
adjourned the meeting.
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When talks resumed a day later Fulleman once again raised the supply depot 
idea, only to have it quashed by Gardner, this time with the support of the 
BRC’s representative, Lt. Colonel Brown. An alternative proposal from the 
British for smaller depots in each POW work camp (Wehrkreis) was put 
forward but it was thought that this could only be successful if such depots 
were situated outside ‘likely bombing targets’.
729
727 BRC Report, vol.1, pp.418-420.
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729 Ibid. – Minutes of Interdepartmental Meeting with ICRC, 12 December 1944.This proposal had first been raised by Gardner during the meeting in Geneva 
but the specifics of the plan appear not to have been considered by the British 
during the intervening weeks. For instance, the idea of situating the camp 
outside likely bombing targets took no account of the increasingly arbitrary 
nature of the air war and the fact that the British had repeatedly refused to 
grant immunity to any zone within the occupied territories.
730 It seems, 
therefore, that the plan was put forward only as a means of reaching a 
compromise with the ICRC. Actual realisation of the necessity of the depots, 
central or otherwise, was not widely recognised by Whitehall, which had not 
raised the issue in interdepartmental meetings prior to the mission to 
Switzerland and did nothing to follow up its own proposal for Wehrkreis 
depots in the months to come.
731 The concept of parcel depots simply did not 
interest the British.
The second issue raised by Fulleman, that of parcel distribution, enjoyed 
greater consideration by the British than the depot idea. However, despite the 
change in the numbers and composition of the POWs the British line on this 
issue was no different to what it had been in 1940. At the Geneva meeting in 
November the raising of the topic of supplies and conditions for non-British 
POWs by the ICRC delegates was met with near silence from the British 
representatives.
732 At the December meeting Gardner made British feelings 
clear when he urged Fulleman to make sure that ‘British prisoners of war were 
not impeded by some arbitrary formula’ for delivering parcels. The notion of 
distributing parcels without regard to nationality, therefore, was still not 
welcomed by Whitehall.
730 ICRC:G85/1049 – Minutes of Meeting between ICRC and British government Representatives, 
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731 For details of British interdepartmental meetings during 1944 see TNA:PRO WO 193/344; BRC 
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732 ICRC:G85/1049 - Minutes Of Meeting between ICRC and British government Representatives, 
26 November 1944.Not only was this a clear example of the British refusing to learn the lessons 
of 1940, but, in terms of British-ICRC relations, it was a damaging hurdle. 
Whitehall’s refusal to give up its option of self-interest – even at the expense 
of its closest allies from across the Atlantic – obstructed Geneva’s goal of 
establishing a more fluid and flexible form of parcel delivery in 1944. It was 
not until February 1945 that the ICRC, by this time thoroughly exasperated by 
Whitehall’s reluctance, began the system of pooling parcels, without any 
authorisation from the British or any other belligerent government.
733 
As with prior consultations between the ICRC and Whitehall throughout the 
war, the winter meetings followed a predictable and sad pattern. Rather than 
open the way for new understanding the meetings served only to re-affirm 
the opposing policies each party held towards humanitarian relief. As always, 
Whitehall’s aim of directing the ICRC’s work towards British interests clashed 
with the broader goals of Geneva. This issue had dogged British-ICRC 
relations for much of the war and a change in the situation on the ground in 
Europe over the winter of 1944-45 gave the dispute an added dimension. The 
change also showed that, in planning for a central parcel depot in Germany 
and a more liberal parcel distribution policy, the ICRC had shown a crucial, 
albeit ill-received, degree of foresight.
The change that so disrupted the plans of both the ICRC and the Allies for 
supplying and, in the case of the latter, liberating the camps, was the forced 
evacuation by the Germans of POWs and concentration camp internees 
westwards away from the advancing Red Army. Owing to a lack of adequate 
transport the evacuation, hastily prepared to begin with, degenerated into a 
733 This policy was not made official until 18 April 1945, when the ICRC sent telegrams to all camp 
commandants requesting that parcels be distributed equally to all nationalities – ICRC Report, 
vol.3, p.87.series of brutal marches in which the poorly provisioned prisoners were led 
across the length and breadth of a snow-covered and battle-scarred Germany. 
This mass evacuation, referred to as The March by those who suffered 
through it, was arguably the greatest trauma inflicted upon Allied POWs in 
Europe during the Second World War. Although previous forced marches had 
taken place in 1940 the bitter weather conditions, greater number of 
marchers, on-going military operations and the utter chaos and 
disorganisation of the exercise made The March of 1944-45 incomparably 
harsher. It also made the ICRC’s efforts to bring relief to those involved that 
much more difficult.
An example of how difficult is evident in the tale of one of the first instances 
of evacuation on 13 July, when the prisoners of Stalag Luft VI (Heydekrug) 
were abruptly ordered by their guards to gather whatever they could carry in 
preparation for departure within half an hour. Their destination and means of 
getting there were not specified by their captors, who also did not inform 
either the Protecting Power or the ICRC of their plans. In fact, the directive 
was simply that the prisoners be moved away from the Russian’s line of 
advance. Half of those evacuated from Heydekrug eventually ended their 
journey 200 miles south at Thorn, having endured a thirty-six hour train 
journey in enclosed cattle wagons.
The second group suffered a far longer ordeal, beginning with a sixty-hour 
voyage across the Baltic in an overcrowded coal barge. Once they arrived at 
the port of Swinemünde in Pomerania, they were shackled, subjected to 
several hours of travel in cattle wagons and finally marched through a dense 
pine forest towards their destination, Stalag Luft IV (Gross Tychow). This 
camp soon became overcrowded with the arrival of further groups of evacuees and was in turn evacuated on 6 February, this time without any 
transportation to assist the prisoners.
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What made matters worse for the marchers was that it was only in the days 
following the evacuation from Gross Tychow that the ICRC and the Allies 
began fully to comprehend what was going on, not just at that camp, but 
across the entire eastern half of the Reich. Lack of notification from the 
Germans, disruption to POW mail services and the uncertainty of the 
evacuations had cut off the means of contact between the prisoners and the 
Allied leadership.
735 The Allies therefore, were dependent on information from 
the ICRC and Protecting Power inspectors.
Not surprisingly, it was Harry Phillimore who first recognised this situation and 
assessed its gravity.
736 On 24 January 1945 he expressed concern to the 
Foreign Office that ‘with the advance of the Russian armies it is possible that 
the Germans may move prisoner of war camps’. He requested, therefore, that 
the Protecting Power be consulted immediately for any information it had on 
the matter. Phillimore also indicated that the ICRC should be contacted, albeit 
in an afterthought that he scribbled in pen over the telegram.
737
The Protecting Power was the first to confirm Phillimore’s fears. The Swiss 
Embassy in Berlin, however, stressed the optimistic opinion that, due to time 
734 Nichol and Rennell, Last Escape, pp.20-25, 406; MacKenzie, Colditz Myth, p.360.
735 Some of the POWs possessed radios, however, they were only capable of one-way 
communication and so could only be used by the prisoners to keep abreast of developments in 
the war – Nichol and Rennell, Last Escape, p.154.
736 The British had first been made aware of this possibility of evacuations February 1944, when a 
report was received detailing the forced removal by cattle truck of POWs from Stalag IIIG 
(Steglitz). The Protecting Power were asked to launch a protest and at that the issue ended – 
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737 TNA:PRO FO 916/1156 – WO to FO, 24 January 1945. An amended version of Phillimore’s note, 
including the ICRC in the request, was sent out a day later.constraints, evacuations could not possibly take place before the camps were 
taken over by the Russians on their inexorable westward march. The Swiss 
argued that sick and wounded prisoners and a lack of provisions would slow 
down the Germans’ plans.
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This assessment gave the Foreign Office a dangerously naïve view of the 
situation. The Swiss did not take into account the fact that the Germans 
neglected time-consuming preparations regarding the prisoner’s welfare in 
favour of rapid, ill-provisioned flight.
739 It was the very speed of the 
evacuations that also caught the ICRC off guard. The fact that four camps 
were evacuated in the space of ten days during late January, combined with 
the breakdown of communications, made the Committee’s monitoring 
activities difficult to maintain.
740 The result was that throughout February the 
British relied on the Swiss Embassy in Berlin for information on The March, 
whilst criticising the ICRC for its lack of reporting on the POW's movements.
741
Given the many instances throughout the war in which Geneva’s information 
was passed over in favour of that supplied by the Protecting Power, it seems 
strange that the British should have been concerned with the ICRC’s apparent 
negligence. The reason for this was that, as in 1940, the loss of stability in the 
POW situation led the British to a panicked dependency on the ICRC that, 
given the scale of the communications and transport collapse in 1945, the 
latter could not this time fulfil in an expeditious manner. This, at least, is the 
738 TNA:PRO WO 193/343 – Berne to FO, 26 January 1945.
739 TNA:PRO FO 916/1156 – PWD Report on The March, 8 March 1945.
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XX-B (Marienburg) on 23 January and Stalag Luft III (Sagan) on 27 January – Nichol and Rennell, 
Last Escape, pp.405-406.
741 TNA:PRO FO 916/1156 – Berne to FO, 1, 6, 19, 21, 25 February 1945; WO to FO, 16 February 
1945.reason proffered in the ICRC’s official report.
742 Another reason why the 
Committee failed to give the British regular reports on the evacuation of the 
POW camps – which the Protecting Power was somehow able to do
743 – may 
have been because, during the early weeks of February, many in Geneva 
were less concerned with Allied POWs than they were with civilian, specifically 
Jewish, internees.
Since late autumn the Committee’s leadership had discussed the idea of 
approaching the highest ranks of the Nazi leadership, either Hitler or Himmler, 
with the aim of securing last minute protection for concentration camp 
prisoners. Unsurprisingly, the candidate put forward for this task was 
Burckhardt, who, despite the claims of the ICRC’s official historian, was not 
the instigator of the negotiations and was, in fact, contacted by Himmler on 2 
February.
744 Burckhardt had been approached, like Count Folke Bernadotte, 
his opposite number in the Swedish Red Cross, by agents of Himmler as part 
of the Reichsführer-SS's clumsy attempts to broker peace and rectify the 
image of the SS during the war’s final stages by releasing or granting 
concessions to Jewish and other civilian internees.
745
As Burckhardt mused on this invitation over the course of February, he 
received information from Rolf Nordling, the Swedish Consul in Paris, detailing 
attempts by the Swedes to broker the release of Jewish prisoners. As Jean-
742 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.86.
743 The Protecting Power’s reports were based on the observations of camp inspectors. They were 
generally concise in nature and provided information on which camps had been evacuated, but 
little on the actual conditions of the March itself – TNA:PRO FO 916/1156 – Berne to FO, 1, 6, 19, 
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745 For discussion of the Bernadotte/Himmler talks see Walter Schellenberg, The Memoirs of 
Hitler’s Spymaster, ed. and trans. Louis Hagan (London, 2006), ch.38-40; Ralph Hewins, Count 
Folke Bernadotte: His  Life and Work (London, 1949), pp.112-114; Bauer, Jews for Sale?, ch.12.Claude Favez has suggested, Burckhardt, who had been officially named ICRC 
president on 1 January, was in no mood to have his Committee’s thunder 
stolen by the Swedes.
746
Possessed of the 'viewpoint of the historian who measures on a big scale',
747 
Burckhardt realised that in Himmler’s offer there was an opportunity not only 
to boost his image for posterity, but also, perhaps, to fulfil his dream of 
negotiating peace, albeit belatedly. This matter of prestige and reputation 
contributed in no small part to the Red Cross man finally contacting Himmler 
on 18 February with the aim of organising a face to face meeting.
This already complex series of events became further complicated on 20 
February when Burckhardt was appointed, on the recommendation of Charles 
de Gaulle, as Swiss ambassador to France. Mindful of how important the 
negotiations with the SS would be, Burckhardt put off his official appointment 
in Paris until the matter with Himmler could be resolved. In a measure 
Burckhardt claimed was designed to assure ICRC neutrality – a laughable 
explanation if one considers his history – he used the appointment to Paris as 
an excuse to step down from the Committee and continue the negotiations as 
an independent diplomat.
748 
One suspects that, much as in 1937, Burckhardt was once again seeking to 
distance himself from the Committee which, despite its best efforts, had 
endured many failures on the issue of concentration camps during the war.
749 
The reins of the presidency were passed back to Huber, leaving Burckhardt as 
746 Favez, Holocaust, p.260.
747 Description of Burckhardt from German staffer in Danzig – DGFP, Series C, vol.6 – Luckwald To 
Foreign Ministry, 16 April 1937, doc.320, p.659.
748 Favez, Holocaust, pp.256-259; Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.592-93.
749 See Introduction, p.16an independent actor in the drama despite his honorary title of “President on 
Leave” – a leave from which he decided never to return.
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The outcome of Burckhardt’s discussions with the SS will be discussed below. 
For now it is enough to note that these upheavals in Geneva, together with 
the pre-occupation with publicity and concentration camp internees, coincided 
with Whitehall's sudden, panicked interest in POW matters. The result was 
that for the crucial three weeks in which the British sought to gain an 
informed view of the situation, the attentions of the ICRC leadership were 
elsewhere.
That is not to suggest that the ICRC abandoned the POWs. Prestige and public 
opinion were still important for the Committee, especially following the highly 
publicised arrival at the Swiss border on 8 February of 1,200 Jews, led by the 
former president of Switzerland Jean-Marie Musy, who had directly negotiated 
with Himmler for the prisoners’ removal from
 Theresienstadt.
751 
Furthermore, for the ICRC delegates on the ground the heightened concern 
for concentration camp inmates, some of whom were involved in The March, 
could not be divorced from the fate of the POWs. Any lapse in focus on the 
latter issue was, therefore, purely temporary. Indeed, as the streams of 
marchers grew both in size and despair over the course of January and 
February the affairs of both categories of war victim – hitherto carefully 
segregated – became enmeshed as never before. It also became clear 
towards the end of January that the evacuations were being made with no 
750 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.593.
751 Bauer, Jews for Sale?, p.225, 230, 243.regard for nationality, which led to the destination camps being populated by 
multiple nationalities of civilian and military internees.
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This breakdown in segregation, although seemingly troublesome and 
confusing, perfectly suited the ICRC’s preferred method of providing impartial 
relief to all and, unsurprisingly, it resulted in the Committee performing some 
of its most admirable and important work of the Second World War. The 
extremes of the situation also resulted in the ICRC’s long-held frustrations 
with the British moving to boiling point.
The problem of guaranteeing food supplies for all detainees was still the 
ICRC’s main consideration. Having realised that provisions had not been 
organised for the marchers and that the camps the delegates eventually 
reached, such as Stalag 357 (Fallingbostel), were also practically devoid of 
parcels, the ICRC addressed the problem of making sure supplies were 
available for the prisoners at the various stops along their journey.
753 On 3 
February the Committee’s leadership consulted representatives of the BRC 
and ARC on the matter. The result was a striking and practical report on 
solutions to the problem that held back little and criticised the Allies for their 
handling of POW relief matters over the course of the previous year. 
Emphasising the lack of transport and parcel depots, which were both needed 
to supply the marchers, the report bluntly declared that the ICRC required 
‘immediate, repeat, immediate, acceptance’ of its proposal to pool all parcels, 
irrespective of their origin, for distribution to any POWs or civilians who 
752 See ICRC:G3/23F/109 generally, in particular Bachman to Marti, 23 April 1945, in which 
Mauthausen is mentioned in the same sentence as the POW collection point at Moosburg; ICRC 
Report, vol.3, p.89.
753 The smaller of the two camps at Fallingbostel, by mid February Stalag 357 was deemed ‘a very 
bad camp’ by inspectors, who noted that reprisals were common and some buildings didn’t even 
have ceilings – TNA:PRO WO 224/54 – ICRC Report on Fallingbostel, 11 February 1945.needed them. The report also contained one of the few examples of 
exasperated criticism of the Allies that was put to paper by Geneva during the 
war. No doubt with the refusal of Zollinger’s efforts to acquire transport in 
early 1944 in mind, The Red Cross delegates noted that they:
Cannot but deplore in this connection that our request made already 18 months 
ago to British and American authorities for delivery of 600 goods vans or 
material for construction thereof in Switzerland, which we submitted foreseeing 
that serious transport situation was bound to arise sooner or later was not 
acceded to. Had this then been accepted situation today would not be as tragic.
In a final salvo the report declared that the ‘ICRC must decline responsibility if 
proposal should for one reason or another not be put into practice’.
754 This 
assertion was followed on 22 February by a statement from the ICRC to all 
belligerents and National Red Cross Societies indicating that rather than wait 
for an answer from the belligerents the Committee would begin pooling 
parcels immediately at Stalag VIIA (Moosburg) for distribution to ‘any United 
Nations prisoners of war’.
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This missive, bold and acerbic, was prompted by two factors: The ICRC’s 
pent-up frustrations with the Allies and the pressure, in light of public scrutiny 
of the concentration camp internee issue, to create a last minute miracle for 
civilian victims of the Third Reich. The resulting declaration to the Allies was 
long overdue; however, for those prisoners who ultimately benefited it was 
better late than never. In terms of British-ICRC relations it also represented 
something of a watershed. In telling – not asking – the belligerents about the 
details of its plans the Committee showed that it not only understood the 
gravity of the situation that was unfolding across Germany, but could also no 
longer tolerate Allied interference in its plans to deal with it. The ICRC was at 
754 TNA:PRO WO 193/343 – ICRC to ICRC London, 16 February 1945.
755 TNA:PRO FO 1049/26 – ICRC to ICRC London, 22 February 1945.last attempting to dictate the terms of the relationship through forceful 
actions rather than polite words.
This philosophy was also reflected in the Committee’s approach to gathering 
information on the marchers which, although undeniably slower than the 
efforts of the Protecting Power, provided a more complete picture of the scale 
of the evacuations. In early February the ICRC knew roughly which camps 
had been evacuated, but it was not until 28 February that Robert Schirmer, 
Marti’s deputy at the Berlin delegation, filed a report with the US Embassy in 
Berne.
Having tracked the marchers across northern Germany, spoken to various 
POWs and German officials and also compiled information from other ICRC 
delegates in other areas of the Reich, Schirmer identified three distinct lines 
of march. These were a southern line bound for Schongau and consisting of 
80,000 marchers, a central line of 60,000 marchers heading in the direction of 
Dresden and a colossal northern line of 100,000 prisoners marching towards 
Hamburg and Lubeck. In the case of each column of prisoners Schirmer 
provided information on their approximate location, status of supplies and 
health conditions, noting that the southern line was plagued by dysentery and 
the northern line had come under repeated attack from Allied aircraft.
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By the time Schirmer’s detailed report was received the harrowing account 
served primarily to clarify opinion in the Allied camp that something needed to 
be done. Already, on 21 February, the War Office had agreed with Washington 
to hand the problem of supplying the POWs over to SHAEF. This was a wise 
move that prompted swift and decisive action. Within days of being put in 
756 TNA:PRO FO 916/1156 – Schirmer Report, dated 2 March. Originally filed with the US Embassy 
in Berne on 28 February 1945.charge of POW relief Eisenhower authorised the release of a hundred trucks 
and fuel to the ICRC and approved a plan for two relief convoys to be sent 
from Lubeck and Geneva into the prisoner assembly points at Moosburg and 
Marienburg.
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The sudden willingness on the part of the Allies to take decisive action was 
prompted by a combination of the ICRC’s assertiveness and a belated 
realisation that the POW situation had spiralled out of control. The 
Committee’s ultimatum of 16 February and the appearance of Schirmer’s 
report a week later were well timed in that they gave weight to concerns, 
already prevalent in Whitehall, over a possible backlash from the public, 
similar to that which occurred in 1940, if the situation with the POWs dragged 
on without Allied intervention.
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Even with this evident need to act, however, the old habits of the British died 
hard. The War Office was apprehensive of the idea of newly-pooled American 
and British parcels being distributed to the Russians and, although discretion 
was placed in the hands of the Committee, it was made clear by the British 
and the ARC that the trucks supplied by the latter were intended to be used 
only for the benefit of British and American POWs.
759 The British Chiefs of 
Staff went a step further, expressing doubts that the ICRC’s ambitious 
scheme for mobile relief could even be executed. There were the usual 
lamentations over the ‘organisational problems involved’ and emphasis was 
placed on the need for various departments to compile further reports before 
a decision on the ICRC’s proposal could be made.
760
757 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.188. For an outline of SHAEF’s plan see TNA:PRO WO 193/345 – SHAEF to 
WO, 5 March 1945.
758 TNA:PRO WO 193/348 – Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, 19 February 1945.
759 TNA:PRO FO 916/1181 – WO to ICRC London, 3 March 1945; ICRC Report, vol.3, p.197.
760 TNA:PRO WO 193/343 – Chiefs of Staff Committee Memo, 19 February 1945.Despite these, by now near-instinctive, expressions of doubt over the ICRC’s 
plans, there was a realisation in Whitehall of how obsolete and unpopular such 
concerns were in light of the increasingly desperate POW situation. Rather 
than actively obstructing the Committee on these issues, both Washington 
and Whitehall opted instead merely to convey their doubts before offloading 
the perpetually difficult POW issue into the hands of Eisenhower. This attitude 
on the part of the Allied governments and the Chiefs of Staff was a blessing in 
disguise for the prisoners, who by 8 March had received 500 tonnes of 
supplies courtesy of SHAEF’s plans and the ICRC’s willingness and ability to 
execute them. The success of this initial relief mission was crucial for future 
relief operations. Having seen the merits of the ICRC’s plan the Germans also 
opened the floodgates, authorising the Committee to send as many trucks as 
it could over the Swiss border for the purposes of relief – an act that in turn, 
prompted SHAEF to release more vehicles to Geneva.
761 By mid-March, 
therefore, the ICRC’s plans for mobile and fluid relief, first proposed almost a 
year earlier, were at last coming to fruition and notably without the direct 
input of the British government.
Having crossed the border into the shattered German countryside, those 
delegates who accompanied the relief convoys were soon made aware of how 
justified their Committee’s insistence on the trucks had been. Far from an 
organised column, two groups of prisoners that had left eastern Germany and 
Czechoslovakia, and each comprising close to 6,000 marchers, were spread 
out over hundreds of kilometres and led by German commandants with little 
idea of their location. In such circumstances the ICRC’s vehicles were crucial 
761 TNA:PRO WO 193/345 – SHAEF to WO, 10 March 1945.for supplying those prisoners who had been lost, injured or simply left behind 
by their fellow marchers.
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Elsewhere, Burckhardt – still mindful of public opinion – continued to work on 
the problem of the Jews. On 12 March 1945 he crossed the Swiss border at 
the town of Feldkirch and met Himmler's deputy, SS-Obergruppenführer Ernst 
Kaltenbrunner, to discuss the possible release of Jewish, French and Polish 
prisoners. The negotiations were not entirely successful and in the end only 
limited releases were secured.
763  Furthermore, the supposedly clandestine 
negotiations – the substance of which Burckhardt reported to the Swiss 
Federal Council – were one of the worst kept secrets in diplomatic circles, with 
Allen Dulles and the Foreign Office also being made aware of the outcome of 
the talks.
764
Although achieving only negligible success, the process and intent of 
Burckhardt's “secret discussions” were indicative of the changes he had made 
to the ICRC, particularly in regards to its relations with belligerents. As 
Burckhardt himself remarked to Georges Dunand, an ICRC delegate in 
Slovakia, the new mantra for the ICRC was to 'go straight ahead....but be 
careful that the Committee does not have to disown you'.
765 To this end, 
during the war's final weeks the ICRC's delegates distributed supplies, 
negotiated with SS officers and provided protection for inmates – when 
762 ICRC Report, vol.3, p.191.
763 For discussion of the outcome of the Burckhardt/Kaltenbrunner talks see Favez, Holocaust, 
pp.263-64. Another perspective, highlighting Kaltenbrunner's evasiveness and Burckhardt's 
'satisfaction' with the talks, is presented by Walter Schellenberg – Schellenberg, Memoirs, 
pp.432-433.
764 Documents Diplomatiques Suisses 1848-1945, Series 1, vol.14 (Berne, 1997) – Burckhardt’s 
Report on Kaltenbrunner meeting – 17 March 1945, doc.E2001 (D) 3/474, pp.1006-1009; 
Petersen, Hitler’s Doorstep, Document 5-64, Telegram 6909, 14 March 1945, pp.473-474; 
TNA/PRO/FO 371/51193 – Berne to FO, 29 March 1945.
765 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.460.permitted – at concentration camps at Türkheim, Dachau, Theresienstadt and 
Budapest.
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In addition to these unorthodox measures, when the delegate Louis Haefligger 
was refused permission to enter Mauthausen by the hard-line commandant 
Franz Ziereis, Burckhardt – despite officially having stood down from the 
Committee – interjected. Not only did Burckhardt apprise American troops 
close to Mauthausen of the situation, but he also sent a message to Ziereis, 
warning him that if any more inmates died whilst Haefligger waited outside 
the gates, it would be on the Nazi's head. Haefligger was permitted entry to 
the camp on 5 May.
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The ICRC's new found sense of ingenuity, adaptation and it must be said, 
bravery, was also prevalent in its handling of the POW crisis. The main tactic 
adopted by the delegates was to manipulate the Germans’ need to appear 
compassionate to the war's victors. The brokering of deals with German 
commandants and the recruitment of both SS guards and some of the fitter 
POWs for the purposes of unloading supplies was commonplace.
768 Marti’s 
delegation was even able to gain permission from the Germans for US and 
British aircraft carrying supplies to land forty kilometres south of Berlin, an 
initiative that was crucial to supplying the central line of The March.
769
As always, however, the ICRC could do little to protect the POWs from acts of 
violence, especially those inflicted on them by their own forces. As the trucks 
left Switzerland for Germany the question of immunity from air attack was 
766 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.603-604. For discussion of the ICRC's efforts in Hungary see 
Wagner, Righteous of Switzerland, pp.195-205; Favez, Holocaust, pp.236-42.
767 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.463.
768 ICRC Report, vol.3, pp.90-91.
769 TNA:PRO FO 916/1181 – FO to Berne, 9 March 1945; ICRC Report, vol.3, p.92.still unresolved. Instances of POW and civilian internees being strafed – the 
columns were usually mistaken for retreating Wehrmacht troops – continued 
until 8 May. An entire file in the British National Archives is devoted to 
accounts of these “friendly fire” incidents.
770 
In the midst of such violence, the ICRC was itself unprotected. On 3 March 
the Foreign Office declared that the Allies could not guarantee the ICRC’s 
trucks immunity from air attack, even though they were painted white and 
emblazoned with the Red Cross emblem. Concern was even raised over the 
displaying of the Red Cross emblem, as it was feared that the safety implied 
by its presence might attract scavenging German troops – an ironic concern 
given the many attacks on Red Cross marked vehicles.
771
In a reply mimicking that of the Admiralty over Red Cross shipping, the most 
the Allied leadership did was to inform Bomber Command to have its pilots 
keep an eye out for the Red Cross trucks.
772 For their part the Germans 
recognised the Red Cross markings but also refused to guarantee protection.
773 The belligerents’ refusal to acknowledge the status of the Red Cross 
emblem contravened the Geneva Convention. As an example of how far the 
nature of the conflict had pushed those ideals aside, however, the ICRC 
appealed to neither government on this issue. Instead of protests and appeals 
the Committee remained focused on seeing out the final, horrific, weeks of 
the war as best it could, irrespective of the increased danger its delegates 
now faced.
770 See TNA:PRO FO 916/1184.
771 TNA:PRO WO 193/345 – FO to Stockholm, 3 March 1945.
772 TNA:PRO FO 916/1181 – Air Ministry to Bomber Command HQ, 14 March 1945; TNA:PRO WO 
219/243 – SHAEF to Air Ministry, 29 April 1945.
773 ICRC Report, vol.3, pp.195-96.In the context of these difficult circumstances, the ICRC’s operations during
the spring of 1945 ran quite smoothly and with great success. In addition to 
smaller collection areas, three large parcel depots were set up at key POW 
muster points: Neubrandenburg in the north of Germany and Moosburg and 
Ravensbrück in the south. Furthermore, for many of the camps to which 
delivery was re-established, parcels were delivered at a rate of one parcel per 
man per week from mid-March until the end of the war.
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Although many prisoners had gone without parcels for weeks, gratitude at the 
sight of the Red Cross trucks – dubbed the “White Angels” – dispersed any 
feelings of resentment. The British MOC at Moosburg expressed his ‘most 
fervent thanks’ for the efforts of the delegates, and Robert Gale at Stalag 357 
described the arrival of the Red Cross as nothing less than a starvation-
averting ‘miracle’.
775 A representative of the British POWs scattered around 
Lubeck went so far as to write personally to the commander of the newly 
arrived British occupation force praising the efforts of Paul de Blonay, the 
ICRC’s delegate in Lubeck, and requesting that he be retained as part of the 
occupation force’s relief management.
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This praise for the delegates was deserved, for during the war’s final weeks 
the ICRC undoubtedly went above and beyond the call of duty. If, however, 
the story of the ICRC in the Second World War tells us anything, it is that the 
willingness of the delegates to bring relief to victims of war could only be 
implemented in so far as was permitted by the belligerents. In the case of the 
Committee’s efforts in early 1945 its most willing facilitators were not the 
British, American or German governments, but, oddly, the military forces 
774 Ibid. pp.90-93.
775 ICRC:G23/26F/109 – C.H. Burgess to Mock (ICRC delegate at Moosburg), 20 April 1945; 
MacKenzie, Colditz Myth, p.368.
776 ICRC:G23/26F/109 – Captain Bauer to Lieutenant-Colonel Hoseason, 3 May 1945.representing both sides. The importance of proximity in the formulation of 
humanitarian policy is evident.
Unlike the prevaricating Allied government officials, SHAEF – represented and 
informed by soldiers on the ground in Europe, some of whom had seen the 
concentration camps first hand – cooperated with the ICRC’s plans almost 
immediately. In addition to the importance of SHAEF sharing awareness with 
the ICRC over the extremities of the situation, the involvement of the Allied 
military also allowed for a better understanding of how the variable conditions 
on the ground could affect the Committee’s relief efforts. On 29 March 
Eisenhower was able to insist, with some confidence, that the ‘present rapid 
advances’ of the Allied armies meant that POW relief operations had to be 
completed without delay.
777 Few Allied government officials, with the 
exception of the ex-soldier Harry Phillimore, understood this correlation 
between military and humanitarian efforts. 
In terms of this synchronization, the British government’s policy had been to 
do the minimum required in the hope that the ICRC, once summoned, would 
take care of the rest. Once it became apparent over the course of January 
that more than Geneva’s will would be required, the entire programme was, 
wisely, placed in the hands of SHAEF which, owing to its military structure, 
resources and proximity to the chaos within Germany, was more willing than 
the government officials to work with the ICRC on the matter of POWs. 
Eisenhower, in particular, seems to have understood the threat posed to 
POWs and the importance of maintaining a close working relationship with the 
Committee. Even when rejecting the ICRC’s proposal for immunity zones, he 
777 TNA:PRO WO 193/345 – SHAEF Circular Memorandum, 29 March 1945.emphasised that the response should not in any way question the competence 
of the Red Cross.
778 
SHAEF also did whatever it could to prevent attacks on Red Cross vehicles. In 
April a top secret report was received by SHAEF indicating that Allied aircraft 
were still attacking Red Cross convoys in northern Germany – 16 trucks had 
apparently been destroyed in the course of one week. This, along with an 
earlier report of attacks by British fighters on the Henry Dunant and the 
Halleren off the coast of Holland, prompted SHAEF’s Air Staff to send a terse 
circular to Whitehall’s Air Ministry and nearby US Air Force Commands, which 
led to a ban on the 8
th Air Force attacking any vehicles or personnel seen on 
roads. This energetic and supportive response by SHAEF was in striking 
contrast to that of the Air Ministry, which, following the policy adopted by 
Whitehall during the Embla attacks, had remarked only that the ‘Incident 
[was] regrettable but cannot be clearly identified and such accidents [were] 
inevitable during intense operations’.
779
The inflexibility of the Air Ministry on this occasion further highlights the 
invaluable role played by SHAEF as both a facilitator of humanitarian activities 
and a moderating liaison between the ICRC, the War Office and the Chiefs of 
Staff – all of which received regular and detailed reports on the results of the 
Committee’s successful relief missions.
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than the Allied governments to the efforts of the ICRC and the ARC during the invasion, 
Eisenhower kept himself abreast of the problem of protecting POWs and, although he advocated 
a swift conclusion to military operations as the best remedy for the problem, recommended to 
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Eisenhower Circular Memo, 29 March 1945; TNA:PRO WO 193/359 – Minutes of Chiefs Of Staff 
Committee Meeting, 24 April 1945.
779 TNA:PRO WO 219/242 – SHAEF to Air Ministry, 14 April 1945; SHAEF to Air Ministry, 29 April 
1945; SHAEF Report, 26 April 1945.
780 See generally TNA:PRO WO 193/345.The only real sore point in relations between SHAEF and the ICRC was the 
former’s refusal to allow the delegates access to the transit camps for German 
POWs – which were little more than cages or open-air barbed-wire enclosures 
– until the end of October 1944.
781 Aside from this problem, tellingly similar to 
that encountered by the ICRC in dealing with the OKW in 1940, the 
Committee found in SHAEF a willing partner that it had been unable to find in 
Whitehall for the duration of the war. The co-operation between the ICRC and 
the military, prompted by necessity during the final catastrophic weeks of the 
war, was, however, short-lived. What came after the dissolution of this co-
operation is highly symptomatic of the ICRC’s story during the Second World 
War.
POST-WAR: A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO?
As the war in Europe concluded the Allies and the ICRC both turned their 
attentions to the problem of how best to ensure that the liberated, POW and 
civilian alike, survived to enjoy their freedom. The solution to this problem 
was far from simple. In the wake of the conflict Europe was a shattered 
landscape, short of food and medical supplies and lacking infrastructure, 
flooded with the wounded, the homeless and the starving. These civilian 
refugees – close to 7 million in the summer of 1945 – constituted a dependent 
and transient category of war victim: Displaced Persons (DP). 
781 TNA:PRO FO 916/938 – SHAEF to Peake, 21 August 1944; WO to PWD, 30 October 1944; 
MacDonogh, After the Reich: From the Liberation of Vienna to the Berlin Airlift (London, 2007), 
p.1, pp.392-95. For description of the camps see Loringhoven, Bernd Freytag von and D'Alançon, 
François, In the Bunker with Hitler: The Last Witness Speaks (London, 2005), p.183-87. For general 
discussion on the Allied treatment of German POWs see Stephen E. Ambrose and Gunter Bischof, 
eds., Eisenhower and the German POWs: Facts Against Falsehood, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
Press, 1992.By July 1945 many of the DPs had found new homes, or at least temporary 
respite from their wanderings, in the newly established system of DP camps. 
The question of how to sustain them, plus the 7.8 million German POWs held 
by the Allies and the 12 million German expatriates, the Volksdeutsche, who 
were moving back into Germany from territories recovered by Poland, 
remained a problem to be solved.
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Despite its eminent qualifications for the task of co-ordinating relief efforts for 
these victims of war, the ICRC was left out of the Allies’ plans for post-war 
Europe. As a dynamic in specific British-ICRC wartime relations the relief 
operations during the first months of peace are a point of minor significance. 
What follows, therefore, is not an assessment of the details of the ICRC’s 
post-war humanitarian work, but more an illustration of what the British did 
and did not learn about the ICRC, and humanitarian operations in general, 
during the Second World War.
The ICRC and the British government both began their preparations for post-
war Europe early. The British, in fact, pre-empted the ICRC in this regard. In 
1940 Churchill, following his “victory before relief” policy, ordered the 
stockpiling of foodstuffs. Ironically this forward thinking was a product of
MEW’s blockade policy, which dictated that rather than shipping food into 
Europe during the war, stockpiles should be created for the eventual day of 
liberation. In 1941 the British stockpiling initiative was placed under the 
auspices of the newly created Inter-Allied Committee on Post War 
Requirements (IACPR), a branch of MEW headed by the Ministry’s Director 
General, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross.
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782 Giles MacDonogh, After The Reich, 392-392; Mark Wyman, DP: Europe’s Displaced Persons, 
1945-51 (London, 1989), pp.18-23.
783 Leith-Ross was in charge of diplomatic duties at the MEW prior to 1942 and was generally 
more of a moderate than Dalton and Lord Drogheda – Roger Middleton, ‘Ross, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross’ convivial demeanour, coupled with the fact that – unlike matters 
relating to blockade policy – the implementation of post-war relief plans were 
distant considerations, served to help build better co-operation between the 
IACPR and the ICRC than the latter had enjoyed with MEW’s blockade 
enforcers.
In July 1942, for example, Burckhardt and Leith-Ross worked together on a 
proposal for a new meat-wheatmeal compound biscuit to be distributed to 
calorie-starved civilians and POWs in the immediate post-war period. The less 
experimental measure of stockpiling goods in Geneva was received with 
cautious approval by the IACPR provided, of course, that the stockpiles did 
not move beyond Swiss borders prior to the rest of Europe’s liberation.
784 
Once this liberation had occurred these restrictions were relaxed and the 
British agreed to the ICRC shipping supplies out of Switzerland, provided that 
Whitehall was informed how much each country was getting in order to better 
manage the quota system MEW had developed for equitable post-war food 
allocation. So healthy was co-operation between the ICRC and the British on 
this issue, the Ministry of Food even went so far as to cut the Committee in on 
a deal it had brokered with Argentina for purchasing cheap foodstuffs.
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This type of co-operation on the part of the British was logical for a number of 
reasons, the first and most obvious being the change in conditions from war 
to peace. After 8 May MEW’s chief complaint throughout the war – the seizure 
William Leith (1887–1968)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 
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785 ICRC Report, vol.3, pp.376-377; TNA:PRO FO 371/51468 – Minutes of Interdepartmental 
meeting with ICRC delegation, 13 June 1945.of ICRC goods by the Germans and the threat of ICRC-Nazi collusion – was no 
longer an issue. Additionally, the permission granted the ICRC for distributing 
relief during the first weeks of peace was in keeping with Whitehall’s 
insistence throughout the war that humanitarian efforts could only be 
effectively undertaken once hostilities were brought to a close. The British, 
therefore, were as good as their word when it came to facilitating 
humanitarian operations once the war had ended. This did not mean, 
however, that they intended the ICRC should lead the relief effort. 
In 1943 the British and the Americans created the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA), a body designed to coordinate post-war relief 
operations for the benefit of 'nationals of the United Nations, stateless 
persons, and Italian nationals'. In 1944, UNRRA’s duties were extended to 
cover relief for all DPs throughout Europe, with the exception of the 
Volksdeutsche.
786  As the final stage of the war in Europe began SHAEF 
ordered UNRRA to begin forming two-hundred teams, each comprised of 
thirteen members tasked with following the Allied armies’ advance through 
Western Europe and dealing with any refugees they encountered along the 
way. It was at this point that UNRRA, having been activated, proved to be a 
flawed entity, unfit for the task for which it was designed.
For example, although there had been two years preparation for the relief 
operation, there were only eight UNRRA teams available by spring 1945.
787 
The co-ordination of these units with the Allied armies was also generally 
786 This term “United Nations” was coined by Roosevelt for the purpose of the Atlantic Charter 
and originally applied only to the Allied nations of the Second World War – George Woodbridge, 
UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 3 vols. (New 
York, 1950), hereafter UNRRA History, vol.2, p.508.
787 By June 1945 the number of teams had increased to 300, still 150 teams short of SHAEF’s 
requirements – TNA:PRO FO 371/51096 – Sub-Committee Report on UNRRA Activities, 5 July 
1945.poor, despite official agreements that were made between SHAEF and UNRRA 
in 1944.
788 Even UNRRA's official history concedes that 'the duties that UNRRA 
was supposed to perform were not set with precision or exactitude'.
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Within weeks of their activation the members of the UNRRA teams, mostly 
volunteers ranging from doctors to de-mobilised air raid wardens, also gained 
a reputation for being ‘not entirely effective’, ‘more concerned with their own 
personal interests than with doing their respective jobs’ and in general being 
unprepared for the mammoth tasks of their office.
790 The efficiency of these 
teams also suffered from a lack of transport and supplies, which led to them 
being overly-reliant first on SHAEF and then, after the creation of the Allied 
zones of occupation in July, the various occupation forces.
791 
Despite the bad reputation it earned for its sluggish start, UNRRA continued to 
receive support from Britain and the United States, which together pumped 
$10 billion into the troubled organisation’s coffers between July 1945 and 
June 1947. Owing in no small part to this support UNRRA overcame its initial 
difficulties and came to play a pivotal role in averting epidemics of starvation 
and disease throughout Europe.
792 Nevertheless it is notable that UNRRA, an 
untested and initially unqualified entity, was placed in charge of the European 
relief effort by the Allies when the more established and more experienced 
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Austria to the Baltic port of Flensburg, from the Harz Mountains in central Germany to the 
western borders of the Rhineland – Stafford, Endgame, p.487.
792 For an overview of UNRRA’s successes beyond its official history see Wyman, DP, pp.46-52.ICRC was willing and able to assist. In effect, UNRRA found itself in 1945 in a 
similarly unprepared situation to that in which the ICRC had been in 1940.
Once UNRRA failures became apparent Whitehall’s recourse was not to the 
ICRC but to the BRC whose delegates, it was suggested, could provide 
excellent replacements for UNRRA’s struggling volunteers.
793 This suggestion 
was a continuation of an earlier rebuff to the Committee by the Allies. Prior to 
D-Day Geneva was deliberately excluded when the Allied governments 
decided to recognise only the BRC and the ARC – incorrectly deemed to be 
‘quasi military organisations’ – as suitable to conduct humanitarian operations 
in the wake of the Allies’ advance.
794 Despite the Committee’s good working 
relationship with SHAEF during the war’s final months, the suggestion that the 
BRC assist UNRRA indicates that the ICRC had done little to earn the respect 
and trust of the Allied authorities as a competent operator in the field. Before 
examining the reasons why the Committee was slighted in this manner, it is 
important to first establish where the ICRC saw itself in relation to UNRRA.
Owing to its wartime experiences and its generally co-operative relations with 
the IACPR, the Committee believed that it would have a crucial, if not the 
crucial, role in the post-war relief effort. This intention was made clear to the 
belligerents in April 1945 when Max Huber released a circular memorandum 
stating that:
as long as there are prisoners of war and occupied territories there will be 
circumstances in which an institution independent of both victors and 
vanquished, acting only for humanitarian purposes and hampered by no political 
ties, can be of service. Moreover, the Committee’s wealth of experience and 
793 TNA:PRO FO 371/51087 – FO Minutes, 12 April 1945.
794 TNA:PRO WO 219/33 – SHAEF to WO, 25 March 1944; Combined Civil Affairs Committee 
Memo, 12 May 1944.network of delegations render it capable of performing useful work in the 
difficult transition period following the end of hostilities.
795
This declaration was not a hollow one. As the previous chapters have shown, 
and as the ICRC’s official historian points out, at the close of hostilities the 
Committee was, owing to its war time expansion, the ‘largest non-
governmental body for distributing relief’ in Europe.
796 Furthermore, the 
ICRC’s growing penchant for innovation, the recent success of its collaboration 
with SHAEF and the field experience of delegates like Roland Marti and Marcel 
Junod placed it in the unique position of being both immediately on the 
ground and, owing to the stockpiles in Switzerland, ready to help co-ordinate 
the management of the inevitable refugee crisis. Yet, from the very beginning 
of UNRRA’s operations, the ICRC was pushed into the role of junior partner – 
an outcome that brought an understandable degree of annoyance in Geneva.
In discussing the ICRC’s relationship with UNRRA the Committee’s official 
historian is, typically, less than forthcoming on details. Durand’s choice of 
words, however, is revealing enough. In addition to alluding to the ICRC as 
being overseer of all other relief agencies, Durand downplayed the role of 
UNRRA as an organisation that merely ‘gave considerable help’ to the ICRC. 
This statement rings true, but only from a certain perspective.
Owing to UNRRA’s mandate to provide relief only for non-ethnic German DPs, 
the ICRC was left as the primary provider of relief for German POWs the 
Volksdeutsche – a thankless task which, owing to global anti-German 
sentiment, did little for the ICRC's reputation.
797 Despite the criticisms it 
795 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.634-35 citing Max Huber memorandum, undated April 
1945. 
796 Ibid, p.637.
797 Catherine Rey-Schyrr, De Yalta à Dien Bien Phu: Histoire du Comité International de la Croix-
Rouge 1945-1955 (Geneva, 2007), p.138, 178-180; François Bugnion, 'From the End of the Second endured, the ICRC's assignment was a crucial one, particularly for those 
ethnic Germans the Committee helped. However, if one considers the ICRC’s 
ambitious posture during the war’s later years, Durand’s language, Huber’s 
hopeful proclamation in April 1945 and the delegate Nicholas Burckhardt’s 
mocking recollection of UNRRA standing for 'You Never Really Relieved 
Anybody', it seems likely that the ICRC was expecting to be charged with the 
greater duty of co-ordinating relief for all of Europe.
798 This, however, was 
never on the Allies’ agenda.
Although detailed plans were drawn up by the Allied leadership in 1944 for 
post-war co-operation between SHAEF and UNRRA, as well as an agreement 
for the latter to act as ‘co-ordinating authority’ for Red Cross Societies and the 
YMCA in distributing relief, no official plans were drawn up for ICRC-UNRRA 
co-operation.
799
This is evident from the War Office’s reaction to a query from the ICRC to set 
up a new office in Berlin on 11 May 1945. Although he had no objection, 
Colonel N.M. Hammer stressed that any ICRC operations in Germany had to 
be conducted under the auspices of UNRRA, which would also act as the 
conduit for correspondence between the Committee and SHAEF. Notably, 
Hammer stated that UNRRA’s charter made ‘special provision for co-operation 
with the IRC’.
800 In fact, that charter only stated that UNRRA was authorised 
World War to the Dawn of the Third Millennium: the Activities of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross during the Cold War and its Aftermath: 1945-1995', International Review of the 
Red Cross, no.305 (1995) 207-224, p.208.
798 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.505 citing interview with Nicholas Burckhardt, July 1995.
799 For SHAEF/UNRRA co-operation without mention of ICRC see generally TNA:PRO WO 
219/3612; TNA:PRO FO 371/51081 – SHAEF to AGWAR, 11 January 1945.
800 TNA:PRO FO 371/51089 – FO to WO, 11 May 1945.to ‘designate or create agencies and to review the activities of agencies as 
created’.
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This scant reference to co-operation placed the ICRC in the same grouping as 
the YMCA, the Quakers and the World Council of Churches – well-meaning, 
yet amateur relief bodies that were to act more as UNRRA’s agents than 
partners. The only notable instance in which the ICRC was seriously 
considered in UNRRA’s plans was in the relief scheme for Romania, which – at 
the ICRC’s request – was conducted by Geneva with assistance from UNRRA.
802 This arrangement, however, was the exception, not the rule. Not only were 
the Committee’s delegates snubbed as possible replacements for UNRRA 
workers, but at least one official from the Ministry of Food thought that ‘the 
work of the International Red Cross will now tend to shrink’, owing to 
UNRRA’s presence.
803 For all its wartime development the ICRC of the post-
war period was still generally regarded in British eyes as amateur.
There is much in the previous chapters to support this argument. Indeed, the 
British tendency to limit the ICRC’s scope during the war can be best 
described as habitual. As much as this attitude provides some explanation for 
post-war British dismissal of the ICRC in favour of UNRRA, there was another, 
more political reason, for the Committee’s downgrading. This was Moscow’s 
clear repugnance and distrust for all things Swiss. This distrust was made 
evident when the Soviets shut down the ICRC’s offices in Berlin in June 1945 
and interned the delegation in Russia for several months.
804
801 Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (Washington, 1943), 
hereafter UNRRA Charter 1943, Article 1.1.
802 TNA:PRO FO 371/51082 – Series of Telegrams proposing ICRC/UNRRA Operations in Romania, 
4 December 1944.
803 TNA:PRO FO 371/52648 – Ministry of Food to MEW, 29 May 1945.
804 ICRC Report, vol.1, p.436.The Soviet view not only influenced Whitehall’s attitude to the ICRC’s role in 
the post-war period, but it was also a primary reason for the Allies keeping 
faith with UNRRA despite its initial failures. When considering post-war relief 
plans, for example, the Foreign Office was concerned that the relative 
freedom granted ‘a multifarious collection of Red Cross and other Societies 
running about Germany’ would upset the Soviets. Accordingly, UNRRA’s 
appointment as chief co-ordinating body was a means of placating Moscow by 
placing the ‘voluntary societies’ such as the ICRC and the YMCA under a 
greater degree of Allied control.
805 
This idea of controlling the ICRC to placate the Russians was also carried to 
the San Francisco Conference in April 1945, at which the United Nations 
charter was discussed and ratified. Prior to the conference the Foreign Office 
refused a proposal from the BRC for the ICRC to be recognised by name in the 
UN Charter for the purposes of having its position ‘safeguarded’ by the United 
Nations. The BRC’s concern stemmed from the belief that the ICRC’s neutral 
status was still not properly understood by the belligerents, an accusation that 
was backed up by an incident that occurred in the first weeks of peace when 
an ICRC delegate in Paris was accused of being a collaborator for providing 
relief parcels to German POWs.
Considering that such ignorance of the ICRC’s position had been displayed by 
not only the French, but also the Germans, British and the Americans 
throughout the war, the request for a clause in the Charter pledging 
signatories ‘to respect the independent and voluntary character of the Red 
805 The Soviet Union held a position on UNRRA’s Central Committee along with Britain, China, 
Canada and the United States – UNRRA Charter 1943, Article 3.3; TNA:PRO FO 371/51081 – FO 
Minutes, 20 January 1945; SHAEF To AGWAR, 1 January 1945.Cross organisation of all nations’ was reasonable.
806 The Foreign Office, 
however, thought such measures unnecessary. Citing the harsh reality of 
Soviet disapproval of the Swiss, the Foreign Office declared that mention of 
the ICRC at the conference would be a distraction to the participants' efforts 
to keep such a politically weighty meeting ‘on the rails’.
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Although ostensibly this attitude towards the ICRC was for Moscow’s benefit, 
it is unlikely that the British were entirely reluctant to oblige the Russian’s 
prejudices. The only notable deviation of this policy was provided by P.S. 
Falla, a PWD staffer. In rejecting the ICRC’s wishes his concern was not to 
placate the Russians, but to make sure that the Committee’s neutrality was 
not compromised by having the organisation attached to the UN, which Falla 
astutely noted would ‘either be discredited or at all events be deemed to 
“belong to” or side with one or other of the belligerents in any future conflicts.
808 This idea of protecting the ICRC’s neutrality was the exception, however, 
not the rule.
As had been the case for most of the war, the British intended to manage the 
ICRC in the post-war period by allowing it only to perform functions that 
Whitehall thought acceptable. The Committee may have been the primary 
relief agency for German POWs and the Volksdeutsche, but it was not until 
October 1945 that the British drew up an agreement with the ICRC for relief 
action in the former's zone of occupation. In the interim, the Committee’s 
delegates continued the established practice of the war’s final weeks by 
brokering unofficial deals for relief with local military commanders.
809
806 TNA:PRO FO 371/50856 – BRC to Viscount Cranbourne, 13 April 1945.
807 TNA:PRO FO 371/50856 – FO to Dominions Office, 20 April 1945.
808 Ibid. – P.S. Falla to Gore-Booth, 12 May 1945. 
809 ICRC Report, vol.2, pp.427-28.A similarly restrictive approach was taken by the British to the ICRC’s 
promotion in June to the role of Protecting Power for German interests. This 
situation had developed from a combination of the Swiss Federal Council no 
longer recognising the German government and the Allies’ dubious 
classification of German POWs under the newly-created category of war 
prisoner, Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEPs).
810 The statelessness of the 
SEPs meant that they were without a Protecting Power, a role for which the 
ICRC, having had a taste of intermediary work during the conflict, was quick 
to volunteer. In an indication that British war-time objections to such actions 
by Geneva were based on the assumption that Red Cross mediation might 
lead to peace overtures, Whitehall now saw no objection to the Committee’s 
proposal. However, this permission was qualified by an emphasis in the DPW’s 
official authorisation that the ICRC must be joined in this duty by the YMCA 
and that the former should under no circumstances be ‘promoted to the 
status of diplomatic intermediary’.
811
These incidents indicate that, on the subject of the ICRC’s traditional sphere 
of humanitarian relief work and its more progressive pursuit of an 
intermediary role, the British continued their policy of restriction into the post-
war period. As much as this policy was a continuation of wartime practice, the 
problem of Soviet relations with the West was also a factor in the furtherance 
of the British viewpoint. The creation and promotion of UNRRA over the ICRC 
was an action that was in accordance with both Russian and British 
810 This was a classification that stripped German and Japanese prisoners of the right to the 
protection of the 1929 Geneva Convention. Restrictions were placed on the belligerent’s ability 
to ‘transform’ the status of such POWs in this fashion in Article 5 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, 
yet still there is a similarity in status between SEPs and inmates presently held at Guantanamo 
Bay – Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva, 1949) Article 5; Durand, 
Sarajevo to Hiroshima, p.643.
811 TNA:PRO FO 916/219 – FO Minutes, 23 May 1945; Minutes of DPW Meeting, 16 June 1945.reservations over the ICRC. Although, ultimately, the politics of the early Cold 
War proved decisive in shaping Whitehall’s actions, its reservations over the 
Committee were unjustified for a number of reasons.
In addition to the myriad examples of ICRC competence throughout the war, 
the threat of collusion between the Committee and Berlin had been removed 
and with it, in theory, any fears of ICRC misconduct. This, plus the fact that 
collaboration between the Committee and SHAEF during the wars’ final weeks 
was both successful and, by May 1945, well established, should have helped 
to open the way to a more influential role for the ICRC in the post-war relief 
effort. That it did not is yet further evidence that, despite all that the British 
and their Allies experienced of the ICRC during the war, little was learned of 
the philanthropists from Geneva.CONCLUSION
THE ENDS AND THE MEANS
Wartime relations between the International Committee of the Red Cross and 
the British government were characterised by two main issues: conflicting 
aims and British mistrust. The ICRC’s objective was to provide impartial 
humanitarian assistance to all victims of war, civilian and POW, Axis and Allies 
and it ran counter to Whitehall’s twin aims of pursuing “total war” through the 
means of blockade and safeguarding the welfare of British POWs above all 
other prisoners. Contributing to Whitehall’s stance was its mistrust of the 
ICRC which was, in the main, due to its misinterpretation of the status, duties 
and character of the Committee.
Looking at these two issues at face value it is logical to conclude that British-
ICRC wartime relations were inevitably doomed to fail. To accept this 
conclusion, however, is to reject the existence of the opportunities both sides 
had throughout the war to temper these differences and, in the process, 
improve their relationship.
Over the winter of 1940-41 the issue of POW relief and blockade concessions 
presented an opportunity that, if grasped, may have led to more cohesion in 
British-ICRC relations. At that time the ICRC, the BRC and the British 
government were all under fire for their apparent negligence in handling the 
POW crisis. The government, under pressure from both public and parliament, 
chose to shift the blame for this neglect onto the BRC and, through them, the 
ICRC. This course of action contributed to the already troubled relations 
between the three parties and, as a consequence, they struggled throughout 
the early months of 1941 even to maintain clear lines of communication with each other. The result was an exacerbation of both the POW crisis and the 
publicity furore it engendered.
What was missed at this time was an opportunity for the ICRC, the BRC and 
Whitehall to form a united front against their detractors. Had this occurred the 
foundation would then have been laid for better relations in the immediate 
future. Furthermore, as these relations would have been built on the mutual 
interest of POW welfare, the British would have been forced to better 
understand the Committee's duties in regards to POWs.
Sadly, the difficulties encountered by the ICRC over the course of 1940 
confirmed the suspicions of many in Whitehall that, despite its best intentions, 
the Committee was ill-equipped to conduct its duties and the opportunity was 
lost. The substance of Lucie Odier and Marcel Junod's meetings with the 
British in April 1941 – at which the ICRC delegates proposed blockade 
relaxations for the benefit of non-British POWs and internees – also affirmed 
British concerns over the Committee's apparent fixation with French victims of 
war. Had the British and the ICRC been drawn closer together during the 
tumult of late 1940 Whitehall might have better appreciated that the ICRC's 
work was, by its nature, impartial and that effort on behalf of non-British 
POWs was by no means a threat to British interests.
The extent to which this truth would have been welcomed by Whitehall is 
debatable – the British were not the first, and will not be the last, belligerent 
government to put the interests of its own POWs above all others. At the very 
least, however, a closer relationship with Geneva during the POW crisis may 
have helped the British realise that, in order to help British POWs, the ICRC's 
services to other prisoners would have to be improved. This lesson was not learned by the British who were still, even in the final months of the war, 
imposing a “British POWs first” policy on their American allies.
To its credit the ICRC tried in 1940, but ultimately failed, to convince 
Whitehall that impartial POW relief was both in the spirit of the Geneva 
Convention and beneficial for British POWs. A degree of fault for this failure 
lay with both sides. The problem in the ICRC's case was that too much 
reliance was placed – particularly by Lucie Odier – on passion rather than 
pragmatism when conveying arguments to the British. Odier's admirable, yet 
naïve, views of the role of humanity in warfare were rejected by Whitehall, 
which at the time was struggling not only with the threat of a German 
invasion, but, also with a barrage of criticism over the handling of its policy 
concerning British POWs. In such circumstances British selfishness was 
understandable.
The utopian nature of Odier’s proposals in the matter of blockade was 
particularly damaging to British-ICRC relations. Whitehall's reliance on 
blockade as a means of conducting “total war” was both justified by the 
military situation and legal under the laws of war. Accordingly, the ICRC had 
little grounds for protesting against the blockade from the point of view of 
either an impassioned humanitarian organisation or as the guardian of IHL. At 
this point the ICRC committed a cardinal error in its relations with the British: 
it failed to appreciate the importance Whitehall placed on the blockade. That 
is at least until Carl Burckhardt intervened in the matter in December 1940.
Carl Burckhardt's role in British-ICRC relations was a double-edged sword. His 
charm, intelligence and grasp of realpolitik set Burckhardt apart from his 
contemporaries in Geneva, yet it also raised suspicions in Britain over his 
motives and neutrality. Burckhardt's pre-war experiences with officials from the Foreign Office proved invaluable to the ICRC in that it gave the Committee 
a familiar and credible face to present to Whitehall. However, Burckhardt's 
pre-war peace missions and friendship with Ernst von Weizsäcker, Wolfgang 
Krauel and British appeasement circles, meant that any credibility the ICRC 
gained from his presence was tainted with the stain of the appeaser. Because 
of his position as vice-president of the ICRC the Committee as a whole was 
affected by one man's dubious reputation.
The effect of this reputation on British-ICRC relations was apparent during the 
ICRC’s campaign in Greece in 1941-42. The British, already convinced of the 
ICRC's amateurism by Odier's efforts, were even more suspicious of the 
Committee’s intentions when Burckhardt began proposing ambitious relief 
plans that often involved assurances from Berlin. To Burckhardt's credit these 
schemes were shrewdly devised to appeal to British interests and address 
MEW's concern over the Committee's supervision capabilities, but there were 
two problems.
The first was that, despite the ICRC's reassurances, supplies were still being 
stolen by the occupation troops in Greece. This was a reality of occupation 
that could not be remedied then and is, even today, a plague on the ICRC's 
operations.
812 The second problem was that Odier's perceived amateurism and 
Burckhardt's prior relations with the Germans meant that no number of 
British-considerate plans from Geneva would have convinced Whitehall of the 
legitimacy of the ICRC's operations there.
Because the ICRC was not trusted in Greece the practical aspects of 
Burckhardt's expansion plans – the Joint Relief Commission, the White Ships 
812 Some of the more recent examples of the seizure of ICRC supplies and the kidnapping of ICRC 
staff have occurred in the Philippines, Chad and the Sudan. and, later, the Concentration Camp Parcel Scheme – served only to aggravate 
the Committee's detractors in Britain. Because of this frustration and mistrust 
MEW campaigned to weaken the ICRC’s role in Greece by placing the 
operation in the hands of the Swedish Red Cross. Reprehensible as it may 
seem, the British campaign against the ICRC was not totally malicious. 
The fact that MEW was willing to restructure the relief effort in Greece 
indicates that, in spite of all the hard-line talk of blockade enforcement, the 
influence of certain Foreign Office officials and increasing public scrutiny 
played a part in moderating the Ministry’s policy. The importance of the 
ICRC's campaign against the blockade must also be considered as a factor in 
MEW's final decision.
The relentlessness of the Committee’s appeals, and its willingness to try to 
work within MEW’s blockade framework, added yet another set of voices to 
those in America, the Foreign Office and in the public sphere, which advocated 
relief in Greece. The fact that the Committee already had delegates on the 
ground in the region – whether ineffective as supervisors or not – meant that 
the British decision to loosen the blockade regulations by despatching the 
Kurtulus in October 1941 was easier then it otherwise would have been.
In the aftermath of the Kurtulus mission the ICRC again misjudged – or 
simply ignored – the feeling in Whitehall, pushing ahead with yet more 
schemes for increased shipping and securing British permission to form the 
White Ships fleet. As was so often the case for the ICRC, this triumph was one 
step forward and two steps back. In the aftermath of the White Ships 
negotiations the ICRC pushed harder than ever for more concessions. These 
attempts by Geneva to further enhance its recent gains were seen by the British as evidence of the Committee's increasingly dangerous ambition and, 
rather than beating MEW into submission, they had the opposite effect.
Accordingly, by late 1942, MEW had formulated a policy that was also 
adopted, with only slightly less forcefulness, by other departments in 
Whitehall: the ICRC was to be ignored on blockade matters and directed 
solely towards maintaining the welfare of British POWs. Anything else was 
more trouble than it was worth to the British.
As much as Burckhardt and Odier's tactics influenced British opinion, the 
original source of the mistrust was the failure by Whitehall, in 1940, to accept 
that the scope of the ICRC's mission would always have to expand in response 
to the escalating conflict. Unable to get past this hurdle, all proposals from 
the ICRC – even the more sensibly constructed proposals of the war's middle 
years – were always going to encounter resistance from the British. The 
degree to which this lack of understanding impacted upon the lives of non-
British POWs and civilian victims of war cannot be established with certainty. 
What is clear, however, is that only after the ICRC had begun expanding its 
operations in mid 1942 did the Committee start to achieve real success.
It was at this point that a second opportunity to improve British-ICRC 
relations arose – the rise of Carl Burckhardt to shadow president of the ICRC. 
Carl Burckhardt's ascension to power in Geneva was an important facet of the 
Committee's wartime development and, if his subsequent actions in the 
Shackling Crisis and the Katyn Affair are considered, it becomes clear that 
Burckhardt viewed his diplomatic skills as crucial in influencing the 
development of British-ICRC relations. For all his good intentions, however, 
Burckhardt could not be unshackled in British eyes from his past. With the 
exception of his few supporters – David Kelly, Rab Butler, Walter Roberts and Duff Cooper
813 – by 1942 most British officials were firm in their assessment of 
Burckhardt as a bête noire. 
Aware of the negative British view Burckhardt still sought to better relations 
between the British and the ICRC. The purpose of Burckhardt's campaign was 
twofold: to earn a more favourable British view of his expansion plans – which 
he hoped would soon focus more on the role of the Committee in 
humanitarian diplomacy – and to rebuild and enhance his own personal 
reputation. It was a very good attempt and, had his past not been so well 
known to the British, there is every chance that Burckhardt would have 
succeeded in his aims.
Burckhardt's success in the Shackling Crisis should have restored some of 
Whitehall's lost confidence in both the ability of the ICRC and its troublesome 
vice-president. However, as this achievement was effected outside of the 
Committee's traditional mandate and with the use of German informants, 
Burckhardt's mediation was generally regarded as further evidence of the 
ICRC straying outside of its directive. The Committee's non-involvement in 
the Katyn Affair was of some help to the ICRC's reputation in Britain if only 
because the Committee was perceived to be interfering a little less than 
normal.
Owing to Whitehall's pre-existing views of Burckhardt his efforts were never 
going to repair British-ICRC relations. In this regard, the opportunity was 
missed by both sides. Had the British accepted Burckhardt's efforts without 
consideration of his peaceable activities – which had ceased by 1942
814 – then 
813 Cooper had pre-war contact with Burckhardt, who he found to be ‘one of the most interesting 
and charming men you could meet’ – TNA:PRO FO 371/21803 – Cooper to Halifax, 12 Aug 1938.
814 See ch.2, pp.132-33.British-ICRC relations may have improved. Conversely, had Burckhardt 
tempered his ambitions for developing ICRC “humanitarian diplomacy”, as 
well as his own desire to be a diplomat extraordinaire, then perhaps the 
Foreign Office would not have viewed him as so meddlesome. MEW staffers 
might also have not perceived the ICRC as 'manoeuvring with more than 
usual vigour for the position of central agency for civilian relief in Europe’.
815
The final opportunity both sides had to reach an understanding came in 1944-
45 when the Third Reich was collapsing around thousands of hungry, 
exhausted POWs and civilian internees. In these circumstances, the constant 
problem, faced by belligerents and the ICRC, of how to co-ordinate 
humanitarianism with military operations was always going to be a factor. The 
eventual co-operation between the ICRC and SHAEF was an example of how 
much more efficient the Committee could be with the help of military muscle. 
Unfortunately, even at the dawn of the 21st century the UN and the ICRC 
were still attempting to implement such an 'integrated approach' as policy in 
war zones.
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As useful as such co-operation was, no amount of planning by the ICRC could 
have stopped bombing attacks on Red Cross ships, civilians and POWs. What 
could have been averted sooner, however, was the catastrophe that befell the 
prisoners on the March over the winter of 1944-45.
Owing in no small part to its position on the ground in the occupied territories, 
the ICRC foresaw the breakdown of the Third Reich's transport and 
communications infrastructure in ways that the British and their Allies simply 
815 TNA:PRO FO 837/1214 – MEW to Co-Ordination Centre, Washington, 10 March 1943.
816 Jean-Daniel Tauxe, 'The ICRC and Civil-Military Co-operation in Situations of Armed Conflict – 2 
March 2000, ICRC Website, http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57JQBD?
OpenDocument (accessed 12 October 2009).were unable to conceive. If one considers the stark fact that the Allies had a 
war to win then this apparent neglect is understandable. What is difficult to 
comprehend, however, is the extent to which the British ignored the harsh 
lessons of the 1940 POW crisis and then, once made cognisant of the 
problems of 1944, still chose to obstruct the ICRC's plans to alleviate the 
situation.
It was primarily Colonel Harry Phillimore, out of all the British officials 
concerned with these matters, who fully grasped the problems besetting 
British POWs in 1944. His plans to bring relief and rescue to POWs indicates 
that some token measure of consideration was put forward in Whitehall. 
However, rather than co-ordinate with the ICRC on these matters during the 
invasion, the British deemed such schemes to be too difficult. As a result, the 
ICRC was very much left to cope alone during the early stages of the Allied 
invasion of Europe.
Had British and, through them, American collaboration with the ICRC been 
better established, then schemes such as parcel depots, new supply routes 
and increased Red Cross transport, would not still have been in the discussion 
phase as the POW crisis reached its zenith over the winter of 1944-45. All of 
these proposals were first made by Geneva in mid 1944 but fell on deaf ears 
in Whitehall. They stand as stark evidence of the breakdown in the British-
ICRC relationship. Years of poor relations, mistrust and a fair degree of 
mutual antipathy meant that at this crucial point in the conflict – from both 
military and humanitarian points of view – there was no common ground from 
which the primary humanitarian organisation in Europe and one of the major 
belligerent nations could work together.
 This failure in 1944 reflects the many troubling parts of British-ICRC wartime 
relations. The ICRC's plans were perhaps too ambitious, and the means by 
which they were communicated to the British were, often, either too flimsy or 
too dense with particulars to be well received. Conversely, British views of the 
Committee's capabilities were too harsh and Whitehall's views of the ICRC's 
intentions too judgemental.
There was a major difference between the two sides’ ability to acknowledge 
these problems and attempt to rectify them. The ICRC at least recognised the 
problems and tried to be more accommodating, mainly through Burckhardt’s 
intervention, but had admittedly mixed results. Across the Channel, with the 
exception of Walter Roberts and Harry Phillimore, few in Whitehall 
acknowledged that there was a problem in British-ICRC relations which 
needed addressing. 
In many ways this failure to recognise the extent of the problem was simply a 
continuance of Whitehall's long-held mantra that its armies could handle their 
own affairs when it came to humanitarianism in wartime. Accordingly, British 
relations with the ICRC only mattered when a crisis – often exacerbated by 
the poor state of those relations – ensued, such as in 1940 and 1944. In both 
these instances the British took too long to involve the ICRC in their plans 
and, once involved, were all too quick to cut the Committee off until the next 
time its services were urgently needed. British-ICRC relations, therefore, were 
in a constant state of disruption.
In the final assessment of the merits of the British and the ICRC and their 
relations in the Second World War, history sides with the ICRC. As disruptive 
as the Committee's activities may have appeared to the British at the time, its 
initiatives, championed by Burckhardt in particular, achieved something more long-lasting than wartime co-operation from Whitehall. They provided the 
practical basis for the ICRC's post-war development into the global 
humanitarian institution it is today.
At the start of the war in 1939 the ICRC's right to intervene, even in matters 
outlined in the Geneva Convention as its core duties, was made possible only 
by Berlin and Whitehall's agreement to the Committee’s reciprocal inspections 
of British and German POW camps. The right to mediate in POW affairs was 
not granted and the ICRC was to be consulted only if necessary and only to 
'take part' in discussions between the belligerents and the Protecting Power.
817 
These limitations were breached by the ICRC's wartime activities. 
Burckhardt's successful mediation in the Shackling Crisis went beyond the role 
prescribed for the ICRC in the Geneva Convention. This role was further 
transformed by Burckhardt and Roland Marti's unauthorised negotiations with 
the SS for the protection of concentration camp inmates and POWs in 1945. 
In addition to these actions, the practical implementation of plans such as the 
White Ships and the Concentration Camp Parcel Scheme, were also far 
beyond the scope of the ICRC's traditional mandate. So too was the 
designation in 1945 of the ICRC as Protecting Power for the interests of 
German POWs, who, devoid of a state in the first months of peace, were no 
longer entitled to such representation. In this capacity the ICRC expanded the 
sphere of its duties even further by providing legal assistance to POWs.
818  
Although falling short of the grandiose role the ICRC may have envisaged in 
the first months of peace, these activities clearly represented the next stage 
of the expansion that Burckhardt had spearheaded during the war years. In 
817 Geneva Convention 1929, Article 87.
818 Durand, Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp.645-46.pursuing this expansion during the conflict – against British wishes – the ICRC 
was executing an essential humanitarian response to the realities of total war. 
The Committee was also completing a process that had begun in 1921, when 
it first put forward the idea of a new convention for the protection of civilians.
819 
The ICRC's right to provide relief for civilians was accepted in 1923 and 
statues drafted to this effect at the Tokyo Conference in 1934. The outbreak 
of the war, however, meant that legal implementation during the conflict was 
still based on reciprocal agreement between the belligerents. After struggling 
with the lack of clarity on these issues throughout the war the notion of 
civilian protection and relief was top of the ICRC's agenda when it proposed a 
revision of the Geneva Convention – the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.
In this document the ICRC was granted a right that Burckhardt, in particular, 
sought to attain during the war: the right to intervene in any conflict, be it 
international or civil, where the ICRC felt its services were required.
820 
Although far from perfect in terms of enforcement, the substance of the new 
Geneva Convention was in many ways an acknowledgement of the difficulties 
the ICRC experienced in carrying out its duties during the war.
821 As much as 
these difficulties have been, quite rightly, blamed on the occupation practices 
of the Germans, the savagery of the Eastern Front and the bombing of civilian 
targets by both Axis and Allies powers, this thesis has highlighted a less 
noted, though significant, difficulty faced by the ICRC: the attitude of the 
British government.
819 Best, Humanity in Warfare, pp.232-33.
820 Geneva Convention 1949, Articles 3,10.
821 Beaumont, Joan, 'Protecting Prisoners of War: 1939-95' in Prisoners of War and their Captors 
in World War II eds. Fedorowich and Moore, pp.289-90.It is tempting to conclude that Whitehall's poor relations with the ICRC 
resulted in little more than obstruction of the latter's goals. If one considers, 
however, that the negative British attitude forced the ICRC to adopt new 
shipping procedures, more expansive relief plans and a more pragmatic view 
of humanitarian diplomacy, then it is more fitting to conclude that the 
problems presented by the British to the ICRC were, in the end, advantageous 
to the latter. The ICRC's wartime development was an example of difficult 
means leading to surprisingly beneficial ends.
For their part, the British ended the war with a view of the ICRC that was 
relatively unchanged from that which prevailed in 1939-40. Burckhardt was 
still viewed with suspicion; the ICRC's sphere of activities was restricted 
during the immediate post-war period; Huber's 1945 protest at the forced 
repatriation of the Volksdeutsche went unanswered; and at the 1949 Geneva 
Conference the British delegates – concerned that the ICRC would use the 
occasion to propose new regulations on the practice of blockade – adopted an 
attitude of 'high handedness'.
822 The British desire to maintain the status quo 
in its relations with the ICRC and, wherever possible, to ignore the 
Committee, was still firmly in place despite all that the two parties had 
experienced during the Second World War.
A final expression of the British attitude is best evidenced by Churchill's 
reaction in 1946 to a planned visit to Geneva during which the ICRC was to 
host a luncheon in his honour. Confused over the nature of his hosts, Churchill 
requested a 'brief history of the International Red Cross and also a few notes 
about the chief personnel of the Red Cross'.
823  For Britain's wartime leader it 
822 Moorehead, Dunant's Dream, p.553.
823 Churchill Archives, Cambridge: Churchill College, CHURCH 2/244 – Snow to Gilliat, 5 September 
1944.was as if the ICRC – the protector of British POWs and chief opponent of the 
Prime Minister's cherished tactic of blockade – had seldom entered his 
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